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Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Ken-
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
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The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal Education (UKjCLE) is an income-based office of
the University of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is separately budgeted and financially self-support-
ing. UKjCLE operations are similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all direct expenses, salaries and
overhead solely from revenues. No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget. Revenues are
obtained from registrant enroIlment fees, and the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide pro-
fessional development services. In the event surplus funds become available, they are utilized to offset
deficits or retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of services we provide.
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PART 1 - SIX CURRENT QUESTIONS
empower to avoid transfers must bring an action or proceeding to so 1 David G. Epstein,
..
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I. WHO CAN AVOID TRANSFERS?
Avoidance does not occur by operation of law. Rather, a person whom the Code
,.
t Steve H. Nickles, & James J. White, Bankruptcy section 6-2 (1992).
r A. Chapter 13
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A Chapter 13 trustee has the same powers to avoid a transfer as a Chapter 7 trustee.
Section 1303 gives the Chapter 13 debtor some of the trustee's powers. The trustee's powers
expressly given to a Chapter 13 debtor do not include the trustee's avoiding powers. Yet,
statements can be found in the legislative history that the purpose of section 1303 was simply
to set out "rights and powers that the debtor has exclusive of the trustee" without implying that
the "debtor does not also possess other powers concurrently with the trustee." 124 Congo
Rec. 32,409 (1978)(Rep. Edwards)(emphasis added).
Most of the early reported cases held that a Chapter 13 debtor is free to exercise the
various avoiding powers for the benefit of the estate. E.g., In re Pinkstaff, 121 B.R.596, 597
(Bankr. Ore. 1990); Matter of Ware, 99 B.R. 103,105 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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According to Judge Sigmund,
These early Code cases took a pragmatic view of the debtors standing,
Recognizing that the Chapter 13 trustee was unlikely to exercise the avoiding
powers for the debtor's benefit, the courts found the debtor's right, implicit in
the Code, notwithstanding the express grant of such powers only to trustees
(and the debtor-in-possession which is given the rights of a trustee by section
1107). This liberal reading of the statute is unlikely to prevail under more
recent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.
In re Compton, 1998 WL 372659, n. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). In Compton, the Chapter 13
debtors avoidance powers were limited to section 522(h) and involuntary transfers of exempt
property. See also, e.g., In re Smoot, 237 B.R. 675 (Bankr. Md. 1999); In re Reddift, 146
B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1992).
Is section 1107 helpful to understanding section 1303? Is it important that there is
either a debtor-in-possession or a trustee in a Chapter 11 case but both a debtor and a trustee
in a Chapter 13 case? Is important that section 1303 but not section 1107 uses the term
"exclusive"? See generally Morgan King & Jonathan Moss, Avoiding Tax Liens on Personal
Property in Bankruptcy: A Look at the Interplay Between the Bona Fide Purchaser Provisions
of the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes, 31 Calif West. L. Rev. 1,34 seq (11994).
B. Chapter 11
(1) Preconflrmation
There is express statutory authorization for a Chapter 11 trustee or debtor in possession
to bring an avoidance action, sections 1106, 1107. There is no express statutory authorization
for a creditors' committee to pursue an avoidance action. There is, however, ample case
authority: most reported cases have held that the authority exists (i) on a case by case basis,
(ii) when specifically approved by the court, and (iii) on a showing of good cause. E.g., In re
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Daley, 224 B.R. 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Jones, 37 B.R. 969 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1984).
Neither the Chapter 11 trustee nor the Chapter 11 debtor in possession is statutorily
authorized to transfer avoidance actions. In North Atlantic Milwork Corp. 155 B.R. 271
(Bankr. Mass. 1993), the court approved a section 363 sale of a chapter 11 debtors assets
including avoidance actions. The asset purchase agreement expressly authorized the buyer to
commence the avoidance actions for itself. When the purchaser brought avoidance actions, one
of the defendants successfully challenged its authority. After acknowledging that the sale
order approved the assignments, the court ruled that there was no statutory authority for
assigning avoidance actions other than section 11 23(b)(3)(B) which do not here apply. See
also In re S & D Foods, Inc., 110 B. R. 34, 36 (Bankr. Colo. 1990).
(2) Postconfirmation
According to section 11 23(b)(3)(B), the plan may provide for "retention and
enforcement by the debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for
such purpose of any ... claim or interest." (emphasis added) Courts have construed this
language as permitting a transfer of the avoiding powers to the person named in the plan. See
generally C. Wesley Vines & Vernon 0, Teofan, The Preservation and Prosecution of
.
Avoidance Actions Post-Confirmation, 12 Banrk. Dev.J. 735 (1996); see also Note,
Recovering Avoidable Transfers Under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code: Defining For the
"Benefit of the Estate", 72 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 591 (1996).
In applying section 1123(b)(3)(B), courts require a high level of plan specificity.
Matter ofHuntsville Small Engines, Inc., 228 B.R. 9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) seems to
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require that the plan "specifically and unequivocally" provide that the assignee of the claims is
a representative of the estate for the purpose of pursuing the claims. A "confirmation order
that merely approved the assignment by the debtor to South Trust of any avoidance claims that
the debtor held against Husqvarna" did not satisfy section 1123(b)(3)(B). But, cf In re
P.R.T.C., 177 F3d 774 (9th Cir. 1999), (holding that a Chapter 7 trustee could assignee
avoidance actions to largest creditor who agreed to pay 50% of any recovery to the estate). It
is helpful to look not only at section 11 23(a)(3) and the reported cases under that section but
also to other statutory provisions: section 1141 (b)("except as otherwise provided in the plan or
in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the
estate in the debtor") and section 550 ("the trustee may recover for the benefit of the estate the
property transferred") and section 541 (a)(3)("any interest in property that the trustee recovers
under section ... 550"). In In re Burlington Motor Holdings, Inc., 231 B.R. 874 (Bankr. Del.
1999), the court held that the requirements of section 550 were not satisfied by an assignment
of the claims where there was no requirement that all or even a part of the recovery be paid to
the estate. But, cf Blonder v. Cumberland Engineering, 84 Cal. Rptr.3d 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 4
1999) (dictum that section 550 requirement of "benefit of the estate" inapplicable to assignee's
avoidance of security interests because section 547 operates independently of section 550 in
avoidance of liens).
r
r
r
II. CAN THE VARIOUS AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS OPERATE INDEPENDENT
OF SECTION 550?
Sections 544, 545, 547 548, 549, and 553 expressly empower the trustee to "avoid."
A-4
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i None of these provisions use the word "recover." Section 550 uses the word "recover"and
r expressly refers to section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, and 553. Obviously, the avoidance powers
are linked to section 550. What is less obvious is whether the avoidance powers can operate
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independent of section 550.
This question can be of practical importance if: (1) A fully solvent Chapter 11 debtor
seeks to avoid a security interest or mortgage. The avoidance will not meet the section 550
requirement of benefit to the estate, or (2) An noninsider creditor receives a mortgage or
security interest on a guaranteed loan more than ninety days but less than a year before the
primary obligor files for bankruptcy. The 1994 Deprizio fix, section 550(c) simply provides
that the "the trustee may not recover under subsection (a)[of section 550] from a transferee that
is not an insider. "
The relatively few reported cases that have considered the general question are divided.
Compare In re Williams, 234 B.R. 801 (Bankr. Ore. 1999)(independent) with Weaver v.
Aquila Energy Marketing Corp., 196 B.R. 945, 954-55 (S.D. Tex. 1996)(dependent); see
generally 2 David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nickles, & James J. White, Bankruptcy section 6-79
(1992); John Clemency & John A. Harris, Recognizing the Separation Between Avoidance of
Interests Under Section 544(a) and Recovery Under Section 550, 16 American Bankruptcy
Institute Law Journal 20 (Nov. 1997); Margaret Howard, Avoiding Powers and the 1994
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 259, 267 (1995).
III. CAN A PREPETITION SECURITY INTEREST REACH AVOIDANCE
RECOVERIES?
There are reported cases allowing creditors with a blanket security interest to claim a
A-5
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lien upon whatever the estate recovered in an avoidance action. In re Enserv Co., 64 B.R. 519
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (levy by unsecured creditor was avoidable as a preference under
section 547; proceeds were encumbered by bank's sweeping security interest), affd, 813 F.2d
1230 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 98 B.R. 284 (Bankr. W.O. Mich.
1989) (where fully secured creditor was the only party prejudiced by preferential transfer, that
creditor would receive all proceeds of preference avoidance). See, generally, Note Avoidance
Recoveries in Bankruptcy For the Benefit ofthe Estate ofthe Secured Creditor?, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 1376 (1990).
A. Arguments Against
Under section 552(a), a prepetition floating security interest or lien does not extend to
property acquired by the debtor or by the estate after the commencement of the case. A
prepetition security interest cannot attach to a preference or fraudulent transfer action as such
because the right to bring such an action only arises postpetition. In re Vogel Van & Storage,
Inc., 210 B.R. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd 142 F.3d 571 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Tek-Aids Indus.,
Inc., 145 B.R. 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). From this principle, some courts have concluded
that the proceeds of a preference action cannot be subject to a prepetition security interest
because they flow from a postpetition chose in action and amount to property acquired by the
estate postpetition. In re Overland Park Merchandise Mart Partnership, L.P., 167 B.R. 647
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1994); In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc., 152 B.R. 431 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); see
Elliot D. Levin & Phyllis McGurk, Who Gets the Goodies: What Happens to the Enhancement
ofthe Secured Parties; Collateral Post-Petition?, 102 Com. L.J. 55 (1997).
A-6
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Second, some courts have suggested that, under sections 550 and 551, the benefits of
an avoidance action must go to the estate-Le., to general creditors-rather than to a secured
creditor. See In re Integrated Testing Products Corp., 69 B.R. 901 (D.N.I. 1987); Overland
Park Merchandise Mart Partnership, 167 B.R. at 647; see also In re Double IL Invs., Inc.,
No. 90-03877-H5-7, 1995 WL 736463, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1773 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1
995)(court chastised Chapter 7 trustee for bringing an avoidance action that benefitted only a
secured creditor).
B. Counter Arguments
First, there is a difference between the right"of recovery (Le., the estate's avoidance
chose in action) and the property that is actually recovered. It is entirely possible for a secured
creditor to have no rights in a cause of action as such and yet to have every right to assert a
security interest in what the estate receives. See In re Figearo, 79 B.R. 914 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1987).
For example, V.C.C. § 9-104(k) excludes tort claims from the scope of Article 9.
Nonetheless, if a tortfeasor has damaged or destroyed the collateral, and if the debtor recovers
from the wrongdoer, then the security interest attaches to whatever the tortfeasor must pay.
The tort recovery is proceeds of the collateral under V.C.C. § 9-306; In re Phoenix Marine
Corp., 20 B.R. 424 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
Whether a prepetition security interest attaches to the estate's avoidance action as such
is simply irrelevant. The prepetition security interest will attach to the recovery made under
the avoidance action if what is recovered may be identified as the prepetition collateral or the
proceeds of the collateral, just as a security interest will attach to tort recovery or insurance
A-7
ir
r
,.
f
,.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
,..
j
r
!
payments, provided that these are identifiable as payments made to replace the collateral. See
In re Antinarelli Enters, Inc., 107 B.R. 410 (D. Mass. 1989); Figaero, 79 B.R. at 914.
Second, the fact that sections 550 and 551 demand that any recovery must be for the
benefit of the estate in no way prevents a prepetition security interest from attaching to the
recovery. Expanding the secured creditor's collateral reduces the total amount of unsecured
claims. Moreover, recovery for the benefit of the estate encompasses recovery for secured as
well as unsecured creditors. E.g., In re Nowicki, 202 B.R. 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re
North Atlantic Millwork Corp., 155 B.R. 271 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
C. Resolution
A prepetition lien or security interest should attach to an avoidance recovery if, but
only if, what is recovered is clearly identifiable as the collateral itself or as the proceeds of
prepetition collateral, and if the creditor's security interest would be enforceable against the
transferee outside of bankruptcy. If what is recovered is not the collateral itself, look to section
9-306(4)(d) to see whether the recovery constitutes the identifiable proceeds of prepetition
collateral. If so, then, under the mandate of section 552(b), the recovery will be subject to the
security interest
IV. CAN THE AVOIDANCE POWER AVOID THE AVOIDANCE OF BEQUESTS?
A. Prepetition Disclaimers
Two circuits have held that a prepetition disclaimer is not subject to attack as a
fraudulent transfer (or, presumably, as a voidable preference) in the disclaimant's later
bankruptcy.. Matter ofSimpson, 36 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (debtor executed
valid disclaimer one day before filing bankruptcy petition; disclaimer was not subject to attack
A- 8
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as fraudulent transfer because, under Texas law, debtor would be deemed never to have held
any interest in the property); In re Atchison, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.) (same result applying
Illinois law), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991); accord Hoecker v. United Bank ofBoulder,
476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1973) (same result under the Bankruptcy Act applying Colorado
law); see Charles W. Wiley, Use ofDisclaimers in Gift Tax, Generation-Skipping Tax and
Income Tax Post-Mortem Planning, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 23 (1997). These courts have
reasoned that (i) under state law, the creditors of the debtor/disclaimant would have had no
right to reach the property or interest that was disclaimed, and (2) nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code gives creditors of the estate any greater rights than the debtor/disclaimant has.
At least two lower courts have reached a contrary conclusion, reasoning that the debtor
must have had an interest in the property to transfer when she executed her disclaimer;
otherwise, there would have been nothing to disclaim. In re Brajkovik, 151 B.R. 402 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1993) (applying Missouri law), rejected by Matter ofSimpson, 26 F.3d 450 (5th
Cir. 1994); In re Peery, 40 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
r, B. Postpetition Disclaimer by Debtor
r
r
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These prepetition disclaimer cases should be distinguished from attempts by a debtor to
disclaim a bequest, devise or inheritance postpetition. Under section 541 (a)(5)(A), a bequest,
devise or inheritance in which the debtor acquires an interest within 180 days of the filing of
the petition becomes the property of the estate. This statute overrides any state law right to
disclaim, and a postpetition disclaimer is subject to avoidance under section 549. See in re
Cornell, 95 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); Matter ofLewis, 45 B.R. 27 (Bankr. W.D.
A-9
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Mo. 1984); see also In re Detlefsen, 610 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that, under the
Bankruptcy Act, debtor could validly disclaim a bequest both prepetition and postpetition, and,
under state law relation back doctrine, debtor would be retreated as having never had any
interest in the property, but nothing that the result would be different for postpetition
disclaimers under section 541 (a)(5). Property that the debtor receives within 180 days of the
date of the petition as the result of a third party's death is clearly estate property. See In re
Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1997) (where debtor's wife died postpetition, life
insurance proceeds became part of the bankruptcy estate).
C. Postpetition Action by Testator
Although the debtor may not disclaim postpetition, there is nothing to prevent a testator
or testatrix from changing his or her will postpetition so as to effectively disinherit the debtor.
In In re McGuire, 209 B.R. 580 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997), the debtor's mother had altered her
will after the bankruptcy petition had been filed as to exclude the debtor-and hence the debtors
creditors-from any distribution of her property. The mother died shortly thereafter. The court
rejected arguments that the change in the will was invalid because of an overriding federal
bankruptcy policy, and that the mother's property designated for the debtor under the previous
will should pass to the bankruptcy estate under section 541 (a)(5). All that the debtor had when
the petition was filed was an unmatured expectancy under the previous will, and whatever
remote property interest this may have given the debtor, that interest was subordinate to the
mothers absolute state law right to leave her property to whomever she pleased.
V. CAN A TRUSTEE AVOID A PREPETITION LEASE TERMINATION?
Cases and commentators are divided as to whether a prepetition noncollusive
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termination of a commercial lease because of the debtor's default can be a transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property. Nancy C. Connery, Current Issues: Impact ofBankruptcy on
Commercial Leases, 427PLI/REAL 417 (1998),' Marvin GarfInkel, Lease Terminations,
Assignments, and Subleases as Fraudulent Conveyances, SA 81 ALIABA 425 (1996).
A. Transfer
The initial issue is whether a lease termination is a "transfer"for purposes of section
547 or section 548.. Some reported decisions have held that such noncollusive termination is a
"transfer," and hence the termination is subject to analysis as a constructively fraudulent
transfer (or, conceivably, a preference). In re Edward Harvey Co., 68 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D.
Mass 1987); In re Queen City Grain, Inc., 51 B.R. 722 (BanIa. S.D. Ohio 1985); see Robert
E. Goodman, Jr., Avoidance ofLease Termination as Fraudulent Transfers, 54 Bus. I-Aw 897
(1988). Other courts have held that a noncollusive termination of a lease is not a "transfer' at
all in the relevant sense, and hence such a transaction cannot be a preference or a fraudulent
transfer. In re Egyptian Bros. Donut, Inc., 190 B.R. 26 (BanIa. D.N.J. 1995),' In re Haines,
178 B.R. 471 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); see Matter ofJermoo's, Inc., 38 B.R. 197 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1984).
B. Interest of the Debtor in Property
Other courts have focused on the phrase "interest of the debtor in property have
concluded that lawful lease terminations are not subject to avoidance as preferences or
fraudulent transfers, even though these transactions are "transfers" in a strict sense. In re
Durso Supermarkets, Inc., 193 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1996); In re Metro Water&
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Coffee Servs., Inc., 157 B.R. 742 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1993). While the loss of a leasehold
estate means parting with an interest in property held by the prepetition debtor, such property
would not be available to creditors of the estate. Under section 365(c)(3), the bankruptcy
estate may not assume any executory contract or nonresidential lease that has been legitimately
terminated prepetition. In effect, the estate would never have had any interest in the lease. If
an "interest of the debtor in property" is synonymous with "property of the estate," then
noncollusive prepetition lease terminations cannot be preferential or fraudulent, not because
they are not "transfers," but rather because they do not involve a property interest of the
debtor (Le., the bankruptcy estate).
VI. IS SECTION 546 JURISDICTIONAL?
One court of appeals has held that section 546(a) is jurisdictional, so that, if an
avoidance claim is not brought within the time specified, a federal court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the action. In re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1078 (1988). Some lower court decisions support this view. In re Gardner, 218 B.
R. 338 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1998); Matter ofRailway Reorganization Estate, Inc., 133 B.R. 578
(Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Frascatore, 98 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Oro
import Co., 52 B.R. 357 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), revd on other grounds, 69 B.R. 6 (S.D.
Fla. 1986). This position has important consequences. If section 546(a) goes to subject matter
jurisdiction, then defects under that statute simply cannot be waived, and they may be raised
for the first time on appeal.
More courts, however,hold that section 546(a) is in the nature of statute of limitations,
and that it has nothing whatsoever to do with subject matter jurisdiction. In re Compuadd
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Corp., 137 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the 1994 amendment was intended to
clarify the original intent behind the statute); Matter ofTexas Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d .
1330 (5th Cir. 1995); In re M&L Bus. Machs., Inc., 153 B.R. 308(D. Colo. 1993); In re
Shape, Inc., 138 B.R. 334 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992); see also Smith v. Mark Twain Natl Bank,
805 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1986) (construing section 549(d), which is very similar to section
546(a), as having "nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the United States federal courts. "); In
re Day, 82 B.R. 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (criticizing Sixth Circuit's holding in Butcher),
affd, 102 B.R. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Again, if section 546(a) is not jurisdictional, then its
provisions may be waived. See In re Klayman, 1999 WIL 21446 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not specifically address whether Section
546(a) is jurisdictional or merely a statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit, in
examining the 1994 legislative history, concluded that, at least implicitly, Congress meant to
confirm that section 546(a) is a waivable statue of limitations and not a jurisdictional statute of
repose. In re Pugh, 158 F.3d 530 (11th Cir. 1998).
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PART 2 - SIX OTHER RECENT CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
1 In re Dak Industries, Inc., 170 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)(preference/insolvency)
2. In re Thompson Boat Co., 173 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1999)(547(c)(2»(unpublished
opinion)
3 Matter ofMicro Innovations Corp., 185 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 1999)(547(c)(4»
r
r
4.
5.
Nelson v. Scala, 192 F.3d 32 (9th Cir. 1999)(522(t)
Matter ofGasmark lid., 1999 WL 824574 (5th Cir. 1999)
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6. In re Larbar, 177 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 1999)(setoff/mutuality)
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Vern Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 Vand. L.
Rev. 713 (1985)
Shalom Kohn, Recoupment Re-Examined, 73 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 353
(1999)
Douglas Michael, The Past and Future ofKentucky's Fraudulent Transfer and
Preference Law, 86 Ky. L.J. 937 (1997-98)
Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f):
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Carolina L. Rev. 1165 (1995)
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State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law
Kenneth N. Klee
James O. Johnston
Eric Winston'
1. INTRODUCfION
Bankruptcy is the principal device by which failing businesses and financially-troubled families get one last
chance to reorganize their affairs back to financial health. It is also the graveyard for business failures, the place
where we bury dead corporations and divide their remaining assets among their surviving creditors.
In the last decade, the bankruptcy system has given seven million middle-class families a way to start
over-an opportunity to save their homes from foreclosure, rid themselves of overwhelming debts, and reintegrate
themselves into the workforce as productive citizens. It has also been the way that 10,000 corporations have
restructured their way from failure to health, avoiding the disruptive costs of dissolution and liquidation and instead
preserving jobs, stabilizing community tax bases, and fueling the longest period of economic expansion in United
States history. Another 100,000 less fortunate corporations have had their funerals in bankruptcy, as their creditors
have divided their assets and facilitated the redistribution of capital and labor resources that must accompany
liquidation.
Bankruptcy is the safety valve in America's capitalist system: technical and arcane, but so important. For the
last 100 years, bankruptcy has functioned efficiently, proViding a vital lubricant at the rough edges of the American
economy. We do not expect individuals to live life without hope and force them into the underground economy to
avoid a mountain of debt. Nor do we discourage entrepreneurs from starting new ventures by holding them
personally liable if that corporate venture fails. Instead, we give each individual and business person a fair chance to
start over. This second chance breeds innovation and risk taking that puts the United States at the cutting edge of
technological and scientific development.
When our corporations experience liquidity problems, we do not allow lenders to shut them down and
break them up. Rather, we permit sick businesses to file under chapter 11 to provide a breathing spell to rehabilitate
themselves; if rehabilitation cannot be accomplished, we provide a forum for liquidation of the businesses for the
collective good of all creditors.
At a time when the economies of Europe and Asia are moving toward an American-style bankruptcy
system, an ironic twist has taken place in the United States. In cases concerning gambling rights on Indian territory,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, and trademarks and the value of patents, the United States Supreme Court inadver-
tently has thrown the bankruptcy system into upheaval. As the shock wave of the cases reverberates, the bankruptcy
system threatens to shake apart at its core, at least in those cases in which a state is involved.!
The premise behind bankruptcy is that efficiency can be accomplished with aggressively enforced collective
action. All of a debtor's problems are dealt with in a single case in a single court. The rules of the court are clear, and
unless creditors agree otherwise, they will have rights determined according to a strict priority scheme-secured
creditors ahead of unsecured creditors, employees ahead of taxing authorities, and trustees ahead of creditors. If
there is any chance to save the business, all creditors will be forced to hold off in their collection actions, while they
have predetermined rights to shape (or even stop) the company's efforts to reorganize.2 Although unsecured
• Kenneth N. Klee is Acting Professor of Law, UCLA Law School and a partner at Klee, Tuchin & Bogdanoff, LLP; James O.
Johnston is a partner at Hennigan, Mercer & Bennett; Eric Winston is an associate at Stutman, Treister & Glatt, Pc. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the comments and criticisms on previous drafts of Michael Asimow, Daniel Bussel, Evan Caminker, Karen
Cordry, Jerry Kang, William Klein, Lynn LoPucki, Daniel Lowenstein, William Rubenstein, Kirk Stark, Richard Steinberg, Elizabeth
Warren, Stephen Yeazell' and Jonathan Zasloff, the excellent research assistance of John Schafer of the 1999 Class of UCLA Law
School, and the clerical assistance provided by Therese A. Barron, Tal Grietzer, and Michele Leibovitz. Generous funding was
provided by the UCLA Dean's Fund and UCLA Academic Senate.
1. The severity of this threat has not been the subject of an empirical study. However, the few reported decisions hint at the
magnitude of state abuse that occurs in numerous other cases. See, e.g., infra notes 147-55.
2. In a chapter 11 reorganization case, the automatic stay enjoins most creditors from commencing or continuing litigation or
other debt collection activities against the debtor or its property. See 11 U.S.c. § 362 (1994). Creditors may shape the reorganization
case by negotiating their treatment under a plan of reorganization. If a plan impairs creditors' rights, the affected creditors have the
right to vote to accept or reject the plan. See id. §§ 1124, 1129(a)(8). In order for a class of claims to accept the plan, 2/3 in dollar
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creditors often must be satisfied with only pennies on the dollar for what they are owed, they can draw comfort from
one fact: every other general unsecured creditor of the debtor is in exactly the same boat.
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided a case that ended that certainty as it applies to states and the involve-
ment of states in bankruptcy cases. Three years later, it is apparent that although some states are complying with
traditionally held notions of bankruptcy law, other states are defying bankruptcy law by seizing money or property
of a bankrupt business or individual. When bankrupt debtors try to sue states in bankruptcy court to remedy this
defiance, states rely on newly-minted Supreme Court jurisprudence to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense
to federal jurisdiction, rendering the federal bankruptcy courts powerless to act.3
Not only does self-help allow the states to get more than their fair share by jumping ahead of other creditors
without regard to statutory priorities, it also enables states to seize essential equipment or assets that can cripple the
ability of a business to reorganize. As one court noted:
Our national bankruptcy system, in which Congress intended debtors to retain the opportunity to reorganize
and to obtain a fresh start, may be in grave danger if the states cannot be bound by orders issued by the fed-
eral courts under bankruptcy law.4
This dire pronouncement, made by Bankruptcy Judge Tice of the Eastern District of Virginia, relates to the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, in which the Court stated that Congress has no authority to
abrogate a state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by enacting legislation pursuant to an exercise of the
powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution: Although the Seminole Tribe holding itself did not involve
bankruptcy law, the Court, in dictum,6 and nearly every court and commentator that subsequently have addressed
the issue/ interpreted the decision to render unconstitutional section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,s by which
Congress has attempted to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of bankruptcy cases. Abrogation
enables a· bankruptcy court to hold states accountable under the Supremacy Clause for compliance with the
Bankruptcy Code, including violation of the automatic stay or receipt of preferential or fraudulent transfers.9 In
many cases, states are creditors based on regulatory claims, such as permit and license fees and fines, tax claims,
student loans, unpaid alimony claims, small-business loans, and the like.1O The importance of the states' claims (and
thus the importance of abrogation) can vary from case to case, but in a particular case, states now may elect to act
aggressively to seize money or property postpetition in violation of the automatic stay or a discharge injunction. This
wrongful activity can advantage states with respect to other creditors, can imperil the viability of a business as a
going concern, and can undermine the discharge and the debtor's fresh start.
As a result of Seminole Tribe, some states have felt free to violate the myriad protections afforded to debtors
and creditors by the Bankruptcy Code and thereafter to assert the Eleventh Amendment to avoid the enforcement of
the federal statute by a bankruptcy court or, indeed, by any federal court at all. In so doing, such states have fulfilled
a prophecy made by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit more than a decade ago:
[If] the federal courts were not able to order a state to turn over assets to a bankruptcy estate, then any state
owed money by a debtor having financial problems would have a strong incentive to collect whatever funds it
believed to be due as rapidly as possible-even if this pushed the debtor into insolvency-rather than risking
the possibility of recovering only a portion of their debt in any subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. In effect,
we would be holding that the Constitution makes a state a preferred creditor in everybankruptcy. The very
existence of this power would doubtless encourage other creditors to accelerate their collections. The end re-
amount and a majority in number of those voting must vote to accept the plan. See id. § 1126(c). The plan may be confirmed
consensually if it is accepted by all impaired classes. See id. § 1129(a)(8). If an impaired class does not vote to accept the plan,
contested confirmation is possible but difficult to achieve. See id. § 1129(b). Creditors who oppose the plan or are antagoniStic
toward the debtor may seek to dismiss the bankruptcy case or convert it to a liquidation case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. See id. § 1112(b). Creditors also might seek to limit or condition the operation of the business or seek the appointment of a
trustee or examiner to exert control over the reorganization case. See id. §§ 1104, 1108.
3. Nor, apparently, maya debtor now sue states in state courts without their consent. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2246 (1999).
4. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
5. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71-72 (1996) (invalidating congressional legislation promulgated under the
Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
6. See id. at 72 n.16; see also id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
8. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a) (1994). Thus far, the cases have addressed the unconstitutionality of section 106(a) to the extent it
abrogates sovereign immunity to subject states to suits in federal courts. See, infra notes 102-11.
9. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v.
Mahem, 517 U.S. 1130, 1130 (1996); In re Shealy, 90 B.R. 176 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1988); In re Ellis, 66 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
10. "States play an important role in the bankruptcy process, appearing in many bankruptcy cases in a myriad of roles-as
priority tax creditor, secured creditor, unsecured creditor, police and regulatory authority, environmental creditor, landlord,
guarantor, bondholder, leaseholder, and equity interest holder." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'NBANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 20
YEARS900 (1997).
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sult would be an increase in bankruptcies and a distortion of the system of preferences that Congress has care-
fully crafted.11
Indeed, one bankruptcy court has concluded that, without the abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment provided by
section l06(a), "[t]he Bankruptcy Code would soon unravel and the Bankruptcy Clause [of Article I of the Constitu-
tion] would be rendered meaningless.,,12
But the Supreme Court has not rested with Seminole Tribe. Earlier this year, in three cases the Court
dramatically disrupted the balance of power between the states and the federal government.lJ In one, Alden v. Maine,
the Court held that the Constitution provided states with the right to assert common law sovereign immunity in state
court as a defense to suits brought to enforce rights conferred by Article I of the United States Constitution.14 In a
second case, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that
congressional legislation that authorized suits against states for patent infringement was unconstitutional.15 Last, the
Court's decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board overturned the
doctrine of "implied" or constructive waiver of sovereign immunity. iii Each of these cases concerns separate issues,
but together they represent a great shift in favor of states' rights. And with this shift comes a very real apprehension
of state abuse of federal rights in the bankruptcy context.
Although these fears might be exaggerated,17 congressional inability to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment and common law sovereign immunity can lead to and has resulted in troubling situations that are
antithetical to some of the core purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Consider the case of the Tri-City Turf Club, a horse
racing facility in Kentucky.1ll After Tri-City filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the state unilaterally revoked Tri-City's license to conduct live horse racing and intertrack
wagering.19 In doing so, the state violated the automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,lll which
Congress has deemed to be "one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws,,,21 and
deprived Tri-City of the ability to reorganize its business operations. Tri-City thereafter commenced an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court against the state to enjoin the state from violating the automatic stay.2! The
bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding, belieVing that "[t]he inescapable conclusion ... is that the
holding of Seminole Tribe clearly undermines the jurisdictional basis of this action against the defendant, Kentucky
Racing Commission, and the members of the Commission. The court simply lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
adversary proceeding."Z! Tri-City therefore was unable to enforce one of the Bankruptcy Code's "most fundamental
debtor protections" in the forum in which its bankruptcy case was pending.
11. McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 328 (7th Cir. 1987); see Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109-11 (1989) (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(agreeing with the analysis in McVey); Employment Dev. Dep't v. Joseph (In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 174 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1995)
(same).
12. Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Comm'n (In reJ.F.D. Enters.), 183 RR. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
Examples of the unraveling of the Bankruptcy Code are discussed infra notes 147-55.
13. See generally Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
14. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
15. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2202; see also infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
16. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228; see also infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
17. Some states appear to have obeyed the bankruptcy laws despite the availability of Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity to shield improper conduct. Perhaps this is due to enlightened self-interest on the part of government officials in the
executive branch who have reputational concerns and must be accountable for their actions to the electorate in a political arena.
Some government officials might have concluded that the failure of a state to obey federal bankruptcy law would provoke
preemptive actions by other creditors to encumber, attach, or seize the debtor's assets before bankruptcy. Indeed, if bankruptcy
relief becomes ineffective for debtors, they can be expected to resort to asset-backed securitization and other forms of financing ex
ante that will remove assets from the reach of the state. For example, a state has little recourse against a debtor that leases all assets
or has all valuable assets located offshore. Full development of these second-order effects is beyond the scope of this Article.
18. Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf Club), 203 B.R. 617 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996).
19. See id. at 618.
20. 11 U.S.c. § 362(a) (1994); see generally James O. Johnston, Jr., The Inequitable Machinations f Section 362(a)(3): Rethinking
Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Over Intangible Property Rights, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 690-96 (1992) (analyzing decisions regarding
governmental revocation of licenses and related rights). But see 11 U.s.c. § 362(b)(4) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 603,
112 Stat. 2681, 2886 (1998) (ambiguously exempting governmental police or regulatory power from section 362(a)(3».
21. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296.
22. See In re Tri-City Turf Club, 203 B.R. at 618.
23. [d. at 620. To the extent the court thought it was powerless to grant prospective injunctive relief, the opinion appears to be
erroneous. The court probably could have issued a prospective injunction against the responsible state official in accordance with
Ex parte Young. See infra Part IV.0.
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Consider also the case of Harry and June Mitchell, who filed chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and subsequently
received a discharge of more than $300,000 in back taxes owed to the State of California.x After the Bankruptcy
Court entered its discharge order, the state commenced assessment proceedings with respect to the discharged taxes,
and the Mitchells thereafter commenced an adversary proceeding in federal bankruptcy court to determine the
dischargeability of their tax debt and to recover damages based on the state's violation of the Bankruptcy Court's
discharge order.:5 The Bankruptcy Court, however, dismissed the Mitchells' complaint on the ground that the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity deprived the court of jurisdiction over the action, and the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel for the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed that determination.:!> As a consequence, the Mitchells were unable
to receive the full benefit of the fundamental "fresh start" otherwise accorded to them by the Bankruptcy Code.v
This Article explores policy concerns and legislative solutions to determine whether there is any escape from
the "inescapable conclusion" (in the words of the Tri-City court) seemingly demanded by Seminole Tribe and
exacerbated by Alden and its companion decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Eleventh Amendment, as
construed in Seminole Tribe, and common law sovereign immunity, as construed in Alden, render unconstitutional
section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to the extent Congress has purported to abrogate state sovereign immunity
and Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of suits against states in bankruptcy courts. Moreover, Alden has
the effect of denying the vindication of bankruptcy rights in state courts and federal courts alike. As a result, Seminole
Tribe and Alden have the effect of undermining a key purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws by altering the priorities
legislated by Congress to elevate states to preferred positions relative to other creditors.:18 The various mechanisms
that courts and commentators have proposed to circumvent or limit the effect of these decisions, as discussed below,
are of limited utility.29 Congress should consider enacting legislation that ameliorates the effects of Seminole Tribe and
Alden in order to level the playing field on which states and other creditors find themselves in bankruptcy cases.:I'
Without change, the system is likely to crumble or, at a minimum, produce vastly different and inequitable results in
cases in which states take an active role. One greedy governmental creditor can undo all the good for literally
millions of debtors, creditors, employees, and communities. The case law now shows us that the only way to stop it
is by congressional action-not by relying on clever arguments in court. Because we are dealing with a constitutional
proscription, congressional options are limited, but they are not nonexistent. Below, we consider fundamental policy
concerns and offer the best options available.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the history and nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity and the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity and concludes with an examination of Seminole Tribe, Alden, and the
states' newly enshrined constitutional sovereign immunity right. Part III examines the effect of constitutional
sovereign immunity on section l06(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and Part IV reviews the various arguments that courts
have considered regarding limitation of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context. Finally, Part V considers and
critiques legislation that Congress possibly could enact to neutralize constitutional sovereign immunity, which
include (a) reenactment of an analog to section 106(a) under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) creation of
an automatic prospective injunction against state officials with respect to bankruptcy matters; (c) authorization of
suits by the United States trustee or private rights of action by bankruptcy estates and their representatives on behalf
of the United States; (d) disallowance of state claims unless the state waives immunity; and (e) encouragement of a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity through the conditional receipt of federal funds.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SoVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Common-Law Sovereign Immunity and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity flows from the premise that the "King could do no
wrong,,,31 and in its most basic form operates such that "the sovereign cannot be sued in [its] own courts without [its]
24. See Mitchell v. Califomia Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877, 878-79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); see also 11 U.S.C §
727 (setting forth the discharge provisions).
25. See In re Mitchell, 222 B.R. at 878-79. The Mitchells did not seek prospective injunctive relief against a named state official.
See id. at 881 n.4.
26. See id. at 888.
27. Congress deemed the discharge to be "the heart of the fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law." H.R. REp. No. 95-
595, at 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.CCA.N. 5963, 6340.
28. For the law regarding priorities in bankruptcy cases, see 11 U.S.C § 507(a). For the numerous ways in which the federal
bankruptcy laws apply to the states and other creditors, see, for example, infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. Readers who
are unfamiliar with bankruptcy law concepts like priorities are referred to GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FuNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPI'CY
LAW (4th ed. Supp. 1998).
29. See infra Part III.A-B.
30. See infra Part IV.A-E.
31. Vicki C Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1,76 (1988); Louis
1. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. 1. REv. 1,4(1963).
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consent."J1 Before Alden, however, such cornmon law sovereign immunity was not thought to be constitutionally
guaranteed.33 As a result, until Seminole Tribe it appeared that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution enabled
Congress unilaterally to waive or abrogate common law sovereign immunity for several purposes, including
enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code.34 Although Congress has power to waive federal sovereign immunity,;!; it is
less clear whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity to subject a state to suit without its
consent in federal or state courts.);
Noting that the Constitution in its original form did not refer to or purport to preserve state sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court held in the 1793 decision of Chisholm v. GeorgiaJl that the federal courts had jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution to hear and determine actions by citizens of one state against another state as a
sovereign entity.:l! The four judges who concurred in the Chisholm decision each wrote a separate opinion, but the
common thread binding their judgments was the theory that Article III of the Constitution "evidenced the states'
surrender of sovereign immunity as to those provisions extending jurisdiction over suits to which States were
parties.,,:JJ The Chisholm decision, however, apparently produced such a great "shock of surprise" that the Eleventh
Amendment was proposed quickly and was ratified in about two years.4l)
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[tjhe Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.,,4\ Under the Amendment, therefore, federal courts lack
jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting states.42
By its plain language, the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to suits against a state by its own citizens43
or, arguably, to suits based on federal-question jurisdiction (as opposed to diversity jurisdiction).44 Indeed, perhaps
because there was no general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts at the time,45 the Supreme Court
initially interpreted the Eleventh Amendment narrowly, holding that its protection applied solely to actions based on
diversity jurisdiction.46
However, in the 1880s, the Court implied that under the Eleventh Amendment, a state could not be sued
under federal question jurisdiction by a citizen of another state.47 Then, in its 1890 decision of Hans v. Louisiana, the
Court broadened the scope of the Eleventh Amendment by holding that its protections applied to cases based on
federal question jurisdiction filed by a citizen against the citizen's own state.411 In effect, Hans went beyond the
language of the text and appeared to elevate the doctrine of common law sovereign immunity to constitutional status
through the Eleventh Amendment.4'J
32. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868); Jaffe, supra note 34, at 1. The concept of sovereign immunity in American
jurisprudence is taken from the law in England that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts. See Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999). By comparison, a voluntary grant of immunity by one sovereign to another sovereign in the first
sovereign's courts is considered a form of comity. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979).
33. See Patricia 1. Barsalou, Defining the Limits of Federal Court Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Court, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
575, 580-81 (1997).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (dealing with congressional waiver of federal
sovereign immunity).
35. See id.
36. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
37. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
38. See Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule ofLaw: Aspiring to a Highest-Ranked View of the Eleventh Amendment, 1
GEO. MASONINDEP. 1. REV. 1,8-9 (1992).
39. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999). Two of the four Chisholm judges argued a more extreme position-that state
sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty established by the Constitution. See id. at 2249-50
(citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454-58, 470-72).
40. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
41. U.s. CONST. amend. XI.
42. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
119-20 (1984); McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 769 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67-68 (1996).
44. See id. at 110-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In precisely tracking the language in Article III providing for citizen-state
diversity jurisdiction, the text of the Amendment does, after all, suggest to common sense that only the Diversity Clauses are being
addressed.").
45. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (adopting, for the first time, federal-question jurisdiction in 1875).
46. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. 1. REV. 1889, 1968 (1983) ("The Marshall and Taney Courts read the eleventh amendment in
the narrowest possible way and in no instance applied it to cases other than those in which federal jurisdiction depended solely
upon party status.").
47. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506-08 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 69-71 (1886).
48. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). See generally Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case
afthe White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1967) (focusing on the importance of the source of the cause of action).
49. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). The Court made clear its current view that the constitutional
bar contained in the Eleventh Amendment is derived from common-law sovereign immunity:
B -5
Since Hans, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its expansive view of the Eleventh Amendment, holding
repeatedly that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits not only suits against a state by another state's citizen, but also
suits against a state by its own citizens, even if the case involves only federal question jurisdiction.!ll The Court,
however, occasionally has recognized various limitations on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment,51 including, from
1989 until the Seminole Tribe decision, the authority of Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
pursuant to an exercise of power enumerated in Article I of the Constitution.5Z
B. The Seminole Tribe Decision
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Congress's attempt to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,53 which was enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause of Article I of the Constitution.5I The Court, noting a "'due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's
role as an essential component of our constitutional structure,"'&; held that Congress, acting under either the
Commerce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
and require states to submit to a federal court's order for mediation. Specifically, the Court reasoned that "[t]he
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."56
[W]e cannot ... assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. ... There
is ... the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without
their consent, save where there has been a "surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("[T]he background principle of state sovereign immunity
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area ... that is under the
exclusive control of the Federal Government."); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) ("[T]he
Court long ago held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen's own State in federal court,
even though the express terms of the Amendment refer only to suits by citizens of another State.").
The Court's prevailing interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is subject to much debate. Indeed, four current Justices
appear to favor an interpretation that would prevent application of the Eleventh Amendment to cases based on federal-question
jurisdiction and cases involving suits against a state by its own citizens. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76-101 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 101-85 (Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Several recently departed Justices shared similar views, see
Welch, 483 U.S. at 496-521 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), as do numerous commentators, see 13 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524 n.186 (2d ed. Supp. 1995) (surveying commentary
critical of the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,31 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that modern sovereign immunity doctrine depends on "some other constitutional principle
beyond the immediate text of the Eleventh Amendment").
51. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 496 U.S. 18,27 (1990)
(The Supreme Court has "repeatedly and without question accepted jurisdiction to review issues of federal law arising in suits
brought against States in state court."); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (Eleventh
Amendment applies only to states and state agencies and not to local governmental entities); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 144-45
(1908) (federal courts have jurisdiction over a suit against a state official for prospective injunctive relief); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 376-77, 430 (1821) (rejecting argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars the Supreme Court's power on writ of
error to review the judgment of a state court involving an issue of federal law); infra notes 102-93 and accompanying text; see
generally Kurt E. Springmann, Comment & Legis. Rev., The Impact ofSeminole on Intellectual Property Infringement By State Actors: The
Interaction ofArticle I, Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 889, 892-94 (1997).
52. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 23 (1989) (holding that the Commerce Clause of Article I gives Congress the
authority to render states "liable in money damages in federal court"). The Union Gas decision was the product of only a four-Justice
plurality (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), with Justice White concurring only in the result. Nevertheless, both
before and after Union Gas, lower federal courts routinely held that Congress in fact could abrogate state sovereign immunity when
legislating pursuant to its Article I authority. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here
was no constitutional basis for distinguishing between the plenary powers accorded Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment
and those accorded under Article I.") vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.);
Employment Dev. Dep't v. Joseph (In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 172-74 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ("Congress' plenary powers under
Article I did empower it to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause mandate to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws."); McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 314-23 (7th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that "Congress may abrogate state immunity to suit pursuant to any of its plenary powers," including the Bankruptcy
Clause); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1995); Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Sparkman (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 190 B.R. 62, 65-66 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("[I]t is clear that
the states have ceded their sovereign immunity in the field of bankruptcy law."); Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control
Comm'n (In re J.F.D. Enters.), 183 B.R. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); Murray v. Withrow (In re PM-II Assocs.), 100 B.R. 940, 942
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Wayne Manor, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare (In re Wayne Manor, Inc.), 94 B.R. 240, 243-44 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988).
53. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
54. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,227-28 (1989».
56. Id. at 72-73.
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Seminole Tribe has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that no clause in Article I "bestows upon
Congress the power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.";;' Seminole Tribe, however, does not
purport to render void, as a per se rule, any and all attempts by Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Rather, under Seminole Tribe, a "simple but stringent" two-question test applies to determinations whether
Congress may abrogate state immunity in a particular context: "first, whether Congress has 'unequivocally
expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity;' and second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power,' ,,$ (which, after Seminole Tribe, may not be found within the confines of Article I itself). Unless
both prongs of the Seminole Tribe test are satisfied, the congressional enactment will be insufficient to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
C. Alden v. Maine and the New Constitutional Sovereign Immunity Principle
Until 1999, the Supreme Court, despite its expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, did not
elevate to constitutional status a state's common law sovereign immunity to suits in state court. Thus, it was thought
that Congress had the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity to further legislation enacted under Article I.!'!I
In Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court created a new principle of constitutional sovereign immunity by
holding that lithe powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the
power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts:,flI The plaintiffs in Alden were
probation officers employed by the State of Maine. They initially brought suit in federal court alleging Maine had
violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), seeking compensation and liquidated
damages.6t The federal district court dismissed the suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that the
Seminole Tribe decision deprived the federal court of jurisdiction to hear the suit. The plaintiffs then filed the same
action in state court. The trial judge dismissed the action pursuant to Maine's assertion of sovereign immunity, the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
constitutional issue.62
In concluding that Maine's state sovereign immunity barred the suit, the Supreme Court based its decision
on three key concepts. First, the Constitution's structure and history, coupled with the Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, establishes that lithe States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ... except as altered
by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments:,n1 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, strived mightily to prove that at the time the Constitution was ratified, the states universally believed that
immunity from suit was a key aspect of their continuing vitality in the new government~ From this concept Justice
Kennedy was able to conclude "that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the
structure of the original Constitution itself:1O
Second, the Court determined that neither the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, nor the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I authorizes Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. The Court
reasoned that when "a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the
implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States:16
Third, according to the Alden majority, principles of federalism favor constitutional sovereign immunity as a
bar to federal legislation: "[i]n some ways, of course, a congressional power to authorize suits against nonconsenting
57. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. The Florida Prepaid case
removes any doubt that Seminole Tribe was limited to Commerce Clause legislation. "Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers...." Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999).
58. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985».
59. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
60. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
61. See id.
62 See id.
63. ld. at 2246-47. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, focused on the purported acknowledgement by the Founders
that states could not be sued without their consent. See id. at 2247.
64. See id. at 2247-49.
65. ld. at 2254. Alden makes clear that the principles of sovereign immunity that served as a backdrop to the Eleventh
Amendment are not restricted to only cases involving the Eleventh Amendment. "While the constitutional principle of sovereign
immunity does pose a bar to federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States ... this is not the only structural basis of
sovereign immunity in the constitutional design." ld. at 2255.
66. ld. at 2255-56. The Court also rejected appeals to the Necessary and Proper Clause as "incidental authority to subject
States to private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers." ld. at 2256. Yet as
explained below, the Court does not appear to extend this rule to the Spending Clause. See infra notes 354-56, and accompanying
text.
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States in their own courts would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a power to authorize the suits in a
federal forum."'"
Alden is a flawed decision for at least four reasons.HI First, the majority premises its decision on the existence
of the states' constitutional right to sovereign immunity. The Constitution, except for the Supremacy Clause, which
supports the primacy of federal power, and the Eleventh Amendment, which concerns federal court jurisdiction,
contains no mention nor hints of the existence of a constitutional sovereign immunity.8J The majority implicitly
concedes that the Constitution does not expressly grant the right of sovereign immunity; instead, "[t]his separate and
distinct structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by Article III, but
inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.',1I) In essence, "Kennedy found a penumbra.',71
Second, by finding a new constitutional right to sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court prospectively
renders the Eleventh Amendment irrelevant. Constitutional sovereign immunity in Alden necessarily precludes suits
both in federal and state courts. Justice Kennedy attempted to explain why the Eleventh Amendment's language is
fairly limited: "Congress chose not to enact language codifying the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity
but rather to address the specific provisions of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification
debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision."n But the majority made no concerted effort to analyze why
the Eleventh Amendment is necessary if "sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from
the structure of the original Constitution itself.',73 If the Constitution was always meant to guarantee a state's right to
sovereign immunity to suits both in state and federal court, then surely Chisholm was wrongly decided and the
Eleventh Amendment was surplus. Thus the Court violated the ancient rule of construction: "[i]t cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.',74
Third, Alden creates unnecessary and substantial constitutional questions.75 Under the Court's rationale, the
Alden plaintiffs have a federal right under the FLSA against the State of Maine for money damages that cannot be
enforced in any court. Alden therefore violates the "general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.',76 The "right and remedy"
principle, which has deep roots in English law,77 is particularly well-settled in American law and as much inheres in
the United States Constitution as does the purported penumbral right of sovereign immunity.7K
Moreover, leaving parties with private rights no remedy to protect those rights opens the door for abuse by
the states.1'J The majority attempts to rebut this argument by noting certain limitations on the exercise of sovereign
immunit/' and by further stating: "We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or
obey the binding laws of the United States.,,81 But reliance on a state's "good faith" is an unsettling justification.1Q As
the Court previously stated, "[i]f the Constitution provided no protection against unbridled authority, all property
rights would exist only at the whim of the sovereign.',lll
67. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
68. We also note the majority's questionable account of the history of sovereign immunity at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution and its conclusion that Chisholm was wrongly decided, but we leave that criticism for development by others. See id. at
2270-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. See Erwin Chemerinsky,·High COllrt Wrongly Lets States Off the Hook, L.A. TIMES, June 25,1999, at B9.
70. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
71. Molly Ivins, Hey, Watch Ollt! Those SlIpremes Are at it Again, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 29, 1999, at 11; see also
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2219 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The full
reach of [Seminole Tribes] dramatic expansion of the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity is unpredictable; its dimensions
are defined only by the present majority's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text.").
72 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2251.
73. ld. at 2254.
74. Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
75. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982).
76. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 WILUAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
77. See Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 808,815 (K.B. 1794).
78. Justice Souter noted in Alden that several of the states perceived the principle to be so crucial that it was enshrined in state
constitutions. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 n.42 (citing the Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Kentucky and Tennessee,
Constitutions); see also Charles Fried, Supreme COllrt Folly, N.Y. liMES, July 6,1999, at A21 (in criticizing Alden, Florida Prepaid, and
College Savings Bank, Fried noted: "Patent and related protection is proclaimed in the Constitution itself, and the Court did not deny
that patent and trademark laws bind the States. Its structural argument was just that the patent holders cannot sue states to protect
their rights. What kind of structure is that?"). Moreover, the Court's conclusion may create a conflict with the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. See infra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
79. See Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at B9.
80. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266-68. We discuss these limitations in greater detail below. See infra Part III.
81. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
82. "[I]t is implausible to claim that enforcement by a public authority without any incentive beyond its general enforcement
power will ever afford the private right a traditionally adequate remedy." ld. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2294 n.43.
83. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982).
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Fourth, Alden dramatically, and perhaps unknowingly in its full ramifications,1lt alters the balance of power
to favor the states. Under Alden, legislation that authorizes private parties to sue states to enforce federal rights is
unconstitutional. Yet the Supremacy Clause requires the states to accept and enforce lawful federallegislation.16
One must ponder how lawful federal legislation, which the FLSA undoubtedly is, can ever be enforced adequately?
The Court mentions the fact that the federal government itself can sue states in violation of federallaw,lW; but as
Justice Souter notes in dissent, that supposed check against state abuse is likely illusory as a practical matter.&'
Moreover, the Court concedes the principle that the Supremacy Clause guarantees primacy of federal law
but states that "[a]ppeal to the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the question whether a law is a valid exercise of
the national power.,,1Il However, Alden's view of the Supremacy Clause makes no sense when one considers the
purpose of the Ex parte Young doctrine, !II which Alden expressly reaffirms and which permits suit in federal court
against state officials to enforce federallaw.!lJ
III. SEMINOLE TRIBE, AWEN, AND SEcrION 106 OF THE BANKRUPfCY CODE
Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, "[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign
immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with
respect to" various enumerated sections of the Bankruptcy Code.91 Through section 106(a), Congress expressed an
unequivocal intent to abrogate state immunity.92 Thus, under the rubric of Seminole Tribe and Alden, the question is
whether, in so legislating, Congress acted within a valid exercise of its power.
A. Section 106(a) Is Unconstitutional as Applied to the States
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that former section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,1tl the predecessor to
current section 106(a), did not express an unequivocal intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity with
respect to money judgments for bankruptcy-related causes of action.91 As a result, Congress subsequently enacted
the current version of section 106(a) to make clear its unequivocal intent to abrogate state immunity in bankruptcy
matters. Indeed, the legislative intent of section 106(a) is unequivocal: "[t]his amendment expressly provides for a
waiver of sovereign immunity by governmental units with respect to monetary recoveries as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief.,,15 Courts considering the issue therefore have held that Congress unequivocally intended to
abrogate state immunity through section 106(a),"" and the statute accordingly satisfies the first prong of the Seminole
Tribe analysis.
84. The rule that the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court decisions involving federal questions,
enshrined in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816), might fall in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions.
Because the Court interprets constitutional sovereignty to allow states to assert immunity to suits against it in either state or federal
court, it is not inconceivable for a state to waive immunity in state court on a federal cause of action, obtain a favorable ruling and
then assert immunity in an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee is premised on Article III's grant of
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review state court decisions involving federal questions: Yet Seminole Tribeand Alden make
clear that the states did not surrender their sovereignty in Article III. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2253. Unless there is some other
constitutional principle of judicial review (which the majority may have to create) that trumps constitutional sovereign immunity,
the bar that Alden and Seminole Tribesupport theoretically would prevent the Court from reviewing state court decisions without
state consent.
85. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 2267.
87. See id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting). "[T]he allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government is
probably not much more than whimsy." Id.
88. Id. at 2255. The Court's authority for this statement is Alexander Hamilton's analysis: "But it will not follow from [the
Supremacy Clause] that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the
residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land." THE FEDERAUST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But Hamilton was concerned with federal intrusion on areas of traditional state governing.
In Holeu, Congress had acted pursuant to its lawful powers under Article I.
89. See infra Part IV.D.
90. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
91. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a) (1994). The Bankruptcy Code defines "governmental units" to include the states. Id. § 101(27).
92. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
93. Former section 106(c), the predecessor to section 106(a), provided that, "notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign
immunity-(l) a provision of this title that contains 'creditor,' 'entity,' or 'governmental unit' applies to governmental units; and (2)
a determination by the court of an issue under such a provision binds governmental units." Id. § l06(c) (repealed 1994).
94. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1989).
95. 140 CONGo REc HI0766 (1994) (Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks describing § 113 of H.R. 5116). Congress
confused its own power to abrogate state sovereign immunity with a state's "waiver" of its own immunity, but congressional intent
to overturn Hoffman V. Connecticut and abrogate state sovereign immunity is crystal clear.
%. See, e.g., Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (1n re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1997);
Schlossberg V. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998); California
Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996); Employment Dev. Dep't V. Joseph (In
re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167,171-72 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 549
(D. Wyo. 1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); In re NVR, Inc., 206 B.R. 831,837 (Bankr. E.D.
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Whether Congress actually had the power to so act, however, is a more difficult question. Congress clearly
has the power to waive or abrogate federal, foreign, or local sovereign immunity.'17 Prior to Seminole Tribe, it also
appeared that Congress had the power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the bankruptcy context
because (a) the Supreme Court consistently had held that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
when enacting legislation pursuant to the "Enforcement Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment;~ and (b) in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a plurality of the Court had held that Congress similarly could do so when enacting
legislation pursuant to its plenary powers under the Commerce Clause of Article I.!H Indeed, following the Union Gas
decision and prior to Seminole Tribe, every lower court to consider the issue had held that Congress had the power to
abrogate state immunity when enacting legislation pursuant to its plenary powers under the Bankruptcy Clause of
Article I of the Constitution,lm and several courts had reached the same conclusion prior to the issuance of the Union
Gas opinion.un
In Seminole Tribe, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress had no authority under the Commerce
Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. As a result, since
Seminole Tribe a significant majority of courts, including all of the Courts of Appeals to consider the issue:uhave held
that Congress may not abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I
of the Constitution. uo Such courts have reasoned that congressional power to enact legislation pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause is analogous to and coextensive with its authority to enact legislation pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause and that, as a result, there is "no basis for treating its powers under the
Bankruptcy Clause any differently"UM from the explicated powers under the Commerce Clause.1l6
Unfortunately, these courts are correct because there are no logical bases to distinguish the Indian
Commerce Clause from the Bankruptcy Clause or other grants of Congressional power under Article I of the
Constitution. Indeed, even the Constitution's Framers recognized that the Article I powers are "intimately
connected"u~and reflect the need to "escape the risks of economic balkanization."llv Moreover, both the majority
and the dissent in Seminole Tn'be foreshadowed this conclusion. The dissent, for example, decried that application of
the Seminole Tribe reasoning "prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against
states, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the
Va. 1997); Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Sparkman (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 190 B.R. 62,65 (E.D.N.C. 1995); Mather v.
Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); Stern v.
Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Comm'n (In re J.F.D. Enters.), 183 B.R. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
97. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1604-05 (1994); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,140-41 (1965). _
98. The Enforcement Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
99. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.); see also id. at 45
(White, J., concurring without explanation in the plurality's conclusion, but not concurring in its reasoning). The Commerce Clause
provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors
Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.) ("[T]here was no constitutional basis for distinguishing between the plenary powers
accorded Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment and those accorded under Article I."); In re HPA Assocs., 191 B.R. at 172-74
("Congress' plenary powers under Article I did empower it to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause
mandate to establish uniform bankruptcy laws."); In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc., 190 B.R. at 64-65 ("[I]t is clear that the states have
ceded their sovereign immunity in the field of bankruptcy law."); In re Southern Star Foods, 190 B.R. at 425-26; In re ].F.D. Enters., 183
B.R. at 354.
101. See, e.g., McVey Trucking v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 314-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that "Congress may abrogate state immunity to suit pursuant to any of its plenary powers," including the Bankruptcy Clause);
Murray v. Withrow (In re PM-II Assocs.), 100 B.R. 940, 942 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Wayne Manor, Inc. v. Department of Pub.
Welfare (In re Wayne Manor, Inc.), 94 B.R. 240, 243-44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988);cf WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
840 F.2d 996, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to consider whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause because of "the uncertainty that permeates the subject of abrogation").
102. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1998); Department of
Transp. and Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th
Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997); Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't
of Transp. (In re Aer-Aerotron, Inc.), 104 F.3d 677, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[P]erhaps the handwriting is on the wall that the
abrogation provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act will suffer the same fate as the statutes involved in Seminole."); Light v. State
Bar (In re Light), 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition); In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997);
Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 201 B.R. 137, 141 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (listing cases in
which courts have so held).
103. The Bankruptcy Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish ... uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
105. See In re Sacred Heart Hasp., 133 F.3d at 243; In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244; In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145-46.
106. THEFEDERAUSTNo. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
107. In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244.
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regulation of our vast national economy:,1I1l Rather than dispute that conclusion, the majority readily agreed, but
nevertheless professed to be unconcerned:
[I]t has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the
States' sovereign immunity.... Although the copyright and bankruptcy laws have existed practically since our
nation's inception, ... there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of
those federal statutes against the States.IIP
In fact, following the issuance of Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court granted certiorari of the Merchants Grain decision,
in which the Seventh Circuit had concluded that section l06(a) represented a valid exercise of power under the
Bankruptcy Clause/Ill and the Court promptly vacated and remanded that decision "for further consideration in light
of Seminole Tribe."m
In defense of Seminole Tribe's rendering unconstitutional Section l06(a), certain commentators opined that
bankruptcy causes of action against states could be resolved in state courts and that as a result, Seminole Tribe would
not have the catastrophic impact that many believed it would have. Before Alden, these commentators were correct
that federal question causes of action could be brought against a state in state court without offending Eleventh
Amendment immunity. States cannot rely on the Eleventh Amendment immunity to protect them against suits in
their own court system.1I2 Moreover, when states have waived sovereign immunity through statutes or conduct,
they clearly can be sued in state courts.ll3 Under the prevailing pre-Alden view,114 Congress could abrogate common-
law "sovereign immunity enjoyed by states in their own courts by legislating pursuant to its Article I powers,,,11S
including, presumably, its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. At least one lower court held that section l06(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code validly abrogated common law sovereign immunity for actions against a state brought in state
courts. l16
Indeed, the Court had held that the Supremacy Clause not only provides state courts with jurisdiction over
federal causes of action, it also required state courts of general jurisdiction to exercise such jurisdiction absent some
108. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 72 n.16 (emphasis added). Several bankruptcy courts have taken issue with the Court's statement that there is no
tradition of allowing enforcement of federal bankruptcy laws against the states. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216
B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) ("We, like every bankruptcy judge we know, regularly and routinely enforced applicable
bankruptcy law against the States prior to Seminole."); Schulman v. California Water State Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200
B.R. 358, 376 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 1996).
110. Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-37 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v.
Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.).
111. See Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130, 1130 (1996).
112. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,204-05 (1991) ("[A]s we have stated on many occasions,
the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.").
113. Many states have elected to waive sovereign immunity with respect to proprietary, as opposed to governmental,
functions. For example, New York State has done so in section 8 of its Court of Claims Act. See Miller v. New York, 467 N.E.2d 493,
4% (N.Y. 1984). If a debtor were owed money by the State of New York based on a proprietary function, the debtor could sue the
state. See also 705 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 505/8 (West Supp. 1998) ("The court [of claims] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear ... [a]ll
claims against the state for damages in cases sounding in tort ...."). In all, it appears that thirty-four states have enacted statutes
waiving sovereign immunity in state courts, to some extent. See ALASKA STAT. 09.50.250 (Michie Supp. 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-821 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-201 to -210 (Michie 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4- 61(a) (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-21-1 (Michie 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-1 (1993); 705 ILL. CaMP. STAT. § 505/8 (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-913
(1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2181 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 151O-A
(West 1989 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T§ 12-201(a) (Supp. 1997); MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6419 (West 1995);
MINN. STAT. § 3.751 (1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-45-1 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-1-404 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8,301 (1994);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.031 (Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 491:8 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:13-3 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
37-1-23 (Michie 1990); N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-02 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (Supp. 1996); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4651-1 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
37-13.1-1 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-32-2, 21-32-10 (Michie 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) (Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-5 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-69,11-70 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.92.010 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 14-2-
4, 14-2-13 (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1997).
114. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 1,58 & n.273; Henry Paul
Monaghan, Comment, The Soverign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. 1. REv. 102, 122-25 (1996). This view is "better" precisely
because the original doctrine of sovereign immunity was not so much about "whether the Crown or its agents could be sued, but
how." PAUL M. furoR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1002 (4th ed. 1996). Adoption of the
contrary position, as in Alden, will immunize states and their agents from retrospective suits in any forum and would encourage
state defiance of federal laws without accountability to any court.
115. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 374-78 (1990). Only if the state
court invokes a neutral rule of judicial administration may it refuse to exercise its general jurisdiction against the state on a federal
cause of action. See id. To the extent state law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to which
governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of
federal law. The Howlett Court was careful to note that it left open the question "whether Congress can require the States to create a
forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process on parties who would not otherwise be
subject to the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 378.
116. See O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 736-38 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
B-ll
other available federal forum.1l7 But to say that a state court has subject matter jurisdiction118 to resolve federal
causes of action is not to resolve whether Congress can abrogate a state's immunity in its own courts with respect to
those actions. 119 Seminole ducked the issue but noted in passing that "this Court is empowered to review a question
of federal law arising from a state-court decision where a State has consented to suit:,al
As a conceptual matter, where the state had not consented to suit, Congress should be able to abrogate state
sovereign immunity to require vindication of federal causes of action in state courts.121 Otherwise no forum would
be available to vindicate state violations of federal law, federal legislative power would be impotent to bind the
states, and the Supremacy Clause would be undercut severely.m
Despite these obvious concerns, the Supreme Court's decision in Alden squarely decides the issue in favor of
the states. Under Alden, states may assert sovereign immunity to suit in their courts to any cause of action arising
under Article I. Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in section 106(a), like its attempted abrogation in the
Fair Labor Standards Act, is unconstitutional as applied to a state without its consent. Thus, while causes of action
for money damages granted under the Bankruptcy Code against a state are, in theory, available, there is currently no
forum in which to bring such bankruptcy causes of action.
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court reaffirmedlZl that Congress constitutionally may abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that,
since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the states after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, federal
legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionally could "intrude upon the province of the
Eleventh Amendment:,124
117. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) ("[When] a federal statute does impose liability
upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court.") (quoting Howlett,
496 U.S. at 367-68); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see also In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. at 736 ("[S]tates are bound by federal law; they
must comply with federal law; and federal law can ensure that they do."); In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 843. Section 1334(b) of title 28,
United States Code, the primary bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, supports this point by providing that the federal courts "shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28
U.S.c. § 1334(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that only states may determine
whether to provide jurisdiction in state courts of federal causes of action. See Karen Cordry, State Governments in the BankruptCl)
Courts After Seminole: Are They the New BOO-Pound Gorillas, 28 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT 23, at A10 (May 14,
1996). Moreover, it is doubtful that a state court would have jurisdiction over disputes relating to property of the estate or other
matters over which Congress has granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts, such as in 28 U.S.c. § 1334(e), which grants the
federal district court exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate. See Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The
Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SoCY U.S.A. 63, 99-100 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of
Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEX. 1. REV. 685, 765 (1989); Monaghan, supra note 114, at 132. Thus, Congress
should consider amending section 1334(e) to grant state courts concurrent jurisdiction over property of the estate solely for actions
that cannot be brought in federal court without the state's consent.
118. Some courts have held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a court's subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. See, e.g.,
Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984). The better view is that although sovereign immunity is jurisdic-
tional, it is "not of the same character as subject matter jurisdiction." In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302, 304 (8th Cir.
1994); see infra note 182. When a state waives sovereign immunity, it confers personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. See PEAKSolutions Corp. v. State Dep't of Transp. (In re PEAKSolutions Corp.), 168 B.R. 918, 922 & n.10
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).
119. See Meltzer, supra note 114, at 57-60. Where a state deprives a person of property in violation of federal law, the state
court must provide relief, notwithstanding "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts." Reich v.
Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994) (tax refund case).
120. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996)
121. See Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME 1. REV. 1145, 1171-77
(1984); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 58; Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their
Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REv. 189 (1981).
122. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,211 (1991) ("If a suit against state officers is precluded in the
national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a state to its courts ... an easy way is
open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution ... ."). Indeed one might speculate whether state
prosecutors and other officials will misbehave if they are immune from federal review and liability. Prospective injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young might not be sufficient to remedy actions taken by state officials before injunctive relief is granted.
Conceivably, second order reputational and political pressures will operate to keep state officials obedient to federal law. See supra
note 17. Resorting to state courts to resolve complex bankruptcy issues is inconsistent with concepts of federalism.
123. See Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 59; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (recognizing congressional power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment). Recently the Court renewed this reaffirmation in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2206·07 (remedial legislation waiving state
sovereign immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to cases where Congress identifies a pattern of state
deprivation of constitutional rights).
124. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Another basis to distinguish the Fourteenth Amendment from Article I is that the
Fourteenth Amendment is of limited scope and was intended specifically to alter the relationship between states and the federal
government. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55.
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At least four bankruptcy courts and one district court have seized upon this "exception" to the Eleventh
Amendment to hold that section 106(a) in fact is constitutional.125 The first such case was Southern Star Foods, Inc.,flt>
in which a chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding against a state agency to recover an unauthorized
postpetition transfer127 of property of the estate and to equitably subordinate the agency's claim against the debtor in
priority of distribution to claims of other creditors. 12H After the state argued that Congress lacked the power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and that section 106(a) was unconstitutional}29 the bankruptcy court held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth AmendmentU ) enabled the trustee's action to proceed.
Specifically, the court held that the exercise of "national legislative powers under any of the provisions of Article I
will usually (if not invariably) implicate" privileges and immunities within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
and that, as a result, section 106(a) is a constitutional embodiment of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. l1l The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code provides citizens with at least the following "privi-
leges and immunities" within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[The) efficient liquidation or other use and ratable distribution of a debtor's assets, or (to put it another way)
with immunity from the inefficient liquidation or use and inequitable distribution of a debtor's assets which
may occur under State laws; the privilege of discharge, or ... with immunity from oppressive debt collection
which may obtain under State laws; lioerty from economic bondage, and protection against undue loss of
value of property in exigent financial circumstances; and fair and efficient determination of all of the above,
according to the process due in a national court of equitable jurisdiction, without regard to persons or to any
special privileges save those considered by Congress to be justified as a matter of policy.132
Courts that have followed Southern Star have adopted similar reasoning.111
Courts of Appeals addressing the issue, however, unanimously have rejected the Fourteenth Amendment as
a means of "rescuing" the viability of section 106(a).111 In so doing, the appellate courts have focused on the
legislative history of the statutetf; where, not surprisingly, "there is simply no evidence suggesting that section 106(a)
was enacted pursuant to any constitutional provision other than Congress's Bankruptcy Clause authority.,,1J6 The
125. See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (Ill re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D. Wyo. 1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); Headrick v. Georgia (In re Headrick), 203 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Mather v.
Employment Sec. Comm'n (Ill re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); Burke v. Georgia (In re
Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), affd on other grounds, 146 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2410
(1999).
126. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 426. Although Southern Star actually predates Seminole Tribe, its reasoning has
been followed by every court that has held section 106(a) to be constitutional since Seminole Tribe was published.
127. Id. at 422. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 549(a), 550(a) (1994) (permitting the trustee to avoid an unauthorized postpetition transfer of
property of the estate and to recover the transferred property or its value from the transferee).
128. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 422. See 11 U.S.c. § 51O(c) (permitting the trustee to bring an action to equitably
subordinate the priority in distribution granted to the claim of one creditor to the claims of other cre<;litors).
129. See In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 422.
130. See id. at 426. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment
thus forbids states from abridging the "privileges and immunities that flow from national citizenship." Storer v. French (In re
Storer), 58 F.3d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1995).
131. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 426.
132. Id.
133. See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D. Wyo. 1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); Headrick v. Georgia (In re Headrick), 203 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Burke v.
Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). Courts addressing the issue also could note that bankruptcy is not a
right of citizenship and that entities that are not individual human beings, residents of the United States, or citizens may be debtors
under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 101(9), (27), (40), (41), 100(a) (1994).
134. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 1998); Department of
Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir.
1997); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); cf Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d
389,391 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]f section 5 is not to be distended beyond all reasonable bounds, it cannot be used to authorize legislation
so remote from the policies and objectives of the equal protection clause as [the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act] is."); Elias v. United States (In re Elias), 218 B.R. 80, 84-86 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1998).
135. See In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 244; In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146; see
also Bakst v. New Jersey (In re Ross), 234 B.R. 199,202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999);In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 842 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1997); Schulman v. California Water State Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 382 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); In re Lush
Lawns, 203 B.R. 418,421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf Club),
203 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) ("The court can find no hint that Congress had in its collective mind Fourteenth Amend-
ment concerns when it enacted Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.").
136. [T)he conclusion seems logically inescapable that in passing the 1994 [Bankruptcy] Act Congress exercised the same
specifically enumerated Article I bankruptcy power that it has traditionally relied on in enacting prior incarnations of the
bankruptcy law dating back to 180Q-68 years before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. We will not presume that
Congress intended to enact a law under a general Fourteenth Amendment power to remedy an unspecified violation of
rights when a specific, substantive Article I power clearly enabled the law.
B -13
better reasoned result, therefore, is that Seminole Tribe sounded the death knell for section 106(a) and that, as a result,
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity currently remains intact with respect to most, if not all, bankruptcy causes of
action brought against a state in federal bankruptcy court.
One very limited exception might lead a court to conclude that section 106(a) effectively abrogates Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to actions to remedy discriminatory practices brought against a state in
bankruptcy court pursuant to section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code. lJ7 Although there is no legislative history
indicating that Congress promulgated Section 525 under the Fourteenth Amendment}''!! the prohibition against
discriminatory treatment goes to the heart of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A section
525 cause of action is analogous to a cause of action brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States
Code.OJ Although the Court has held Congress did not explicitly abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to section 1983 of title 42,1«1 this precedent should not apply by analogy to preclude abrogation with
respect to section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code in light of the explicit reference to section 525 in section 106(a).141
Courts holding that they are without jurisdiction to order a state to reinstate a debtor's driver's license have simply
overlooked the possibility that section 525 was promulgated under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. l4Z
The potential flaw in relying on the Equal Protection Clause to uphold abrogation with respect to section 525
is that bankruptcy debtors are not members of suspect classifications. Some courts have held that using the Equal
Protection Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to overcome sovereign immunity should be limited to
discrimination based upon suspect classifications.1<D The Supreme Court may resolve this issue during the October
1999 term.144
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE ApPLICABILITY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN BANKRUPTCY CASESAFTER
SEMINOLE TRIBE AND ALDEN
Because Congress cannot simply "overrule" the decisions (which, of course, are based on interpretations of
the Constitution), Seminole Tribe and Alden have created a "potentially irreconcilable conflict" between the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the Eleventh Amendment, and constitutional sovereign immunity.l45 Indeed, as noted at the outset of
this Article,I4Ii constitutional sovereign immunity, as construed by Seminole Tribe and Alden, might substantially
undermine the paramount bankruptcy policies of a debtor's discharge and "fresh start" and of the fair and equitable
distribution of the estate's assets to creditors. For example, since the Seminole Tribe decision was published, courts
have held that unless states consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Code's provisions regarding
111 re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146 (citation omitted). See also 111 re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 244; In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R.
at 840.
137. Section 106(a) expressly abrogates sovereign immunity with respect to section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 525
protects debtors, who are, or have been, seeking protection under the Bankruptcy Code from discriminatory treatment. See 11 U.S.c.
§525.
[Section 525] codifies the result in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), which held that a state would frustrate the congn:s-
sional policy of a fresh start for a debtor if it were permitted to refuse to renew the debtor's driver's license because a tort
judgment against the debtor resulting from an automobile accident had been unpaid as a result of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6321-22.
138. Congress is not required to state expressly that it enacts legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
139. See Maya v. Philadelphia Gas Works (In re Maya), 8 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Toth v. Michigan State Hous.
Dev. Auth., 136 F.3d 477, 479 n.l (6th Cir. 1997).
140. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
141. Section 106(a) provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit ... with respect to ... [section] 525 ... of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
142. See, e.g., In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); 111 re Perez, 220 B.R. 216, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998), affd,
No. 98-2043, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21513 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (holding in light of Seminole Tribe that "to the
extent earlier cases have relied on ... the 'anti-discrimination provision' set forth at Bankruptcy Code § 525, to restore a debtor's
driver's license ... such reliance ... is no longer applicable").
143. See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389,391 (7th Cir. 1998); see also infra note 261 and accompanying text. But see Little
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, No. 98-1721, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13166, at -7 (8th Cir. June 14, 1999). The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that Congress validly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. 1d. The court rejected the state's argument that because disabled status is not a suspect classification
Congress could not use the Fourteenth Amendment exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Kimel v. Florida Bd of Regents, 139 F.3d 1429 (11th Cir. 1998), the court stated: "the mere fact of non-suspect status does not
preclude Congress from legislating on a group's behalf." 1d. at -23. Moreover, the court explained why the IDEA satisfies the Boerne
"proportionality" test. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its views on non-suspect status in Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, No. 97-1825,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16945, at -23 (8th Cir. July 23,1999).
144. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), em. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999). Even if the Equal
Protection Argument fails, section 525 might survive as a provision protecting "property" rights secured by the Due Process Clause.
See i1lfra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
145. See In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 n.25 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
146. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
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discharge,J47 avoidance of preferences,14I\ avoidance of fraudulent conveyances,149 avoidance of unauthorized
postpetition transfers/.'ll turnover of property of the estate/51 protection against discriminatory treatment,152 the
automatic stay/53 and determination of tax liability of the bankruptcy estate15l cannot be enforced against states in
federal bankruptcy courts.1.'l;
Application of Seminole Tribe, Alden, and principles of constitutional sovereign immunity to bankruptcy
cases, however, will not result in a blanket immunity from bankruptcy-related matters for all governmental units.
Rather, the scope of sovereign immunity is limited by several established doctrines, which are summarized below
and have been explored and defined in a veritable torrent of opinions published after the Seminole Tribe decision.
A. Only States and Agents Are Protected
One significant and well-established limitation on the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity is that only
a state and its agents may invoke the amendment's protection. Other governmental units, including local jurisdic-
tions such as counties and municipalities, cannot avail themselves of the Eleventh Amendment and its protections. lS6
Because many tax and licensing issues involve local governments, the benefit to a bankruptcy estate and its
creditors of such a limitation is clear.157 However, because state law determines the status of a particular governmen-
tal unit, a local governmental unit that is regarded as autonomous in one state may be regarded as a mere agent in
another state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. J5Il Moreover, the same kinds of governmental functions may be
exercised by an arm of the state in one state but by a local agency in another state.1:>.> As a result, the "local govern-
ment" exception to the Eleventh Amendment has varying and inconsistent application.1ftl
147. 11 U.S.c. § 727 (1994); see, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R. 637, 641 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Mitchell v.
California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877, 883-84 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Elias v. United States (In re Elias), 218 B.R. 80,
83-84 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Morrell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Morrell), 218 B.R. 87, 90 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998); Kish v. Verniero (In
re Kish), 221 B.R. 118, 124 (D.N.J. 1997); Ranstrom v. IRS (In re Ranstrom), 215 B.R. 454, 455-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997); Rose v.
United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 214 B.R. 372, 375 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997); Koehler v. Iowa College Student Aid Comm'n (In
re Koehler), 204 B.R. 210, 216-17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997). But see Department of Transp. and Dev. v. PNL Management Co.(In re
Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1997).
148. 11 U.S.c. § 547; see, e.g., Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs. (In reValue-Added Communications, Inc.),
224 B.R. 354, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1998); see also Ted Janger, Strategies For Preserving the Bankruptcy Trustee's Avoidance Power Against States
After Seminole Tribe, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1431, 1435 (1997).
149. 11 U.s.c. § 548; see, e.g., Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 201 RR. 137, 138, 142
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding fraudulent conveyance action brought by trustee against state was barred by Eleventh Amend-
ment).
150. 11 U.S.c. § 549; see also Janger, supra note 148, at 1435. In Southern Star Foods, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment
defense was not available to a state because laws enacted pursuant to Article I are enforceable through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.) 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995).
Because the Fourteenth Amendment exception cannot withstand analysis as applied to a postpetition transfer in the bankruptcy
context, the court should have held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction against the
state in an adversary proceeding under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code.
151. 11 U.S.c. § 542; see, e.g., Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana (In reGuiding Light Corp.), 213 B.R. 489, 491 (Bankr. E.D. La.
1997); Horwitz v. Zywiczynski (In re Zywiczynski), 210 B.R. 924, 925-26 (Bankr. W.O.N.Y. 1997).
152. 11 U.S.c. § 525; see In re Perez, 220 B.R. 216, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995), affd, No. 98-2043, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21513
(D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
153. 11 U.S.c. § 362; see, e.g, In re Burkhardt, 220 RR. 837, 843-44 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); Louis;Harris v. Barall (In re
Louis;Harris), 213 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997); Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf
Club), 203 RR. 617, 618 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996); In re Martinez, 196 RR. 225 (D.P.R. 1996).
154. 11 U.S.c. § 505; see Bakst v. New Jersey (In re Ross), 234 RR. 199,202-03 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999); Mueller v. Idaho (In re
Mueller), 211 RR. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997).
155. See In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (holding that finding court lacked jurisdiction to compel state
agency to return driver's license privilege even though return of license is aspect of confirmed chapter 13 plan); In re Lush Lawns,
Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Teresa K. Goebel, Comment, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy
Proceedings After Seminole Tribe, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 911 (1998).
156. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Hadley v. North Ark. Community Technical
College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to independent political subdivisions
created by the State, such as counties and cities."); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[A]lthough states and
their agencies are protected by the eleventh amendment, counties and municipalities are not."); In re Christie, 218 RR. 27, 31 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1998).
157. Because a local governmental unit cannot shield itself behind the Eleventh Amendment, it is subject to the automatic stay
provisions in § 362 and may be compelled to appear in federal court to have its tax assessments determined pursuant to § 505.
158. See, e.g., Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a five-prong test for determining whether, under state
law, a particular governmental unit is an agent of a state:
To determine whether a governmental agency is an arm of the state, the following factors must be examined: [1] whether a
money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental functions, [3]
whether the entity may sue or be sued, [4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the
name of the state, and [5] the corporate status of the entity.
Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1992).
159. As the court in Belanger noted, California school districts, unlike school districts in most of the states, have budgets that
are controlled and funded by state government rather than by local school districts. See Belanger,963 F.2d at 251. Because school
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B. States Are Protected Only Against "Suits In Law Or Equity"
By its plain language, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to "suits in law or equity:,161 As a conse-
quence, several courts have attempted to limit the applicability of Seminole Tribe on the ground that bankruptcy cases,
or at least particular matters within a bankruptcy casei do not constitute "suits" within the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. 162 .
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that the Eleventh Amendment did not per
se preclude the bankruptcy court's discharge of a claim held by'<iState because the bankruptcy case in which the
discharge was granted did not constitute a "suit" against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes:
In a bankruptcy case, in its simplest terms, a debtor turns over his assets, which constitute the estate, for liqui-
dation by a trustee for the benefit of creditors according to their statutory priorities. Bankruptcy law modifies
the state's collection rights with respect to claims against the debtor, but it also affords the state an opportu-
nity to share in the collective recovery. Bankruptcy oRerates by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and without
forcing the state to submit to suit in federal court. From this standpoint, [the debtor]'s entitlement to assert his
discharge against the state's claims invoked no Eleventh Amenament consequences [because) [t)he state never
was hauled into federal court against its will in the banlcruptcy.1lil
Other courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to the determination of a debtor's tax liability to
a state pursuant to section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code lbl and with respect to the treatment and discharge of a state's
claim under a chapter 11 plan of reorganizationll6 or a chapter 13 plan of adjustmeneffi Moreover, prior to Seminole
Tribe, the Supreme Court had held that the objection to a proof of claim filed by a state in a bankruptcy case did not
constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.1&'
Although appearing to be a neat solution to the "problem" of Eleventh Amendment immunity in bank-
ruptcy cases and proceedings, the actual application of the "bankruptcy cases are not suits for Eleventh Amendment
purposes" line of reasoning is quite limited. For example, the Fifth Circuit itself expressly noted that the Eleventh
Amendment does apply to preclude the "commencement of certain adversary proceedings directly against a state."lfIl
Thus, courts have held repeatedly that adversary proceedings to determine the dischargeability of a debt to a state in
fact are "suits" within the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.l9J Courts have reached the same conclusion with
respect to other complaints that request declaratory judgments regarding other aspects of the operation of the
bankruptcy laws. llIl
The recent case In re Burkharde71 nicely illustrates the illusory nature of this "limitation" on the Eleventh
Amendment. In Burkhardt, a bankruptcy court held that it could enter an order confirming a chapter 13 plan and
discharging the debtor's debt to the state because confirmation of the plan did not result in a "suit in law or equity"
that would trigger application of the Eleventh Amendment.17Z The court, however, concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment precludes enforcement of the discharge and thus the plan against the state:
district funding comes from the state, a judgment against a California school district will be paid out of the state treasury. See id. at
252. Thus, in California, school districts are arms of the state. This result differs from that in Doyle, where the Supreme Court
concluded that Ohio school districts were not arms of the state of Ohio. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280.
160. Compare Moore v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973) (holding that a county is not arm of the state under California law)
with DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children's Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679 n.l (7th Cir. 1998) (implying
county family services division is an arm of the state).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
162. See Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 929 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding a motion to reopen bankruptcy to determine
whether a debt owed to state was dischargeable was not a suit against the state).
163. Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Collins, 173
F.3d at 929.
164. See Smith v. Psychiatric Hosps., Inc. (In re Psychiatric Hosps., Inc.), 216 B.R. 660, 661 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
165. See In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795,801-08 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
166. See In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 847-50 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
167. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.s. 565, 573 (1947) ("If the claimant is a state, the procedure of proof and allowance is not
transmuted into a suit against the state because the court entertains objections to the claim.").
168. Walker, 142 F.3d at 823.
169. See, e.g., Mitchell v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877, 882-84 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); cf. Ranstrom v.
IRS (In re Ranstrom), 215 B.R. 454, 455-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997).
170. See, e.g., NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, LP), Nos. 98-2211, 98-2244, 98-2271, 98-2272, 98-2273,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15499, "18-"27 (4th Cir. July 12, 1999) (finding a debtor's motion for declaratory relief against the state to
recover transfer taxes is a suit subject to the Eleventh Amendment); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.),
204 B.R. 132,137-39 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affd, 133 F.3d 1237 (3d Cir. 1998) (adversary proceeding for a declaratory judgment regarding
applicability of section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code); Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana (In re Guiding Light Corp.), 213 B.R. 489,
492 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997) (adversary proceeding for declaratory judgment regarding extent of property of the estate).
171. In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 838 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
172. Id. at 849.
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With its holding herein, the Court fully recognizes that in confirming a Chapter 13 plan which contemplates a
discharge of a aebtor's motor vehicle violations upon completion of all r.ayments under the Plan, the Bank-
ruptcy Court is in effect granting a "right without a remedy," insofar as the abIlity of this Court to compel the res-
toration of a state issued driver's license. While acutely aware of this anomaly created by the recognition of
the discharge of the debt under the federal bankruptcy statutes, without the Jurisdictional ability to compel
the sovereign to enforce the discharge, the proper redress lies with the United States Congress and is beyond
the prerogative of this Court. J7J
As such, even though a bankruptcy case may not constitute a "suit" for Eleventh Amendment purposes and a
bankruptcy court accordingly may have the power to enter orders in a case that directly affects the rights of a state,
the bankruptcy court may be powerless to enforce its orders against the state. If so, at least with respect to the state,
the debtor and its creditors may be no better off than if the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction in the first place.174
C. Waiver ofImmunity
States always may consent to be sued in federal court and can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity
expressly.l75 Thus, proof of a voluntary waiver of immunity by a state would constitute another way to gain
jurisdiction over a state consistent with constitutional sovereign immunity.l76
The doctrine of waiver, however, is quite narrow in scope. For example, a state waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity only if it unequivocally expresses an intent to waive its constitutional immunity protection/77
and a state's intent to waive is strictly construed. Indeed, even a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own state
courts is insufficient to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to permit it to be sued in federal court.17ll
Moreover, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, the Court
overturned the "implied waiver" doctrine/)'J holding that a state does not waive its sovereign immunity, construc-
tively or by implication, merely by participating in a federal program.Uil In College Savings Bank, the petitioner
argued that Florida waived its immunity to suits brought under the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act ("TRCA")
because Florida voluntarily engaged in activities covered by the TRCA. A five-member majority of the Court rejected
the petitioner's argument, reasoning that the "implied waiver" doctrine "stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence
of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutionallaw."IKI
Nevertheless, it is possible for a state to explicitly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Such a
potential waiver presents two important issues. First, what constitutes a sufficient waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity? Second, who has the authority to waive immunity on behalf of a state?
When a state commences an adversary or similar proceeding in a federal forum, whether a bankruptcy court
or otherwise, it waives its sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity at least with respect to the subject matter of
that proceeding and any defenses, counterclaims, and causes of action against the state that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence on which the state's proceeding is based.1Kl This comports with the general rule that a state
waives its immunity by "voluntarily invoking [federal court] jUrisdiction."oo
173. [d. at 850 (emphasis added); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R. 637, 646 (BoA.P. 9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to sanction a state for violating a discharge order). But query whether the
bankruptcy judge could issue an Ex parte Young injunction against a state official to reinstate the debtor's driver's license?
174. But see infra Part III.E (discussing the possibility of enforcing bankruptcy court orders against states in state courts).
175. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (stating that a state may expressly consent to suit
in federal court through a clear statement in its constitution or a statute).
176. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1999).
177. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney,
495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) ("The Court will give effect to a State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity 'only where stated by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.' ") (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,673 (1974»; Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Sees., Inc., 151
F.3d 439, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1115 (1999); V-I Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421
(10th Cir. 1997).
178. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. In Atascadero, the Court stated, "[a]lthough a State's
general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment 'absent a clear' intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Id.; accord Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.s. 436, 441-
45 (1900). .
179. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
180. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2204-05; see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47; Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 800-01 (1998).
181. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2228 (1999). The Court stated the
"implied waiver" doctrine violated the rule that a state's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal. See id. The fact
that the TRCA placed states on notice that they could be subject to suit for conduct did not satisfy the unequivocal express waiver
test. Justice Scalia explained: "the most that can be said with certainty is that the State has been put on notice that Congress intends
to subject [the State] to suits brought by individuals. That is very far from concluding that the State made an 'altogether voluntary'
decision to waive its immunity." Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
182. See, e.g., In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a state waived sovereign immunity by commencing
an adversary proceeding for declaratory relief that its claim was nondischargeable); Confederated Tribes v. White (In re White), 139
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Courts have extrapolated that concept to hold that a state's active participation in a bankruptcy case, even
absent the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the debtor, suffices to waive the state's applicable
immunity.UK Moreover, the Supreme Court long ago held that a state also waives its immunity when it files a proof
of claim in a debtor's bankruptcy case, even if it otherwise does not participate in the bankruptcy case, at least with
respect to matters regarding allowance of that claim. lffi Specifically, the Court reasoned as follows:
It is traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of
claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences of that procedure. If the claimant is a State,
the procedure of proof and allowance is not transmuted into a suit against the State because the court enter-
tains objections to the claim. The State is seeking something from the debtor. No judgment is sought against
the State. The whole process of proof, allowance, and distnbution is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of in-
terests claimed in a res. It is none the less such because the claim is rejected in toto, reduced in eart, given a
priority inferior to that claimed, or satisfied in some other way than payment in cash. When the State becomes
an actor and files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the ad-
judication ofthe claim. ur;
Based on such reasoning, Congress has enacted an express waiver of sovereign immunity through section l06(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for the following:
A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity
with respect to a claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit arose.1ll7
F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Initiation of a lawsuit is an action that 'necessarily establishes consent to the court's adjudication of
the merits of that particular controversy,' including the risk of being bound by an adverse determination.") (quoting McClendon v.
United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1989». But see United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d 922, 931 (10th Cir.
1996) (Applying pre-Bankruptcy Code law, the Tenth Circuit held that the United States does not waive its sovereign immunity,
absent consent, when its agents institute an action or file a claim in court.); United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Absent unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity, a court does not have jurisdiction to hear a counterclaim against the United
States, even though the United States initiated the action. The court recognized, however, that the counterclaim could be asserted
by way of setoff or recoupment.). Murdock and Forma appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v. New Jersey,
329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947), in which the Court held that a state waives its immunity when it files a proof of claim in a debtor's
bankruptcy case. Moreover, Murdock and Forma have little application in bankruptcy cases and proceedings where Congress has
explicitly waived federal sovereign immunity under section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See also Davis v. U.S. Postal Sew. (In re
Leeth Constr., Inc.), 170 B.R. 684,688 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
183. Col/ege Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228; see Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); see also Sutton v.
Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (The state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by
removing the case from state court to federal court and litigating the merits of the case).
184. See, e.g., Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
446 (1998); In re White, 139 F.3d at 1270-71 (holding that Native American Tribe waived its immunity by twice voting on the debtor's
plan of reorganization, objecting to confirmation of the plan, submitting an order denying confirmation, and otherwise participating
in the bankruptcy case). The prospect that a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity creates a potential conflict with
traditional notions of jurisdiction. Similar to a claim that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1989), a state may assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity to bar federal jurisdiction at any
point in litigation, including on appeal for the first time. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555,1559 (10th Cir. 1992)
("The Eleventh Amendment defense is jurisdictional [and, therefore, is a threshold issue]."). Generally a party cannot waive the
requirement that a federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter being litigated; that is, the parties cannot
confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982). But the Supreme Court has held consistently that a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) ("The State can waive the defense."); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). The reason for the distinction between Eleventh Amendment
immunity and subject matter jurisdiction lies in the history of the Eleventh Amendment. The amendment has its roots in the
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.s. 313, 322-23 (1934), which could always be waived with
proper consent. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868). The Court explained in Clark v. Barnard that "immunity from suit
belonging to a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United
States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure." Clark, 108 U.S. at 447. "The Amendment, in other words, enacts a
sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary's subject matter jurisdiction." Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997). "The Eleventh Amendment ... does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction."
Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052. For an excellent overview of the debate whether the Eleventh Amendment implicates subject matter or
personal jurisdiction, see Glauberman, supra note 117, at 69-70 & n.39.
185. See Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573; New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 330 (1933); see also Virginia v. Collins (In re
Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1999).
186. See Gardner, 329 U.s. at 573-74 (emphasis added); see also Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. at 332 ("If a state desires to participate in
the assets of a bankrupt, she must submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power; otherwise, orderly and expeditious
proceedings would be impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act would be frustrated.").
187. In re Straight, 143 F.3d at 1390 (finding that section 106(b) codifies the Gardner rule). See also 11 U.s.c. § 106(c) (1994)
("Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a governmental unit, there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a
governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate."). Critics of this view might assert that
section 106(b) is an abrogation of immunity rather than a waiver, because the filing of a proof of claim is an act by a state that does
not implicate immunity. On the contrary, however, Congress has imposed a condition on the right of a state to file a proof of claim:
B -18
,
•
.J
i
!
.J
1
J
1
J
J
J
J
J
j
J
J
J
Ij
J
r
F
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
•
r
Thus, section 106(b) expressly deems the filing of a state's proof of claim to be a waiver of immunity with respect to
claims against the state that arose out of the "same transaction or occurrence out of which the claim of such
governmental unit arose.,,1ltl
Notwithstanding long-standing Supreme Court authority regarding a state's waiver of sovereign immunity
on the filing of a proof of claim, however, several courts have held and commentators have speculated, post-Seminole
Tribe, that section l06(b) is an unconstitutional attempt to "deem" a wavier on the part of the states.w The courts
finding section l06(b) to be unconstitutional instead have adopted the standards used to identify compulsory
counterclaims under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that the "fundamental fairness of
judicial process" requires only that a state's proof of claim waives immunity with respect to matters that would
constitute compulsory counterclaims to a typical complaint.!"')
These critics may find support in the Supreme Court's decision in College Savings Bank in which Justice Scalia
specifically distinguishes between notice to the states that Congress intended for the states to be subject to suits in
federal court and actual waivers of immunity by the states.191 Under the College Savings Bank rationale, section
l06(b)'s effect should be no more than to notify states that Congress intended for the states to be subject to federal
court jurisdiction. Thus, under College Savings Bank, it may be said that section 106(b)'s abrogation of immunity is
unconstitutional.
Other courts, however, have held that section l06(b) is constitutional notwithstanding Seminole Tribe.I'J2
These opinions represent the better view because they recognize the states are voluntarily invoking federal
jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim.1'l1 Nevertheless, because section 106(b) imposes a "same transaction or
occurrence" test that is similar, if not identical, to the standards used to determine compulsory counterclaims, the
same results generally will occur under both lines of authority.!91
Finally, a minority of courts has determined that a state's filing of a proof of claim represents a broad
consent to suit in federal court, regardless of the nature of claim at issue.J<6 Notwithstanding the persuasive
reasoning followed by this line of cases, the conclusion that a proof of claim amounts to a broad waiver is difficult to
defend in light of the language of section 106(b) and the Supreme Court's insistence on strictly construing waivers of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.l% Of course even if immunity is not waived, the estate may still assert any of the
debtor's defenses to disallow the state's claim.I'Il
under section 106(b) the state's election to file a proof of claim is deemed a waiver of immunity with respect to compulsory
counterclaims, even if they exceed the amount of the claim and result in an affirmative recovery. Moreover, a state cannot argue that
it is deprived of a right of access to the courts without due process of law. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires due
process when the federal government deprives a person of life, liberty or property. A state is not a "person" within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301, 323 (1966); In re Herndon, 188 B.R. 562, 565 n.8 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. 1995).
188. 11 U.S.C § 106(b).
189. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997); Rose v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1997); Grabscheid v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re CJ. Rogers, Inc.),
212 B.R. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 239 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see also Harden v. Texas Dep't of Transp. (In
re Aer-Aerotron, Inc.), 104 F.3d 677, 683 (4th Cir. 1997) (Niemeyer, J., concurring). One commentator notes that filing a proof of
claim in bankruptcy may be an insufficient voluntary act by the state to constitute a waiver because the state has no alternative
forum in which to collect on its claim. See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.
195,212 (1996). Another flatly states that Congress does not have the power to decree that a state's filing a proof of claim constitutes
a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Glauberman, supra note 117, at 89.
190. See Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs. (In re Value-Added Communications, Inc.), 224 B.R. 354, 357
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
191. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2228 (1999).
192. See, e.g., In re Straigh~ 143 F.3d at 1391-92; Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820-23 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865
(1999); Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children's Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 678-80 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Aer-
Aerotron, 104 F.3d at 680; Confederated Tribes v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61,
63 (D.N.J. 1997); Schulman v. California State Water Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358,377 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 1996).
193. See cases cited supra note 185.
194. See, e.g., Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1317 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
2410 (1999); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1995); In re Value-Added Communications, Inc., 216 B.R. at 550 (noting that the same result occurs under section 106(b) and the
compulsory counterclaim test) Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that "§ 106(b) may
well be a correct restatement of the jurisprudence regarding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity").
195. See, e.g., In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. at 64 (holding that, irrespective of section 106, a state may consent to be sued in federal
court, and filing a proof of claim constitutes consent); Ossen v. Connecticut Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re Charter Oaks Assocs.), 203 B.R.
17,22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) ("In short, because section 106[b) unambiguously alerts the states as to the consequence of filing a
bankruptcy claim ... a governmental unit that does so waives its sovereign immunity.") (quoting WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1003 (1st Cir. 1988)); Burke v. Georgia (In re Bdrke), 200 B.R. 282, 287 (1996); In re Barrett Refining
Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 810 (Bankr. W.O. Okla. 1998).
196. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
197. See 11 U.S.C § 558 (1994); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947).
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Waiver will likely continue to be one of the most vigorously contested issues in disputes between states and
other parties to a bankruptcy proceeding. As one commentator recognized, "the doctrine of waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity ... provides a foothold for the efforts of bankruptcy trustees and courts to assert authority
over states in the bankruptcy process, while also respecting federalism concerns."I!1\ Despite the courts' splintering,
debtors and creditors, other than a state, should take comfort with what appears to be a rough majority rule-that a
state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it files a proof of claim, at least with respect to that claim and
other claims satisfying the transaction/occurrence test.
Another limitation on the waiver doctrine, however, is that not all agents of a state have authority to waive
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The law of a particular state determines who has the authority to waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity,t'H and in many cases, state law requires an act of the state legislature to
effectuate a valid waiver of immunity.,m As a result, at least one court has held that since the state had not author-
ized a state attorney general to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the attorney general's proof of claim
simply was not sufficient to effect a waiver, notwithstanding section l06(b).IQ Moreover, a split of authority exists
with respect to the question whether, even if there has been a duly authorized waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity as a result of a proof of claim filed by one state agency or arm of a state, such a waiver eliminates Eleventh
Amendment immunity just for that one agency or for the entire state and other agencies of the state.:!.u Consonant
with what constitutes a waiver, the issue whether a state official is authorized to waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity and bind all other arms of the state will continue to be significant for the courts. The split in authority over
these issues merely reflects the overall problem created by Seminole Tribe-trying to vindicate the need for a
centralized, efficient, and just reorganization or distribution of resources in a context where a state, by virtue of the
Supreme Court's strained interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, can seize a preferred position.
D. Ex parte Young Injunctions.
Another "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment is the Ex parte Young doctrine.:!.ll Under Ex parte Young, a
federal court may exercise "federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospec-
tive injunctive relief in order to 'end a continuing violation of federal law: "n Thus, although a federal bankruptcy
judge presumably cannot, after Seminole Tribe, issue a money judgment against a state without a waiver of immunity,
he or she may be able, under Ex parte Young, to issue a prospective injunction to enjoin state officials from violating
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. But a prospective injunction will not be effective to recover preferences or
fraudulent transfers paid into the state treasury or property transferred to the state before the commencement of a
bankruptcy case or property seized by the state after the commencement of the bankruptcy case before the injunction
issues.
The Court in Seminole Tribe, however, made it difficult to invoke the Ex parte Young exception.:!./; In fact, in
Seminole Tribe itself, the plaintiff actually had sought an injunction against the Governor of the State of Florida for
prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.:!.~ The Court, however, refused to permit even that aspect of the
198. Goebel, supra note 155, at 928.
199. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945); Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential
Sec., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1115 (1999) ("[T]he state's waiver must be accomplished by someone
to whom that power is granted under state law."); Mark Browning, Who Can Waive State Immunity, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 15,1997,
at 10 (contending that states may only waive immunity by constitution or statute).
200. See Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573; Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467.
201. See Midland Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 200 B.R. 453, 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Magnolia
Venture Capital Corp., 151 F.3d at 444, (holding that authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be inferred from a
general authorization to enter into contracts); Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2410 (1999); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); see also Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36
F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that under Illinois law, the state attorney general is not authorized to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity in a non-bankruptcy context).
202. Compare Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1390 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
446 (1998) (holding that the waiver on behalf of one state agency constitutes a waiver for all state agencies), Brewer v. New York
State Dep't of Correctional Servs. (In re Value-Added Communications, Inc.), 216 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997) (same), and
Ossen v. Connecticut Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re Charter Oak Assocs.), 203 B.R. 17,22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (same), with Schulman v.
California State Water Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 378 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding waiver limited to
waiving agency), and Rocchio & Sons, Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp. (In re Rocchio & Sons, Inc.), 165 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1994).
203. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,149 (1908).
204. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985».
205. See id.; see ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 904 (1999). See also
Gibson, supra note 189, at 213. Indeed, one commentator has speculated that "Young may not be good law for long." Glauberman,
supra note 117, at 80.
206. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.
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plaintiff's case to proceed because "Congress hard] prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a
State of a statutorily created right.,,:au Thus, the Court reasoned, Congress "chose to impose upon the state a liability
that is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the State officer under Ex parte Young,,,n
and Congress therefore must have intended not to impose Ex parte Young liability on a state officiae9
Simply put, under Seminole Tribe, congressional intent regarding enforcement of federal statutes against the
states is important in the Ex parte Young context.2IO Specifically, with respect to bankruptcy law, the question is
whether the Bankruptcy Code provides a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a state of a statutorily
created right.211 At least one bankruptcy court has concluded that it does not,212 a result that appears to be correct.
Specifically, a "detailed remedial" scheme, as described by Seminole Tribe, exists where Congress has crafted an
intricate statutory scheme that limits or prohibits potential remedies.2IJ Although the Bankruptcy Code is certainly
an intricate weaving of various policies and considerations, there is nothing in the Code that indicates Congress
intended to limit or prevent certain remedies against a state or state officials.214
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently recognized yet another limitation on the use of Ex parte Young. In
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply where the requested
injunctive relief implicates a state's "special sovereignty interests.,,215 Because the ability of a state to levy and collect
207. ld. at 74 (emphasis added). Under IGRA, on request of a tribe, a state is required to negotiate in good faith with a tribe to
create a class III tribal-state gaming compact. See 25 U.S.c. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994). If the state is not responsive, the tribe may sue
the state in federal district court where the state has the burden of proving that it has negotiated in good faith. See id. § 2710(d)(7).
If the district court finds that the state has failed to negotiate in good faith, then a detailed negotiation and mediation procedure is
prescribed from which a state-tribal compact must result. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B). The district court is not authorized to award
monetary damages or any other remedy against the state.
208. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75.
209. See id.; see also Gibson, supra note 189, at 214.
210. See Gibson, supra note 189, at 214.
211. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.s. at 75; supra note 210,.
212. See Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps. (In reGuiding Light Corp.), 213 B.R. 489, 492 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1997); see also Schmitt v. Missouri Western State College (In re Schmitt), 220 B.R. 68, 79 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998). As one
commentator noted, the statutory scheme in Seminole Tribe is distinguishable from the bankruptcy enforcement mechanism because
in Seminole Tribe, the IGRA permitted only substantially limited relief against a state in federal court. More importantly, Congress
had established a "system of mediation and possible intervention by the Secretary of the Interior." Gibson, supra note 197, at 215.
The Bankruptcy laws do not substantially limit relief in federal court; if anything, the opposite is true. See 11 U.s.c. § 105(a); cf. Ellis
v. University of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 1998) (Congress did not craft a detailed remedial scheme when it
enacted 42 U.s.c. § 1981 because there was "nothing in § 1981 that shows Congress intended to limit or bar remedies generally
available to an aggrieved party."). Although the United States Trustee has standing to be heard on any bankruptcy matter, the
Trustee's standing flows from the need to protect the rights of the United States and not, like the Secretary of the Interior, to
facilitate a specific mediation between a Native American tribe and a state. See 25 U.S.c. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(v).
213. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998). In ANR Pipeline, the Tenth Circuit considered the
issue of whether the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.s.c. § 1341, was a "detailed remedial scheme" that precluded use of the Ex parte Young
doctrine. See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1188. The court held the Tax Injunction Act was a "detailed remedial scheme" under
Seminole Tribe because Congress expressly limited the power of federal courts to issue certain types of remedies pertaining to the
assessment, levy or collection of state taxes. See id. at 1191.
214. Although section 362(a) is an automatic stay against creditors, it is not a limit on the debtor's remedies, except perhaps for
section 362(h), which grants individual debtors detailed remedies for willful violations of the stay. "An individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay provided by [section 362] shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." 11 U.S.c. § 362(h); cf Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaff), 974
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaiing that if the United States waives sovereign immunity, an individual debtor can assert a
compulsory counterclaim for actual damages under section 362(h». Nor is there a detailed remedial scheme in section 105 of the
Code. It prOVides in relevant part: "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.c. § 105(a). In enacting section 105, Congress intended to not limit, but expand, remedies
available to aggrieved parties. "[A]lthough the waters may have been muddied a bit, it appears to continue to be permissible to sue
state officials in the bankruptcy court in their official capacities to prevent future violations of the bankruptcy laws." Gibson, supra
note 189, at 215.
215. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997); id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Coeur d'Alem; a Native-
American tribe sought a declaratory judgment against the State of Idaho establishing the Tribe's right to quiet enjoyment over
submerged lands located in Idaho as well as prospective injunctive relief against state officials to prevent them from exercising the
state's asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the lands. ld. at 265-66. The Court held that Ex parte Young may not be used when the
requested injunctive relief was "functional[ly] equivalent" to an award of money damages: "[ilt is apparent ... that if the Tribe were
to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its land and waters would be affected in a degree fUlly as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury." ld. at 287. Moreover, in Coeur d'Alene, two Justices further attempted to
limit the Ex parte Young doctrine by imposing a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry into whether (a) an available forum existed to
vindicate the federal rights at issue, and (b) the matter involves the interpretation of novel questions of important federal law. ld. at
270. A majority of the Court, however, held that the appropriate inqUiry under Ex parte Young remains "a straightforward inquiry
into whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federaliaw and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." ld. at
296 (O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas, IT., concurring in part); id. at 298-99 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg, & Breyer, IT., dissenting); see also
Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1039 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 444 (1998); Doe v.
Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). However, a 5-4 majority in Coeur d'Alene recognized the special
sovereignty interest exception to Ex parte Young. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, &
Thomas, J.J.). At least one circuit has stated that Coeur d'Alene places a new limitation on the application of Ex parte Young. See ANR
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taxes is a "special sovereignty interest,,,211i prospective injunctive relief in bankruptcy, granted pursuant to the Ex
parte Young doctrine, might conceivably implicate a state's "special sovereignty interest" in its power to levy and
collect taxes and therefore be inapplicable. 217 On the other hand, because Congress has created exclusive jurisdiction
over property of the estate in the federal district courts,2J8 a court could conclude that the state's sovereignty interest
does not extend to the federally created bankruptcy estate.219
E. The In Rem Exception
Bankruptcy courts have exclusive in rem jurisdiction "of all property, wherever located, of the debtor as of
the commencement of [the bankruptcy case], and of property of the estate. ,,231 Such in rem jurisdiction enables
bankruptcy courts to determine the claims and interests in and to property of the estate,221 including the claims and
interests of a state in and to such property notwithstanding a state's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 222
The reason for this is that, unlike an adversary proceeding that causes the bankruptcy court "to issue process
summoning the state to appear," the exercise of in rem jurisdiction simply is not a "suit against one of the United
States by a private party."2Z1 Rather, it is a "suit," if at all, against the property itself.
Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust 21A is a good example of this concept. In that case, the State of
Maryland and two local counties brought suit in state court to collect taxes on transfers of estate property made
pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization and the bankruptcy court's confirmation order, which exempted the
relevant transfers from state taxes.Z!5 Although the state taxing authorities had received adequate notice of the
bankruptcy case, they declined to participate by filing a proof of claim or otherwise.23\ After the case was removed to
federal court, the taxing authorities asserted that the Eleventh Amendment barred the bankruptcy court from
exercising jurisdiction over them in the confirmation proceeding and that, as a result, its confirmation order could not
and did not bind the taxing authorities to the plan.2Z7
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the state's argument. Among other things, the court
reasoned that a confirmation order "was not entered in a suit 'against one of the United States' filed by a private
party,"ZlH and that the power to enter a confirmation order was derived, not from jurisdiction over a state or creditors,
but rather from jurisdiction over the debtor and the property of its estate.219 Thus, a party's status or assertion of
Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1193; see also James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review
ofState-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REv. 161, 188 (1998).
216. See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1194 ("The [appellants'] request to rewrite Kansas' property tax code with respect to its
application against the personal property of natural gas pipelines is certainly a major intrusion into Kansas' special sovereignty
interests.").
217. See, e.g., 11 U.S.c. § 362(a) (the automatic stay); 11 U.S.c. § 505 (determination of tax liability).
218. See 28 U.s.c. § 1334(e) (1994).
219. Like the federal government, see U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, states have the power to lay and collect taxes. The power to
tax is a critical function of government, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819), and the issue whether a state
may levy a tax has formed the substance of one of American jurisprudence's most recognized statements in one of its most famous
cases. Id. at 431 ("That the power to tax involves the power to destroy.").
220. 28 U.S.c. § 1334(e); see also Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1997); O'Brien v.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998). Section 1334(e)
was intended to eliminate jurisdictional disputes arising from the equity principle that makes in rem jurisdiction over an
item of property exclusive in the first court to assert jurisdiction over it. A creditor might file a lien against property of the
debtor in a court in State A and shortly afterward the debtor might declare bankruptcy in State B. Control over the debtor's
property would be shared by the court in A and the bankruptcy court in B-it might even be the same piece of property....
Section 1334(d) gives the bankruptcy court control of all the property. Creditors who want to enforce their liens have to do
so in that court regardless of the location of the creditor or the property.
In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997).
221. See In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. at 737 (quoting JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 16 MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE 108-06 (3d ed. 1997»:
Our in rem jurisdiction over property of the debtor and the estate empowers us "to determine all claims that anyone,
whether named in the action or not, has to the property or thing in question. The proceeding is one 'against the world.'
The practical effect of such an action is to establish unquestionable title to the property because no one can later claim ex-
emption from the effect of the judgment on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.
222. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786. But see French v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue (In re ABEPP Acquisition Corp.), 215 RR. 513,
517 (RA.P. 6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to a debtor's adversary proceeding to recover
prepetition tax payments, noting (questionably) that the debtor "has not alleged that the 3% tax remained an identifiable res").
223. Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786-87; see supra Part I1I.B.
224. Antonelli, 123 F.3d 777.
225. See 11 U.s.c. § 1146(c) (1994) ("the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section
1129 of this title[ ] may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax").
226. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 780.
227. See id. at 786.
228. ld.; see supra Part I1I.B. If, however, the debtor pays transfer taxes and sues the state to recover the transfer taxes, the state
may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to bar the suit. See NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, LP),
Nos. 98-2211, 98-2244, 98-2271, 98-2272, 98-2273, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15499, at *18-*27 (4th Cir. July 12, 1999).
229. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786.
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immunity had no bearing "on the bankruptcy court's power to determine whether the terms of a reorganization plan
comply with federallaw."Zl'
The court further noted that, if the state wanted to challenge a bankruptcy court's order of which it had
notice, it could waive Eleventh Amendment immunity and submit to federal jurisdiction.Zl1 Recognizing that such
may present a Hobson's choice for the states, the court noted that the choice resulted from "Congress' constitution-
ally authorized legislative power to make federal courts the exclusive venue for administering the bankruptcy
law:,zl!
The Supreme Court recently examined the in rem "exception" to Eleventh Amendment immunity in
California and State Lands Commission v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,m which was decided after Seminole Tribe. In Deep Sea
Research, the Court held that, at least in cases where a state does not have actual possession of the vessel at issue, the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a suit pursuant to the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdictionZl4 to
determine title to an abandoned shipwreck, even where the state is one of the potential title holders.Z5
Given that result, and the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Antonelli, states may be unable to raise their Eleventh
Amendment immunity to avoid the application of orders entered generally in a bankruptcy case, such as, for
example, orders confirming a plan of reorganization, orders authorizing the sale of property of the estate, or,
perhaps, orders enforcing the automatic stay. Z16 As long as the order pertains to property of the bankruptcy estate,
the Eleventh Amendment should not be an obstacle to its enforcement where the debtor is in possession of the
property.Zl7
However, as with those cases that hold that bankruptcy cases generally are not "suits" within the meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment,ZJl the scope of this in rem "exception" is not limitless. In fact, the Supreme Court
specifically has held that an in rem jurisdictional basis, standing alone, does not provide authorization for the
issuance of process directly against a state:
The fact that a suit in a federal court is in rem, or quasi in rem, furnishes no ground for the issuance of process
against a non-consenting State .... [W]hen the State does not come in and withholds its consent, the court has
no authority to issue ~rocess against the State to compel it to subject itself to the court's judgment, whatever
the nature of the suit.
Moreover, the Court specifically has noted, in the bankruptcy context, that "we have never applied an in rem
exception to the sovereign-immunity bar against monetary recovery, and have suggested that no such exception
230. Id. at 787.
231. See id.
232. Id.; see also O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) ("The
Eleventh Amendment is not violated, because [the state] cannot be compelled to appear and defend. It can choose to stay home.");
Schulman v. California State Water Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358,380 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (The fact that a state
"finds these choices unattractive does not convert the choice into an involuntary decision: if this were so, many of the choices that
people make in many different contexts of life would be 'involuntary: and some people could live virtually their entire lives
without making any voluntary choices at all."); cf. New Jersey v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691, 693 (D.N.J. 1997) ("The very object and
purpose of the [Eleventh] Amendment [is] to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals
at the instance of private parties .... In the present case, the state is not a defendant and, as such, cannot invoke the protection of
the Eleventh Amendment:'). The question of a compulsory waiver of immunity is developed more fully supra notes 179-94 and
accompanying text.
233. California & State Lands Comm'n v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464 (1998).
234. See 28 U.S.c. § 1333(1) (1994). Federal admiralty jurisdiction encompasses "maritime causes of action begun and carried
on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing itself is treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or
description in order to enforce a lien:' Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954). Even though suits in admiralty are not
suits in "law or equity:' the Supreme Court has applied the Eleventh Amendment to admiralty suits generally. See Ex parte New
York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921).
235. See Deep Sea Research, 118 S. Ct. at 1472. Four concurring Justices in Deep Sea Research (Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer) indicated that they would reach the same result regardless of whether the property at issue was in the
possession of the state. Id. at 1473-74 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1474 (Kennedy, Ginsburg, & Breyer, H., concurring).
236. For example, the in rem theory has been applied to a discharge order, which was subsequently used as an affirmative
defense against a state in state court, see Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820-22 (5th Cir. 1998),cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865 (1999), and an
adjudication of dischargeability where the state filed an adversary proceeding. See Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children's
Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998).
237. The in rem exception is not necessarily limited only to those circumstances where the debtor possesses the property, as
long as the state does not have possession. In Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Updegraff, the court, interpreting Deep Sea Research, held
that a state is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity where the plaintiff neither named the state in a suit or served the state
with process and the res was in the possession of the court. Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 1998)
("Florida does not have possession of the disputed res-the [res is] part of the record in this case, currently in the possession of the
federal judiciary:').
238. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
239. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18,28 (1933); see also O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (In reO'Brien), 216 B.R.
731,737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (citing Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 189 (1886) ("[N]o personal liability ... can be created against
the absent [state]; the power of the court being limited to the disposition of the property, which is alone within its jurisdiction"».
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existS."Ja' As a result, the in rem nature of bankruptcy cases and proceedings likely does not enable a trustee or
debtor in possession to bring affirmative causes of action for monetary recovery, such as preference or fraudulent
conveyance actions, against a state in bankruptcy court absent the state's consent. It is unclear whether the trustee or
debtor in possession can obtain an order requiring the state to turn over property of the estate in the state's
possession.
Finally, following Alden, it is not clear that the in rem "exception" or, indeed, any limitation of state
immunity based upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment, retains any practical Viability whatsoever. If, as
discussed above,241 Alden means that the Court now has enshrined common law sovereign immunity with Constitu-
tional status and essentially rendered the Eleventh Amendment underinclusive and redundant,242 the in rem doctrine
simply has no further applicability because, unlike the Eleventh Amendment, the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity is not limited merely to "suits in law or equity." If not limited to "suits," the foundations of the in rem
doctrine fall away, leaVing Alden's concept of constitutional common law sovereign immunity to preclude all actions
that affect non-consenting states, even those that may not be deemed to be "suits" within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment.
F. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause presents an intriguing constitutional possibility in overcoming a
state's Eleventh Amendment defense. The Clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.,,243 A person who is deprived of a vested legal cause of action by the governmene44 is
deprived of property and must be justly compensated.245 Courts have held that the United States may not assert its
sovereign immunity as a defense to a Takings Clause claim.246 By asserting a sovereign immunity defense, the state
acts to deprive a debtor's estate of vested legal causes of action, such as preferences and fraudulent conveyances, for
money damages.
Prior to Alden, the Takings Clause argument stopped short of success. If the state itself provided a forum for
compensation, there could be no impermissible taking of private property, and as a result, a state could continue to
assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. In Harbert International, Inc. v. fames, the plaintiff asserted a Fifth
Amendment "takings" claim for money damages against state officials, alleging the state's failure to make payments
and perform contractual duties in connection with the construction of a bridge constituted a taking without just
compensation.247 The state asserted the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to federal court jurisdiction.248 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the state could assert the Eleventh Amendment defense because
"Alabama state courts do proVide Harbert with a means of redress for its claim.,,24f1 Thus, if the state provides a
forum in which it may be sued, there is no taking of a debtor's estate's cause of action for money damages.
Alden dramatically changes the analysis. By allowing a state to use sovereign immunity to defeat federal
claims brought in state courts, unless the state has consented to suit, Alden leaves parties with no ability to seek a
money damages remedy for the deprivation of a federal right. The practical effect of leaving no forum to enforce
vested causes of action is to deprive the parties possessing those actions of "property" without just compensation.
Takings claims could be legitimate options for parties seeking to enforce their bankruptcy rights against those states
that have not consented to be sued in state courts.2'il
240. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 38 (1992) (emphasis added).
241. See supra Part II.C.
242. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
244. The Takings Clause applies to both the federal government and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the states. See, e.g.,
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). See also infra note 251.
245. See Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that a
legal cause of action is property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.); if. McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 906 F.
Supp. 749, 769 (D.R.I. 1995) ("Contract rights are as much private property under the Takings Clause as they are under the Due
Process Clause.").
246. See Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 n.7 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Actions brought under the taking clause of the fifth
amendment are, of course, an exception to the rule that sovereign immunity is a bar to damages against the United States for direct
constitutional violations.").
247. See Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).
248. See id. at 1276.
249. Id. at 1277.
250. Any "Takings" claim must first exhaust existing state law "just compensation" remedies. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg.
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,734 (1997). Usually a takings claimant will need to show an exhaustion of state "inverse condemna-
tion" causes of action. See id. at 734 n.S ("Ordinarily, a plaintiff must seek compensation through state inverse condemnation
proceedings before initiating a takings suit in federal court, unless the state does not provide adequate remedies for obtaining
compensation."); see also Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1997). If a state does not provide a
forum for bringing inverse condemnation claims against the state, either by failing to provide a cause of action by statute or through
assertion of constitutional sovereign immunity, then the exhaustion prerequisite has been satisfied. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 n.S.
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The Takings claim will fail, however, for the simple reason that in order enforce the Takings Clause against a
state, a party must rely on the Fourteenth Amendment.:z;t But the Fourteenth Amendment by itself does not abrogate
a state's immunityz;l and the current statutory vehicle for bringing such a claim, section 1983 of title 42, does not
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.25l
V. CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE POWER TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF SEMINOLE TRIBE, ALDEN, AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
As explained above,251 the Supreme Court's construction of the Eleventh Amendment under Seminole Tribe
and establishment of the new constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine under Alden risk undermining the
paramount bankruptcy policies of a debtor's discharge and "fresh start," and of the fair and equitable distribution of
the estate's assets to creditors. Indeed, at its most basic level, Seminole Tribe's and Alden's discovery of a constitu-
tional right to sovereign immunity undermines essential aspects of bankruptcy law by elevating states to preferred
positions relative to other creditors. Except to any extent the states consent to be sued, states appear to be free to
infringe upon the bankruptcy rights of other parties without fear of suit for money damages in any court.2ffi
Moreover, as noted above, the existing options to ameliorate the effects of constitutional sovereign
immunity are only of limited effectiveness in the bankruptcy context. As a result, Congress should consider enacting
legislation to neutralize some of the deleterious effects of the Supreme Court's decisions, and this Article sets forth
five potential avenues that Congress could explore. 25h First, Congress could purport to re-enact section 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Congress could authorize
United States trustees, and possibly private trustees or debtors-in-possession, to sue states for bankruptcy causes of
action in the name of the United States. Third, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide for a standing
injunction against state officials pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine. Fourth, Congress could amend the
Bankruptcy Code to provide for disallowance of a state's claim, unless the state waived sovereign immunity and
Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding the claim and compulsory counterclaims. Fifth, Congress could
encourage a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity through conditions to the receipt of federal funds.
A. Reenactment Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Because legislation enacted pursuant to the Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunitylS' or sovereign immunity,li< Congress conceivably could purport to reenact section
106(a) under the guise of its Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause authority.75J The reenacted section 106(a),
however, likely would fail as an unconstitutional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity,
notwithstanding the nominal imprimatur of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps for legislation enacted
under the Due Process Clause.
On its face, legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment must be rationally related to
recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims.1ti1 However, bankruptcy is not connected to the traditional Fourteenth
Amendment purposes of preventing discrimination against individuals on the basis of suspect classifications like
251. The Fifth Amendment, according to its literal language, applies only to the federal government. However, the substantive
protections of the Fifth Amendment are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
252. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.s. 781, 782 (1978).
253. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979). Of course Congress could abrogate the states' immunity for section 1983
actions or enact other appropriate legislation to redress monetarily the wrongs asserted under the Takings Clause. See Garrett v.
lllinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980). We address this point further in Part IV.A.
254. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
255. Alden asserts that the fear of the unrestrained state is without merit:
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.
The good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (quoting U.s. CONST. art. VI.).
256. Other commentators have analyzed congressional options after Seminole with respect to a broader range of federal
regulatory issues. See, e.g., Glauberman, supra note 125, at 100-16 (discussing conditional spending power, suit by the United States,
and amendment of exclusive jurisdiction statutes); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 49-61 (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, conditional spending power, and suit by the United States).
257. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
258. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999) (reaffirming the
test to abrogate state sovereign immunity set forth in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997».
259. Congress is not reqUired to expressly state that it enacts legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997). Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to enforce any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve its ends. See, e.g., United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966).
260. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532; Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203,
208 (6th Cir. 1996).
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race or gender~ As noted above, 'i6'- some cases attempt to link section 106(a), through the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,:NiI with recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims. The better reasoned view, however, is that bankruptcy is
not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.:!">I Indeed, the
Supreme Court has determined there is no constitutional right to a bankruptcy discharge,:OW; one fundamental feature
of the federal bankruptcy laws.
More importantly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been rendered of little use in this context due to
the Supreme Court's century-old decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Court determined that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws.,,2(t; The Court's list of recognized privileges and immunities under
that standard is very limited,N and, notwithstanding the Court's recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, the Court is unlikely
to "discover" a new bankruptcy-related right that falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, as noted
recently by a bankruptcy court:
Against such a backdrop, this court can conceive of no ground which might warrant the "discovery" of a
bankruptcy privilege in the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the United States Department of Justice has
referred to the "right to obtain a fresh start" as belonging to the national citizenry ... no authority has been
cited as elevating that right to constitutional status.2iil
Thus, legislation that merely reenacts section l06(a) with an express statement that the stated abrogation of state
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity is achieved pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to
survive judicial scrutiny.:rII
The Velasquez v. Frapwe1l7il' case provides a good analogy. In Velasquez, the Seventh Circuit considered
whether the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA,,)271 was enacted pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to permit suits against a state in federal court without running afoul of the
Eleventh Amendment.272 The court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide the constitu-
tional basis for enacting USERRA because the statute was too remotely connected to the policies of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7lJ Courts probably would reach a similar result if Congress purported to reenact the Bankruptcy Code
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although Congress cannot rely on the Equal Protection Clause and the PriVileges and Immunities Clause as
a means of reenacting section 106(a), the Florida Prepaid decision leaves some room for Congress to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity for bankruptcy purposes to further the protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank was the owner of a patent for a
261. See Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d at 210. A court must apply three factors to determine whether a congressional enactment is
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) whether the statute was enacted to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause; (2) whether it is "plainly adapted to that end"; and (3) whether it is consistent with the "letter and spirit of the
constitution." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
262. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
263. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
264. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cL 14; Kish v. Vemiere (In re Kish), 212 B.R. 808,817 (D.N.]. 1997) (holding that bankruptcy does
not constitute a privilege or immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, and criticizing contrary cases for failing to consider,
under the "privileges and immunities" theory, whether section 106(a) was enacted for remedial or preventive purposes). Moreover,
in order to fall within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, bankruptcy itself would have to be a privilege or immunity because
"the judiciary has recognized that the 'privileges and immunities of national citizenship do not ... encompass the right to have a
federal question heard in a federal forum:" In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 841 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting Carr v. Axelrod,
798 F. Supp. 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992».
265. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
266. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873); see In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 842.
267. These include: the right to become a citizen of the state in which a citizen of the United States resides, see Saenz v. Roe, 119
S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (1999); the right to take and hold real property, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,640 (1948); the right to carry
on interstate commerce, see Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 56 (1891); the right to be free from violence while in the lawful
custody of a United States marshal, see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 266 (1892); the right to vote in national elections, see The
Ku-KIux Cases, 110 U.s. 651, 664 (1884); the right to enter the public lands, see United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884); the
right to petition Congress for redress of grievances, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875); the right to pass freely
from state to state, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); and the right to inform federal officials of violations of
federal law, see In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1895).
268. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 842.
269. Indeed, at least one court has warned that allowing Congress to enact bankruptcy law pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment would "render Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity meaningless and eviscerate the
fundamental construct of federalism in our constitutional form of government:' In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
270. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998).
271. 38 U.S.c. §§ 4301-4333 (1994).
272. See Frapwell, 160 F.3d at 391.
273. See id. (noting that military personnel are not members of a discrete or insular minority)
B -26
I
.J
.J
J
f
...
j
I
oJ
J
J
J
J
i
J
l
J
J
.~
I
..J
I
oJ
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
methodology for the financing of future college expenses.274 It brought suit against the Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Education Expense Board (the "Board"), alleging the Board infringed upon College Savings Bank's patent.275 By
the time College Savings Bank had brought its suit, Congress had enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy Act"),27fo which purported to subject states to suit in federal court for
infringements of patents.27'J The Board, which the Court concluded was an "arm of the State" of Florida,2Ill asserted
that congressional abrogation of its Eleventh Amendment immunity was unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the immunity defense, reasoning that patents are property subject to
the protections of the Due Process Clause and that Congress's "objective in enacting the Patent Remedy Act was
permissible because it sought to prevent states from depriving patent owners of this property without due
process."m The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the Patent Remedy Act was not
legislation appropriately enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order for legislation to be
"appropriate" under Section 5, Congress "must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.,;!Kl The
Patent Remedy Act failed to meet Florida Prepaid's test because, in legislating the Act, Congress failed to consider the
availability of state remedies for patent infringement, and the Act failed to detail a history of widespread and
persisting deprivation of property rights "of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5
legislation.,,:>J<I This lack of information made the abrogation provisions of the Patent Remedy Act " 'so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.' ,,2K2
But Florida Prepaid expressly accepts the proposition that Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity in order to vindicate property rights protected under the Due Process Clause. The Court stated: "if the
Due Process Clause protects patents, we know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against their
deprivation without due process under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.',m Bankruptcy concerns property rights
1lIIthat are protected by the Due Process Clause. Thus, Congress could re-enact the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if Congress can show a widespread and persistent pattern of state
deprivations of property rights protected under the Bankruptcy Code. Given the numerous times states have been
found to violate the automatic stay, one of many instances of potential state abuse, it seems fairly simple for Congress
to establish such a pattern. ll6
Additionally, Congress could reenact section 1983 of title 42 to provide for abrogation of the states'
sovereign immunity. Such abrogation would allow takings claims to proceed in federal court against a state for
money damages.:1ffi Although a takings claim will not lie if a state has proVided a forum in state court, at least with
274. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2201 (1999).
275. See id.
276. 35 U.S.c. § 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
277. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,2223 (1999). Congress had
passed the statute to meet the Atascadero requirement of a "clear statement" of abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
278. In the companion College Savings Bank case, Justice Stevens, in dissent, disputes the conclusion that the Board may assert
sovereign immunity. ld. at 2233-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argues that a state should not be able to assert sovereign
immunity where the state engages in "commercial activities." ld. at 2234.
279. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119
S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
280. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2201 (1999).
281. ld. at 2202.
282. ld. at 2210 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,532 (1997».
283. ld. at 2208.
284. Although bankruptcy law does not create property rights, see, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), Abele v.
Phoenix Suns Ltd. Partnership (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218,219 (9th Cir. 1996), it does determine what is "property of the estate," 11
U.S.c. § 541 (1994), and provides protections against interference with estate property. See ld. §§ 362(a), 549(a). For example,
welfare benefits may constitute "property of the estate." See Howell v. Commonwealth of Penn., Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re
Howell), 138 B.R. 484, 486 (W.D. Pa. 1992). The denial of welfare benefits under certain circumstances constitutes a violation of the
Due Process Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,261 (1970). If a state asserts sovereign immunity to a valid claim for
welfare benefits in bankruptcy, it "deprives" the claimant of the claimant's property rights without just compensation. See supra
note 251; see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 436-37
(holding that causes of action are property of the estate).
285. Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, unlike the Patent Remedy Act, did
include a study of state infringements of copyrights and potential state remedies. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2215, n.9 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Congress could use such information to model similar Bankruptcy legislation. But see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
No. 97-1825, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16945, "23-"28 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999) (holding that extensive legislative record alone did not
suffice to bring title II of the Americans with Disability Act under the umbrella of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment where
legislation goes beyond rational relationship standard and forces states to make modifications).
286. See Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980).
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respect to the causes of action against states, like Maine/l<7 that have not waived sovereign immunity broadly or at all,
some forum would be provided for aggrieved bankruptcy parties.
B. Suing in the Name of the United States
Congress also could authorize suits against states by a United States Trustee,:Ml or possibly by a private
trustee or debtor-in-possession, on behalf of the United States.2IfI Alden recognized that suits brought in the name of
the United States differ "in kind from the suit of an individual.,,29J In fact, one court already has provided a post-
Seminole Tribe bankruptcy law roadmap for Congress to do so. Specifically, in Department of Transportation and
Development v. PNL Asset Management Co. (In re Fernandez), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a judgment creditor, who had acquired a judgment from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") and thereafter contested a state's title to property purchased from the debtor, could step into the shoes of
the United States to sue the state in federal court.2!II
The court first noted that the "Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States government from filing
suit in federal court against a state.',M However, the court ultimately held that the judgment creditor's suit could not
proceed because "a private successor to the FDIC cannot by implication enjoy the status accorded the national
government for Eleventh Amendment purposes."m Thereafter, in denying a petition for a rehearing, the Fifth
Circuit noted that:
we are persuaded that there must be a clear expression of purpose to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in any
extension of agency status to a private party for the purpose of jurisdiction. We find no such clarity of pur-
pose [in section l06(a)] as required by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe.~
Although it is clear from the Fernandez decision that private parties cannot merely step into the shoes of the
federal government to sue states at will, Congress probably could authorize bankruptcy trustees and debtors-in-
possession to bring suits based on federally created bankruptcy claims for relief in the name of the United States as
long as it made such authorization clear and unequivocal.<!5 Congress also likely would have to create a stronger
287. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2268 (1999).
288. Meltzer believes that authorizing suit by the United States Trustee perhaps "would alleviate the serious problems
otherwise posed by Seminole for the administration of bankruptcy." Meltzer, supra note 114, at 57 & n.264. Glauberman doubts
whether Meltzer's analysis is correct, noting that many bankruptcy suits arise under state law and questioning whether Congress
may authorize the United States to bring actions against states that do not arise as federal causes of action. See Glauberman, supra
note 117, at 104-06 & n.259.
289. This could work in at least two ways. First, the United States Trustee could sue a state for bankruptcy causes of action
held by the federal bankruptcy estate and not by any private plaintiff. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965);
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) (holding that the state could not maintain an Eleventh Amendment defense against a
suit brought by the United States even though the suit was brought for the benefit of a Native American tribe; however, under
section 307 of the Bankruptcy Code, the United States Trustee has standing to do so.) The important issue is whether the United
States has a sufficient interest in the suit to justify an elimination of a state's Eleventh Amendment defense. The interest need not be
a direct pecuniary interest. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375 (1923); United States v. University of N.M., 731 F.2d
703,705 (10th Cir. 1984) (The United States may bring suit against a state as a trustee for a Native American tribe in a trespass
action.); Multi-district Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31 v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. (In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution),
481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the United States may sue as parens patriae to vindicate the interests of its citizens.).
On the other hand, the United States may not delegate its own power to sue a state to a private party. See Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 783 (1991) (dictum) (not permitting Native American tribes to sue in the name of the United States
to redress injury to the tribes.).
Second, within the constraints of Alden and Blatchford, Congress could authorize a private party, like a chapter 7 trustee or
chapter 11 debtor in possession, to bring suits on behalf of the United States. See Joseph F. Riga, State Immunity in Bankruptcy After
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 28 SETON HALL L. ~v. 29, 59 (1997). Thus, the suits would have to assert claims for relief created as a
matter of federal bankruptcy law that do not belong to a private plaintiff. Whether this proposal will avoid Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity depends on whether courts will consider injury to a federally created bankruptcy estate to be injury to the
United States and whether the United States Trustee's supervisory authority over trustees and debtors in possession constitutes
sufficient government control over the litigation. See United States ex reI. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d
195,202-03 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (holding that qui tam suits against States are not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); infra notes 311-20 and accompanying text.
290. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
291. Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Management Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1997),
amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1997).
292. In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; 130 F.3d at 1138 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965». When states
entered into the Union, they consented to be sued by the United States. See id. 123 F.3d at 246; 130 F.3d at 1138.
293. Id. 130 F.3d at 1139 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added).
295. See Janger, supra note 148, at 1438 (suggesting Congress could vest power in the United States trustee to bring avoidance
actions). Under current law, the private trustee or debtor in possession stands in the shoes of all of the debtor's unsecured creditors,
including the United States when it is an unsecured creditor. See 11 V.S.c. § 544(b) (1994). Under Fernandez this statute might meet
the requirement that the private trustee or debtor in possession enjoys the status accorded the national government for Eleventh
Amendment purposes because section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly and expressly abrogates sovereign immunity with
B - 28
1
.....
j
.J
J
J
..J
J
I
....
J
J
J
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
nexus between the United States Trustee and the private trustee, such as requiring the United States to receive a
percentage of any funds recovered from a state.:&> Indeed, Congress already has done so in the analogous context of
qui tam suits brought in the name of the United States. In these suits, a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
cannot be asserted successfully. 'B7 The qui tam statute presents a simple model for Congress to follow:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the I'erson and for the United States gov-
ernment. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if
the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.2ll
In a qui tam suit, a private plaintiff may sue in the name of the United States299 to seek civil damages for
violation of the False Claims Act.3.11 Under the False Claims Act, a person who makes a false monetary claim to the
United States government is liable to the government for treble damages plus a $5,000-$10,000 civil penalty.3.R The
United States is given control over the litigation through the power to intervene,3.2 settle,3.D or terminatiM the suit. If
the United States does not intervene, the private plaintiff conducts the action,3.6 but any recovery belongs to the
United States, subject to the right of the private plaintiff to receive a percentage of the proceeds of the suit.n
Delegating the power to sue in the name of the United States to private parties is not without substantial
criticism. Allowing private parties to sue in the federal government's name in bankruptcy, essentially for the
purpose of circumventing Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, distorts the principles of federalism by
removing the states' constitutional protection against non-consensual appearances in federal court.3.V The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in recognizing the blatant end-run around the Eleventh Amendment, held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars qui tam suits brought by private parties where the United States declines to intervene.3.8
The court reasoned that when the federal government takes a passive role in a qui tam action, "it is difficult to treat it
as the party that has 'commenced or prosecuted' the suit.,,3.9 Moreover, the qui tam statute does not contain the clear
expression of abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in its extension of agency status to private parties.3.'
respect to section 544. Cj, e.g., Pate v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 136 B.R. 437, 450-51 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that trustee's claim
asserted on behalf of the United States was not barred by the state statute of limitations since the trustee was empowered to assert
rights of the United States as a creditor); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affd sub nom.,
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). In our view it is unlikely, however, that the Supreme
Court would accord such a charitable construction to the Bankruptcy Code. Relying on City of Boerne, the Court would probably
hold that there is no clear statement that Congress intended in section 544(b) to lend the name of the United States to abrogate
immunity and there is not a sufficient nexus between the United States and the private trustee to allow such a suit. Moreover, even
if congressional intent was clear, we think the Court would find delegation of the power to sue in the name of the United States to
transgress the constraints of Blatchford. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
296. See United States ex reI. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195,202-03 (2d Cir. 1998). Providing
the United States a monetary incentive is not itself dispositive, see supra note 295, but it would strongly favor an indication that the
United States is the real party in interest.
297. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202-03; United States ex reI. Berge v. Board of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in qui tam context); United States ex reI. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. University of Mich., 860 F. Supp. 400,404 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (dismissing
on Eleventh Amendment grounds a retaliation suit brought by individual against state pursuant to False Claims Act but noted that
Eleventh Amendment would not bar a private suit brought under main qui tam action.); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of
Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 550 (1995); Justin V. Switzer, Note, Did they really think this
is over? Seminole Tribe v. Florida and the Bankruptcy Code, 34 HODS. L. REV. 1243, 1275 (1999) (analogizing to qui tam actions). But see
Glauberman, supra note 117, at 102-04 (finding this analysis to be fatally flawed once it is extended beyond traditional qui tam suits).
298. 31 U.S.c. § 3730(b)(1) (1994). However, qui tam actions might be distinguished from bankruptcy actions on one important
ground. Unlike qui tam actions, in bankruptcy, the United States is often a creditor itself. Thus, one commentator has suggested
that vesting power in the bankruptcy trustee to bring suits in the name of the United States may create a conflict of interest. See
Janger, supra note 148, at 1440. But since the United States stands to benefit from any recovery from the state that is distributed to
creditors, the conflict is more appearance than real.
299. See 31 U.s.c. § 3730(b)(1).
300. 31 U.S.c. §§ 3729-3731.
301. See id. § 3729(a).
302. See id. § 3730(c).
303. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
304. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
305. See id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
306. See id. § 3730(d).
307. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,58 (1996) ("The Eleventh Amendment serves to avoid the 'indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties' ") (quoting Puerto Rico Aquaduct
& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993»; see also Siegel, supra note 297, at 558. Qui tam actions, unlike
bankruptcy, do not adversely affect federalism principles because such actions directly vindicate the interests of the federal
government. See Siegel, supra note 244, at 561 (delegating of authority to sue in the name of the United States should be permitted
for qui tam actions because they are "genuinely actions in which the United States is the plaintiff").
308. United States ex reI. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999).
309. Id. at 291. The Foulds decision has placed the Fifth Circuit at odds with the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States ex reI.
Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999), the Second circuit's decision in United
States ex reI. Stevens v. Vermont Agency ofNatural Resources, 162 F.3d 195,201-03 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999), and
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This issue should be resolved by the Supreme Court in the October 1999 term. The Court granted certiorari
to review the Second Circuit's decision in United States ex reI. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency ofNatural Resources.311
In Stevens, the plaintiff had filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging the Vermont agency had made
fraudulent claims against the United States.312 The United States declined to intervene in the suit.313 The state agency
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that that the state was not a "person" within the meaning of the False
Claims Act3U and, more importantly, the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.315 The majority opinion in Stevens
concluded that the term "person" included states within the meaning of the False Claims Act and further decided
that the Eleventh Amendment defense had no application.316 The court first noted that the states have no sovereign
immunity as against the United States~7 The court then concluded that the False Claims Act's statutory design
indicates that the real party in interest is the federal government, even in suits where the United States declines to
intervene.3lll Thus, a private qui tam suit is still a cause of action that belongs to the federal governmene19 and the
immunity states enjoy must yield to it. Assuming that the Court does not reverse Stevens, an assumption that is
dubious in the current climate of the balance of power between the federal government and the states,3!J then
modeling the Bankruptcy Code after the False Claims Act is constitutional and reasonably feasible.
C. Self-Executing Ex parte Young Injunction
As noted above,321 the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe recognized that individuals may sue state officials
for prospective injunctive relief in federal court under the Ex parte Young doctrine as long as Congress has not already
crafted a "detailed remedial scheme" in the statute at issue. 3Z2 In Alden, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of
the Ex parte Young doctrine. 323 Accordingly, one additional avenue that Congress should consider to ameliorate the
effects of Seminole Tribe in the bankruptcy context is the promulgation of a statutory provision that automatically
creates, on the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a standing injunction applicable to state officials and
proscribing the violation of federal bankruptcy laws.311 Such an injunction could supplement and reinforce the
existing injunctive provisions of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which state that the commencement of a
bankruptcy case automatically operates as a stay of certain actions and conduct.325
Creating a standing Ex parte Young injunction would be beneficial in at least three respects. First, it would
save the bankruptcy estate the litigation costs and the bankruptcy court system the administrative costs that would
be incurred in bringing a separate proceeding for prospective injunctive relief against state officials at the com-
the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States ex reI. Milam v. University of Tex. MD. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 '(4th Cir.
1992). The Foulds decision rests on the notion that although the United States stands to recover, at minimum, seventy percent of any
recovery against a state and thus must be considered the "real party in interest," the Eleventh Amendment will bar suit because it is
the private party that invests resources in bringing the suit and makes the day-to-day litigation decisions. Foulds, 171 F.3d at 293.
("With the merely chimerical presence of the United States in this case, the relator's significant control over the litigation process
plainly impinges on state sovereignty.").
310. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 294.
311. United States ex reI. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391
(1999).
312. See id. at 198.
313. See id. at 199.
314. The False Claims Act authorizes suits only against "persons" who defraud the federal government. 31 U.S.c. § 3729(a)
(1994).
315. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 199.
316. See id. at 205.
317. See id. at 201 (citing West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987».
318. See id. at 202.
319. See id. at 203. Because the cause of action belongs to the federal government, the Supreme Court's rule in Blatchford does
not apply. See id.
320. Given this Court's makeup, we would not be surprised to find the Court agreeing with the dissent's view in Stevens,
which remarkably foretold many of the arguments expressed in Alden, see id. at 211 (Weinstein, district judge, dissenting), that the
qui tam suit against a state is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 229. But cf Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
Justice Kennedy's opinion hinted that a suit brought in the name of the United States overcomes sovereign immunity as long as the
suit does not represent a "broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States." Id. at 2267. Thus, the most promising
course for Congress should be to authorize suits against states by the United States trustee in the name of the United States.
321. See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
322. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.s. 44, 74 (1996).
323. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2263.
324. The Automatic Stay of section 362(a) already enjoins a state official who pursues the state's interest as a prepetition
creditor. See 11 U.S.c. § 362(a) (1994). Section 362 is a statutory injunction, equivalent to a court-ordered injunction, that arises
without any court action. See, e.g., Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 1993); Carver v.
Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992); Atkins v. Martinez (In re Atkins), 176 B.R. 998, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) ("The
automatic stay in bankruptcy comes into existence as a matter of law; it is self-effectuating."); In re Xavier's, Inc., 172 B.R. 667,672
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). Although the stay is imposed by statute rather than court order, courts have considered the statutory stay
to be the equivalent of a court-ordered injunction. Thus, section 362 provides a model for Congress for enacting a statutory
injunction embodying Ex parte Young.
325. See 11 U.S.c. § 362(a) which arguably already serves this purpose.
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mencement of every case. Second, it could act as a deterrent against willful violations of the Bankruptcy Code by a
state, because it would place state officials on notice that they could be held accountable for such violations.:L}; Third,
it would avoid litigation over any existing ambiguity regarding the ability to bring Ex parte Young actions in
bankruptcy cases or proceedings.
At the very least, Congress should make clear in the Bankruptcy Code its intent to authorize parties in
interest from commencing Ex parte Young actions in bankruptcy courts to enforce some or all of the provisions of the
statute.
D. Conditional Claims Allowance
Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow a state's claim for purposes ci voting and distribu-
tion327 only if the state has waived sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding the claim and
compulsory counterclaims.:tll Under current law, the state may file a proof of claim which is deemed allowed unless
an objection is timely filed.319 As noted above,:m section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code purports to deem the filing of
a proof of claim by the state to be a waiver of sovereign immunity regarding compulsory counterclaims.:m Some
courts have questioned whether section 106(b) is unconstitutional.:rt!
Even if section l06(b) is impotent to waive state sovereign immunity, Congress could amend section 502(b)
of the Bankruptcy Codem to disallow a state's claim unless the state has waived Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity regarding the claim and compulsory counterclaims. Under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution,:DI
Congress has the power to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. Congress
has enacted a Bankruptcy Code that creates an estate comprised of all property of the debtor on the date of the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.:n> It is solely within the province of Congress to determine who has the right to share in the
estate and the priority of distribution of the estate's assets.n'i Congress could simply amend the Bankruptcy Code to
provide that if the state wants access to share in the distribution of the estate, the state must agree, perhaps through
an act of its legislature, to surrender its immunity as the price of admission. At least where the state holds an
unsecured claim, there should be no Constitutional impediment to the imposition of such a condition.:W
E. Conditional Spending
Finally, as a last resort, Congress could encourage the waiver of state Eleventh Amendment immunity
through conaitions to the receipt of federal funds.
The Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to the Spending Clause power,nl Congress may condition the
receipt of federal funds to "further broad policy objectives:,3JJ and Congress repeatedly has used its Spending Clause
power to condition receipt of federal funds to influence states to regulate or act in a federally-desired manner.311
326. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, state officials may be required to pay money damages as "costs" for violating
a court's equitable order. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-92 (1978). The Hutto Court reasoned that the cost of disobeying a
federal court order is ancillary to enforcement of federal law. See id. at 690. Thus, a state official who willfully disobeys the
automatic stay, or any other bankruptcy court order, may be held in contempt and ordered to pay money damages to the aggrieved
party.
327. In a chapter 11 case, a creditor may have a claim allowed for two separate purposes. First, the claim may be allowed for
purposes of voting on a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 502, 1111(a), 1126; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a). Second, the claim may
be allowed for purposes of distribution even if the creditor was not permitted to vote on the plan. See 11 u.s.c. §§ 1123(a)(3), 1124.
328. Based on his view that the constructive waiver doctrine is defunct and that Congress cannot use its Article I power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Glauberman sharply disagrees that Congressional action of this kind will work. See
Glauberman, supra note 117, at 87 (discussing conditional patent or copyright legislation). But Glauberman is more optimistic about
congressional legislation that would condition access to the bankruptcy court on the state legislature's having passed a law waiving
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 87 n.145 (discussing possible copyright and patent legislation).
329. See 11 U.S.c. §§ 501(a), 502(a).
330. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
331. See 11 U.S.c. § 106(b).
332. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
333. 11 U.S.c. § 502(b) (providing nine bases to disallow claims under current law).
334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
335. See 11 U.S.c. § 541(a).
336. See id. §§ 507(a), 726(a).
337. As stated above in note 187, the state may not assert a due process or takings defense under the Fifth Amendment because
the state is not a "person" within the meaning of the Amendment.
338. The Spending Clause provides that Congress has the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay
for the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
339. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
340. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (National Minimum Drinking Age Act); Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d
1148,1149 (5th Cir. 1988) (Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980); Kit Kinsport, Implied Waiver After Seminole, 82 MINN.
L. REv. 793,822-23 (1998). In response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause), President Clinton
announced that the federal government should "encourage states to ban guns from school zones by linking Federal funds to
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Presumably, Congress could require that states agree to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to
bankruptcy-related actions in order to receive, for example, federal highway funds.341
Although there are several limits to Congress's authority in this regard, none would appear to prevent
Congress from enacting such a bankruptcy-related provision. The first such limitation is found within the Spending
Clause itself-exercise of the power must be in pursuit of the "general Welfare."34'l This limitation has little
substantive application, however, because the Supreme Court has given substantial deference to the judgment of
Congress regarding the nature of the "general Welfare."X1 Thus, in the bankruptcy context, Congress likely could
justify use of its Spending Clause power to further the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, which is a legal scheme crafted
in the interest of the general welfare.314
A second limitation might arise from dictum that conditions on federal funds "might be illegitimate if they
are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.' ,,315 The relationship between the
conditions and the federal interest involved, however, need only be reasonable, and there need not be a direct
relationship.316 Additionally, the relationship only needs to run between the condition and the federal interest that is
served; the interest need not be related to the purpose of the funds. 317 Conditioning waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity with respect to bankruptcy matters clearly would be reasonably related to the important federal interests
in fostering a debtor's "fresh start" and a level playing field for creditors, both of which would be enhanced by
eliminating a state's ability to secure a preferred position relative to other creditors through the assertion of Eleventh
Amendment or sovereign immunity.J4Il
Third, the Supreme Court has noted "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds.',349 This limitation, however, is designed to prevent Congress from requiring
states to engage in discriminatory treatment of individuals on the basis of suspect classifications, engage in the
restriction of free speech or free exercise of religion, and the like. It does not limit use of the Spending Clause to
require a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically, courts have held that although Congress may not
use the Spending Clause power to require states to engage in unconstitutional activity in order to receive federal
funds, it in fact may require a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a condition to receipt of federal funds
because such a condition would not require the state to engage in any unconstitutional activity (since states always
are free to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity).:B1
enactment of school-zone gun bans." Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1995, at AI.
341. Kinsport discusses the general subject at some length and concludes that there is nothing in the Eleventh Amendment that
would bar such conditioning. See Kinsport, supra note 340, at 826. In particular, Kinsport notes that because the Eleventh
Amendment itself envisions the possibility of a waiver, "asking the states to exercise their waiver rights does not require them to
violate any 'independent constitutional bar.' " Id.; see Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1959)
(finding a state's agreement in compact to congressional condition subjected it to suit). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stated in Tennessee Department of Human Services v. United States Department of Education, 979 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1992):
"A state can waive its immunity explicitly when it opts to participate in a federal program in which Congress clearly has
conditioned participation on such waiver."
342. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
343. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. The "general Welfare" by its very terms includes a broad range of activities and necessarily
includes concerns beyond what the Constitution directly grants Congress the power to legislate. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.s.
1, 66 (1936) (explaining that the spending clause power is not "limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution"). The Court in Dole questioned whether the "general Welfare" limitation is at all a judicially enforceable restriction on
congressional power. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2; see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1911, 1929 (1995).
344. Dole instructs the courts to "defer substantially to the judgment of Congress" when determining whether the first element
of the Spending Clause test has been met. Dole, 483 U.s. at 207.
345. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion».
346. The Supreme Court left this issue open in Dole. Id. at 208 n.3. Lower courts, however, have consistently applied the
reasonable relationship standard instead of the more exacting direct relationship standard. See, e.g., California v. United States, 104
F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997).
347. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Corom'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (upholding a condition withholding highway funds from the states when a highway official violated
the Hatch Act's prohibition against participating in a political campaign). This distinction is subtle but important. Consider the
highway funds scenario. Bankruptcy has, at best, a very remote relationship to highways. Congress, however, may use highway
funds to further an unrelated, constitutionally permissible interest. Thus, Congress could use highway funds to further the federal
interest in bankruptcy law (clearly a permissible interest under Article I of the U.S. Constitution) as long as the condition imposed (a
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity) and the federal interest in bankruptcy are reasonably related.
348. But see Meltzer, supra note 114, at 55. Meltzer speculates that congressional bankruptcy statutes abrogating sovereign
immunity "are not now, and could not easily be, associated with federal spending programs." Id.; see also Glauberman, supra note
117, at 108 n.274 (agreeing with Meltzer's proposition).
349. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
350. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) ("One way for a state to waive its immunity is to accept federal
funds where the funding statute 'manifest(s) a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a
State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity.' " (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.234, 247 (1985»;
Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1992); Beasley v. Alabama State
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States may argue that Congress exceeds its permissible use of the Spending Clause power by "coercing"
states into waiving their Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy cases, and, in fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion: ,,:51 The "coercion" theory, however, has not been used in any
reported decision as a reason for barring Congressional use of the Spending Clause power.:m Additionally, a
"coercion" theory makes little analytical sense: "can a sovereign state which is always free to increase its tax revenues
ever be coerced by the withholding of federal funds--or is the state merely presented with hard political choices?',E
Recent Supreme Court cases offer little further guidance. In Alden, the Court, citing South Dakota v. Dole, stated:
"[nlor, subject to constitutional limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or means to seek the
states' voluntary consent to private suits:,:f;I Yet a statement in College Savings Bank indicates the current Court's
uneasiness in allowing Congress to condition federal funding on waiver of sovereign immunity. Justice Scalia stated:
"we think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the states' sovereign immunity is involved, the point
of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the
refusal to waive is the exclusion of the state from otherwise lawful activity:,lD But Justice Scalia's statement should
not affect Congress's ability to condition federal funding on waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to bank-
ruptcy cases and proceedings. The Court instead was distinguishing between the withholding of a gift or gratuity of
federal funds and exclusion from otherwise permissible activity.It; Thus while the recent cases appear to breathe
some life into the "coercion theory," requiring states to waive immunity in bankruptcy cases in order to receive
federal funds should not result in unconstitutional use of the Spending Clause power.
States also may argue that the Tenth Amendment:!>' prohibits Congress from "commandeering" states'
legislative process "by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program:,:HI This
argument similarly fails because the Tenth Amendment "commandeering" theory does not apply to use of the
Spending Clause power to condition receipt of federal funds.:DJ Congress, by reason of conditioned receipt of federal
funds, does not "commandeer" a state's legislation into waiving that state's Eleventh Amendment or sovereign
immunity. Instead, all that conditioning does is present a state with a choice-either it can accept federal funds and
waive its Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity for bankruptcy purposes, or it can decline the federal funds
in order to maintain its constitutional immunity.
F. Federalism Concerns
Although the options outlined above are constitutionally permissible, we must ask whether the threats to
bankruptcy law caused by the Eleventh Amendment justify our prescriptions on policy grounds. Given that Seminole
Tribe and Alden establish a constitutional right to sovereign immunity, a proper defense of the listed options requires
an analysis of federalism principles.XiI We are certain that despite the apparent harshness of some of our recom-
mended options, federalism justifies all of them.
Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d. 1304,1314 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("[E]ven the most expansive language in Seminole Tribe should not be read as
curtailing Congress's spending clause power to condition receipt of federal funds on states' waiver of their sovereign immunity.").
351. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937». Indeed, the state might argue that
although Congress can encourage a state to adopt a new program as a condition to receiving federal funds, it cannot require the
state to relinquish a property right or immunity as a condition to engaging in commerce. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (1999) ("[W]e think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the
states' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver de-
stroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.").
352. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that no party challenging the conditioning of
federal funds has ever succeeded under the coercion theory). Indeed, the Court in Dole noted that "coercion" theory would apply
only in the most extraordinary circumstances. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
353. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989).
354. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2276 (1999). The Court's reference to "constitutional limitations" is merely a confirmation
of the existing limits the Constitution places on the Spending Clause power and does not add any new restrictions.
355. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999).
356. "In the present case, however, what Congress threatens if the State refuses to agree to its condition is not the denial of a
gift or gratuity, but a sanction: exclusion of the State from otherwise permissible activity." ld.
357. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
358. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981».
359. See id. at 168 ("By [use of the Spending Clause power], as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to
conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.");
Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("Congress may 'hold out incentives to the State as a method of
influencing a State's policy choices ... " ") (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 165».
360. Alden premised its decision in part on an appeal to federalism principles. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263-65 (1999);
see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. We note there is a marked lack of scholarship on bankruptcy law within the context of
federalism. This gap likely is attributable to the pre-Seminole Tribe absence of conflict between the federal government and states
over bankruptcy issues. We do not intend to transform this Article into a lengthy discussion of federalism. Instead, we attempt
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Federalism is a subject that has occupied the attention of lawyers, judges, scholars, and politicians since the
earliest days of our republic.:Yil Essentially, federalism concerns the allocation of power between the federal
government and the states.J>! But such a broad definition offers little guidance unless the investigation is limited to
our narrow topic: whether federalism justifies congressional enactments that specifically are designed to circumvent
the Eleventh Amendment's bar to the nonconsensual exercise of federal jurisdiction against a state in bankruptcy
court. We believe that federalism provides such justification.3fU
Before examining each of our proposed congressional solutions on federalism grounds, it is helpful to note
certain considerations that guide the analysis. First, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, federalism principles favor
federal power if the Constitution generally permits the federal government to engage in particular actions.3M As a
corollary to the Supremacy Clause consideration, in areas of federal economic policy-making, the justification for
judicial restraint is particularly strong.:Ni Congress is granted preemptive authority to enact bankruptcy laws.:W;
Thus, even if the new constitutional sovereign immunity, as applied in Seminole Tribe and Alden, prevents Congress
from using its Article I power to abrogate the states' constitutional immunity in bankruptcy, other constitutional
methods that achieve the same result should be favored.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions undercut our conclusion to some extent. Alden elevates common law
sovereign immunity to a constitutional status that trumps the use of Article I power. Florida Prepaid restricts the use
of the Due Process Clause to overcome constitutional sovereign immunity. College Savings Bank eliminates the
implied waiver doctrine. All three caseS must be interpreted as a triumph of states' rights.:Yi7 But the Court did not
reject the well-grounded theory that federalism favors federal power if that power is lawfully exercised, even if the
purpose of the use of lawful power is to diminish the states' sovereign immunity.Y/l The Court carefully recognized
the limitations on sovereign immunity and noted that the states are bound to follow federal law.
Second, the traditional justifications for protecting states on federalism grounds have little application to
bankruptcy law. These traditional concerns include the "indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties,"XIJ fear of the tyranny of the federal government,J;\1 the states'
better ability to respond to its citizens' needs,3'l and the benefit of having states act as laboratories for social and
economic change.371 To the extent such justifications are legitimate,:v.l none affect bankruptcy. There cannot be fear
only initially to defend on federalism grounds the potential solutions available to Congress to overcome the Seminole Tribe and Alden
decisions.
361. See Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. 1. REV. 1295, 1299 (1997).
362. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U.I<AN. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1997).
363. Because appearing in state courts to enforce bankruptcy rights would undercut the policy of uniformity and is a practice
most bankruptcy practitioners would care to avoid, our policy discussion is limited to abrogating immunity to suit in federal court.
Nevertheless, the inability to sue states in state courts undercuts traditional bankruptcy jurisdiction that allows the estate's
representative to sue in state courts. See 11 U.S.c. § 1334(b) (1994).
364. A clear example of this consideration is the Court's venerable decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
427 (1819). There the Court held that a Maryland tax on the National Bank of the United States violated Congress's power to
legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Particular to our inquiry, Justice Marshall stated that "congress should exercise its
discretion as to the means by which it must execute the powers conferred upon it." Id. at 326.
365. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Essay, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole
Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. 1. REv. 2213, 2220 (1996).
366. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819); supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
367. See Joan Biskupic, Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WASH. POST, June 24,1999, at AI.
368. The Court's affirmation of the principles of Ex parte Young and Dole indicates approval.
369. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997).
370. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. 1. REV. 499, 525 (1995). The Lopez decision reasoned that if
Congress could enact a law banning guns around schools on Commerce Clause grounds, then Congress could fairly justify a law
regulating school curriculum on the same theory. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; 565 (1995). Implicit in this reasoning is
the fear that Congress's regulation of local school curricula is an exercise of tyrannical federal power. Fear of federal power has
roots extending to earliest years of the United States, see Weinberg, supra note 361, at 1302-03 (noting that the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions were a response to the Sedition Act of 1798), and has provided a powerful platform for electoral candidates. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2221.
371. See Chemerinsky, supra note 370, at 527.
372. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.
Id.
373. George Washington once stated: "To be fearful of vesting Congress, constituted as that body is, with ample authorities for
national purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular absurdity and madness." Weinberg, supra note 361, at 1299 (quoting
Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786) in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PuBUC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 207-D8 (Henry P.
Johnson ed., 1970». The reliance on federalism to favor states' rights has, on numerous occasions throughout American history,
produced terrible results. Before the Civil War, southern legislators consistently relied upon notions of federalism to defend the
institution of slavery. See id. at 1301. Federalism and the protection of the states was invoked to defeat national labor laws. See
Hovenkamp,supra note 365, at 2213-14. During the Civil Rights Movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles of federalism
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of federal tyranny by the mere creation of a neutral forum for marshaling, sorting through, and distributing a
debtor's assets. Moreover, preventing a suit against a state in bankruptcy court does not further a state's responsive-
ness to its citizens. And because bankruptcy is the paramount domain of Congress, state insolvency laws are
superseded by any federal bankruptcy law.J74 Thus, the benefit of states as laboratories for social and economic
development simply does not exist in the bankruptcy context. J;5 Last, the argument that states ought not be subject
to the indignity of the coercive process, while bandied about by the current majority of the Supreme Court in a slew
of cases, has little merit in American jurisprudence.J;l;
Third, states have the ability to protect their interests in bankruptcy both inside the courthouse and in
Congress. States already receive some preference in bankruptcy.J7l States also have a unique lobbying power at the
national level that safeguards their autonomy and insures that Congress does not abuse its power.J;ll
Fourth, there is a strong, uniquely national, interest in bankruptcyPJ and a specific national interest in the
bankruptcy court as a neutral forum.:H1 As we stated in the introduction, bankruptcy provides resolution to
competing claims that often cross state lines. The Court's apparent disregard in Florida Prepaid for the national
interest in patent law uniformity, as a justification for overcoming sovereign immunity, must cause some concern for
bankruptcy advocates, but even in Florida Prepaid the Court accepted the basic premise that patent law needs to be
uniform in order to be effective. :Ill
Armed with these considerations,3l1 we examine whether the options available to Congress may be justified.
We begin with the easiest suggestion-the enactment of the self-executing Ex parte Young injunction. As mentioned
above, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide for a standing Ex parte Young injunction. Such an
enactment would promote bankruptcy interests by saving private and public litigation costs and deterring state
officials from willfully violating Bankruptcy Code provisions. In light of the federalism principles we discuss, clearly
such a provision favors federal power. Ex parte Young provides for the supremacy of federallaw.:JO It applies only to
prospective injunctive relief claims and thus does not directly affect a state's treasury. And such an enactment would
significantly deter state officials from willfully abusing the automatic stay, thereby helping to maintain the level
playing field among creditors.
were consistently paraded by the southern states in their attempts to defeat desegregation and implementation of the Voting Rights
Act. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). In a challenge to a provision of the Voting Rights Act that required
all voting changes by covered states to be "precleared" by the United States Department of Justice, South Carolina premised its
attack on federalism grounds. See id. Justice Black, in concurring and dissenting in the case, echoed South Carolina's argument:
[The Voting Rights Act], by proViding that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amend-
ments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional struc-
ture of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost mean-
ingless.
[d. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); see also SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 19-20 (1993). In each case the rhetoric of federalism was used to hide the desire of the states to continue repugnant
practices.
374. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819).
375. See Chemerinsky, supra note 370, at 539 (noting that the National Labor Relations Act's weaknesses have led states to
enact laws that better guarantee fair working conditions for all employees). If anything, changes in the national economy require
flexibility and experimentation at the national level, which counsel for more deference to federal decision-making. See Hovenkamp,
supra note 365, at 2221.
376. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2289 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter aptly noted that the theory of
"dignity" as a justification for state sovereign immunity is anomalous to a republican form of government. See id. The very concept
of sovereign immunity has its roots in separating the royal from his subjects. See id. Under the American form of government, the
people are the government. See id.
377. See 11 U.S.c. § 362(b)(4) (1994) (automatic stay apparently does not apply to a governmental unit's commencement or
continuation of a proceeding to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power); id. § 503(b)(1)(B) (administrative
expense priority for certain types of tax claims); id. § 507(a)(8) (some unsecured pre-petition tax claims entitled to priority ahead of
general unsecured creditors).
378. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. 1. REV. 1103, 1163 (1987). The "political
safeguards" theory is not without its critics. See Baker, supra note 343, at 1940; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. 1. REv. 849,911-12 (1999). Moulton does concede that the "political safeguards" theory at
least "rightly focuses attention on the fact that most of the hard work of allocating responsibility among levels of government
happens outside the courtroom." [d. at 913.
379. The national interest in uniform bankruptcy laws has been recognized for over two hundred fifty years. See Sturges, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 124 ("[Clongress only can make laws on the subject of bankruptcies. It is a national subject ....").
380. See Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL 1. REv. 1093,1094-95 (1992). A bankruptcy court
is not only beneficial as a neutral forum for debtors and creditors, but by virtue of its federal character, it prevents the need to resort
to state courts to vindicate national interests. See Chemerinsky, supra note 362, at 1229. James Madison once stated: "Confidence
cannot be put in State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests." [d. (quoting 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 27 (1913».
381. See Florida Prepaid Postsecongary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1999).
382. We by no means assume our list is exhaustive. Considerations governing federalism no doubt span well beyond the
scope of this Article. See supra note 360.
383. See Chemerinsky, supra note 362, at 1228.
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Amending the Bankruptcy Code to disallow a state's claim unless it waives immunity with respect to the
claim and compulsory counterclaims that may be asserted against a state also respects federalism principles. It is
perfectly reasonable to require a state, the one kind of creditor that can assert an Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity, to surrender those defenses in order to participate in a federal bankruptcy res. Such a prescription restores
the level playing field bankruptcy requires in order to fulfill its purpose. And the state's invocation of federal
jurisdiction to vindicate its claim should distinguish our proposal from the Court's attack on involuntary waivers in
College Savings Bank.:JII
The last three options appear to be more difficult to justify on federalism grounds. Reenacting the
Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Due Process Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment sets a potentially
dangerous precedent.:t6 Any federal program enacted pursuant to Article I might be made to apply to the states
through the Due Process Clause, assuming that Congress could satisfy the conditions that the Court set in Florida
Prepaid.:w. However, the resolution of property rights in bankruptcy has direct connections to legitimate due process
concerns.:W Moreover, the rate of state abuse of the bankruptcy laws is something Congress easily can catalog and
present as evidence of a continuing and pervasive pattern of state violations of the Due Process Clause. Thus,
although concerns that Congress could stretch the Fourteenth Amendment exception to tyrannical levels are
noteworthy, cloaking bankruptcy with the protections of the Due Process Clause is justified.:Hl
Our fourth option, conditional receipt of federal funds, does not have the grandeur of the Due Process
Clause. And despite its continued constitutional vitality/:HI conditional spending has been attacked routinely by
critics of federal power.:NI Conditioning a state's receipt of federal funds on waiver of the Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy smacks of dirty politicking:J)l and blatant intimidation by the federal government.
The Spending Clause power works only when Congress makes the receipt of federal funds irresistible.:JJ2 Moreover,
it must be conceded that the Eleventh Amendment defense in bankruptcy is difficult to connect with federal funds.:J.ll
384. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999) ("We think where
the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically
passed-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from
otherwise lawful actiVity.").
385. As explained above, re-enacting the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clause likely exceeds the scope of Congress's power. But see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518,
1526-27 (1999) (arguably breathing new life into the privileges and immunities clause).
386. See Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Management Co. (ln re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997),
amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138 (5th Cir. 1997).
387. The Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
388. Even easier than reenacting the entire Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Due Process Clause, a congressional amendment
to section 1983 of title 42 to abrogate sovereign immunity, thus prOViding bankruptcy parties potential takings claims, is clearly
defensible on federalism grounds. The Fifth Amendment already bars the federal government from asserting sovereign immunity
to takings claims. See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 13 (1933). There is nothing in the nature of state sovereign immunity that
distinguishes it from federal sovereign immunity for purposes of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
389. The 1990s are rife with Supreme Court opinions, beyond the Eleventh Amendment cases, supporting states' rights at the
expense of limiting federal power, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2268-69 (1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act cannot abrogate
state sovereign immunity from suit in state courts); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act invalidly abrogates state sovereign immunity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549/ 567-68 (1995) (The Gun Free School Zones Act
exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (federal law regulating
low-level radioactive waste violated the Tenth Amendment because it coerced state legislative and regulatory regimes); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (Congress may regulate the retirement age of state judges only by clear language). One would
reasonably think that the Spending Clause cases would be an inviting target for the Supreme Court. Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist
was the author of the majority opinion in Dole, and Justice Scalia recognized its vitality as an exception to constructive waiver of
sovereign immunity in College Savings Bank. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2231 (1999).
390. These attacks have focused on the lack of constraints on the Spending Clause power and the inability of states to protect
themselves from Congress. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 343, at 1933; Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. Cr. REv. 85, 87 (1988).
391. Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in FERe v. Mississippi that "[c]ongressional compulsion of state agencies ... blurs
the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs."
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J./ dissenting). The point Justice O'Connor makes is that the federal
government can insulate itself from political accountability by influencing the states to enact legislation that the state's citizens may
not in fact want (highway speed limits) in order to receive federal funds. Even if Justice O'Connor's point has merit, it only works if
in fact state citizens would care about the state's surrender to federal influence. It seems doubtful that state citizens would generate
hostility or offer any opinion on whether a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consents to be sued in federal court.
392. See William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces ofSilver" for the Rights ofYour People, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 303,319-20 (1993).
States substantially rely upon federal funding to support a wide array of projects. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 390, at 86.
393. For example, receipt of education funds on the condition that states enact gun-free zone laws or receipt of highway funds
as a condition of raising minimum drinking ages are logically connected. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Dole, argued for a rule
that required Congress to show a more than attenuated or tangential connection between the federal funds being offered to a state
B -36
J
J
J
Ij
i
!
...J
J
J
,
J
J
J
J
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
Yet the power of Congress to influence decision making at the state level through the Spending Clause
clearly supports federalism principles. Congress itself is made up of representatives of the states. Congressional
members are not immune to the pressures from home to protect specific state interests.:»! Thus, the states can, in
some measure, protect themselves against abusive federal conditioning.3\5 Moreover, the actual harm to a state in
surrendering its constitutional sovereign immunity in bankruptcy is "more rhetoric than fact.'''''' Finally, because
bankruptcy is an area of federal economic regulation,J!17 Congress must be given more deference to promote
bankruptcy goals, including, if necessary, conditioning receipt of federal funds on waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity and sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.
Last, we consider whether authorizing private trustees or debtors in possession to sue in the name of the
United States offends or supports federalism principles. Unlike the other solutions, lending the name of the United
States to a private party causes a direct confrontation between the federal government and the states. Assuming
arguendo the constitutionality of such a gambit, such authorizations solve the problem of Seminole Tribe and Alden
only because the Eleventh Amendment must yield to the supremacy of the federal government when the federal
government directly confronts a state.
Yet there is a flaw in authorizing private trustees to sue in the name of the United States such that federalism
principles suggest abandoning this option. The Supreme Court likely would conclude that the federal government's
interest in bankruptcy estates represented by private trustees or debtors-in-possession is at best remote. This is
distinguished from qui tam suits where the favorable resolution of the suit in fact benefits the United States directly.:J.Il
The direct benefit to the federal government in qui tam actions justifies lending the federal government's power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.:m
If the "suing in the name of the United States" statute is tailored such that the United States stands to benefit
from any bankruptcy recovery, however, then federalism favors such a provision. Moreover, if the United States
trustee exercises governmental discretion whether to prosecute the action on behalf of the estate in the name of the
United States, then federalism concerns evaporate. Alden recognized that the states' constitutional sovereign
immunity right must yield to suits brought by the federal government; in fact, one point of contention between the
majority and the dissenters was on the likelihood of the federal government actually bringing suits to enforce federal
law.411 Both the Alden majority and Justice Souter, in debating the likelihood of federal intervention in Fair Labor
Standard Act suits, implicitly accept the notion that federalism principles favor suits against states in federal court
where the United States stands to benefit.41R Thus, granting trustees in bankruptcy cases the right to sue in the name
of the United States in order to partially recover for the United States should be preferred.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden render section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
unconstitutional as applied to its abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity. Congress,
though providing the necessary unequivocal intent to abrogate the states' immunity, failed to abrogate states'
immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power because the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I is not a source of
legislative power that may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bankruptcy courts cannot save
section 106(a) by applying the Fourteenth Amendment exception to the Eleventh Amendment because there is no
and the federal program in which Congress wishes the states to participate. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-15 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). It is reasonable to believe that a few retirements of current Supreme Court Justices could elevate Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Dole to majority status.
394. Public choice theory states that most regulatory schemes are enacted to promote the interests of particular groups. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2217. There is no reason why states cannot lobby for self-interested legislation as effectively as a
manufacturing lobby, trial lawyers, or the American Association of Retired Persons. See infra note 395.
395. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 CoWM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2221. As Wechsler notes, national
level politicking "is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states."
Wechsler, supra at 558. Not all commentators accept Wechsler's "political safeguards" theory. See Moulton, supra note 378, at 911-
12.
396. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. As noted above, supra note 391, state citizens likely do not care whether the Eleventh Amendment is
waived as a condition to receipt of federal funds.
397. See Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2220.
398. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 306 and
accompanying text.
399. Amending the Bankruptcy Code to require the estate to distribute a percentage of any recovery to the United States
treasury may solve this problem. The fees to which the United States Trustee is entitled in 28 U.S.c. § 1930 probably are insufficient
to create a nexus between a private trustee and the United States because those fees are generated in every bankruptcy case, not just
in suits against a state.
400. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
401. See id.
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legal basis to view bankruptcy as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Nor will the Takings Clause be
available as long as section 1983 of title 42 does not abrogate sovereign immunity. But, subject to the constraints of
Boerne and Florida Prepaid, Congress might be able to reenact section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code to address
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process issues, at least to the extent states act intentionally to seize or destroy property
of the estate. Except for possible Due Process redress, it appears that a bankruptcy court may not exercise jurisdic-
tion over a state absent the state's consent or waiver of Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity.
Although Seminole Tribe and Alden have significant adverse effects for enforcing bankruptcy law against
states, trustees or debtors-in-possession still have a variety of limited options at their disposals. Governmental units
that are not arms of the state, such as counties and cities, may not invoke Eleventh Amendment protections
successfully. Trustees may still sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief pursuant to the Ex parte Young
doctrine. And, there may be a limited in rem "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment in the bankruptcy context.
But these limited options provide no relief to debtors and creditors in cases such as Tri-City TurfClub,
described in this Article's introduction. To provide meaningful resolution to the problems caused by Seminole Tribe
and Alden, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to further the policies of bankruptcy law. Congress might
achieve this goal in several ways. First, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to authorize the United States
trustee, and possibly private trustees or debtors in possession, to sue states in the name of the United States. Second,
Congress could amend the statute to provide for a standing, self-executing Ex parte Young injunction against state
officials. Third, Congress could condition a state's claim to bankruptcy proceeds on a waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment and sovereign immunity. Fourth, Congress could resort to the Spending Clause power to condition a state's
receipt of federal funds on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity.
Although these potential legislative enactments either have a limited scope or cause uneasiness with respect
to notions of federalism,411Z they are desirable to remedy the potentially devastating effect of Seminole Tribe, Alden, and
their progeny in bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
402. See Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 1133.
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BACKGROUND
B. Membership.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission
PENDING PROPOSALS FOR TAX AMENDMENTS
TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Babette A. Ceccotti, New York. Ceccotti is a labor lawyer.
Robert E. Ginsberg, United States Bankruptcy Judge,
Illinois.
M. Caldwell Butler, a fonner Member of Congress, Virginia.
Jay Alix, CPA, Michigan. Alix is a nationally prominent
bankruptcy and turnaround specialist.
C - 1
Jeffrey Hartley, Alabama. Hartley is a United States
Bankruptcy Judge in Alabama and fonner staff member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
John A. Gose, Washington. Gose is a real estate lawyer.
Edith Hollan Jones, United States Circuit Judge, Fifth
Circuit, Texas.
James I. Shepard, California. Shepard is a lawyer. See I.C.l
below.
4.
2.
3.
9.
5.
6.
7.
8.
A. Creation. Pub. L. No. 103-392, the Bankruptcy Refonn Act of
1994, established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the
"Commission"). The Commission was created to investigate and
study issues relating to the Bankruptcy Code, solicit divergent views
of parties concerned with the operation of the bankruptcy system,
evaluate the advisability of proposals with respect to such issues and
prepare a report to be submitted to the President, Congress and the
Chief Justice not later than two years after "the date of the first
meeting. The Commission, in fact, issued its report on October 20,
1997.
1. Rep. Mike Synar was the original Chainnan of the
Commission. He resigned due to illness on December 19,
1995 and died on January 9, 1996. He was replaced as Chair
on March 29, 1996 by Brady C. Williamson of Madison,
Wisconsin. Williamson is a corporate lawyer.
I.
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C. The Advisory Committee. ij
1. In early February of 1997, Chainnan Williamson appointed
an infonnal tax advisory committee (the "Advisory
Committee") to assist the Commission in "sifting and
winnowing" the Commission's tax agenda. The members of
the Advisory Committee were:
j
I
J
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.
J.
Professor Jack Williams, Georgia State College of
Law, Chainnan.
Professor Grant Newton, Pepperdine University.
Stephen Csontos, Deputy Attorney General, United
States Department of Justice.
Joyce E. Bauchner, Internal Revenue Service.
Ms. Bauchner chose not to serve and designated her
associate, Robert Miller, as a substitute member.
Mark Browning, Assistant Attorney General, State of
Texas.
Joan Pilver, Assistant Attorney General, State of
Connecticut.
Paul H. Asofsky, Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
Houston, Texas.
Robert E. McKenzie, Attorney, small finn
practitioner, Chicago, Illinois.
Mark Segal, Attorney, sole practitioner, Las Vegas,
Nevada.
Kenneth C. Weil, Attorney, sole practitioner, Seattle,
Washington.
I
J
Ii
,
oJ
J
J
I
1
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J
D. Report of Advisory Committee.
1. In August 1997, the Advisory Committee submitted its
report to the Commission. The report is published as an
appendix to the Commission's final report. The Advisory
Committee attempted to divide all of the tax issues raised in
the course of the Commission's deliberations according to
whether they were non-controversial or important and highly
controversial. In all of its recommendations where there was
not consensus, the Advisory Committee stated the competing
C-2
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b. To prescribe a uniform statutory rate of interest to be
applied when the Bankruptcy Code permits tax
payments to be deferred.
propositions and recorded the vote by member for each
proposition. The Advisory Committee identified 32
proposals as non-controversial (the "consensus proposals"),
the most significant ofwhich are as follows:
a. To adopt a series of rules changes proposed by the
Justice Department that would have the effect of
giving notice of a bankruptcy case to a governmental
unit at a place of its designation and setting forth the
nature of the claim ofthe governmental unit.
r
,
r
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
r
F
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
1
r
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.
J.
To set forth notice rules when- a debtor invokes the
prompt audit procedures of Bankruptcy Code
Section 505(b).
To conform the federal tax treatment and state and
local tax treatment as to bifurcating a taxable year
when an individual files a bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.
To provide certain tolling rules to prevent debtors
from filing successive bankruptcy petitions to avoid
the non-dischargeability rules for income taxes.
To clarify the tolling rules for non-dischargeability
when the debtor makes an offer in compromise.
To require small business debtors to create and
maintain separate bank accounts for trust fund taxes
when such debtors file a bankruptcy case.
To except fraudulent taxes from Chapter 11 discharge
for corporations.
To make clear that the automatic stay against Tax
Court proceedings does not apply to tax periods
ending after the filing ofthe case.
To conform the treatment of secured tax claims with
unsecured tax claims that are entitled to six-year
deferral under Section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
C - 3
k.
1.
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n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
To preclude trustees from taking advantage of the
bona fide purchaser rules of Internal Revenue Code
§ 6323 to invoke Section 545(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
To require debtors to pay postpetition taxes in the
ordinary course of business without the necessity of
having a governmental creditor file a request for
payment ofadministrative expenses.
To generally conform state and local tax rules
contained in the Bankruptcy Code with federal tax
rules.
To make clear that under Section 1398 of the Internal
Revenue Code, an individual's bankruptcy estate
treated as a separate entity is subject to both
alternative minimum tax and preferential capital
gains rates.
To provide a Bankruptcy Code definition of the term
"assessed" or "assessment" in those cases where a
state law does not define the term.
To prescribe standards for tax disclosures In
Chapter 11 disclosure statements.
To clarify the time period in which a taxing authority
must file a proof of claim for a priority tax in a
Chapter 7 case.
To require debtors seeking Chapter 13 relief to have
filed at least the last six years worth of tax returns.
To allow debtors to be discharged from tax liabilities
in cases where they did not file a return but otherwise
agreed to a taxing authority's determination of their
tax liability.
j
J
1
J
1
..J
Notwithstanding the foregoing, some governmental taxing authorities and private bar
groups have opposed some of these consensus items. In addition, in some cases, the
consensus has fallen apart in working out the details.
J
2. In addition to the foregoing recommendations, most ofwhich
were procedural in nature, the Advisory Committee made a
number of recommendations that involved changes to
substantive tax law. While these were consensus items,
Mr. Csontos from the Department of Justice and Mr. Miller
C-4
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from the Internal Revenue Service abstained from these
votes. The most important of these recommendations were
as follows:
a. To allow the estate to avail itself of any statutory
exclusion from gain on the sale of a personal
residence.
The Advisory Committee also made a number of
recommendations by divided votes, and most of these have
not found their way into proposed legislation.
r
r
r
r
r
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3.
b.
c.
To liberalize provisions of Internal Revenue Code
§§ 108 and 382 so that Chapter 11 corporate debtors
can retain a greater portion of their net operating loss
carryovers that were reduced or eliminated as a result
of the repeal of the stock for debt exception in 1993.
To overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), and to
provide for parallel tax treatment of the use of
property to satisfy recourse and non-recourse debt.
r
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E. Commission Action.
1. With one exception dealing with Chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy cases, the Commission rubber stamped all of the
consensus proposals of the Advisory Committee without
taking a separate vote. However, the Commission did, after
debate, adopt a number of specific recommendations on
proposals as to which the Advisory Committee was divided.
Among the more important of these were:
a. To restore secured status to ad valorem tax liens by
partially repealing Section 724(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
b. To have the burden of proof in tax disputes in the
Bankruptcy Court be the same as the rules prevailing
in non-bankruptcy tax tribunals.
c. To require periodic payment of deferred taxes under
Section 1129(a)(9) ofthe Bankruptcy Code.
d. To permit the government to set off prepetition
income tax refunds against undisputed prepetition tax
liabilities.
C-5
e.
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g.
h.
1.
To create a statutory rule for abandonment of
property by the trustee which generally treats the
abandoned property as having been disposed of by
the debtor immediately prior to bankruptcy.
To permit corporate debtors to elect to bifurcate their
tax years in a manner similar to that applying to
individuals under Section 1398(d)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
To grant the Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction to issue
declaratory judgments in respect of the tax
consequences of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
To provide that where a taxing authority does not
respond to a request under Section 505(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the discharge granted by
Section 505(b) applies to the estate itself as well as to
the debtor, a successor to the debtor, and a trustee.
To subordinate prepetition non-pecuniary loss tax
penalties in Chapters 11, 12 and 13.
- i.."~
F. Important and Controversial Items as to Which the Commission
Made No Recommendation.
1.
2.
3.
Whether to retain the Chapter 13 superdischarge in the case
of tax liabilities that may not be discharged in Chapter 7.
Whether to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545 (1990),
which allows a Bankruptcy Judge to confirm a plan of
reorganization which allocates the first payments of deferred
taxes to trust fund liabilities for which individual responsible
officers may be personally liable.
To write a definition of fraud for discharge purposes in the
case of an individual. Some cases construe the fraud
exception to discharge so broadly that debtors who pay other
debts when tax liabilities exist cannot receive a discharge.
See,~, In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994).
j
J
II. Lee;islative Response to the Commission's Tax Proposals
A. S. 1149 (Grassley, Durbin). The Investment in Education Act of
1997. This bill passed the Senate on October 30, 1997. This bill
consists only of two tax provisions, described at III and IV below.
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B. H.R. 3150 (Gekas). Reported to the House by the House Judiciary
Committee. This bill had a title containing 18 tax provisions. Passed
House 6/10/98.
C. S. 1301 (Grassley). Reported by Senate Judiciary Committee.
Merged with H.R. 3150. It was a consumer bankruptcy bill that had
no tax provisions. Passed Senate as H.R. 3150, 9/23/98.
D. S. 1914 (Grassley). Hearings held by Senate Judiciary Committee,
but never reported. Contained tax provisions similar to H.R. 3150.
E. Conference Report on H.R. 3150 printed 10/7/98. Contained House
tax provisions. House passed conference bill 10/9/98. Died in
Senate.
F. H.R. 833 (Gekas). This bill largely incorporated the Conference
Report on H.R. 3150, including tax provisions. Passed House 5/5/99.
G. S. 625 (Grassley). Included H.R. 3150 tax provisions. During the
course of the consideration of bankruptcy reform by the Senate, the
Finance Committee took an interest in the tax provisions of the bill.
By agreement with the sponsors, jurisdiction over the tax provisions
was ceded to the Finance Committee. The result of the Finance
Committee's deliberations was an amendment introduced by
Senators Roth and Moynihan. The amendment passed by a voice
vote. References in this memorandum to S. 625 are to that bill as
amended by the Roth-Moynihan amendment. The Senate has not
completed action on S. 625.
PROPOSALS INCORPORATED IN PENDING LITIGATION
Repeal of Section 724(b)
A. Proposal. To restore ad valorem tax liens to full secured status in
Chapter 7 cases. Under Section 724(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as
in effect since 1978, secured tax claims are treated as unsecured
priority claims as ifno lien existed.
B. Source of Proposal. Local school boards through the National
Association of Attorneys General; Department of Justice. Generally,
the private bar opposed amendments to Section 724(b), notably the
ABA Task Force, the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The ABA Task
Force has withdrawn its opposition. The National Bankruptcy
Conference now supports the amendment as to ad valorem real
property taxes.
C-7
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D.
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Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee considered only
two proposals, viz, to repeal Section 724(b)(2) altogether, so that all
tax liens would be recognized in bankruptcy and, alternatively, to
retain present law. By a vote of five to four with one abstention, the
Advisory Committee voted to repeal Section 724(b)(2).
Commission. The Commission ultimately gave the local taxing
authorities most, though not all, of what they wanted. Under the
Commission proposal, "11 U.S.C. § 724(b) should be amended to
exempt from subordination properly perfected, non-avoidable liens
on real or personal property of the estate arising in connection with
an ad valorem tax. Section 724(b) should also require the trustee to
marshall unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate and surcharge
secured claims, if warranted by the circumstances, under 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c) prior to subordinating any tax liens under the statute."
Since the Commission issued its report, the National Bankruptcy
Conference has changed its position to support repeal of
Section 724(b)(2) with respect to ad valorem real, but not personal,
property taxes. The breaking of ranks by the National Bankruptcy
Conference appears to be a significant political development.
H.R. 833 and S. 625. Under pressure from local school boards and
with the support of Commissioner Shepard, Senator Grassley
introduced S. 1149, the Investment in Education Act of 1997, which
was co-sponsored by Senator Durbin, the then ranking minority
member of the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee to which
this matter was assigned. Sections 801(a) ofH.R. 833 and 701(a) of
S. 625, each of which is substantially identical to section 2(a) of
S.1149, would exempt ad valorem real or personal property tax liens
from the operation of Section 724(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Thus, if a lien is properly perfected and unavoidable, it would be
given effect as a secured claim in accordance with its usual priority,
except that it would continue to be subordinated to claims for wages,
salaries and commissions entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(3)
of the Bankruptcy Code and to claims for contributions to an
employee benefit plan entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Code. Other tax liens, for example, federal tax liens,
would continue to be subordinated under the current provisions of
Section 724(b)(2). However, before subordinating a tax lien in such
a case, the trustee would be required to exhaust the unencumbered
assets of the estate, and, in a manner consistent with Section 506(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code, recover from property securing an allowed
secured claim the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of
preserving or disposing of that property. Also, subordination does
not apply to administrative expenses in converted chapter 11 cases.
Issues.
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1. Should expenses of administration in Chapter 7 take priority
over secured as well as unsecured tax claims?
2. Is the interest of local school boards in property tax revenue
sufficiently important to treat ad valorem secured tax claims
on a higher priority than all others, including federal tax
liens?
3. Should non-governmental secured creditors bear the burden
of these taxes since this is the commercial expectation?
Downgrading the tax lien would appear to give such secured
creditors a windfall.
Limitation on Bankruptcy Court's Section 505 Jurisdiction
A. Proposal. To preclude the Bankruptcy Court from redetermining
ad valorem property taxes if the contest period under local law has
expired.
B. Source of Proposal. Local school boards through the National
Association ofAttorneys General.
C. Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee considered a
proposal to limit the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in
determining tax liability to situations in which a non-bankruptcy
forum would have jurisdiction to hear the matter. This proposal
incredibly received only one vote, that of the Assistant Attorney
General from Connecticut. It was defeated seven to one with two
abstentions. All four private practitioners, both professors, and the
Assistant Attorney General from Texas voted against the proposal.
D. Commission. The Commission did not take up this proposal.
E. S. 1149, H.R. 833 and S. 625. Sections 801(b) of H.R. 833 and
701(b) of S. 625, each of which is substantially identical to section
2(b) of S.1149, would withdraw jurisdiction from the Bankruptcy
Court to determine the amount or legality of any ad valorem real or
personal property tax if the applicable period for contesting or
redetermining that amount under non-bankruptcy law has expired.
F. Issues.
1. Should the bankruptcy court generally have the power to
determine tax controversies under circumstances where the
debtor has lost its rights under non-bankruptcy law?
2. If the answer to this question is yes, is there any justification
for making an exception for ad valorem taxes?
C-9
v. Notice to Governmental Units
-
A.
B.
C.
D.
Proposal. To prescribe statutory rules for the content and method of
notice to governmental creditors.
Source of Proposal. United States Department of Justice;
Commissioner Shepard.
Advisory Committee. Recommended Justice Department's
proposals as a rules change. These proposals generally would permit
a governmental unit to designate an address to which service of
process must be addressed and would provide some specificity as to
the content of such notice. However, the taxing authority would be
required to file such address and specification with each local
bankruptcy clerk so that a debtor seeking .to comply with the
requirements in good faith could readily ascertain them. The
Advisory Committee specifically rejected a proposal that would
require an individual debtor to red flag a potential trust fund liability,
but instead placed the burden on the government by requiring the
debtor to list on his schedules all business entities in which the debtor
was an officer, director or substantial equity holder. Thus, it would
be up to the governmental taxing authority to assert the trust fund
penalty in the bankruptcy case, or else the debtor would be
discharged.
Commission. Recommended Justice Department's proposals as a
rules change. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference has not
adopted the Justice Department's rules package in spite of the
Commission's recommendation, thus precipitating legislative action.
I
J
E. H.R.833.
1. Section 503 of the bill would require a debtor who lists a
governmental unit as a creditor in a list or schedule to
identify the department, agency or instrumentality through
with the debtor is indebted. If the debtor's liability to a
governmental unit arises from a debt or obligation owed or
incurred by another individual, entity, or organization, or
under a different name, the debtor shall identify such
individual, entity, organization or name. The clerk of each
bankruptcy court is required to keep and update quarterly a
register in which a governmental unit may designate a
safe-harbor mailing address for service of notice in cases
pending in the district. A notice not complying with the
requirements of the statute shall have no effect unless the
debtor demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
C -10
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S. 625. No provision.
r
r
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r
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F.
G. Issues.
1.
timely notice was given in a manner reasonably calculated to
satisfy the requirements of the statute, and if the
governmental unit does not file a safe harbor mailing
address, the debtor's burden includes proving that an officer
of the governmental unit who is responsible for the matter or
claim had actual knowledge of the case in sufficient time to
act.
Is the statute a proper place to prescribe detail for the content
and method of notice, or should such detail be left to the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial
Conference?
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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r
r
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VI.
2. Should an individual debtor be discharged from an as yet
unasserted trust fund tax liability if he has not notified the
relevant taxing authority of the potential for such liability?
Section 505(b) Notice
A. Proposal. To allow tax authorities to prescribe the form and method
ofnotice when Section 505(b) relief is sought. Present practice is for
debtors to file their Section 505(b) requests with their tax returns.
The IRS has adopted specific requirements in Rev. Proc.81-17,
1981-1 C.B. 688, but has met with mixed results in the bankruptcy
courts.
B. Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; Commissioner
Shepard.
C. Advisory Committee. Adopted substance of proposal but required
each governmental unit to file the address for sending notice in a
registry maintained by the clerk in each district.
D. Commission. Rubber stamped as part of consensus proposals.
E. H.R.833. Section 803 of the bill would amend Section 505(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code to require that any request for a determination of
tax liability under that section must be made "substantially in the
manner designated by the governmental unit." There is no
requirement for filing these requirements with the court.
F. S. 625. Section 703 of the bill would require the clerk of each
district to maintain a listing under which a Federal, state or local
taxing authority may designate an address for service of requests
C-11
G.
under Section 505(b) and describe where further information
concerning additional requirements for filing such requests may be
found. If the taxing authority does not make such a filing, any
Section 505(b) request may be served at the address for the filing of a
tax return or protest with the appropriate taxing authority.
Issues.
,.
1.
2.
Should all taxing authorities be permitted to prescribe the
form and method of notices under Section 505(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code as the Internal Revenue Service has
attempted to do in Rev. Proc. 81-171
If such authority is to be granted, should there be a central
office or a computer website in which the taxing authority
must post such requirements so that "a debtor seeking the
benefits of Section 505(b) will be able to readily ascertain
such requirements? Most private bar groups would accept
the general proposal as so modified.
VII. Interest Rate on Deferred Tax Payments
A.
B.
c.
D.
E.
Proposal. To provide a uniform rate of interest in respect of tax
claims.
Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department ofJustice.
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee adopted as a
consensus item that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to prescribe a
uniform interest rate in the case of deferred taxes at a stated statutory
rate regardless ofwhether federal, state or local taxes were involved.
The report stated, "Although short of a consensus, a majority of
members of the Advisory Committee suggest that the fixed federal
deficiency rate under IRC § 6621(a)(2), without regard to
IRC § 6621(c), be employed."
Commission. The Commission adopted the Advisory Committee
proposal and specifically adopted the Section 6621(a)(2) deficiency
rate.
H.R. 833. (Section 804)
j
...
1. In the case of an ad valorem tax claim, whether secured or
unsecured, other unsecured tax claims where interest is
required to be paid under Section 726(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code and secured tax claims, the rate is to be
determined under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
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VIII.
2. In the case of all other tax claims, the "minimum" rate of
interest is the Federal short-term rate determined under
Section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code plus three
percentage points. The rate is determined on the basis of the
prevailing rate in the calendar month in which a plan of
reorganization is confirmed.
F. S. 625. Under Section 704 of the bill, the rate is the applicable non-
bankruptcy rate, determined as of the calendar month in which a plan
is confirmed. The importance of the Senate provision is significantly
diluted by its specific provision of a uniform interest rate for deferred
payments under Section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code. See
XIII below.
G. Issues.
1. Should the Bankruptcy Code determine interest rates with
respect to tax claims on the basis of bankruptcy policies, or
should applicable non-bankruptcy tax deficiency rates apply?
Tollin2 of Section 507(a)(Sl(Al Time Periods
A. Proposal. To toll the priority/nondischarge periods of
Section 507(a)(8)(A) for prior bankruptcy cases, pending offers in
compromise and installment payment agreements. Under present
law, taxes becoming due within three years or assessed within 240
days of a bankruptcy filing cannot be discharged, but the 240-day
period is tolled during the time that an offer in compromise is in
effect.
B. Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department ofJustice; Commissioner Shepard.
C. Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee proposed as a
consensus item a tolling for the time during which a previous
bankruptcy case was pending for the three-year nondischarge period
of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), but did not vote on a six-month, or any
other, add-on. The Advisory Committee also adopted a proposal for
the tolling of the 240-day nondischarge period of
Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) during the period when offers in
compromise are pending, as well as accepted offers. The Advisory
Committee rejected a proposal to apply any tolling to the period
during which an installment payment agreement is in effect.
D. Commission. The Commission adopted the Advisory Committee
consensus.
C-13
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H.R. 833. Section 805 of the bill would provide for the tolling of
certain time periods provided In Section 507(a)(8)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code. The proposal would add to the three-year
nondischargeability period now applicable under
Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) the period of time during which a prior
bankruptcy case was pending plus six months. Also, the provision
would make the 240-day period under Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) for
offers in compromise apply to pending as well as to accepted offers.
Finally, the bill would toll the 240-day period during the time an
installment payment agreement is in effect, plus 30 days, with a
maximum period ofone year.
S. 625. Section 705 of the bill would adopt tolling periods as
follows:
-
The private bar does not oppose these provisions. The only disputes
involve the add-on periods and the application of the tolling rules to
installment payment agreements.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
For prior bankruptcy cases, the Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)
priority period would be tolled during the period of the prior
case plus 90 days;
The 240 day priority period of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)
would be tolled during any period of time in which an offer
in compromise was pending or in effect plus 30 days;
The 240 day priority period of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)
would be tolled during any period of time for which a stay of
proceedings against collection was in effect during a prior
case plus 90 days; and
The priority periods under Section 507(a)(8) would be tolled
during the time a governmental unit is prohibited under
applicable non-bankruptcy law from collecting a tax as a
result of a request by a debtor for a hearing and an appeal of
any collection action taken or proposed against a debtor.
This latter tolling period IS designed to preserve the
government's rights during the time when a taxpayer is
invoking hearing and appeal rights given him by the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997.
Note that unlike H.R. 833, there is no tolling in S. 625
applicable to the period of time when an installment payment
agreement is in effect.
!
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G. Issues.
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r IX.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Should the nondischarge period of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) be
tolled during any period in which a prior bankruptcy case
was pending? Does the absence of such a tolling provision
encourage serial filings?
Should there be an additional six months (or any other time)
added to any such tolling period? Cf. Section 6503(h) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Should the 240-day nondischarge period of
Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) be tolled for the period during
which any offer in compromise is pending but not yet
accepted?
Should the nondischarge period under
Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) be tolled for the period during
which any installment payment agreement is in effect?
Would such a provision favor taxpayers who run away from
the IRS over those who try, but fail, to work out their tax
debts?
F. Issues.
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
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A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Proposal. To provide a definition of "assessment" for non-federal
taxes in bankruptcy cases.
Source of Proposal. National Association ofAttorneys General.
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee adopted as a
consensus item that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to provide that
the term "assessed" or "assessment" as used in Sections 362(b)(9),
dealing with the automatic stay, and 507(a)(8), dealing with
nondischargeability periods, shall mean "that time at which a taxing
authority may commence an action to collect a tax." This
amendment would apply with respect to state and local taxes only,
since the definition of assessment for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code is clear.
Commission. Rubber stamped as part of the consensus proposals.
H.R. 833 and S. 625. Section 806 ofH.R 833 and Section 706 ofS.
625 would both substitute the word "incurred" for the word
"assessed" where it appears in Section 507(a)(8)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Code, providing for a priority for ad valorem real
property taxes.
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3. These provisions are noncontroversial.
x. Chapter 13 Dischar2e
1. Should the Bankruptcy Code provide a definition of the tenn
"assessment" to cover those cases where that tenn is not
specifically used under a state or local law imposing a tax?
2. Should any such definition apply both for purposes of the
automatic stay provisions of Section 362 and the priority
provisions ofSection 50n
-
-
A.
B.
Proposal. To repeal the Chapter 13 "superdischarge." Under
present law, a debtor who goes into Chapter 13 and commits future
income on a best efforts basis can be discharged from tax liabilities
that would survive Chapter 7.
Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department of Justice.
C. Advisory Committee. Divided five/five. No proposal.
D. Commission. Generally rejected proposals to repeal the
superdischarge; divided four/four with one abstention on a proposal
to deny discharge in the case oftax fraud.
E. H.R. 833. Section 807 of the bill would deny a discharge in
Chapter 13 in respect of tax debts that could not qualify for a
discharge in Chapter 7.
s. 625. Section 707 of S. 625 would deny the superdischarge to
taxes that are non-dischargable under Sections 523(a)(1)(B) and
523(a)(1)(C), i.e., fraudulent returns, unfiled returns, and late filed
returns. Other tax liabilities could be discharged.
F.
G. Issues.
1.
2.
What is the justification for granting a discharge from a tax
(or other) liability in Chapter 13 if such liability is excepted
from discharge in Chapter 7 by Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code?
Will the availability of a broader discharge in Chapter 13
encourage more delinquent taxpayers to use their best efforts
to pay some of their liabilities and come back into the
system? If so, do tax authorities really lose anything if a
superdischarge is continued?
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Chapter 11 Dischar1:e
B. Source of Proposal. Commissioner Shepard
This is the most controversial provision in the bill.
A. Proposal. To make an exception to the Chapter 11 discharge for
corporations in fraudulent tax cases.
What is the definition of fraud for purposes of the discharge
rules?
Even if there is room for a "superdischarge" in Chapter 13,
should it extend to tax liability attributable to fraud?
3.
4.
XI.
r
r
r
r
r,
C. Advisory Committee. Adopted proposal unanimously.
r
!
,..,
D.
E.
Commission. Rubber stamped as part of the consensus proposals.
H.R. 833. Section 808 of the bill would deny Chapter 11 discharge
to tax liabilities arising from fraudulent tax returns filed by
corporations.
r F. S. 625. Section 708 of the Bill is the same as Section 808 ofH.R. 833.
Tax Court Jurisdiction
r
r
.
r,
r
r,
r
r
r
r
XII.
G.
A.
Issues.
1. At present, a Chapter 11 discharge is complete. Unlike
Chapter 7 discharges for individuals, there are no exceptions
in corporate Chapter 11 cases. Are innocent creditors
punished by this provision?
2. Will this proposal, if enacted, open Pandora's box and begin
an erosion of the chapter 11 discharge in the same way the
chapter 7 discharge has been eroded?
While originally quiescent, all major bar groups dealing with chapter
11 have come out in opposition to this proposal.
Proposal. To give the Tax Court jurisdiction over tax years ending
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition and to allow appeals from
non-bankruptcy tax tribunals notwithstanding the automatic stay.
Under a glitch in present law, the Tax Court has no jurisdiction over
an individual's post-petition tax years while the individual is in
C -17
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chapter 7, notwithstanding that the Bankruptcy Court has no
jurisdiction over those years either.
Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; National Association
ofAttorneys General.
Advisory Committee. Adopted the proposal as a consensus
proposal.
Commission. Rubber stamped the consensus proposal.
H.R.833. Section 809 of the bill would provide an exception to the
automatic stay for appeals from certain court and administrative
decisions determining a tax liability of the debtor. It would also
remove the automatic stay from any tax court proceeding involving a
taxable year ending after the petition date.
S. 625. Contains the provision with respect to the Tax Court, not the
more general provision with respect to appeals.
,
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-
G. Issues.
1.
2.
Should the prOVISIon limiting the automatic stay to
prepetition taxes be confined to individuals in chapter 7
cases? Under the proposal as drafted, the Tax Court would
have jurisdiction over administrative taxes in chapter 11 for
no apparent reason.
Should the bankruptcy court supplant federal and state
appeals tribunals as well as courts oforiginal jurisdiction?
J
XIII. Equal Installments of Deferred Taxes
A. Proposal. To require that installments of deferred tax payments
under Section 1129(a)(9)(C) be equal in amount.
I
....
B. Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department ofJustice.
C. Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee did not deal with
the equal payments issue explicitly. It did vote to preclude the
possibility of balloon payments, voting seven to three to require
"periodic" payments that should be monthly or quarterly. A fair
reading of the Advisory Committee proposal would be that such
payments should be equal or approximately equal. The Advisory
Committee also proposed that the six-year payment period run from
the date of the order for relief rather than the date of assessment, as is
C -18
...
r,
,
C -19
Issues.
S. 625. Section 710 ofthe bill would:
Ending the deferral period five years after the date of the
entry ofthe order for relief; and
Requiring that such payments be made "in a manner not less
favorable than the most favored non-priority unsecured claim
provided for in the plan (other than cash payments made to a
class ofcreditors under Section 1122(b».
Commission. The Commission adopted the Advisory Committee
proposal.
H.R. 833. Section 810 of the bill would require "regular installment
payments in cash, but in no case with a balloon provision, and no
more than three months apart, beginning no later than the effective
date of the plan and ending on the earlier of five years after the
petition date or the last date payments are to be made under the plan
to unsecured creditors." Secured tax claims are treated the same as
unsecured tax claims and no deferral is permitted for ad valorem
property taxes.
the case under present law. Secured tax claims would be treated the
same as unsecured tax claims.
1. Return to the concept of a value of payments equal to the
allowed amount of the claim based upon a discount rate
equal to the regular tax deficiency rate under Section
6621(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, thus
nullifying the effect of Section 704 of the bill above in cases
to which Section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code
applies;
2.
4. Secured tax claims are treated the same as unsecured tax
claims.
1. What is the justification for allowing prepetition tax claims,
which are entitled to a priority, to be deferred over a six-year
period in cases where the plan provides that general
unsecured creditors are paid at confirmation or under some
more accelerated schedule?
3.
2. Should any deferral period be measured from the date of
assessment ofthe tax or the date of the order for relief?
E.
D.
F.
G.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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3. Should secured tax claims be entitled to a longer deferral
period? Should the debtor have the same flexibility in
dealing with these as with secured non-tax claims?
XIV.
4. Do special considerations apply to ad valorem real property
taxes?
State and local Tax authorities here made the uniform interest rate
their biggest objection to S. 625.
Avoidance of Tax Liens
A.
B.
C.
Proposal. To prevent a bankruptcy trustee from stepping into the
shoes of a hypothetical purchaser to create a superpriority under
I.R.C. § 6323 and thus avoid a tax lien.
Source of Proposal. Commissioner Shepard; Department ofJustice.
Advisory Committee. Adopted the proposal as a consensus item.
D. Commission. Rubber stamped the Advisory Committee consensus.
E.
F.
G.
H.R. 833. Section 811 of the bill would amend Section 545(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code by adding the words "except where such purchaser
is a purchaser described in Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 or similar provision of state or local law."
S. 625. Section 711 of the bill is substantially the same as
Section 811 ofH.R. 833.
Issues.
1.
2.
Section 6323 allows a purchaser of certain types of property,
~, securities and automobiles, to take good title
notwithstanding a filed federal tax lien so as not to impede
commerce in those items. Should a trustee be treated as a
purchaser of those items to avoid the lien? Carefully crafted
state tax lien provisions preserve the lien in bankruptcy.
The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association
supports this provision. The National Bankruptcy
Conference opposes it.
j
j
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XV. Administrative Taxes as Course of Business Expense
C - 20
.1
..
,.
I
r
r
r
A.
B.
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Proposal. To require that all postpetition taxes be paid as ordinary
course ofbusiness expenses.
Source of Proposal. Department ofJustice; Commissioner Shepard.
Advisory Committee. Proposed that taxes treated as administrative
expenses be paid in the nonnal course of business, that ad valorem
real property taxes be treated as an administrative expense and be
treated as a reasonable and necessary cost ofadministering the estate.
D. Commission. Rubber stamped Advisory Committee's consensus.
r
r
r
r
r
E.
F.
G.
H.R.833. Section 812 ofthe bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code
and related statutes to require that postpetition taxes be paid in the
ordinary course of business, that ad valorem real property taxes be
paid when due, and that no request be required of a governmental
unit as a condition for the debtor's payment of an administrative
period tax liability in the nonnal course. Exceptions are made for
taxes in respect of real property abandoned by the trustee and
Chapter 7 cases where a court makes a finding of probable
insufficiency of funds of the estate to pay all administrative
expenses, in which case such tax payments may be deferred until
final distribution.
S. 625. Section 712 of the bill IS substantially the same as
Section 812 ofH.R. 833.
Issues.
XVI. Late Filed Tax Claims in Chapter 7
Commission. Rubber stamped the Advisory Committee consensus.
Source of Proposal. Kenneth C. Weil.
Advisory Committee. Proposed that claim must be filed prior to the
date on which the court approves the final report and accounting of
the trustee.
These proposals are noncontroversial.1.
Proposal. To move the deadline for a taxing authority to file a late
tax claim in Chapter 7 (such claims are treated as general unsecured
claims not entitled to priority) to a fixed date prior to the
commencement of distribution so that the distribution process cannot
be disrupted.
A.
C.
B.
D.
r
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H.R. 833. Section 813 of the bill requires the claim to be filed
within 10 days following the mailing to creditors of the summary of
the trustee's final report, or the date on which the trustee commences
distribution under section 726, whichever is earlier.
S. 625. Section 713 of the bill is substantially the same as Section
813 ofR.R. 833.
XVII.
G. Issues. None.
Definition of Return for Discharge Purposes
A.
B.
C.
Proposal. To allow Chapter 7 discharges to individuals who do not
file returns but otherwise settle tax liabilities with taxing authorities.
Source of Proposal. ABA Task Force.
Advisory Committee. By a vote of eight to one with one abstention,
the Advisory Committee recommended that for dischargeability
purposes, a written consent to tax liability signed by the debtor, a
non-bankruptcy tax tribunal stipulation signed by the taxpayer or an
attempt by the debtor to sign a substitute for return prepared by a tax
authority all be considered a filed return. A return prepared by a
taxing authority but not consented to by the debtor would not be
considered a return for any purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. J
D. Commission. No action.
E.
F.
G.
H.R. 833. Section 814 of the bill would liberalize the exception to
discharge under Section 523(a)(I)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code for
taxes attributable to unfiled returns and certain late filed returns by
providing that a return includes a return filed pursuant to
Section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, or similar state or
local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment entered by a
non-bankruptcy tribunal. A return prepared by a tax authority under
Section 6020(b) or equivalent is not a return.
S. 625. Section 714 of the bill is substantially the same as Section
814 ofH.R. 833.
Issues.
J
1. Should a debtor who signs a return prepared by a tax
authority or who enters into a written stipulation of tax
liability in a non-bankruptcy tribunal be entitled to the
finality otherwise given to stale tax liabilities under
Section 523 ofthe Bankruptcy Code?
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rXIX. Dnmed Returns in Chapter 13
Scope of Section 505(b) Protection
Issues.
Source of Proposal. ABA Task Force.
On the other hand, does the mere signing of a government
prepared return or a stipulation constitute a sufficient good
faith disclosure to the government of an individual's
financial affairs that he should be protected from further
assessment if the taxing authority later determines that
additional tax, interest or penalty may be due?
2.
Advisory Committee. By a vote of six to three with one abstention,
the Advisory Committee recommended adoption of the ABA Task
Force proposal.
Proposal. To extend Section 505(b) protection to the estate where a
taxing authority does not timely respond to notice. This proposal
would reject the holdings in In re Fondiller, 125 B.R. 805 (N.D. Cal.
1991); In re Rode, 119 B.R. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); and In re
West Texas Marketing Com., 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir. 1995).
Commission. The Commission unanimously adopted the ABA Task
Force proposal.
H.R.833. Section 815 of the bill would add the estate to the debtor,
a successor to the debtor and the trustee as a person who would be
protected from a tax claim upon the failure of a governmental unit to
respond to a request for a determination of taxes under
Section 505(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
1. If a taxing authority has failed to respond to a properly filed
Section 505(b) request within the required sixty-day period,
thus discharging the debtor, any successor to the debtor and
the trustee from liability for taxes in respect of that
administrative tax period, should the taxing authority
nevertheless be able to assert a claim to estate assets if
distribution has not yet been made?
S. 625. Section 715 of the bill is the same as Section 815 of H.R.
833.
Proposal. To require debtors to bring tax returns current as a
condition for obtaining Chapter 13 relief.
A.
B.
C.
E.
D.
G.
F.
A.
XVIII.
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Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department of Justice; Commissioner Shepard.
Advisory Committee. Adopted detailed proposal. As a prerequisite
for confirming a Chapter 13 plan, a debtor must have filed tax returns
for all tax periods ending within six years prior to the petition date.
A debtor's written consent to a substitute for return prepared by a tax
authority or written stipulation to a judgment in a nonbanlcruptcy tax
tribunal will constitute a "filed return" for purposes of this proposal.
Prepetition tax returns must be properly filed with the appropriate tax
authorities at least one day prior to the conclusion of the first meeting
of creditors. At or before the conclusion of the first meeting of
creditors, the debtor must file with the court a statement certifying,
under penalty ofperjury, that all required tax returns for the relevant
periods have been properly filed with the appropriate tax authorities.
The Chapter 13 trustee may require that a debtor submit copies of
returns to the trustee. If tax returns have not been filed by the date on
which the first meeting of creditors commences, the trustee may
continue the first meeting to allow additional time to file returns.
The additional time allowed shall be no longer than (1) 120 days
from the order for relief for returns that are past due as of the order
for relief, or (2) for returns not past due as of the order for relief date,
the later of (i) 120 days from the petition date or (ii) the automatic
extension date for filing a return under applicable tax law. Failure to
timely file tax returns by the above deadline for prepetition returns,
or by due dates (including extensions pursuant to applicable tax laws)
for postpetition returns, shall constitute cause for conversion or
dismissal under section 1307(c). The court, for good cause shown
due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable, may extend the return-filing deadline. Dismissal or
conversion would be automatic if such extended deadline were
missed. The deadline for objecting to plan confirmation shall be at
least sixty days after prepetition tax returns are filed with the tax
authorities. A debtor may not file an objection to a proof of claim for
a tax required to be reported on a return unless the debtor has filed a
return for that tax. The section 502(b)(9) "governmental bar date"
will be modified (for tax claims only) to allow tax authorities sixty
days from the filing of tax returns by debtors to file proofs of claim;
provided, however, that this modification will not have the effect of
shortening the governmental bar date in any case.
Commission. Approved Advisory Committee proposal after debate.
-
-
E. H.R.833.
1. Section 816 of the bill generally adopts the Advisory
Committee's proposal, but (i) reduces the required number of
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tax returns to three, and (ii) allows further continuances for
the filing of returns to be granted by the Court only where
the debtor demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the failure to file returns is due to circumstances beyond
the control of the debtor. This extension for past due returns
is limited to 30 days.
2. For purposes of this section only, a return includes a return
prepared pursuant to Section 6020(a) or (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 or similar state or local law, or a
written stipulation to a judgment entered by a
non-bankruptcy tribunal.
S. 625. Section 716 of the bill is the same as Section 816 of H.R.
833, except that six years of returns is required..
r
r
r
G. Issues.
1.
2.
In the case of a debtor who is a habitual non-filer, is it
practical to require six years of tax returns? Is this a fair
condition for obtaining Chapter 13 relief? Would three years
be sufficient?
If the debtor pleads for more time to file his tax returns and
can make a showing, is the clear and convincing standard too
high a threshold?
xx. Chapter 11 Disclosure Statements
r
r
r
r
r
r
A.
B.
c.
D.
Proposal. To provide statutory standards for tax discussion In
Chapter 11 cases.
Source of Proposal. ABA Task Force. The Task Force position
was narrowly drafted. It would "amend Bankruptcy Code
Section 1125(b) to provide that the bankruptcy court shall not
approve a disclosure statement unless it contains (1) a discussion of
the material federal and state tax consequences of the plan to the
debtor and any entity created pursuant to the plan, and (2) with
respect to each class of claims and interests, a discussion of the
material federal tax consequences of the plan to a hypothetical
investor typical of the holders of claims or interests of the relevant
class."
Advisory Committee. Adopted ABA Task Force proposal as a
consensus item.
Commission. Rubber stamped as part ofconsensus proposals.
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H.R. 833. Section 817 of the bill requires "a full discussion of the
potential material federal, state and local tax consequences of the
plan to the debtor, any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical
investor domiciled in the state in which the debtor resides or has its
principal place ofbusiness."
S. 625. Section 717 of the bill requires a discussion [not a "full"
discussion] of the material federal [not state or local] tax
consequences of the plan to the debtor, any successor to the debtor,
and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or
interests.
Issues.
1. Should the Bankruptcy Code require a "full" discussion of
the tax consequences of a plan of reorganization In a
Chapter 11 disclosure statement? Does such a requirement
encourage objections to disclosure statements?
J
j
XXI. Setoff
2.
3.
Should any such requirement extend to a discussion of state
and local tax issues? To the debtor only? To holders of
claims and interests? Under H.R. 833, what local tax
consequences need be discussed?
Should the requirement vary depending upon the size of the
case?
A.
B.
C.
D.
Proposal. To allow taxing authorities to set off prepetition refunds
against prepetition tax liabilities without moving for relief from stay.
Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; United States
Department of Justice.
Advisory Committee. By a vote of eight to one with one abstention,
the Advisory Committee voted to allow governmental tax authorities
to set offprepetition tax refunds against prepetition tax liabilities. By
a vote of six to four with all governmental representatives in the
minority, the Advisory Committee rejected a government proposal to
allow setoffofpostpetition refunds against prepetition tax liabilities.
Commission. The Commission adopted a narrow proposal,
proposing to allow setoffs of prepetition income tax refunds against
"undisputed" prepetition income tax liabilities and did not consider
C - 26
.J
J
the proposal to allow setoff of postpetition refunds against
prepetition liabilities.
S. 625. Section 718 of the bill generally allows a setoff of a
prepetition income tax overpayment against a prepetition income tax
liability, except that in any case in which the setoff of an income tax
refund is not pennitted under applicable non-bankruptcy law because
of a pending action to detennine the amount or legality of a tax
liability, the tax authority may hold the refund pending resolution of
the action unless the court grants the taxing authority adequate
protection for the secured claim ofthat authority in the setoff.
H.R. 833. Under Section 818 of the bill, a governmental unit is
generally pennitted to set off an income tax refund for a prepetition
period against an income tax liability for a prepetition period without
regard to the automatic stay, unless prior to such setoff an action to
detennine tax liability under Section 505(a) was commenced. The
proposal would further provide that where a setoff of an income tax
refund is not pennitted because of a pending action under
Section 505(a), the governmental unit may hold the refund pending
the resolution of the action. These exceptions are meaningless.
Effectively, the statute allows setoff of prepetition income tax
refunds against prepetition income tax liabilities.
Bifurcation of Corporate Taxable Year
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G. Issues.
1.
2.
3.
4.
What is the justification for relieving taxing authorities from
the necessity of moving the court to pennit a setoff when
such requirement applies to all other creditors?
If setoff is to be pennitted, should the right be extended to
allow setoff of postpetition refunds against prepetition
liabilities?
If setoff is to be permitted for uncontested income tax
liabilities, what standard should be applied to detennine
whether a prepetition tax liability is undisputed? Does the
requirement of the filing ofa contest under Section 505(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code go too far?
If this statute passes, what should become of existing local
rules and standing orders that currently allow setoffs in
individual districts?
r
•
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A. Proposal. To provide that corporate income tax liabilities for the
year of bankruptcy filing are treated as an administrative expense.
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E. H.R.833. No provision.
B.
c.
D.
F.
G.
Overrule In re LJ. O'Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995),
In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995) and
United States v. Hillsborough Holdings Com., 116 F.2d 1391 (11th
Cir.1997)..
Source of Proposal. Internal Revenue Service; Department of
Justice.
Advisory Committee. Voted seven to three to adopt the proposal.
Divided evenly on a proposal to allow a corporate debtor an election
to create two short taxable years.
Commission. The Commission adopted a compromise proposal
which would generally treat the filing year liability of a corporation
as an administrative expense, but give to the debtor an election,
similar to that given to individuals by Section 1398(d)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code, to terminate its taxable year on the day
before bankruptcy. If the corporate debtor makes such an election, it
will have to file another return, but the liability shown on the first
short-year return will be subject to the six-year stretchout under
Section 1129(a)(9)(C) ofthe Bankruptcy Code.
S. 625. Section 705 of the bill takes the language "for a taxable year
ending on or before the date of filing of the petition" and moves it
from Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code into the
introductory language of Section 507(a)(8)(A), so that the relevant
portion of Section 507(a)(8)(A) now reads, "Eighth, allowed
unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent that such
claims are for - (A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts
for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the
petition - (iii) . . . not assessed before, but assessable, under
applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the
case." Thus, it would appear, that no portion of a straddle year could
give rise to a priority claim under Section 507(a)(8), and the claim
for the entire year of filing would be an administrative expense under
Section 503(b)(1).
Issues.
-
j
J
...
!
J
j
1. Income tax liabilities cannot be determined until the last day
of a taxable year, when all items of income and deduction
have been accrued. Is there any theoretical justification for
treating a tax liability for the year of filing as anything other
than an administrative expense?
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2. To the extent that the economic activities of the debtor
giving rise to a tax liability occur in the portion of the
taxable year preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
should the debtor be permitted to identify that portion of the
filing year tax liability and enjoy the six-year deferral of
Section 1129(a)(9)(C) ofthe Bankruptcy Code?
3. Section 1398(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code allows an
individual to elect to terminate his taxable year as of the day
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Should a similar
election be given to a corporation?
Tax authorities strongly support this proposal. There is a wide
divergence ofviews in the private bar.
Conformity of Federal Tax Provisions With State/Local
A. Proposal. To conform various state and local tax provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code with corresponding federal tax provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.
B. Source of Proposal. National Bankruptcy Conference; Professor
Grant Newton.
C. Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee recommended a
laundry list ofconforming changes as follows:
1. Repeal Section 1231(b) of the Bankruptcy Code so that no
separate taxable entity would be created upon the filing of a
family farmer bankruptcy.
2. Provide debtors with a short year termination election (as
opposed to the current mandatory termination) for state and
local tax purposes identical to that provided by
Section 1398(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.
3. Section 346(a) should be revised to provide that for state and
local tax purposes the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 are to be used:
a. To determine when a separate estate is created as the
result of the filing of a bankruptcy petition;
b. To determine which attributes that are available
under state and local tax laws are transferred to the
estate on the filing of a bankruptcy petition and are
transferred back to the individual on termination of
the estate;
C -29
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e.
To detennine how income (to the extent provided for
under state and local laws) from the estate (when
created) is taxed or deductions (to the extent provided
for under state and local laws) are allowed;
To detennine how income from the cancellation of
debt is to be reported and how basis and other tax
attributes (to the extent they are available under state
law) are reduced; and
To detennine the tax consequences of transfers
between the bankruptcy estate and individual debtor.
;:
-
-
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
A new subsection should be added to Section 346 to provide
that the applicable state and local tax rates (rather than
federal rates) should be used to detennine any tax liability or
refund for state and local taxes.
A new subsection should be added to Section 346 to provide
that it is the responsibility of the trustee to file federal, state
and local tax returns (when required under applicable
federal, state and local laws) for a separate estate created by
the filing of a bankruptcy petition and for partnerships and
corporations filing bankruptcy petitions.
Section 346(c) should be repealed. (I.R.C. § 1398 addresses
the applicable issues -- when an estate is created, how an
estate is taxed and the accounting methods to use).
Section 346(c) should be repealed. (I.R.C. §§ 1398 and 1399
and the proposed change in Section 346 address these
issues -- filing status for corporations and partnerships and
responsibilities for filing tax returns (item 5 above».
Section 346(d) should be repealed (Section is not needed if
I.R.C. § 1398 applied -- a separate estate is not created in
Chapter 13).
Section 346(e) should be repealed (Section is not needed
since I.R.C. § 1398 provides for how income is handled by
the estate and the allowance of expenses).
Section 346(f) should be modified to provide that the same
provisions apply to federal tax law as well -- deals with
payment ofwithheld items.
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11. Section 346(g) should be repealed (I.R.C. § 1398 addresses
the applicable issues -- transfers between bankruptcy estate
and individual debtor).
12. Section 346(h) should be repealed (I.R.C. § 1398 addresses
the applicable issues -- preservation of NOL and provides
that short tax years do not create a separate year for NOL
carryover periods (Note that the current section 346(h) is
inconsistent with I.R.C.».
13. Section 346(i) should be repealed (I.R.C. § 1398 addresses
the applicable issues -- attribute carryover and use of NOL
carryovers).
14. Section 346(j) should be repealed (I.R.c. §§ 1398 and 108
address the applicable issues -- income from cancellation of
debt, tax attribute reduction, etc.).
15. Section 728(a) should be repealed (I.R.C. § 1398 provides
that the estate's year ends the day before the petition is filed
if the election for a short year is timely filed).
16. Section 728(b) should be repealed (provisions regarding the
requirement of the filing of returns are now included in
Section 346 (see item 5 above).
17. Section 728(c) and (d) should be repealed. (With the
suggested changes above, there would be no useful purpose
for these provisions).
18. Section 1146(a) should be repealed. (I.R.C. § 1398 provides
that the estate's year ends the day before the petition is filed
if the election for a short year is timely filed).
19. Section 1146(b) should be repealed (provisions regarding the
requirement of the filing of returns would be included in
Section 346 (see item 5 above).
20. Section 1231 should be repealed -- a separate estate is not
created in Chapter 12.
CommissioD. Adopted Advisory Committee consensus.
H.R. 833. No provision.
s. 625. Section 719 of the bill would rewrite Section 346 of the
Code to largely have substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
mirror corresponding provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
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Thus, if a taxable entity is created for Federal income tax purposes, a
taxable entity is created for state and local tax purposes as well. If no
taxable entity is created for state and local tax purposes, then income
tax is imposed directly on the debtor. In combination, these two
changes take care of the chapter 12 problem. Taxable years are also
confonned, so that if a tennination election is made for Federal
income tax purposes, it automatically applies for state income tax
purposes, but not otherwise. Accounting methods, tax attributes,
withholding rules, transfer nonrecognition provisions, discharge of
indebtedness and attribute reductions resulting therefrom will all be
governed by principles of the Internal Revenue Code. The draftsmen
may have created a needless ambiguity by providing that the trustee
is only required to file partnership returns for state and local income
tax purposes if also required to make such filings for Federal income
tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that
the trustee of a partnership must file partnership infonnation returns
even though the expense involved may have no benefit to creditors.
There are some who disagree that the Internal Revenue Service has
the authority to make such a rule in the absence of a statute.
Otherwise, former rules relieving trustees of filing returns during
bankruptcy administration if there was not net taxable income for the
entire period of administration of the case have been repealed.
G. Issues.
1. None. This proposal is noncontroversial.
XXIV. Failure to File Post-petition Returns.
i
J
A. Proposal. To require conversion or dismissal of cases in which a
debtor does not file post-petition tax returns.
B. Source of Proposal. Unknown.
C. Advisory Committee. No recommendation.
D.
E.
F.
Commission. No recommendation.
H.R. 833. No provision.
S. 625. Section 720 of the bill would add a new subsection (k) to
Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that notwithstanding
any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code, if the debtor fails to file
post-petition tax returns a taxing authority may request that the court
enter an order converting or dismissing the case, and if the debtor
does not file the required return or obtain an extension to do so
within 90 days after a request is filed by a taxing authority "the court
C - 32
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shall convert or dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interests of
the creditors and the estate."
Issues.
1. Bankruptcy is a process (at least in the case of an individual)
aimed at sorting out, satisfying and possibly discharging pre-
petition debts. What is the relevance of the failure of a
debtor to file a post-petition tax return on whether he should
be entitled to a discharge?
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HR833
TITLE VIII- BANKRUPTCY TAX PROVISIONS
SEC. 801. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LIENS.
(a) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LIENS.-Section 724 of title II,
United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding
paragraph (I), by inserting "(other than to the extent that there
is a properly perfected unavoidable tax lien arising in
connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal
property of the estate)" after "under this title";
(2) in subsection (b)(2), after "507(a)( I )", insert
"(except that such expenses, other than claims for wages,
salaries or commissions which arise after the filing of a
petition, shall be limited to expenses incurred under chapter 7
of this title and shall not include expenses incurred under
chapter II of th is title)"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(e) Before subordinating a tax lien on real or personal
property of the estate, the trustee shall-
"( I) exhaust the unencumbered assets of the estate;
and
"(2) in a manner consistent with section 506(c) of this
title, recover from property securing an allowed secured claim
the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving or
disposing of that property.
"(f) Notwithstanding the exclusion of ad valorem tax liens set
forth in this section and subject to the requirements of subsection
(e)-
"( I) claims for wages, salaries, and comm issions that
are entitled to priority under section 507(a)(3) of this title; or
S625
TITLE VII- BANKRUPTCY TAX PROVISIONS
SEC. 701. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LIENS.
(a) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LJENS.-Section 724 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding
paragraph (1), by inserting "(other than to the extent that there
is a properly perfected unavoidable tax lien arising in
connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal
property of the estate)" after "under this title";
(2) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting "(except that
such expenses, other than claims for wages, salaries or
commissions which arise after the filing of a petition, shall be
limited to expenses incurred under chapter 7 of this title and
shall not include expenses incurred under chapter 11 of this
title)" after "507(a)( I)"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(e) Before subordinating a tax lien on real or personal
property of the estate, the trustee shall-
"( I) exhaust the unencumbered assets of the estate;
and
"(2) in a manner consistent with section 506(c),
recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the
reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving or
disposing of that property.
"(f) Notwithstanding the exclusion of ad valorem tax liens
under this section and subject to the requirements of subsection (e),
the following may be paid from property of the estate which secures a
tax lien, or the proceeds of such property:
"(1) Claims for wages, salaries, and commissions that
are entitled to priority under section 507(a)(4).
(")
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"(2) claims for contributions to an employee benefit
plan entitled to priority under section 507(a)(4) of this title,
may be paid from property of the estate which secures a tax lien, or
the proceeds of such property.".
(b) DETERMINATION OF TAX LIABlLlTY.-Section 505(a)(2)
of title II, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "or" at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting "; or"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(C) the amount or legality of any amount arising in
connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal
property of the estate, if the applicable period for contesting
or redetermining that amount under any law (other than a
bankruptcy law) has expired.".
SEC. 802. EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO GOVERNMENT.
(a) EFFECTIVE NOTICE TO GOVERNMENTAL UNITS.-Section
342 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by section 603, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
"(g) If a debtor lists a governmental unit as a creditor in a list
or schedule, any notice required to be given by the debtor under this
title, any rule, any applicable law, or any order of the court, shall
identify the department, agency, or instrumentality through which the
debtor is indebted. The debtor shall identify (with information such as
a taxpayer identification number, loan, account or contract number, or
real estate parcel number, where applicable), and describe the
underlying basis for the governmental unit's claim. If the debtor's
liability to a governmental unit arises from a debt or obligation owed
or incurred by another individual, entity, or organization, or under a
different name, the debtor shall identify such individual, entity,
organization, or name.
"(h) The clerk shall keep and update quarterly, in the form
S625
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"(2) Claims for contributions to an employee benefit
plan entitled to priority under section 507(a)(5).".
(b) DETERMINATION OF TAX LIABILlTY.-Section 505(a)(2)
of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "or" at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting "; or"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(C) the amount or legality of any amount arising in
connection with an ad valorem tax 011 real or personal
property of the estate, if the applicable period for contesting
or redetermining that amount under any law (other than a
bankruptcy law) has expired.".
SEC. 702. TREATMENT OF FUEL TAX CLAIMS.
Section 501 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"(e) A claim arising from the liability of a debtor for fuel use
tax assessed consistent with the requirements of section 31705 of title
49 may be filed by the base jurisdiction designated pursuant to the
International Fuel Tax Agreement and, if so filed, shall be allowed as
a single claim.".
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and manner as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts prescribes, and make available to debtors, a register in
which a governmental unit may designate a safe harbor mailing
address for service of notice in cases pending in the district. A
governmental unit may file a statement with the clerk designating a
safe harbor address to which notices are to be sent, unless such
governmental unit files a notice of change of address.".
(b) ADOPTION OF RULES PROVIDING NOTICE.-The Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference shall,
within a reasonable period of time after the date of the enactment of
this Act, propose for adoption enhanced rules for providing notice to
State, Federal, and local government units that have regulatory
authority over the debtor or which may be creditors in the debtor's
case. Such rules shall be reasonably calculated to ensure that notice
will reach the representatives of the governmental unit, or subdivision
thereof, who will be the proper persons authorized to act upon the
notice. At a minimum, the rules should require that the debtor-
(I) identify in the schedules and the notice, the
subdivision, agency, or entity in respect of which such notice
should be received;
(2) provide sufficient information (such as case
captions, permit numbers, taxpayer identification numbers, or
similar identifying information) to permit the governmental
unit or subdivision thereof, entitled to receive such notice, to
identify the debtor or the person or entity on behalf of which
the debtor is providing notice where the debtor may be a
successor in interest or may not be the same as the person or
entity which incurred the debt or obligation; and
(3) identify, in appropriate schedules, served together
with the notice, the property in respect of which the claim or
regulatory obligation may have arisen, if any, the nature of
such claim or regulatory obligation and the purpose for which
notice is being given.
(c) EFFECT OF FAILURE OF NOTICE.-Scction 342 of title II,
S 625
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United States Code, as amended by section 603 and subsection (a), is
amended by adding at the end of the following:
"(i) A notice that does not comply with subsections (d) and (e)
shall not be effective unless the debtor demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that timely notice was given in a manner
reasonably calculated to satisfy the requirements of this section was
given, and that-
"( I) either the notice was timely sent to the safe
harbor address provided in the register maintained by the
clerk of the district in which the case was pending for such
purposes; or
"(2) no safe harbor address was provided in such list
for the governmental unit and that an officer of the
governmental unit who is responsible for the matter or claim
had actual knowledge of the case in sufficient time to act.".
SEC 803. NOTICE OF REQUEST OF A DETERMINATION OF
TAXES.
Section 505(b) of title II, United States Code, is amended by
striking "Unless" at the beginning of the second sentence thereof and
inserting "I f the request is made substantially in the manner
designated by the governmental unit and unless".
S625
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SEC 703. NOTICE OF REQUEST OF A DETERMINATION OF
TAXES.
Section 505(b) of title 11, United States Code. is amended.-
(I) in the first sentence, by inserting "at the address and in the
manner designated in paragraph (I)" after "determ ination of such
tax";
(2) by striking "( I) upon payment" and inserting "(2)(A) upon
payment";
(3) by striking "(A) such governmental unit" and inserting "(i)
such governmental unit";
(4) by striking "(8) such governmental unit" and inserting (ii)
such governmental unit";
(5) by striking "(2) upon payment" and inserting "(8) upon
payment";
(6) by striking "(3) upon payment" and inserting "(C) upon
payment";
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SEC. 804. RATE OF INTEREST ON CLAIMS.
(a) AMENDMENT.-ehapter 5 of title 11, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
"§511. Rate of interest on tax claims.
"If any provision of this title requires the payment of interest
on a tax claim or requires the payment of interest to enable a creditor
to receive the present value of the allowed amount of a tax claim, the
rate of interest shall be as follows:
"( 1) In the case of ad valorem tax claims, whether
secured or unsecured, other unsecured tax claims where
interest is required to be paid under section 726(a)(5) of this
title, secured tax claims, and administrative tax claims paid
under section 503(b)(1) of this title, the rate shall be
determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
S 625
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(7) by striking "(b)" and inserting "(2)"; and
(8) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so designated, the
following:
"(b)(I)(A) The clerk of each district shall maintain a listing
under which a Federal, State, or local governmental unit responsible
for the collection of taxes within the district may-
"(i) designate an address for service of requests under
this subsection; and
"(ii) describe where further information concerning
additional requirements for filing such requests may be found.
"(8) If a governmental unit referred to in subparagraph (A)
does not designate an address and provide that address to the clerk
under that subparagraph, any request made under this subsection may
be served at the address for the filing of a tax return or protest with the
appropriate taxing authority of that governmental unit.".
SEC. 704. RATE OF INTEREST ON TAX CLAIMS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subchapter I of chapter 5 of title II,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"§511. Rate of interest on tax claims
"(a) If any provision of this title requires the payment of
interest on a tax claim or the payment of interest to enable a creditor
to receive the present value of the allowed amount of a tax claim, the
rate of interest shall be the rate shall be [sic] determined under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
"(b) In the case of taxes paid under a confirmed plan under
this title, the rate of interest shall be determined as of the calendar
month in which the plan is confirmed.".
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for
chapter 5 of title II, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 510 the following:
"511. Rate of interest on tax claims:'.
n
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"(2) In the case of all other tax claims, the minimum
rate of interest shall be the Fedral short-term rate rounded to
the nearest full percent, determined under section 1274(d) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, plus 3 percentage points.
"(A) In the case of claims for Federal income
taxes, such rate shall be subject to any adjustment that
may be required under section 6621 (d) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
"(8) In the case of taxes paid under a
confirmed plan or reorganization, such rate shall be
determined as of the calendar month in which the plan
is confirmed.".
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections of
chapter 5 of title II, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 510 the following:
"511. Rate of interest on tax claims.".
SEC. 805. TOLLING OF PRIORITY OF TAX CLAIM TIME
PERIODS.
Section 507(a)(8)(A) of title II, United States Code, as so
redesignated, is amended-
(I) in clause (i) by inserting after "petition" and
before the semicolon ", plus any time, plus 6 months, during
which the stay of proceedings was in effect in a prior case
under this title"; and
(2) amend clause (ii) to read as follows:
"(ii) assessed within 240 days before the date
of the filing ofthe petition, exclusive of-
"(I) any time plus 30 days during
which an offer in compromise with respect of
such tax, was pending or in effect during such
240-day period;
"(II) any time plus 30 days during
S625
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SEC. 705. PRIORITY OF TAX CLAIMS.
Section 507(a)(8) of title II, United States Code, is
amended-
(I) in subparagraph (A)-
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting
"for a taxable year ending on or before the date of filing of the
petition" after "gross receipts";
(8) in clause (i)-
(i) by striking "for a taxable year
ending on or before the date of filing of the
petition"; and
(ii) by inserting before the semicolon
at the end, the following: ", plus any time
during which the stay of proceedings was in
effect in a prior case under this title or during
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which an installment agreement with respect
of such tax was pending or in effect during
such 240-day period, up to 1 year; and
"(III) any time plus 6 months during
which a stay of proceedings against
collections was in effect in a prior case under
this title during such 240-day period.".
SEC. 806. PRIORITY PROPERTY TAXES INCURRED.
Section 507(a)(8)(B) of title II, United States Code, IS
amended by striking "assessed" and inserting "incurred".
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which collection was precluded by the
existence of I or more confirmed plans under
this title, plus 90 days"; and
(C) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
"(ii) assessed within 240 days before
the date of the filing of the petition, exclusive
of-
"(I) any time during which an
offer in compromise with respect to
that tax was pending or in effect
during such 240-day period; plus 30
days; and
"(II) any time during which a
stay of proceedings against
collections was in effect in a prior
case under this title during that 240-
day period; plus 90 days.".; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(H) An otherwise applicable time period
specified in this paragraph shall be suspended for-
"(i) any period during which a
governmental unit is prohibited under
applicable nonbankruptcy law from collecting
a tax as a result of a request by the debtor for
a hearing and an appeal of any collection
action taken or proposed against the debtor;
plus "(ii) 90 days.".
SEC. 706. PRIORITY PROPERTY TAXES INCURRED.
Section 507(a)(9)(B) [sic] of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking "assessed" and inserting "incurred".
n
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SECTION 807. CHAPTER 13 DISCHARGE OF FRAUDULENT
AND OTHER TAXES.
Section 1328(a)(2) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by inserting "( I )," after "paragraph".
SECTION 808. CHAPTER 11 DISCHARGE OF FRAUDULENT
TAXES.
Section 1141 (d) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
"(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (I),
the confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor which
is corporation from any debt for a tax or customs duty with
respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such
tax....
SEC. 809. STAY OF TAX PROCEEDINGS.
(a) SECTION 362 STAY LIMITED To PREPETITION TAXES.-
Section 362(a)(8) of title II, United States Code, is amended by
striking the period at the end and inserting ", in respect of a tax
liability for a taxable period ending before the order for relief....
(b) ApPEAL OF TAX COURT DECISIONS PERMITTED.-Section
362(b)(9) of title II, United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subparagraph (C) by striking "or" at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (D) by striking the period at the
end and inserting "; or"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(E) the appeal of a decision by a court or
administrative tribunal which determines a tax
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SECTION 707. NO DISCHARGE OF FRAUDULENT TAXES
IN CHAPTER 13.
Section 1328(a)(2) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by sections 105, 213, and 314 of this Act, is amended by inserting
"( 1)(8), (I )(C)," after "paragraph".
SECTION 708. NO DISCHARGE OF FRAUDULENT TAXES
IN CHAPTER 11.
Section 1141 (d) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
"(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (I), the confirmation
of a plan does not discharge a debtor that is a corporation
from any debt for a tax or customs duty with respect to which
the debtor-
"(A) made a fraudulent return; or
"(8) willfully attempted in any manner to evade or
defeat that tax or duty....
SEC. 709. STAY OF TAX PROCEEDINGS LIMITED TO
PREPETITION TAXES.
Section 362(a)(8) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by inserting ", in respect to a tax liability for a taxable period ending
before the order for relief under this title" before the semicolon at the
end.
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liability of the debtor without regard to whether such
determination was made prepetition or postpetition.".
SEC. 810. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF TAXES IN CHAPTER 11
CASES.
Section I I29(a)(9) of title II, United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subparagraph (8) by striking "and" at the end;
and
(2) in subparagraph (C)-
(A) by striking "deferred cash payments, over
a period not exceeding six years after the date of
assessment of such claim," and inserting "regular
installment payments in cash, but in no case with a
balloon provision, and no more than three months
apart, beginning no later than the effective date of the
plan and ending on the earlier of five years after the
petition date or the last date payments are to be made
under the plan to unsecured creditors,"; and
(8) by striking the period at the end and
inserting "; and"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(D) with respect to a secured claim which would be
described in section 507(a)(8) of this title but for its secured
status, the holder of such claim will receive on account of
such claim cash payments of not less than is required in
subparagraph (C) and over a period no greater than is required
in such subparagraph.".
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SEC. 710. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF TAXES IN CHAPTER 11
CASES.
Section I I29(a)(9) of title II, United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subparagraph (8) by striking "and" at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (C)-by striking "deferred cash
payments, over a period not exceeding six years after the date
of assessment of such claim," and all that follows through the
end of the subparagraph, and inserting "regular installment
payments in cash-
"(i) of a total value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
"(ii) with interest thereon calculated at the
rate provided in section 6621 (a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986;
"(iii) over a period ending not later than 5
years after the date of the entry of the order for relief
under section 301, 302 or 303; and
"(iv) in a manner not less favorable than the
most favored nonpriority unsecured claim provided
for in the plan (other than cash payments made to a
class of creditors under section 1122(b»; and"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(D) with respect to a secured claim which would
otherwise meet the description of an unsecured claim of a
governmental unit under section 507(a)(8), but for the secured
status of that claim, the holder of that claim will receive on
account of that claim, cash payments, in the same manner and
over the same period, as prescribed in subparagraph (C).".
n
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SEC. 81t. AVOIDANCE OF STATUTORY TAX LIENS
PROHIBITED.
Section 545(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking the semicolon at the end and inserting ", except where such
purchaser is a purchaser described in section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 or similar provision of State or local law;".
SEC. 812 PAYMENT OF TAXES IN THE CONDUCT OF
BUSINESS.
(a) PAYMENT OF TAXES REQUIRED.-Section 960 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "Any"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) Such taxes shall be paid when due in the conduct of such
business unless-
"( I) the tax is a property tax secured by a lien against
property that is abandoned within a reasonable time after the
lien attaches, by the trustee of a bankruptcy estate, pursuant to
section 554 of title 11, United States Code; or
"(2) payment of the tax is excused under a specific
provision of title 11, United States Code.
"(c) In a case pending under chapter 7 of title II, payment of
a tax may be deferred until final distribution is made under section
726 of title 11, United States Code if-
"( 1) the tax was not incurred by a trustee duly
appointed under chapter 7 of title 11, United States Code; or
"(2) before the due date of the tax, the court has made
a finding of probable insufficiency of funds of the estate to
pay in full the administrative expenses allowed under section
503(b) of title 11 that have the same priority in distribution
under section 726(b) of title II as such tax.".
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SEC. 711. AVOIDANCE OF STATUTORY TAX LIENS
PROHIBITED.
Section 545(2) of title II, United States Code, is amended by
striking the semicolon at the end and inserting ", except in any case in
which a purchaser is a purchaser described in section 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or in any other similar provision of
State or local law;".
SEC. 712 PAYMENT OF TAXES IN THE CONDUCT OF
BUSINESS.
(a) PAYMENT OF TAXES REQUIRED.-Section 960 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "Any"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) A tax under subsection (a) shall be paid on or before the
due date of the tax under applicable nonbankruptcy law, unless-
"( 1) the tax is a property tax secured by a lien against
property that is abandoned within a reasonable period of time
after the lien attaches by the trustee of a bankruptcy estate
under section 554 of title 11; or
"(2) payment of the tax is excused under a specific
provision of title 11.
"(c) Ina case pend ing under chapter 7 of title 11, payment of
a tax may be deferred until final distribution is made under section
726 of title 11 if-
"(1) the tax was not incurred by a trustee duly
appointed under chapter 7 oftitle 11; or
"(2) before the due date of the tax, an order of the
court makes a finding of probable insufficiency of funds of
the estate to pay in full the administrative expenses allowed
under section 503(b) of title 11 that have the same priority in
distribution under section 726(b) of title 11 as the priority of
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(b) PAYMENT OF AD VALOREM TAXES REQUIRED.- Section
502(b)( I)(B) of title II, United States Code, is amended in clause (i)
by inserting after "estate," and before "except" the following:
"whether secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which
liability is in rem only, in personam or both,".
(c) REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE
TAXES ELiMINATED.-Section 503(b)(I) of title II, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(D) notwithstanding the requirements of subsection
(a) of this section, a governmental unit shall not be required to
file a request for the payment of a claim described in
subparagraph (B) or (C);".
(d) PAYMENT OF TAXES AND FEES AS SECURED CLAIMS.-
Section 506 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by inserting "or State statute"
after "agreement"; and
(2) in subsection (c) by inserting ", including the
payment of all ad valorem property taxes in respect of the
property" before the period at the end.
SEC. 813. TARDILY FILED PRIORITY TAX CLAIMS.
Section 726(a)(I) of title II, United States Code, is amended
by striking "before the date on which the trustee commences
distribution under this section" and inserting "on or before the earlier
of 10 days after the mailing to creditors of the summary of the
trustee's final report or the date on which the trustee commences final
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that tax.".
(b) PAYMENT OF AD VALOREM TAXES REQUIRED.- Section
503(b)( I)(B)(i) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "whether secured or unsecured, including property taxes for
which liability is in rem, in personam, or both," before "except".
(c) REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE
TAXES ELiMINATED.-Section 503(b)(I) of title 11, United States
Code, is amended-
(I) in subparagraph (B), by striking "and" at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by adding "and" at the end;
and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(D) notwithstanding the requirements of subsection
(a), a governmental unit shall not be required to file a request
for the payment of an expense described in subparagraph (B)
or (C), as a condition of its being an allowed administrative
expense;"
(d) PAYMENT OF TAXES AND FEES AS SECURED CLAIMS.-
Section 506 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(I) in subsection (b) by inserting "or State statute"
after "agreement"; and
(2) in subsection (c) by inserting ", including the
payment of all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the
property" before the period at the end.
SEC. 713. TARDILY FILED PRIORITY TAX CLAIMS.
Section 726(a)(I) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking "before the date on which the trustee commences
distribution under this section;" and inserting the following: "on or
before the earlier of-
"(A) the date that is 10 days after the mailing to
n
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distribution under this section".
SEC. 814. INCOME TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY TAX
AUTHORITIES.
Section 523(a)( I)(B) of title II, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by inserting "or equivalent report or notice," after
"a return,";
(2) in clause (i}-
(A) by inserting "or given" after "filed"; and
(B) by striking "or" at the end;
(3) in clause (ii}-
(A) by inserting "or given" after "filed"; and
(B) by inserting ", report, or notice" after
"return"; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
"(iii) for purposes of this subsection a
return-
"(I) must satisfy the
requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law, and includes a
return prepared pursuant to section
6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, or similar State or local law,
or a written stipulation to a judgment
entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal,
but does not include a return made
pursuant to section 6020(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or
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creditors of the summary of the trustee's final report; or
"(B) the date on which the trustee commences final
distribution under this section;".
SEC. 714. INCOME TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY TAX
AUTHORITIES.
Section 523(a) of title II, United States Code, is amended-
(I) in paragraph (1 )(B}-
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by
inserting "or equivalent report or notice," after "a
return,";
(B) in clause (i}-
(i) by inserting "or given" after
"filed"; and
(ii) by striking "or" at the end; and
(C) in clause (ii}-
(i) by inserting "or given" after
"filed"; and
(ii) by inserting ", report, or notice"
after "return"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following flush
sentences:
"For purposes of this subsection, the term 'return' means a
return that satisfies the requirements of applicable
nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).
Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section
6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar
State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not
include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or local
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similar State or local law; and
"(II) must have been filed in
a manner permitted by applicable
non-bankruptcy law; or".
SEC. 815. DISCHARGE OF THE ESTATES LIABILITY FOR
UNPAID TAXES.
Section 505(b) of title 11, United States Code is amended in
the second sentence by inserting "the estate," after
"misrepresentation,".
SEC. 816. REQUIREMENT TO FILE TAX RETURNS TO
CQNFIRM CHAPTER 13 PLANS.
(a) FILING OF PREPETITION TAX RETURNS REQUIRED FOR
PLAN CONFIRMATION.-Section 1325(a) of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 140, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (6) by striking 'and' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (7) by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; and"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(8) if the debtor has filed all Federal, State, and local
tax returns as required by section 1308 of this title.".
(b) ADDITIONAL TIME PERMITTED FOR FILING TAX
RETURNS.-( 1) Chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, as
amended by section 135, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
"§1308. Filing of prepetition tax returns
"(a) On or before the day prior to the day on which the first
meeting of the creditors is convened under section 341(a) of this title,
the debtor shall have filed with appropriate tax authorities all tax
returns for all taxable periods ending in the 3-year period ending on
the date of filing of the petition.
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law.".
SEC. 715. DISCHARGE OF THE ESTATES LIABILITY FOR
UNI)AID TAXES.
The second sentence of section 505(b) of title 11, United
States Code, as amended by section 703 of this Act, is amended by
inserting "the estate," after "misrepresentation,".
SEC. 716. REQUIREMENT TO FILE TAX RETURNS TO
CONFIRM CHAPTER 13 PLANS.
(a) FILING OF PREPETITION TAX RETURNS REQUIRED FOR
PLAN CONFIRMATlON.-Section 1325(a) of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 213 of th is Act, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (6), by striking "and' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; and"; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
"(8) if the debtor has filed all applicable Federal,
State, and local tax returns as required by section 1308.".
(b) ADDITIONAL TIME PERMITTED FOR FILING TAX
RETURNS.-
(1) IN GENERAL-Chapter 13 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"§1308. Filing of prepetition tax returns
"(a) Not later than the day before the date on which the
meeting of the creditors is first scheduled to be held under section
341 (a), the debtor shall file with appropriate tax authorities all tax
returns for all taxable periods ending during the 6-year period ending
on the date of the filing of the petition.
n
I
VI
o
HR833
TITLE VIII - BANKRUPTCY TAX PROVISIONS
"(b) If the tax returns required by subsection (a) have not been
filed by the date on which the first meeting of creditors is convened
under section 341 (a) of this title, the trustee may continue such
meeting for a reasonable period of time, to allow the debtor additional
time to file any unfiled returns, but such additional time shall be no
more than-
"( 1) for returns that are past due as of the date of the
fiI ing of the petition, 120 days from such date;
"(2) for returns which are not past due as of the date
of the fil ing of the petition, the later of 120 days from such
date or the due date for such returns under the last automatic
extension of time for filing such returns to which the debtor is
entitled, and for which request has been timely made,
according to applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
"(3) upon notice and hearing, and order entered
before the lapse of any deadline fixed according to this
subsection, where the debtor demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the failure to file the returns as
required is because of circumstances beyond the control of the
debtor, the court may extend the deadlines set by the trustee
as provided in this subsection for-
"(A) a period of no more than 30 days for
returns described in paragraph (1) of this subsection;
and
"(B) for no more than the period of time
ending on the applicable extended due date for the
returns described in paragraph (2).
"(c) For purposes of this section only, a return
includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020 (a) or (b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or similar State or local
law, or a written stipulation to a judgment entered by a
nonbankruptcy tribunaL".
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"(b)( I) Subject to paragraph (2), if the tax returns required by
subsection (a) have not been filed by the date on which the meeting of
creditors is first scheduled to be held under section 341 (a), the trustee
may hold open that meeting for a reasonable period of time to allow
the debtor an additional period of time to file any unfiled returns, but
such additional period of time shall not extend beyond-
"(A) for any return that is past due as of the date of
the fiI ing of the petition, the date that is 120 days after the
date of that meeting; or
"(B) for any return that is not past due as of the date
of the filing ofthe petition, the later of-
"(i) the date that is 120 days after the date of
that meeting; or
"(ii) the date on which the return is due under
the last automatic extension of time for filing that
return to which the debtor is entitled, and for which
request is timely made, in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
"(2) Upon notice and hearing, and order entered before the
tolling of any applicable filing period determined under this
subsection, if the debtor demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that the failure to file a return as required under this
subsection is attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the
debtor, the court may extend the filing period established by the
trustee under this subsection for-
"(A) a period of not more than 30 days for
returns described in paragraph (1 ); and
"(B) a period not to extend after the
applicable extended due date for a return described in
paragraph (2).
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(2) The table of sections of chapter 13 of title II,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1307 the following:
"\308. Filing ofprcpctition tax returns.".
(c) DISMISSAL OR CONVERSION ON FAILURE TO
COMPLY.-Section 1307 of title II, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as
subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
"(e) Upon the failure of the debtor to file tax returns
under section 1308 of this title, on request of a party in
interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall dismiss a case or convert a case under
this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, whichever is
in the best interests of creditors and the estate.".
(d) TIMELY FILED CLAIMS.-Section 502(b)(9) of title 11,
United States Code, is amended by striking the period at the end and
inserting ", and except that in a case under chapter 13 of this title, a
claim of a governmental unit for a tax in respect of a return filed under
section 1308 of this title shall be timely if it is filed on or before 60
days after such return or returns were filed as required.".
(e) RULES FOR OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS AND TO
CONFIRMATION.-It is the sense of the Congress that the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference should,
within a reasonable period of time after the date of the enactment of
this Act, propose for adoption amended Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure which provide that-
(I) notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 3015(f), in cases
under chapter 13 of title II, United States Code, a governmental unit
may object to the confirmation of a plan on or before 60 days after the
debtor files all tax returns required under section 1308 and 1325(a)(7)
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"(c) For purposes of this section, the term 'return' includes a
return prepared pursuant to section 6020 (a) or (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or local law, or a written
stipulation to a judgment or a final order entered by a nonbankruptcy
tribunaL".
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of
sections of chapter 13 of title II, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1307
the following:
"1308. Filing ofprcpctition tax returns.".
(c) DISMISSAL OR CONVERSION ON FAILURE TO COMPLY.-
Section 1307 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
( I) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as
subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d), the following:
"(e) Upon the failure of the debtor to file a tax return under
section 1308, on request of a party in interest or the United States
trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court shall dismiss a case or
convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title,
whichever is in the best interests of the creditors and the estate.".
(d) TIMELY FILED CLAIMS.-Section 502(b)(9) of title II,
United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period at the
end of the following ", and except that in a case under chapter 13, a
claim of a governmental unit for a tax with respect to a return filed
under section 1308 shall be timely if the claim is filed on or before the
date that is 60 days after the date on which such return was filed as
required.".
(e) RULES FOR OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS AND TO
CONFIRMATlON.-It is the sense of the Congress that the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference should, as
soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, propose
n
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of title 11, United States Code; and
(2) in addition to the provisions of Rule 3007, in a case under
chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, no objection to a tax in
respect of a return required to be filed under such section 1308 shall
be filed until such return has been filed as required.
SEC. 817. STANDARDS FOR TAX DISCLOSURE.
Section 1125(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended in
paragraph (1 )-
( I) by inserting after "records," the following:
"including a full discussion of the potential material Federal,
State, and local tax consequences of the plan to the debtor,
any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor
domiciled in the State in which the debtor resides or has its
principal place of business typical of the holders of claims or
interests in the case,";
(2) by inserting "such" after "enable"; and
(3) by striking "reasonable" where it appears after
"hypothetical" and by striking "typical of holders of claims or
interests" after "investor".
SEC. 818. SETOFF OF TAX REFUNDS.
Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
sections 118, 132, 136 and 203, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (29) by striking "or";
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for adoption amended Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure which
provide that-
(1) notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 3015(f), in
cases under chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, an
objection to the confirmation of a plan filed by a
governmental unit on or before the date that is 60 days after
the date on which the debtor files all tax returns required
under sections 1308 and 1325(a)(7) of title II, United States
Code; and
(2) in addition to the provisions of Rule 3007, in a
case under chapter 13 of title 11, United States Code, no
objection to a tax with respect to which a return is required to
be filed under section 1308 of title 11, United States Code,
shall be filed until such return has been filed as required.
SEC. 717. STANDARDS FOR TAX DISCLOSURE.
Section 1125(a)(I) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by inserting "including a discussion of the
potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the
debtor, any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical
investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in the
case," after "records"; and
(2) by striking "a hypothetical reasonable investor
typical of holders of claims or interests" and inserting "such a
hypothetical investor".
SEC. 718. SETOFF OF TAX REFUNDS.
Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 402 of this Act, is amended-
(I) in paragraph (25) by striking "or" at the end;
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(2) in paragraph (30) by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; or"; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (30) the following:
"(31) under subsection (a) of the setoff of an income
tax refund, by a governmental unit, in respect of a taxable
period which ended before the order for relief against an
income tax liability for a taxable period which also ended
before the order for relief, unless-
"(A) prior to such setoff, an action to
determine the amount or legality of such tax liability
under section 505(a) was commenced; or
"(8) where the setoff of an income tax refund
is not permitted because of a pending action to
determine the amount or legality of a tax liability, the
governmental unit may hold the refund pending the
resolution of the action.".
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(2) in paragraph (26) by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; or"; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (26) the following:
"(27) under subsection (a), of the setoff under
applicable nonbankruptcy law of an income tax refund, by a
governmental unit, with respect to a taxable period that ended
before the order for relief against an income tax liability for a
taxable period that also ended before the order for relief,
except that in any case in which the setoff of an income tax
refund is not permitted under applicable nonbankruptcy law
because of a pending action to determine the amount or
legality of a tax liability, the governmental unit may hold the
refund pending the resolution of the action, unless the court,
upon motion of the trustee and after notice and hearing, grants
the taxing authority adequate protection (within the meaning
of section 361) for the secured claim of that authority in the
setoff under section 506(a).".
SEC. 719. SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE
TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 346 of title II, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 346. SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE
TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES.
"(a) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides
that a separate taxable estate or entity is created in a case concerning a
debtor under this title, and the income, gain, loss, deductions, and
credits of such estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the estate, a
separate taxable estate is also created for purposes of any State and
local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and such income,
gain, loss, deductions and credits shall be taxed to or claimed by the
estate and may not be taxed to or claimed by the debtor. The
preceding sentence shall not apply if the case is dismissed. The
trustee shall make tax returns of income required under any such State
or local law.
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"(b) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides
that no separate taxable estate shall be created in a case concerning a
debtor under this title, and the income, gain, loss, deductions, and
credits of an estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor, such
income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits shall be taxed to or claimed
by the debtor under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured
by income and may not be taxed to or claimed by the estate. The
trustee shall make such tax returns of income of corporations and of
partnerships as are required under any State or local law, but with
respect to partnerships, shall make said returns only to the extent such
returns are also required to be made under such Code. The estate shall
be liable for any tax imposed on such corporation or partnership, but
not for any tax imposed on partners or members.
"(c) With respect to a partnership or any entity treated as a
partnership under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured
by income that is a debtor in a case under this title, any gain or loss
resulting from a distribution of property from such partnersh ip, or any
distributive share of any income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of a
partner or member that is distributed, or considered distributed, from
such partnership, after the commencement of the case, is gain, loss,
income, deduction, or credit, as the case may be, of the partner or
member, and if such partner or member is a debtor in a case under this
title, shall be subject to tax in accordance with subsection (a) or (b).
"(d) For purposes of any State or local law imposing a tax on
or measured by income, the taxable period of a debtor in a case under
this title shall terminate only if and to the extent that the taxable
period of such debtor terminates under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.
"(e) The estate in any case described in subsection (a) shall
use the same accounting method as the debtor used immediately
before the commencement of the case, if such method of accounting
complies with applicable non-bankruptcy tax law.
"(f) For purposes of any State or local law imposing a tax on
or measured by income, a transfer of property from the debtor to the
estate or from the estate to the debtor shall not be treated as a
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disposition for purposes of any provision assigning tax consequences
to a disposition, except to the extent that such transfer is treated as a
disposition under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
"(g) Whenever a tax is imposed pursuant to a State or local
law imposing a tax on or measured by income pursuant to subsection
(a) or (b), such tax shall be imposed at rates generally applicable to
the same types of entities under such State or local law.
"(h) The trustee shall withhold from any payment of claims
for wages, salaries, commissions, dividends, interest, or other
payments, or collect, any amount required to be withheld or collected
under applicable State or local tax law, and shall pay such withheld or
collected amount to the appropriate governmental unit at the time and
in the manner required by such tax law, and with the same priority as
the claim from which such amount was withheld or collected was
paid.
"(i)( I) To the extent that any State or local law imposing a tax
on or measured by income provides for the carryover of any tax
attribute from one taxable period to a subsequent taxable period, the
estate shall succeed to such tax attribute in any case in which such
estate is subject to tax under subsection (a).
"(2) After such a case is closed or dismissed, the debtor shall
succeed to any tax attribute to which the estate succeeded under
paragraph (1) to the extent consistent with the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.
"(3) The estate may carry back any loss or tax attribute to a
taxable period of the debtor that ended before the order for relief
under this title to the extent that-
"(A) applicable State or local tax law provides for a
carryback in the case of the debtor; and
"(8) the same or a similar tax attribute may be carried
back by the estate to such a taxable period of the debtor under
the Internal Revenue code of 1986.
"G)( I) For purposes of any State or local law imposing a tax
(")
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on or measured by income, income is not realized by the estate, the
debtor, or a successor to the debtor by reason of a discharge of
indebtedness in a case under this title, except to the extent, if any, that
such income is subject to tax under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.
"(2) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides
that the amount excluded from gross income in respect of the
discharge of indebtedness in a case under this title shall be applied to
reduce the tax attributes of the debtor or the estate, a similar reduction
shall be made under any State or local law imposing a tax on or
measured by income to the extent such State or local law recognizes
such attributes. Such State or local law may also provide for the
reduction of other attributes to the extent that the full amount of
income from the discharge of indebtedness has not be applied.
"(k)( 1) Except as provided in this section and section 505, the
time and manner of filing tax returns and the items of income, gain,
loss, deduction, and credit of any taxpayer shall be determined under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
"(2) For Federal tax purposes, the provisions of this section
are subject to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and other applicable
Federal nonbankruptcy law.".
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-
(1) Section 728 of title 11, United States Code, is
repealed.
(2) Section 1146 of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking subsections (a) and (b) and by
redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (a) and
(b), respectively.
(3) Section 1231 of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking subsections (a) and (b) and by
redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (a) and
(b), respectively.
SEC. 720 DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE TAX
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RETURNS.
Section 521 of title I I, United States Code, as amended by
this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(k)( I) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, if the
debtor fails to file a tax return that becomes due after the
commencement of the case or to properly obtain an extension of the
due date for filing such return, the taxing authority may request that
the court enter an order converting or dismissing the case.
"(2) )fthe debtor does not file the required return or obtain the
extension referred to in paragraph (I) within 90 days after a request is
filed by the taxing authority under that paragraph, the court shall
convert or dismiss the case, whichever is in the best interests of
creditors and the estate.".
On page 268, line 13, strike "123 I(d)" and insert "I231(b)".
On page 280, strike lines 16 through 19.
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I. ELIGIBILITY - § 109
A. Regular Income - Is debtor an individual with regular income
(and is plan feasible) where funding of plan is provided by
family member or "significant other":
1. In re Murphy, 226 B.R. 601 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(debtor shared household with "significant other" for 11
years; "significant other" filed an affidavit agreeing to
make the debtor's plan payments).
2. In re Baird, 228 B.R. 324 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999)
(debtor became unemployable due to stroke; son's
payment of debtor's plan payments for 5 months was
"acceptable source of 'stable and regular' income".
3. In re Jordan, 226 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) (no
evidence of live-in boyfriend's assent to making chapter
13 plan payments).
4. Alfaro v. Vazquez (In re Alfaro), 221 B.R. '927 (1st eir.
B.A.P. 1998) (debtor's plan called for a $520,000
contribution over a five-year period from debtor's sister;
court found payments from sister "speculative at best").
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B. Debt Limitations - § 109
1. In re Scovis, 321 B.R. 336 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999) (debt
secured by an avoidable jUdgment lien is treated as an
unsecured claim to determine debt limits, even though
adversary proceeding will be required at later date).
2. In re Brooks, 216 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998)
(debtor is ineligible where IRS debt was scheduled as
unsecured but disputed in the amount of $271,000).
C. Pending Cases - § 109(g)
1. In re Barnes, 231 B.R. 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (chapter 13
case filed while chapter 7 case was still open was
dismissed; debtor's attorney was sanctioned $500).
2. In re Cowan, 235 B.R. 912 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1999)
(court declined to dismiss chapter 13 case filed after
chapter 7 discharge was entered but before case was
closed).
3. Transamerica Credit Corp. v. Bullock (In re Bullock), 206
B.R. 389 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (ok for debtor to file
chapter 13 case before entry of discharge in pending
chapter 7 case where "equities of a case so dictate and if
a second filing will not materially hinder the efficient
administration of the debtor's estate").
4. In re Whitmore. 225 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998)
(debtors' motion to dismiss should be granted even
though trustee previously filed motion to dismiss for
failure to make payments; debtors would have been
ineligible to file second case for 180 days under §
109(g)(1) if case were dismissed on trustee's motion;
second chapter 13 case filed after debtors voluntarily
dismissed first chapter 13 case but before order
dismissing first case was entered; court held that the fact
both cases were open simultaneously for a few days did
not warrant dismissal of second case).
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D. Prior Case Dismissed After Creditor Requested Stay Relief-
§ 109(g)(2) - Is Dismissal of Second Case Mandatory?
1. Andersson v. Security Federal Savings & Loan of
Cleveland (In re Andersson), 209 B.R. 76 (6th Cir. B.A.P.
1997) (section 109(g)(2) is mandatory and requires
dismissal of second chapter 13 case filed within 180 days
of the voluntary dismissal of a prior chapter 13 case in
which a request for relief from stay was filed; stay motion
in first case was resolved by the parties prior to a
hearing, and debtors' motion to voluntarily dismiss first
case was filed six months after motion for relief from
stay).
2. In re Sole, 233 B.R. 347 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998)
(trustee's motion to dismiss second case was overruled
where trustee did not show causal connection between
creditor's motion to terminate stay in first case and
debtor's subsequent request to dismiss first case).
3. In re Roland, 224 B.R. 401 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997)
(whether dismissal is mandatory or discretionary, second
case will be dismissed to prevent delay of foreclosure
action).
4. In re Ramos, 212 B.R. 29 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1997) (court
has discretion to suspend enforcement of prohibition
against refiling under special circumstances "such as
where the request for relief from stay was resolved in
favor of the debtor or where the request for relief from
stay and the dismissal were separated in time").
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II. AUTOMATIC STAY
A. Recovery of Car Repossessed Prepetition: Does a Creditor
Who Refuses to Return the Car at Debtor's Request Violate
the Automatic Stay?
1. In re Sharon (Transouth Financial Corp. v. Sharon), 234
B.R. 676 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1999) (before bankruptcy
petition was filed, creditor repossessed but had not sold
debtor's car; withholding possession of debtor's car after
demand and tender of adequate protection violates the
automatic stay; creditor's right to adequate protection is
not grounds for refusal to deliver possession; creditor
was required to pay debtor's attorney fees of $2,122.50)
(dissent by Judge Stosberg: chapter 13 debtor lacks
standing to recover property of the estate; demand for
turnover must be made by adversary proceeding, not
motion; creditor should be able to receive adequate
protection as a condition of turnover).
2. Charles R. Hall Motors. Inc. v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137
F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) (right of redemption became
property of the estate, but "We are not convinced ... that
the mere existence of the estate's ability to redeem the
automobile renders the automobile itself 'property of the
estate,' at least to the extent that it should be turned over
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)."}.
3. Spears v. Ford Motor Credit Corp (In re Spears), 223
B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1998) (FMCC did not violate
automatic stay by refusing to return car to debtor).
4. Eaton v. River City Body Shop (In re Eaton), 220 B.R.
629 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998) (car repair shop did not
violate automatic stay by retaining possession of car after
demand for turnover because, under Arkansas law,
mechanic's lien was perfected by possession, and
pursuant to § 546(b), debtor's right of recovery was
subject to mechanic's right to retain possession}.
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B. Relief From Stay on House
1. In re McPherson, 225 B.R. 203 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998)
(expensive house is not necessary to an effective
reorganization).
2. In re Binder, 224 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998)
(postpetition default in mortgage payments; home is not
necessary where debtor has no equity, debtor presented
no evidence that "the Debtor cannot obtain rental housing
at a cost equal to or less than her current payments" and
debtor unable to cure default through plan modification).
3. In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998)
("there is an irrebuttable presumption that a chapter 13
debtor's home is necessary for an effective
reorganization"), rev'd 232 B.R. 610 (D. Vt. 1999)
(remanded for determination whether property was in fact
debtor's primary residence).
4. In re White, 216 B.R. 232 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) ("A
debtor's home is necessary to an effective reorganization
only if the property is not fungible with other living
arrangements meeting the debtor's minimum living
arrangements."; debtor not permitted to retain $450,000
home while paying unsecured creditors only 25%).
C. Effect of Confirmation on Stay Relief
1. Diviney v. NationsBank of Texas (In re Diviney), 211
B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997), aff'd 225 B.R. 762
(10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) ("drop dead" provision in stay
relief order was trumped by confirmation order; stay relief
order entered before confirmation does not give bank
right to repossess car after confirmation where neither
plan nor confirmation order incorporated terms of stay
relief order).
2. Chevy Chase Bank v. Locke (In re Locke), 227 B.R. 68
(E.D. Va. 1998) (creditor may not seek relief from stay on
grounds that plan does not provide adequate protection
where creditor did not object to confirmation).
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D. Other § 362 Cases .
1. Rowe v. Ocwen Federal Bank & Trust, 220 B.R. 591
(E.D. Tex. 1997) (fifth chapter 13 case filed within 180
days of dismissal with prejudice of fourth case was found
to be in bad faith; therefore the fifth case was a nullity
and never triggered the automatic stay; bankruptcy court
annulled the stay ab initio and validated foreclosure sale).
2. In re Georgeff, 226 B.R. 852 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998)
(creditor willfully violated automatic stay by initiating
garnishment while chapter 13 case was still pending;
creditor admittedly was not certain whether order for
conversion or dismissal had become effective).
3. In re Cox, 214 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997) (trustee
filed motion to dismiss case for failure to make payments;
before the hearing, creditor repossessed debtors' car;
creditor's employee believed debtors' case had been
dismissed; creditor found to have willfully violated
automatic stay).
4. In re Sucre, 226 B.R. 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(creditor violated automatic stay by failing to stop
garnishment upon notice of chapter 13 filing; creditor had
argued that debtor shared in responsibility to contact the
Sheriff, who was the collection officer, to stop
garnishment).
5. In re McDaniels, 213 B.R. 197 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1997)
(court sua sponte granted relief from stay to all creditors
and overruled trustee's motion to dismiss).
E. Co-Debtor Stay
1. In re Schaffrath, 214 B.R. 153 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)
(relief from co-debtor stay is required where plan does
not provide for payment of co-signed debt in full).
2. In re Janssen, 220 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998)
(creditor not entitled to relief from co-debtor stay where
debtor's plan proposes to pay claim in full but not post-
petition interest).
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III. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. Causes of Action
1. American General Finance Inc. v. TiDDins (In re
Tippins), 221 B.R. 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (chapter 13
debtor has standing to bring cause of action when it was
scheduled as exempt and no one objected).
2. Olick v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 145 F.3d 513
(2d Cir. 1998) (chapter 13 debtor has standing to pursue
cause of action).
3. Davis V. Victor Warren Properties. inc. (In re Davis), 216
B.R. 898 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (trustee is proper party
to prosecute a cause of action that is property of the
estate unless the plan or confirmation order provide
otherwise).
B. Exemptions
1. In re Gamble, 168 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1999) (exempt
property is available for debtor's use after expiration of
3D-day objection period).
2. In re Pendleton, 225 B.R. 425 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998)
(proceeds from settlement of personal injury suit
constituted "disposable income" to be paid into plan
despite the fact that debtor had claimed exemption).
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IV. CHAPTER 13 PLAN ISSUES
A. Classification of Claims
1. Cosigned Debts
(a) In re Markham, 224 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998)
(unfair discrimination to classify co-signed debt for
less favorable treatment).
(b) In re Chacon, 223 B.R. 917 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1998)
(unfair discrimination to pay separately classified co-
signed debts prior to paying other unsecured
creditors).
2. Student Loans
(a) In re Mammel, 221 B.R. 238 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1998) (separate classification is unfair; provision in
plan that student loans will be discharged upon
completion of plan payments gives debtors no reason
to pay anything to student loan creditors).
(b) In re Turpen, 218 B.R. 908 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998)
(unfair classification to pay student loans in full while
paying other unsecured debts less than 100%).
(c) In re Featherston, 238 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1999) (debtor must file adversary proceeding to
determine dischargeability of student loans; provision
in plan providing that collection costs are discharged
upon completion of plan payments did not in fact
discharge the debt).
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3. Pension Loans
(a) In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1997) (not unfair discrimination to pay loans from
debtor's pension plan in full while paying 14% to
unsecured creditors; pension fund has a secured
claim).
(6) In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1999) (court does not reject debtor's attempts to
distinguish the Sixth Circuit's holding in In re
Harshbarger, 66 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1995);
Harshbarger decision did not create a per se rule;
court analyzed Harshbarger and Buchferer and
ultimately concluded that plan providing for full
payment of pension loan while paying unsecured
creditors less than 100% is not confirmable).
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B. Cramdown - Residence
1. Claims Secured "Only By A Security Interest In Real
Property That Is the Debtor's Principal Residence"
Cannot Be Modified - § 1322(b)(2):
(a) In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998)
(claim originally secured by home and 50 acres;
before bankruptcy, debtor divided acreage into 10-
acre lots and sold one lot; at commencement of case,
debtor had home and 10-acre lot as residence and 3
lots for commercial development; loan could be
modified because at time of petition loan was secured
by property other than principal residence), rev'd on
other grounds, 232 B.R. 610 (D. Vt. 1999).
(b) In re Howard, 220 B.R. 716 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)
(creditor took mortgage in 103-acre tract and smaller
tract that contained debtor's residence; prior to
bankruptcy creditor foreclosed on 103-acre tract;
when petition was filed mortgage documents still
referred to the additional collateral even though the
only collateral remaining was debtor's residence;
mortgage could be modified).
(c) In re Smart, 214 B.R. 63 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997)
(determination of whether mortgage holder's rights
can be modified is based on circumstances at the
time of the transaction, "not the serendipitous or
manipulated facts existing on the date of the filing of
the petition."; house was debtor's residence at time of
mortgage but was leased to unrelated third parties at
time of petition; modification not permitted).
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Short-term, Matured, or Balloon-Payment Obligations
Which Can Be Modified - § 1322(c)(2)
(a) First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Eubanks (In re
Eubanks), 219 B.R. 468 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1998)
(permitting modification of undersecured "short term"
second mortgage in debtors' principal residence)
(dissent by Judge Stosberg: 1322(c)(2) was not
enacted to overrule Nobleman; agrees with 4th Circuit
in Witt).
(b) In re Nepil, 206 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (under
§ 1322(c)(2), debtor may pay in full during the life of
the plan a mortgage that was accelerated and
reduced to foreclosure jUdgment prepetition; "As a
practical matter this Court can discern no difference
among a fully matured mortgage debt, a mortgage on
which the balloon payment is due, and a foreclosure
judgment.It; but foreclosure judgment must be paid in
full during life of plan).
(c) In re Glenn, 1999 WL 68570 (6th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished disposition) (confirmed plan provided for
mortgage to be satisfied by payments under the plan
for 60 months with a balloon payment due at the end
of the plan; original mortgage called for a balloon
payment at end of 5 years; debtors filed bankruptcy a
year and a half into mortgage term).
(d) In re Rowe, 239 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) ("last
payment due" means due under the original note, not
as accelerated in foreclosure; debtor's remedy in
chapter 13 is to reinstate the mortgage, cure the
arrearages through the plan and resume payments on
the mortgage outside the plan.
(e) In re Reeves, 221 B.R. 756 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1998)
(debtor may bifurcate and cram down note that
ballooned and became payable before bankruptcy).
0-11
(f) In re Witt, 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting §
1322(c)(2) as permitting modification of payments, not
modification of claim; "Thus, § 1322(c)(2) was only
intended to allow payments to be stretched out over
time; the debtor is still required to pay the 'full amount
of the allowed secured claim.").
(g) In re Dandridge, 221 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn.
1998) (fact that note had a call provision did not
permit modification under § 1322(c)(2); call provision
is distinguishable from balloon provision; court's
conclusion may have been different if call had been
exercised before bankruptcy).
(h) In re Petrella, 230 B.R. 829 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999)
(creditor holding first and second mortgage on
debtors' residence objected to plan on grounds that it
impermissibly modified creditor's claim; court held
creditor failed to satisfy its burden of proof on its
objection because it did not provide evidence of when
last payment on second mortgage would become
due; "it is incumbent upon [the creditor] to show that
the provisions of § 1322(c)(2) are not applicable.";
second mortgage could be modified).
D -12
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C. Cure Defaults
1. In re Bumgarner, 225 B.R. 327 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1998)
(mortgage did not specifically authorize interest on
unpaid arrearages; therefore, chapter 13 plan did not
need to provide for interest on arrearages in order to cure
mortgage default).
2. In re Morgan, 225 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998)
(mortgage holder was not entitled to receive interest on
arrearages to the extent the claim was undersecured).
3. In re Reed, 226 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998) (six
months was maximum permissible period of time in
which debtors could cure their automobile lease
arrearage).
D. Surrender of Property
1. Williams v. Tower Loan of Mississiooi. Inc. (In re
Williams), 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999) (debtor cannot
surrender part of collateral in partial satisfaction of non-
purchase money lien and pay balance of claim for
retained collateral; debtor proposed to surrender law
books, one TV, and gold chain, and retain a camera,
saxaphone, video cassette recorder, and one TV).
2. In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 195 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998)
(debtor may surrender three 10-acre lots and retain the
fourth 10-acre lot; mortgage originally was secured by
one 50-acre tract; prior to bankruptcy, debtor divided
property into five tracts and sold one lot), rev'd on other
grounds, 232 B.R. 610 (D. Vt. 1999).
D-13
E. Post-Confirmation Modification - § 1329(a)(1)
1. Chrysler Fin. Corp. v. Nolan, 234 B.R. 390 (M.D. Tenn.
1999) (debtor may not surrender car and reclassify
deficiency claim as unsecured; full amount of the secured
claim as of the effective date of the plan must be paid).
2. In re Dunlap, 215 B.R. 867 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997)
(debtor cannot surrender car after confirmation and treat
deficiency as unsecured claim).
3. In re Waller, 224 B.R. 876 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1998)
(after creditor obtained relief from stay post-confirmation
to repossess car, debtor could modify plan to reclassify
deficiency balance as unsecured claim; "any plan
payments on the bank's secured claim that accrued
before [the stay was terminated] must be paid as a
secured claim.").
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v. CONFIRMATION ISSUES
A. Disposable Income
1. In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1999)
(proceeds that debtors received five days after
confirmation from sale of homestead did not constitute
disposable income; postpetition disposable income does
not include prepetition property or its proceeds; "The test
is whether the asset in question is an anticipated stream
of payments.").
2. In re Pendleton, 225 B.R. 425 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998)
(proceeds from settlement of personal injury suit
constituted "disposable income" to be paid into plan
despite the fact that debtor had claimed exemption).
B. Binding Effect
1. In re Pardee, 1999 WL 965651 (9th Cir. 1999) (plan
specifically provided that postpetition interest on student
loan debt would be discharged; creditor did not object to
confirmation or appeal order confirming plan; creditor
waived its right to assert postconfirmation collateral
attack against plan on basis that interest discharge
provision violated Bankruptcy Code; plan had res judicata
effect).
2. In re Andersen, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999) (plan
specified that confirmation would constitute finding that
payment of student loans beyond that provided for by
plan would impose undue hardship upon debtor, and that
student loans would be dischargeable; debtor did not
initiate adversary proceeding to prove undue hardship;
lender did not object to plan or appeal order confirming
plan; plan is res judicata; confirmed plan is not rendered
void merely because a certain provision of the plan may
be inconsistent with, or even contrary to, the Bankruptcy
Code).
D -15
3. In re Holmes, 225 B.R. 789 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998)
(secured creditor's claim may be valued and/or modified
in chapter 13 plan through the confirmation process, and
no formal objection claim is required; debtors' motion to
confirm provided adequate notice and due process
sufficient to inform secured creditor that amount of its
claim would be determined at time of confirmation
hearing).
4. In re Scott, 229 B.R. 811 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999) (for
order confirming chapter 13 plan to be given res judicata
effect, and for plan to bind oversecured mortgagee to
treatment provided in plan, mortgagee had to be given
notice that plan was reducing its claim, and in absence of
any notice or motion filed by debtors, or of anything in
plan to put mortgagee on notice that plan was reducing
its claim, res judicata did not apply).
5. Marlow v. Sweet Antiques (In re Marlow), 216 B.R. 975
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (only rights that may be asserted
by party after confirmation are those provided for in plan;
res judicata barred debtor's postconfirmation adversary
proceeding against judgment creditor where debtor had
neither filed timely objection to judgment creditor's proof
of claim nor reserved cause of action in confirmation
order).
6. In re Thomas, 222 B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998)
(notice in plan of value of secured claim and that liens
would be released upon payment of value set forth in
plan provided creditor with sufficient notice; plan
established amount of creditor's secured claim).
D -16
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C. Effect of Confirmation on Stay Relief
1. CheVY Chase Bank v. Locke (In re Locke), 227 B.R. 68
(E.D. Va. 1998) (creditor may not seek relief from stay on
grounds that plan does not provide adequate protection
where creditor did not object to confirmation).
2. Diviney v. NationsBank of Texas (In re Diviney), 211
B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997), affd 225 B.R. 762
(10th Cir. B.A.P. 1998) ("drop dead" provision in stay
relief order was trumped by confirmation order; stay relief
order entered before confirmation does not give bank
right to repossess car after confirmation where neither
plan nor confirmation order incorporated terms of stay
relief order).
D. Standing to Object to Confirmation
1. The Court Sua Sponte
(a) In re Walsh, 224 B.R. 231 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998)
(court may raise objection to confirmation based on
disposable income test sua sponte even though
neither trustee nor unsecured creditor objected; good
faith factors overlap disposable income test, and §
1325(b)(1) does not preclude court from considering
good faith).
(b) In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1998) (court may not raise objection to confirmation
based on disposable income test; pursuant to §
1325(b)(1)(B). objection may be raised only by trustee
or unsecured creditor).
(c) In re Mammal, 221 B.R. 238 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1998) (court retains "independent right and duty to
review proposed Chapter 13 plans for compliance
with the Code" even where trustee withdraws
objection and no creditor objects to confirmation).
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2. Creditors
(a) In re Morgan, 225 B.R. 290 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(corporate servicing agent for mortgage lacks
standing to object to confirmation and engages in the
unauthorized practice of law by doing so).
(b) In re Tumen, 218 B.R. 908 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998)
(creditor is not required to file proof of claim in order
to have standing to object to confirmation, especially
where confirmation hearing is held before bar date;
however, creditor must be the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim in order to object based on
disposable income test per § 1325(b)(1 )(B)).
(c) In re Holmes, 225 B.R. 789 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998)
(creditor has affirmative duty to object to confirmation
when it is put on notice in debtor's motion to confirm
plan that plan proposed to pay creditor less than
creditor's proof of claim).
E. Lien Avoidance via Confirmation; Release of Liens
1. In re Thompson, 224 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998)
debtors could not obtain a release of secured creditors'
liens until debtors successfully completed their confirmed
plans and received discharge.
2. In re McPherson, 230 B.R. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999)
("in order to protect the creditor from premature lien
termination, and insure that the debtor is not held
hostage beyond the time he/she has performed
according to the confirmed plan, ... the better approach
is to require that a lien be released upon successful
completion of the Chapter 13 plan, but before a
discharge is entered.").
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3. Keene v. Charles (In re Keene), 222 B.R. 511 (E.D. Va.
1998) (if plan contemplates valuing secured creditor's
collateral, then secured creditor must be given notice that
valuation hearing will be held; mere notice that
bankruptcy court will hold confirmation hearing on
proposed plan, in absence of notice specifically directed
at security valuation process, will not suffice; plan stated:
"The order confirming this Plan shall be deemed to avoid
the lien and shall be a judicial determination of the
property's value" and further provided that lien shall be
released upon confirmation of plan; debtor was required
to file an adversary proceeding or a motion requesting
valuation).
4. In re Harnish, 224 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998) (a
lien not preserved in a Chapter 13 plan is extinguished at
confirmation, if the creditor has filed a proof of a secured
claim and is scheduled as an unsecured creditor).
5. In re Robertson, 232 B.R. 846 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999)
(claim of creditor holding unperfected lien would be
allowed as unsecured even though chapter 13 trustee
had not filed an adversary proceeding to avoid the lien).
6. In re Therneau, 214 B.R. 782 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997)
("As a general rule liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected unless there is affirmative avoidance action
taken. Sometimes that action must be an adversary
proceeding, but in some circumstances ... the lien may
be challenged by an objection. Liens may also be
modified through the valuation process, which in this
district involves notifying the secured creditor of the
allowed amount of the secured claim through the
confirmation order and giving the creditor an opportunity
to object.").
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VI. DISMISSAUCONVERSION
A. Debtor's "Absolute" Right to Dismiss Chapter 13 Case
1. In re Barbieri, 226 B.R. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (court has
discretion to refuse to dismiss case at debtor's request
and instead to order conversion where there is evidence
of bad faith).
2. Clearstory & Co. v. Blevins, 225 B.R. 591 (D. Md. 1998)
(debtor has absolute right to dismiss case even though
creditor had filed motion to convert and there were
allegations of bad faith).
3. In re Whitmore, 225 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998)
(debtors' motion to dismiss should be granted even
though trustee previously filed motion to dismiss for
failure to make payments; as a result, debtors were able
to immediately file second case, which was not dismissed
under § 109(g)(1».
B. Relief From Stay as Alternative to Dismissal
In re McDaniels, 213 B.R. 197 (Bankr. M.D. Gal. 1997)
(trustee filed motion to dismiss case for failure to make
payments; court sua sponte granted relief from stay as to all
creditors and overruled motion to dismiss on grounds that if
motion to dismiss were granted, debtor may refile before
mortgage holder completes foreclosure sale).
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APPENDIX
UNITED STATES CODE
Title 11. Bankruptcy
Chapter 13. Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With RelUlar Income
Subchapter II. The Plan
SECTION 1321 (11 U.S.C. I 1321)
I 1321. FIlIng of plan. The debtor shall file a plan.
o
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
SECTION 1322 (11 U.S.C. I 1322)
• 1322. Content. of plan.
I
(a) The plan shall-
(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of
future eanlings or other future income of the debtor to
the supervision and control of the tntstee as is necesscuy
for the execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment. in deferred cash pay-
ments. ofall claims entitled to priority under section 507
ofthis title. unless the holder ofa particular claim agrees
to a different treatment of such claim; and
(3) if the plan classifies claims. proVide the same treat-
ment for each claim within a particular class.
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section. the
plan may-
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims,
as provided in section 1122 of this title. but may not
discriminate unfairly against any class so designated.
however. such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt
of the debtor ifan individual is liable on such consumer
debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured
claims;
(2) modify the rights ofholders ofsecured claims. other
than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence. or of
D - 21
holders of unsecured claims. or leave unaffected the
rights of holders of any class of claims;
(3) provide for the curing 'or waiving of any default;
(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be
made concurrently with payments on any secured claim
or any other unsecured claim;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection.
provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable
time and maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on
which the last payment is due after the date on which
the final payment under the plan is due;
(6) provide for the payment of all or any part of any
claim allowed under section 1305 of this title;
(7) subject to section 365 of this title. provide for the
assumption. rejection. or assignment of any executoIY
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previously
rejected under such section;
(8) provide for the payment of all or part of a claim
against the debtor from property of the estate or property
of the debtor;
(9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate. on
confirmation of the plan or at a later time. in the debtor
or in any other entity; and
(l0) include any other appropriate provision not incon-
sistent with this title.
(c) NotWithstanding subsection (b)(2J-and appUcable non-
bankruptcy law-
(1) a deJauU with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien
on the debtor's principal residence may be cured under
paragraph (3) or (5) ojsubsection (b) untU such residence
is sold at a Joreclosure sale that is conducted in accor-
dance with applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(2) in a case in which the last payment on the original
payment scheduleJor a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
8 1322 BANKRUPrCY CODE
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~U~ME~OFDE~mDWIDU~ 813M
residence is due before the date on which the.final pay-
ment under the plan is due, the plan may provide for the
payment of the claim as modified pursuant to section
1325(a)(5) of this title.
fet (d) The plan may not provide for payments over a
period that is longer than three years, unless the court. for
cause. approves a longer period, but the court may not
approve a period that is longer than five years.
(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) of this section and
sections 506(b) and 1325(a)(5) of this title, if it is proposed
in a plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure
the default, shaU be determined in accordance with the
underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy Rule References: 3013 and 6006
SECTION 1323 (11 U.S.C. 8 1323)
·8 1323. Modification of plan before conflrmatlon.
(a) The debtor may modify the plan at any time before
confirmation. but may not modify the plan so that the plan
as modified fails to meet the requirements of section 1322
of this title.
(b) After the debtor files a modification under this sec-
tion. the plan as modified becomes the plan.
(c) Any holder of a secured claim that has accepted or
rejected the plan is deemed to have accepted or rejected.
as the case may be. the plan as modified. unless the
modification provides for a change in the rights of such
holder from what such rights were under the plan before
modification. and such holder changes such holder's previ-
ous acceptance or rejection.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
SECTION 1324 (11 U.S.C. 8 1324)
U324. Conflrmatlon he~ After notice, the court
shall hold a hearing onc~ ation of the plan. A party
in interest may object to confirmation of the plan. .
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8 1325 BANKRUPrCY CODE
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
SECTION 1825 (11 U.S.C. § 1825)
I 1325. CoDflrmatiOD of plan.
(a) Except as provided In subsection (b), the court shall
confinn a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions ofthis chapter
and with the other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount reqUired under chapter
123 of title 28, or by the plan, to be paid before confirma-
tion, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not
by any means forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of
each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate
of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided
for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(8)(1) the plan provides that the holder of such claim
retain the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such
claim to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under
the plan and to comply with the plan.
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder ofan allowed unsecured
claim objects to the confinnation ofthe plan, then the court
may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date
of the plan-
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ADJUSTMENT OF DEBrS-INDIVIDUAL 8 1326
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim: or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year
period beginning on the date that the first payment is
due under the plan will be applied to make payments
under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection. "disposable in-
come" means income which is received by the debtor and
which is not reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor. including charitable contri-
butions (that meet the definition of "charitable contri-
bution" under section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religlous
or charitable entity or organization (as that term is
defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed
15 percent of the gross income of the debtor for the
year in which the contributions are made: and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business. for the
payment of expenditures necessary- for the continua-
tion. preservation. and operation of such business.
(c) After confirmation of a plan. the court may order any
entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or
any part of such income to the trustee.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
SECTION 1326 (11 U.S.C. 8 1326)
I 1326. Payments.
(a)(1) Unless the court orders otherwise. the debtor shall
commence making the payments proposed by a plan within
30 days after the plan is rued.
(2) A payment made under this subsection shall be
retained by the trustee until confirmation or denial of
confirmation ofa plan. Ifa plan is confirmed. the trustee
shall distribute any such payment in accordance with
D -25
I 1327 BANKRUPfCY CODE
-
-
-
the plan:. as soon as practicable. If a plan is not con-
finned, the trustee shall return any such payment to the
debtor, after deducting any unpaid claim allowed under
section 503(b) of this title.
(b) Before or at the time of each payment to creditors
under the plan. there shall be paid-
(1) any unpaid claim of the kind specUled in section
507(a)(l) of this title; and
(2) ifa standing trustee appointed under section 586(b)
of title 28 is serving in the case, the percentage fee fixed
for such standing trustee under section 586(e)(l)(B) of
title 28.
(c) Except as otherwise prOVided in the plan or in the
order conftnnmg the plan. the trustee shall make pay-
ments to creditors under the plan.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3010
SECTION 1327 (11 U.S.C. 8 1327)
§ 1327. Effect of coDflrmation.
(a) The provisions of a conflnned plan bind the debtor
and each creditor, whether or not the claim ofsuch creditor
is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such
creditor has objected to. has accepted, or has rejected the
plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order
conftnning the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of
the property of the estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise prOVided in the plan or in the
order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the
debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear
of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the
plan.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
D -26
-
-
-
-
-
Ii
...i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS-INDIVIDUAL 8 1328
SECTION 1328 (11 u.s.c. 8 1328)
I 1828. Discharge.
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor
of all payments under the plan, unless the court approves
a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after
the order for rel1efunder this chapter, the court shall grant
the debtor a discharge ofall debts provided for by the plan
or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any
debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title;
(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (~ 01 (8) (5), (8),
or (9) of section 523(a) or 523(a)(9) of this title; or [sic)
(3) for restitution, or a criminal fme, included in a
sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.
(b) At any time after the conftnnation ofthe plan and after
notice and a hearing, the court may grant a discharge to
a debtor that has not completed payments under the plan
only if-
(1) the debtor's failure to complete such payments is
due to circumstances for wWch the debtor should not
justly be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property actually distributed under the plan on account
of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would have been paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor had been liquidated under chapter
7 of tWs title on such date; and
(3) modification of the plan under section 1329 of this
title is not practicable.
(c) A discharge granted under subsection (b) of this
section discharges the debtor from all unsecured debts
prOvided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502
of this title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title;
or
(2) of a kind specified in section 523(a) of this title.
D -27
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
a discharge granted under this section does not discharge
the debtor from any debt based on an allowed claim flied
under section 1305(a)(2) of this title ifprior approval by the
trustee of the debtor's incurring such debt was practicable
and was not obtained.
(e) On request of a party in interest before one year after
a discharge under this section is granted, and after notice
and a hearing, the court may revoke such discharge only
if-
(1) such discharge was obtained by the debtor through
fraud; and
(2) the requesting party did not know of such fraud
until after such discharge was granted.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 4007
SECTION 1329 (11 U.S.C. 1 1329)
11329 BANKRUPrCY CODE
-
-
-
J
-
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§ 1329. ModUlcation of plan after confirmation.
(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before
the completion ofpayments under such plan, the plan may
be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to-
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on
claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor
whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent
necessary to take account of any payment of such claim
other than under the plan.
(b)(1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title
and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply
to any modification under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless. after
notice and a hearing, such modification is disapproved.
(c) A plan modified under this section may not provide
for payments over a period that expires after three years
D - 28
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ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS-INDMDUAL I 1330
after the time that the first payinent under the original
confirmed plan was due, unless the CCiurt, for cause, ap-
proves a longer period, but the court may not approve a
period that expires after five years after such time.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 3015
SECTION 1330 (11 U.S.C. I 1330)
I 1330. Revocation of an order of coDflrmation.
(a) On request of a party in interest at any time within
180 days after the date of the entry ofan order ofconfirma-
tion under section 1325 of this title, and after notice and
a hearing, the court may revoke such order if such order
was procured by fraud.
(b) If the court revokes an order of confirmation under
subsection (a) of this section, the court shall dispose of the
case under section 1307 of this title, unless, within the
time fixed by the court, the debtor proposes and the court
confirms a modification of the plan under section 1329 of
this title.
Bankruptcy Rule Reference: 7001
D -29
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Chapter 11 Plan Hits Supreme Court and Sinks
A. Bank ofAmerica v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, _ U.S. _' 119 S.Ct.
1411, _ L.Ed.2d _ (1999). The Court did and did not resolve the issue
whether the new value "exception" or "corollary" to the absolute priority rule
can be utilized to cram down a chapter 11 plan under § 1129(b)(2) of the Code.
In this case, the partners would have been allowed to retain the asset of the
partnership by contributing new money under the debtor's plan proposed during
its period of exclusivity.
B. The Court seemed to indicate that the contribution of new value may, in some
circumstances, permit an existing underwater class to retain an equity interest
E -1
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even if a class of creditors does not receive full payment. However, these were
not the circumstances.
In interpreting § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) which provides that a junior class may not
receive or retain any property "on account of such junior claim" if a senior class
is not paid in full, the Court gave "on account of" its plain meaning, i.e.,
"because of". In this case, it was because of the fact that the class consisted of
equity (partners) that they were allowed to contribute money and retain their
interests. This the Code does not permit.
On the other hand, what the Code permits is a "truly full value transaction" in
cash or money's worth. This would pose no "threat to the bankruptcy estate."
j
,
,j
J
J
J
J
J
E. Since noone else was permitted to "compete for the equity or to propose a
competing reorganization plan", the plan was doomed.
F. Furthermore, the exclusivity factor barring any other party from proposing a
plan, must be considered property of value to the equity holders because it is on
account of their status that only they can purchase the property. Since this
property is also "on account of," it causes the plan to run afoul of the cramdown
provisions.
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G. Conclusion: The plan sinks.
1. Possibly, the Court would approve a debtor's plan proposed during the
exclusivity period that provided for an auction.
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II.
2. Possibly, the court would approve a debtor's plan that provided only for
the equity holders to retain the interest if exclusivity has been terminated
and other parties in interest had an opportunity to propose a plan but did
not do so.
3. It is unlikely that the Court, in a future case, will deny totally the
existence of the new value exception/corollary.
Shoot Out between Senior and Subordinated
A. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that § 510(a) abrogates a
relatively long standing judicially constructed rule known as the "rule of
explicitness" and resort to applicable nonbankruptcy law is required. Chemical
Bank v. First Trust ofNew York (In re Southeast Banking Corp.), 156 F.3d
1114 (11th Cir. 1998).
1. The "rule", concerning senior debt's entitlement to postpetition interest
from any distribution that would otherwise go to subordinated debt,
required the subordination agreement to provide explicitly that senior
E - 3
debt would be entitled to such postpetition interest in the event of a
bankruptcy distribution. General language would not suffice to put the
subordinated creditors on notice of their rights or lack thereof, in a
bankruptcy case.
,
.J
-\Iij
,
J
2. The Eleventh Circuit held that § 51O(a) displaced the rule by providing
that the enforceability of a subordination agreement is dependent on
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Accordingly, whether or not senior debt
was entitled to postpetition interest in advance of any payment to
subordinated debt was controlled by nonbankruptcy law, in this case the
law of New York.
,
J
,I
.J
B. The Eleventh Circuit certified the issue of entitlement to postpetition interest to
the New York Court of Appeals, which held that under New York law, the rule
of explicitness continued in full force. Chemical Bank v. First Trust ofNew
York (In re Southeast Banking Corp,), 93 N.Y. 2d 178, N.E.2d ,
- --
N.Y.S.2d _ (1999). Specific, clear language is required in any subordination
agreement to inform a junior creditor of the possibility of being charged with
postpetition interest on senior debt. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court I s ruling that the senior debt was not
entitled to the postpetition interest. In re Southeast Banking Corp., 179 F.3d
1307 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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C. Conclusion: The out-gunned juniors win again. While the decisions ended up
as if there were no § 51O(a), what is necessary today is to research relevant state
law and draft the subordination agreement in accordance with that law and the
parties' intent. As to outstanding agreements, look closely at the language if a
bankruptcy case in commenced or begins to appear likely. Presumably, until
such time, involved counsel, on either side, will not recognize the existence of a
potential problem.
Environmental Claim Entitled to Administrative Priority.
A. Texas law required the owner to plug wells that were unproductive for one year.
Wells became inoperative during the chapter 11 case and, thus, the obligation to
plug them arose postpetition. The chapter 11 trustee and the State agreed that
the State would do the plugging and charge the chapter 11 estate. The case was
converted to chapter 7 and the chapter 7 trustee argued that plugging the wells
was of no benefit to the estate and, therefore, the cost should not be an
administrative expense under § 503. The court disagreed. State of Texas v.
Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co., Inc.), 151 F.3d 434 (Sib Cir. 1998), citing and
applying Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 20 L.Ed.2d 751, 88 S.Ct. 1759
(1968). Under § 503(b)(I)(A), benefit to the estate is inextricably interwoven
with that which is a necessary expense. Here the combination of state and
federal law certainly made it a necessary expense because the plugging was
E - 5
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required by state law and 28 U.S.C. 959(b) requires a bankruptcy trustee to
comply with state law.
In Pennsylvania Department ofEnvironmental Resources v. Tri-State Clinical
Laboratories, Inc., 178 F. 3d 685 (3d Cir. 1999), the debtor, a clinical
laboratory, commenced a case under chapter 11. The case was subsequently
converted to chapter 7. A few months after the chapter 11 filing, municipal
workers emptying a dumpster were sprayed with blood the debtor had illegally
placed in the dumpster. The debtor was charged with two counts of violating
the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act. The first count charged that the
debtor had illegally stored the blood prepetition. The second count charged that
the debtor illegally dumped the blood postpetition. The debtor was convicted on
both counts and assessed fines for both counts ($10,000 and $20,000
respectively).
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") filed proofs
of claim asserting a $10,000 unsecured claim based on the prepetition conduct
and a $20,000 administrative expense claim based on the postpetition conduct.
The chapter 7 trustee objected to the treatment of the $20,000 claim as an
administrative expense. The bankruptcy court found that the $20,000 claim was
not entitled to priority as an administrative expense, and the district court
affirmed. The court of appeals held:
E-6
!
#
.J
.
J
-
I
J
i
...
J
J
r
,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1.
2.
3.
According to § 503(b)(I)(A), for a claim to be given priority as an
administrative expense it must be (1) a "cost" or "expense" that is (2)
"actual" and "necessary" for (3) "preserving the estate". The Supreme
Court, in Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 88 S.Ct. 1759,
concluded that "the words 'preserving the estate' include the larger
objective, common to arrangements, of operating the debtor's business
with a view to rehabilitating it." In addition it held that " 'usual and
necessary cost' should include costs ordinarily incident to operation of a
business, and not be limited to costs without which rehabilitation would
be impossible."
The language of § 503(b), read as a whole, suggests a quid pro quo
pursuant to which the estate accrues a debt in exchange for some
consideration necessary to the operation or rehabilitation of the estate.
The court distinguished the current case from the Reading case, in which
the Supreme Court held that damages from a fire to a property adjacent
to the bankruptcy estate's property, that was caused by negligence of the
receiver, was entitled to priority as an administrative expense under
Section 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. In Reading, the Supreme Court's
holding was motivated by considerations of fairness and practicality.
The Court believed that those who continue to transact business with the
E-7
4.
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debtor during the Chapter 11 case [sic], and who suffer financially as a
result, are entitled to priority over other creditors who have not
affirmatively assumed such risk. Fairness dictates that those injured by
the operation of a business by a receiver acting within the scope of
authority should be compensated for the injury.
The court held that payment of the criminal fine would not compensate
for damages resulting from Tri-State's conduct. It would merely cause
Tri-State to satisfy its obligations to the state out of the pockets of its
creditors. The Third Circuit refused to equate criminal fines and the
conduct they attempt to punish to costs of operating the debtor's business
and preserving the estate. The purpose of the criminal fines was not
related to compensation or proper business operation but rather to
"deterrence, retribution, and punishment".
Section 503(b)(1)(C) provides that fines and penalties related to taxes
incurred by the estate are to be treated as administrative expenses. The
inclusion of tax fines and penalties in § 503(b) cannot, however, be
expanded to include other fines and penalties.
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c. Since there was enough money in the estate to pay all chapter 7 administrative
expenses, the court did not have to determine whether the cost of plugging
would be subordinated to the chapter 7 expenses.
Only the Trustee May Surcharge under § 506(c).
A. In re Hen House Interstate, Inc., 177 F.3d 719 (8 th Cir. 1999) (en bane), cert.
granted sub nom. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Magna Bank N.A., 68
U.S.L.W. 3310 (1999). Chapter 11 was unsuccessful and resulted in
conversion to chapter 7, leaving an insurance company with unpaid premiums
for workers' compensation insurance. All the debtor's assets were encumbered
by bank's security interest. In the chapter 11 case, the cash collateral order
provided, with the bank's agreement, that the insurance company would be
paid. In the chapter 7 case, the insurance company sought to surcharge the
collateral with this claim and the lower courts agreed, under a prior Eighth
Circuit case. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed but with two judges
suggesting an en bane hearing to overrule the earlier precedent. In a split
decision, the court, en bane, overruled and held that only the trustee may seek
to surcharge a creditor's collateral for expenses that were of benefit to the
creditor.
E-9
B. Four judges, in a strong dissent, would have permitted the insurance company to
recover under § 506, basically on the grounds that the section does not say that
only the trustee may recover and, in a case such as this, a trustee has no
incentive to bring an action and there is no reason to permit the secured creditor
a windfall. The dissent stressed that four circuits have held contrary to the
majority and Collier also expresses the view that persons other than the trustee
should be able to bring a surcharge action. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy
~ 506.05[8] at 506-142-43 (15th ed. rev.)
V. Circumventing (in part) Bankruptcy Remote Provisions.
A. "Fashion has a role not only in the garment industry but in the legal one as well.
One of the newest fashions in commercial real estate financing is the so-called
"mortgage backed securitization" coupled with the presence of corporate
governance provisions known as "bankruptcy remote provisions" designed to
make bankruptcy unavailable to a defaulting borrower without the affirmative
consent of the mortgagee's designee on the borrower's board of directors." In
re Kingston Square Associates, 214 B.R. 713, 714 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)(per
Brozman, C.J.).
B. On the eve of foreclosure, involuntary chapter 11 petitions were filed against
single asset real estate debtors, allegedly as result of collusion between debtors
E-IO
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VI. Break-Up Fees in Trouble
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and petitioning creditors. Such creditors were sought out by debtors and
consisted of one trade creditor each with rest being professionals, and the
litigation expenses would be borne by others. Proof existed that such collusion
did not warrant dismissal, bad faith did not exist, and it was to stay foreclosure
in the presence of corporate provisions barring filing of voluntary petition
without unanimous consent of all directors, one of whom was the mortgagee's
designee.
Interestingly, the court did not reach the question as to whether the bylaw
provision was void as against public policy (antibankruptcy). Nor was there
discussion, presumably no raised issue, regarding lender liability for
mortgagee's having a director on the board.
The future of bankruptcy remote provisions is still up in the air. In this case,
the involuntary petition was used to circumvent them.
r
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Debtor and bidder entered into purchase agreements for all of debtor's assets
which was conditioned on court approval of break-up fee and break-up expenses. Court
refused to approve and in new bidding, consent order was entered providing that bidder
reserved right to seek fee and expenses. New bidder was successful and first bidder applied
for fees and expenses. Bankruptcy and district courts denied request. Court of appeals
E -11
affirmed. Standard to determine propriety of such fees was under Code's administrative
expense provisions and not a general common law developed for break-up fees. Here the facts
showed that such fees were not necessary to preserve value of the estate and did not benefit it.
In re O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999).
VII. Preferences
l
,
\
.,
,
1
,
.,
A. Debt Restructuring
In In re Kaypro, 230 B.R. 400 (9th Cir. RA.P. 1999), the court held that
l
.,
payments pursuant to a debt restructuring are not, as a matter of law, outside of the ordinary
course of business. Under the facts of this proceeding, however, the § 547(c)(2) exception
was not available to the transferee.
,
,
,
B. Valuation of Collateral
Payments on a fully secured claim are not preferential because § 547(c)(5)
,
.,
requirement will not be met. Payments on an undersecured claim are voidable because they
are applied to the unsecured portion of the claim. To determine whether the claim is fully
secured, the collateral should be valued as of the transfer date and not as of the petition date.
In re Telesphere Communications, Inc., 229 RR. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
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A Misread of the Preference Section: "Substantially Contemporaneous"
1. In re Dorholt, Inc., (B.A.P., 8th Cir. 1999), the BAP held that perfection
of a security interest by the filing of a financing statement 16 days after
the security agreement became effective was substantially
contemporaneous with the creation of the security interest. In effect, the
holding reads out of § 547 the provisions in subsection (e) that determine
when a transfer is made and which provide a ten-day grace period for
perfection of a security interest. The court found that the late filing was,
in fact, substantially contemporaneous, and it was intended to be
substantially contemporaneous, therefore, the exception in subsection
(c)(I) controlled.
2. The decision was 2-1. The dissent would have held that the ten-day
period of § 547(e) controlled rather than the exception in subsection
(c)(I).
3. The dissent was correct and the majority opinion and holding were a
misread of § 547. if the majority is correct, any time a secured creditor
belatedly perfects the security interest it would argue to this majority
that, of course, the perfection was meant to be substantially
contemporaneous with the execution of the security agreement and it
E-13
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was, in fact, substantially contemporaneous. Even without § 547(e), it
seems absurd to conclude that a delay of 16 days is substantially
contemporaneous. How about 20 days, 18 days, 25 or 50 days?
The Relation Between § 547(c)(3)(B) and State Law
1
1
,
1
,
In Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998), a purchaser of
a new car gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price,
secured by the car. Twenty-one days later, Fidelity mailed the application necessary to perfect
its security interest under Missouri law. The purchaser later filed a chapter 7 petition, and the
trustee moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable
preference under § 547(b).
Section 547(c)(3)(B) provides a grace period for perfecting a purchase money
security interest of 20 days after the debtor receives possession of the property. The trustee
argued that the exception limits the grace period to 20 days.
Fidelity responded that under Missouri law, a motor vehicle lien is perfected on
the date of its creation (in this case, within the 20-day period), if the creditor files the necessary
documents within 30 days after the debtor takes possession.
The bankruptcy court set aside the lien as a voidable preference, holding that state
law could not extend § 547(c)(3)(B)'s 20-day perfection period. The district court affirmed, as
did the court of appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that:
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1. A transfer of a security interest is made under § 547(c)(3)(B) on the date
that the secured party has completed the steps necessary to perfect its
interest. A creditor may invoke the enabling loan exception only by
satisfying state law perfection requirements within the 20-day period
provided by the federal statute.
2. Section 547(e)(l)(B) provides that "a transfer of ... property ... is
perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial
lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." This definition
implies that a transfer is perfected only when the secured party has done
all the acts required to perfect its interest, not at the moment as of which
state law may retroactively deem that perfection effective. The statutory
text, structure, and history lead to the understanding that a creditor may
invoke the enabling loan exception only by acting to perfect its security
interest within 20 days after the debtor takes possession of its property.
VIII. Executory Contracts and Leases
A. Administrative Rent claim
Rejection of a lease after assumption creates a future rent claim resulting from
the breach that is entitled to administrative expense priority. In re Baldwin Rental Centers,
228 B.R. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998), citing § 365(g)(2) and Nostas Assocs. V. Costich (In re
E -15
Klein Sleep Prods., Inc.), 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996). But the court went on, in dicta, to
hypothesize that if the plain meaning rule would produce an absurd result, it need not be
followed and absurdity would exist if its result would prevent the possibility of reorganization
or so deplete the estate so "as to wipe out all general unsecured claims." Such was not the
case here. But why are these results absurd? Whether or not reorganization should be easy,
difficult or impossible is a legislative determination.
B. Nonassignability
,
1
,
1
1
,
,
1.
2.
When patent law renders a nonexclusive license nonassignable absent
consent of licensor, § 365(c)(l) bars a debtor in possession from
assuming the license, even if it were not to assign it. In re Catapult
Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999). But see VIII.B.2.,
infra.
In Institute Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F. 3d 489 (1st Cir.
1997), a manufacturer of medical diagnostic tests (CBC) filed a chapter
11 petition and continued to operate its testing business as debtor in
possession. Its reorganization plan proposed the assumption of two
cross-licenses with a research foundation (pasteur) that owned various
patented medical diagnosing procedures. According to the original
agreements, each party acquired a nonexclusive perpetual license to use
E -16
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some of the patented technology licensed by the other. Each cross-license
broadly prohibited the licensee from assigning or sublicensing to others.
In addition, the debtor's plan proposed the sale of all the debtor's stock to
a subsidiary of a corporation that is Pasteur's direct competitor in
international biotechnology sales.
Pasteur objected to the plan, relying on § 365(c)(1), contending that the
proposed sale of CBC's stock to its competitor amounted to CBC's
assumption of the cross-licenses and their assignment to a third party in
contravention of the presumption of nonassignability under the federal
common law of patents, as well as the explicit nonassignability provision
contained in the cross-licenses.
The court of appeals held:
a. Subsections 365(c) and (e) contemplate a case-by-case inquiry
into whether the nondebtor party was actually being forced to
accept performance under its executory contract from someone
other than the debtor with whom it originally contracted.
(l) When the particular transaction envisions that the debtor
in possession would assume and continue to perform
under an executory contract, the bankruptcy court cannot
E -17
simply presume as a matter of law that the debtor in
possession is a legal entity materially distinct from the
prepetition debtor with whom the nondebtor party
(Pasteur) contracted. Rather, sensitive to the rights of the
nondebtor party, the bankruptcy court must focus on the
performance actually to be rendered by the debtor in
possession with a view to ensuring that the nondebtor
party will receive the full benefit of its bargain.
(2) Stock sales are not mergers whereby outright title and
ownership of the licensee-corporation' s assets (including
its patent licenses) pass to the acquiring corporation.
Rather, as a corporation, CBC is a legal entity distinct
from its shareholders. Absent compelling grounds for
disregarding its corporate form, therefore, CBC's separate
legal identity, and its ownership of the patent cross-
licenses, survive without interruption notwithstanding
repeated and even drastic changes in its ownership. The
cross-licenses contain no provision either limiting or
terminating CBC's rights in the event its stock ownership
were to change hands. As CBC remained in all material
E -18
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respects the legal entity with which Pasteur freely
contracted, Pasteur has not made the required
individualized showing that it is or will be deprived of the
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full benefit of its bargain.
Impact of Postpetition and Prepetition Defaults on Debtor's Entitlement to
Exercise Lease Renewal Option
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In Coleman Oil Company, Inc. v. The Circle K Corporation (In re Circle K
Corp), 127 F. 3d 904 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 140 L. Ed. 3d 176 (1998), the court of
appeals dealt with the question whether a lessee debtor, prior to deciding whether to assume or
reject nonresidential leases, may exercise an option to renew the leases even though the debtor
is in default and the leases specify that they may not be renewed if in default.
The lessor leased six gasoline stations for ten years, with options to renew for
two additional five-year terms, if not in default. The lessee-debtors (two subsidiaries of the
Circle K Corporation) renewed the lease and subsequently filed a chapter 11 petition. The
debtors sought and received an extension of time within which to assume or reject the leases.
The first five-year extension of the leases was due to expire prior to the time when the debtors
were required to accept or reject the leases. The debtors exercised their option to extend the
leases for a second five-year term, even though prepetition defaults in at least some of the
leases had not been cured and in disregard of the lease default provision.
E -19
The bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that the
leases may be renewed despite the uncured defaults. The court of appeals affirmed, holding:
1.
2.
The nature and extent of the defaults is immaterial because the
bankruptcy court had the power to permit the debtors to extend the leases
without first curing the defaults.
The purpose behind § 365 is to balance the state law contract right of the
creditor to receive the benefit of its bargain with the federal law
equitable right of the debtor to have an opportunity to reorganize.
Section 365, in conjunction with the automatic stay of § 362, suspends,
once the petition is filed, the termination of a lease that is in default. It
extends the debtor lessee's opportunity to cure any defaults until the
debtor has the chance to decide whether to assume the lease. The lessor
will then get the benefit of its bargain upon assumption, when the debtor
lessee must cure the defaults. If the bankruptcy court could not allow a
debtor lessee to renew a lease without first curing defaults, § 365's basic
purpose would be frustrated. The debtor would be denied the benefit of
§ 365's "suspension of time" in order to determine whether to assume or
reject the lease. For example, if a debtor cured defaults in order to
exercise an option to renew, and then later decided to reject the lease,
the debtor would have given a preference to the lessor who would
E-20
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4.
5.
otherwise hold a prepetition claim for pre-petition defaults. On the other
hand, if a debtor did not cure defaults and could not renew, the lease
would expire and the debtor would have lost the opportunity to choose
whether to assume or reject.
A future election under § 365 to assume or reject a lease will be
rendered largely illusory if prepetition defaults must be cured in order to
keep the lease alive for the election.
No explanation is given in the opinion as to how a renewal can be
accomplished without an assumption. Exercise of a renewal provision is
part of the lease and black letter law has often stated an executory
contract must be totally assumed or not assumed at all. And cure must
precede assumption. § 365(b)(l).
In Cannery Row Co. v. Leisure Corp. (In re Leisure Corp.), 234 B.R.
916 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999), the debtor leased its business premises from
the appellant. The lease included five successive one-year options of
renewal. Shortly after exercising its first option of renewal, the debtor
filed a chapter 11 petition. The debtor's time to assume or reject the
lease was extended indefinitely by the bankruptcy court. The debtor
tried to exercise its second lease option of renewal but the lessor claimed
E - 21
the debtor could not exercise the option due to pre and postpetition
defaults under the lease. The lessor filed a motion for relief from the
stay and for adequate protection. The bankruptcy court denied relief
from the automatic stay and allowed the debtor to extend payment of its
postpetition lease obligations. The lessor filed a second motion for relief
from the automatic stay. The debtor asserted that the holding in Circle K
permitted it to exercise the option without first curing its defaults. The
bankruptcy court held that, as a matter of law according to the holding in
Circle K, the debtor had the right to renew the lease irrespective of any
prepetition or postpetition defaults in payment. Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court determined that the debtor had validly exercised the
option to renew the lease, and it denied the lessor's motion for relief
from the automatic stay.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated and remanded the bankruptcy
court's order, holding:
,
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a. "[T]he purpose behind § 365 is to balance the state law contract
right of the creditor to receive the benefit of his bargain with the
federal law equitable right of the debtor to have an opportunity to
reorganize," quoting Circle K.
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The B.A.P. focused on the fact that the alleged defaults in
payment were primarily defaults in postpetition payments rather
than in prepetition payments, as was the case in Circle K.
Postpetition defaults, unlike prepetition defaults, violate the
"timely performance" requirement of § 365(d)(3).
Although § 365(d)(3) requires a debtor to perform timely the
obligations under a lease until the lease is assumed or rejected, §
365(d)(3) neglects to prescribe the consequence of
noncompliance. Thus, there was only one issue to address: may
a debtor who had defaulted on a lease postpetition in violation of
§ 365(d)(3) nevertheless exercise a renewal option in order to
preserve its right to assume the lease, even though the lease
prohibited renewal if there were outstanding defaults?
Circle K does not compel a bankruptcy court to allow renewal
when there is a postpetition default and § 365(d)(3) does not
absolutely prohibit renewal in the same circumstances.
Postpetition defaults should be a factor for the court to consider .
in deciding whether a debtor may renew a lease.
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e. In determining whether the renewal of a lease is effective, the
bankruptcy court should consider any postpetition defaults and
their causes along with the purposes of § 365 of preserving the
debtor's opportunity to reorganize, while also protecting the -
j
...
f.
landlord's right to current payment for current services.
In this case the bankruptcy court erred in concluding as a matter
of law that the debtor could renew the lease despite alleged
postpetition defaults. If the bankruptcy court finds that there
were postpetition defaults at the time of renewal, the court must
exercise its discretion in deciding whether the scope of the
default, the cause of default, any subsequent cure of the default,
and the significance of the lease to the reorganization are
sufficient to outweigh the policy of § 365(d)(3) that the landlord
has a right to timely payment postpetition.
J
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IX. No Damage Requirement Under § 523(a)
In Wolfv. Campbell (In re Campbell), 159 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 1998), the court
of appeals dealt with the issue whether a fraudulently obtained new promise to forbear on an
unpaid, non-fraudulent, dischargeable old indebtedness should render the new extension of
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credit nondischargeable, even though the creditor may in fact be in no worse of an economic
condition as a result of the fraudulent refinancing.
Gary Campbell, an individual debtor and sole shareholder of a debtor
corporation, failed to make payments to certain creditors under a promissory note for
$500,000. In order to obtain the creditors' forbearance from collecting on the defaulted note,
the debtor gave the creditors false financial documents showing inflated inventory and account
receivable values. On the basis of the false documents, the debtor and the creditors negotiated
new repayment terms, and the creditors conditionally agreed to forbear. When the debtor
failed to make the interest payment due, the creditors filed a suit to collect the amount still due
on the original promissory note. The debtor and his wholly owned company subsequently
commenced bankruptcy cases, thereby staying the creditors' suit.
The bankruptcy court held that the debt was dischargeable because the creditors
failed to show that they had suffered any damages since the debtor was already insolvent when
the creditors extended the debt. The district court reversed, holding that the "damages"
requirement imposed by the bankruptcy court had no basis in the language of the statute.
The court of appeals held:
a. An enforceable promise, as in this case, clearly creates a
sufficient "extension of credit" or "refinancing" to come within
the coverage of § 523(a). The waiver of default and the
E-25
agreement to forbear by the creditors in exchange for Campbell's
modified promise to pay formed a deal sufficient to be called a
new "extension of credit". This extension of credit was obtained
by fraud.
b. A contractual "refinancing" or "extension of credit" is sufficient
without showing further damage. A creditor need not show that
the loan could have been collected prior to the commencement of
a case under the Bankruptcy Code but for the new extension of
credit.
J
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c. The court found that the entire amount of the debt was obtained
by the debtor's intentional use of a false statement in writing
regarding his company's financial condition, and the entire
amount was nondischargeable.
1
J
6
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d. The court noted that holding otherwise would create a perverse
incentive for insolvent debtors to lie to creditors to get them to
forbear collection of past due indebtedness.
e. Note: With the decision in this case, the Sixth Circuit joined the
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which have found that
there is no requirement that a creditor must show actual damage
E -26
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proximately resulting from reliance on false financial statements
before a debt may be declared nondischargeable.
x. The Applicability of the "Mareva" Injunction
In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
1961 (1999), a Mexican holding company (GMD), issued $250 million of unsecured,
guaranteed notes, which ranked pari passu in priority of payment with all of GMD's other
unsecured and unsubordinated debt. Four subsidiaries of GMD guaranteed the notes.
Respondents, investment funds, purchased approximately $75 million of the notes. GMD was
involved in a toll road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico that
resulted in severe losses. GMD did not get paid for its part in the project. In response to these
problems the Mexican Government announced a Rescue Program, under which it would issue
guaranteed notes (Toll Road Notes) to the concessionaires of the program (subsidiaries of
GMD), in exchange for their ceding to the Government ownership of the toll roads. GMD
expected to receive approximately $309 million of Toll Road Notes under the program. In
addition to the notes, GMD owed other debts of about $450 million.
GMD filed a 20-F Form with the Securities and Exchange Commission stating
that its current liabilities exceeded its current assets and that there was "substantial doubt"
whether it could continue as a going concern. As a result of these financial problems, neither
GMD nor its subsidiaries (who had guaranteed payment) made the interest payment on the
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notes. GMD attempted to negotiate a restructuring of its debt with its creditors. Eventually,
GMD publicly announced that it would place in trust its right to receive $17 million of Toll
Road Notes, to cover employee compensation payments, and that it had transferred its right to
receive $100 million of Toll Road Notes to the Mexican Government (apparently to pay back
taxes). GMD also negotiated with the holders of the notes (including respondents) to
restructure that debt, but these negotiations had failed. In December 1997, respondents
accelerated the principal amount of their notes and filed suit for the amount due in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that
"GMD is at risk of insolvency, if not insolvent already," that GMD was dissipating its most
significant asset, the Toll Road Notes, and was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned
allocation of Toll Road Notes to the payment of their claims, and by its transfer to them of Toll
Road Receivables; and that these actions would "frustrate any judgment" respondents could
obtain. Respondents sought breach of contract damages of $80.9 million, and requested a
preliminary injunction, restraining GMD from transferring the Toll Road Notes or
Receivables. On that same day, the district court entered a temporary restraining order, as
requested. Later on, the district court entered an order in which it accepted all of the
respondents claims and preliminarily enjoined GMD "from dissipating, disbursing,
transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise distributing or affecting any petitioner's
right to, interest in, title to or right to receive or retain, any of the Toll Road Notes. The court
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ordered respondents to post a $50,000 bond. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court ruled:
1. The essence of the "Mareva" injunction, known in commonwealth
countries, in the words of Lord Denning, is n[I]f it appears that the debt
is due and owing--and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of
his assets so as to defeat it before judgment--the Court has jurisdiction in
a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to prevent him
[sic] disposing of those assets. n 2 Lloyd's Rep., at 510.
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3.
Federal courts cannot issue the U.S. equivalent of a "Mareva"
injunction.
The United States, as amicus curiae, contended that the preliminary
injunction was analogous to the relief obtained in an equitable action
known as a creditor's bill, which was used to permit a judgment creditor
to discover the debtor's assets, to reach equitable interests not subject to
execution at law, and to set aside fraudulent conveyances. The Court
held that it was well established that as a general rule, a creditor's bill
may be brought only by a creditor who had already obtained a judgment
establishing the debt. Therefore, a judgment for the debt was necessary
E-29
4.
5.
before a court of equity would interfere with the debtor's use of its
property.
The Court described the "Mareva" injunction and its influence on
English law since 1975, the year that it was introduced in England.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that it is indisputable that the English
courts of equity did not actually exercise this power until 1975, and that
federal courts in this country have traditionally applied the principle that
courts of equity will not, as a general matter, interfere with the debtor's
disposition of its property at the instance of a non-judgment creditor.
The Court concluded that it is incompatible with its traditionally cautious
approach to equitable powers, which leaves any substantial expansion of
past practice to Congress, to decree the elimination of this significant
protection for debtors.
The district court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction
preventing GMD from disposing of its assets pending adjudication of
respondents' contract claim for money damages.
-
i
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XI. Sheriff's Sale and the Automatic Stay
In Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1999), after a default judgment was
entered on a mortgage note and a sheriff's sale was scheduled for the property securing the
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mortgage note, the debtor commenced a case under chapter 11. The executor of the
mortgagee's estate sought relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court in order to
continue with the sheriff's sale of the property. The debtor did not respond or attend the
hearing before the bankruptcy court, and the court granted relief from the stay. The sale took
place as scheduled, the executor was the high bidder for the property, and the sheriff's deed of
the property was executed and recorded. The debtor's chapter 11 petition was subsequently
dismissed on procedural grounds. The debtor later filed an adversary complaint in the
bankruptcy court and contended, among other things, that the continuance of the sheriff's sale
after the debtor had filed a chapter 11 petition violated § 362(a) and, therefore, voided the sale
of the property. The bankruptcy court granted the executor's motion to dismiss the adversary
complaint on the ground that there had been no violation of the automatic stay. The district
court dismissed the debtor's appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concentrated on the purpose of the
automatic stay and whether a continuation of a sheriff's sale serves to maintain the status quo
between the debtor and creditors or whether it constitutes 'a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding' prohibited by § 362(a)(l). The court concluded that:
1. The continuation of a sheriff's sale connotes the postponement of a .
proceeding and effectuates the purposes of § 362(a)(l) by preserving the
status quo until the bankruptcy process is completed or until the creditor
obtains relief from the automatic ~tay.
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2. So long as the chapter 11 petition is pending before the bankruptcy court,
a creditor must apply for and obtain relief from the stay before it can
proceed with the sale. The creditor properly applied for and obtained
relief from the automatic stay before it proceeded with the sale of the
property. Upon receiving relief from the stay, the creditor was permitted to
proceed with the sheriffs sale so long as appropriate notice requirements
had been met.
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XII. Ancillary Relief Under § 304
In In re Board ofDirectors ofHopewell International Insurance Ltd., 238 B.R.
25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), Hopewell International Insurance Ltd., a Bermuda reinsurance
company (Hopewell), adopted a scheme of arrangement between the company and its creditors,
similar to a prepackaged chapter 11 plan. The scheme was unanimously approved by the
creditors and sanctioned by a Bermuda court under Bermuda law. Subsequently, one of the
creditors (Gold Medal) informed Hopewell that it intended to sue it in Minnesota and to attach
any Hopewell assets in the United States in satisfaction of an insurance contract claim. Since
such actions would violate the dispute resolution process contained in Hopewell's scheme of
arrangement, the Bermuda court enjoined Gold Medal from violating the scheme. Immediately
thereafter, Hopewell's board of directors filed a petition in New York to commence an
ancillary case to enforce the Bermuda injunction and to issue a nationwide injunction enforcing
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the terms of the scheme against all creditors in order to preserve Hopewell's assets in the U.S.
for the benefit of all creditors.
Gold Medal and its insured, General Mills, opposed the granting of a nationwide
injunction, raising numerous objections to the relief sought by Hopewell:
1. They argued that the scheme of arrangement was not a "foreign
proceeding" for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 304 because it was a
"stand-alone scheme" that was not under court supervision. The
bankruptcy court held that the scheme satisfied the Code's definition of a
foreign proceeding, "a foreign judicial or administrative process whose
end it is to liquidate the foreign estate, adjust its debts or effectuate its
reorganization. "
2. Gold Medal and General Mills asserted that Hopewell's scheme was no
longer a foreign proceeding because the Bermuda court's file was closed
after the scheme was sanctioned. The bankruptcy court held that since
that significant judicial involvement continued, and the proceeding was
pending until one of the goals of a foreign proceeding has been
accomplished, regardless ofwhether the case is technically open or shut,
Hopewell was the subject ofa foreign proceeding.
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3. Gold Medal and General Mills argued that Hopewell's board of directors
was not eligible to be a "foreign representative" that could file a petition
under § 304 because it had not been appointed by the Bermuda court to
oversee the scheme. The bankruptcy court dismissed this argument on
the ground that the statute does not require that the foreign representative
be court appointed. Moreover, it observed that since the Bermuda court
had sanctioned the scheme, which provided for the company to
implement it, the board of directors, as the company's management,
constituted the duly selected representative of the estate.
j
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5.
Gold Medal and General Mills argued that Hopewell's scheme treated it
unfairly in several respects. The court rejected these arguments. It stated
that because Gold Medal had not established that fraud occurred or that
the scheme proceeding was procedurally unfair, the scheme had the same
binding effect as a confirmed plan under the Bankruptcy Code and was
immune from collateral attack.
Gold Medal and General Mills also argued that they would be prejudiced
and inconvenienced by having to arbitrate their reinsurance claim in
Bermuda under Bermuda law. The court held that Gold Medal had
consented to the change in governing law when it voted to accept the
scheme, which superseded its prior rights just as a chapter 11 plan may
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modify preexisting rights. Moreover, the court found that the arbitration
would not be offensive, as it would be conducted in accordance with the
International Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1993, which adopted
the model law promulgated by UNCITRAL.
6. Finally, the court considered the question of comity. It observed that the
scheme's arbitration procedures were established to centralize the claims
resolution process and to enhance uniformity in treatment of all
creditors. To allow Gold Medal to sidestep that procedure and attach
assets in the United States would undermine the administration of the
estate for the benefit of all creditors. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the sanctioned scheme and the Bermuda injunction were entitled to
comity to ensure a fair, economical, and expeditious administration of
Hopewell's estate.
XIII. The Right to Jury Trial in a Nondischargeability Action
Within two days, two bankruptcy courts, one in New York and one in
Tennessee, dealt with exactly the same issue but reached exactly opposite conclusions.
In In Re Weinstein, 237 B.R 567 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999), decided on 8/18/99,
the plaintiff filed a complaint for a determination of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A)
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and (B) for a debt incurred as a result of fraud. The plaintiff made a timely demand for a jury
trial and moved to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court held: In a § 523(a)(2) proceeding, there can be a state or
federal jury trial on the existence of fraud or deceit, and if and only if there is a judgment
against the debtor, the bankruptcy court will determine the issue of nondischargeability.
In In Re Bandy, 237 B.R. 661 (BanIa. E.n.Tenn. 1999), decided on 8/19/99,
creditors filed complaints against two separate chapter 7 debtors (both "no asset" cases),
claiming that debtors convinced them to buy a Jeep by intentionally misrepresenting its
condition. The complaints asked for damages and a determination that the debt was
nondischargeable. The creditors requested a jury trial, and the defendants objected.
The bankruptcy court held: There is no right to ajury trial in dischargeability
proceedings, even on the liability issues. All proceedings that deal with whether the debtor is
entitled to a discharge are equitable proceedings, including a proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a particular debt.
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The Bankruptcy Code contains special provisions dealing with single asset real estate cases and with small
business Chapter 11 cases. These provisions were inserted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. 1 Both single
asset real estate cases and small business Chapter 11 cases were perceived as being only rarely successful due to the
lack ofresources available to the debtors in these cases and to the procedural complexity, delay, and expense
involved in consummating a reorganization under Chapter 11. The general intention of the provisions was to
provide a fast, up-or-out track for single asset real estate cases and an simplified, expedited procedure for small
business Chapter 11 cases, eliminating complexity and delay and insuring that the cases would be consummated
quickly, whether successfully or unsuccessfully. To date, the amendments have not generated a large number of
published judicial opinions. This may be due to the relatively short period of time which has elapsed since their
enactment, and to the fact that the debtors involved in these cases rarely have the resources with which to fight a
prolonged legal battle.
II. SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE CASES
The provisions dealing with single asset real estate cases reflect the view, held by many lenders and their
counsel and by some judges, that many such cases are desperate last ditch efforts by a debtor to retain possession of
heavily over-encumbered real estate at the expense of the debtor's secured creditors. These cases are viewed by
some as an inappropriate use of bankruptcy law to resolve what is essentially a two-party dispute. Reorganization of
a single asset real estate debtor generally has relatively little impact on parties other than the debtor and secured '
creditors, since the debtor usually has few employees and owes only modest amounts ofunsecured trade debt. Also,
the probability of a successful reorganization in many of these cases is remote. The Bankruptcy Code's provisions
dealing with single asset real estate cases are relatively simple. They consist ofa definition and an additional
ground for a secured creditor's obtaining relief from the automatic stay. The definition is set forth at II U.S.C.
§101(51B). The provision for obtaining relief from the automatic stay is 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(3).
A. Definition - The definition is of "single asset real estate," but it contains elements relating to the
debtor owning the property as well as elements relating to the property itself. The definition can
conveniently be broken down into four criteria that must be satisfied ifreal property is to be considered
"single asset real estate."
1. Single Property or Project - The real property must consist of a single property or
project, other than residential real property with fewer than four residential units. Whether
something is "real property" will not often generate controversy. Nor will whether residential
property contains fewer than four units. The debtor must own the real property directly, and not
indirectly, such as through the debtor's ownership of the general partner's interest in a partnership
which has direct ownership of the property. Whether the real estate is a single property will
ordinarily be determinable by reference to deeds and land records. Ifmore than one property or
parcel of real estate is involved, determining whether they constitute a single project may be
somewhat more difficult. Parcels on which the debtor intends to construct separate semi-detached
houses to be sold to separate buyers have been held to constitute a single project and single asset
real estate.2 Even if the parcels are not all adjacent, or are not all intended for the same use, they
may constitute a single project if the debtor and secured creditor treat them as such; for example,
by financing them on a project-wide basis. However, the mere fact of common ownership, or that
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Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
In re Philmont Development Co., 181 B.R. 220 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
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the properties adjoin one another, does not suffice to constitute a single project. They must be
linked together in some fashion in a common scheme or plan involving their use.3
2. Generating All of Debtor's Gross Income - The real property must generate
substantially all ofthe debtor's gross income. The gross income test should be simple to apply in
most cases. Use ofa net income test would have introduced accounting issues and complexities,
necessitating hearings and a judicial resolution of whether this element of the definition was met.
The meaning of "substantially all" may be disputed, but a determination of that issue will not long
occupy a bankruptcy judge.
a. Raw Land - The requirement that the real property generate substantially all of
the debtor's gross income gives rise to the question whether raw, unimproved land not
generating any income can be single asset real estate. Raw land can fall within the
definition, notwithstanding the awkwardness of the statutory language.4 Many of the
cases decided prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 treated raw land as single
asset real estate, and that this settled case law should be given weight in determining
Congress' intent in enacting the definition. Interpreting the statute to exclude raw land
would not serve the purpose of the statutory scheme of expediting cases.
3. No Other Business - The debtor must be conducting no substantial business on the
property other than the business of operating the property and activities incidental thereto.
Distinguishing the business ofoperating the property and activities incidental thereto from a
business conducted on the property but distinct from its operation may involve some difficulty.
Some cases will be clear. For instance, an apartment complex from which the debtor derives
rental income will be single asset real estate even though the debtor also collects some revenue
from coin-operated laundry facilities located in the complex. The laundry facilities and revenue
derived therefrom are incidental to the operation of the apartment complex. At the other end of
the spectrum, if the owner of a strip mall rents a number of retail stores to third parties, but itself
occupies and operates a retail store in the mall, the definition of single asset real estate is probably
not met. The retail store is a business separate from and not merely incidental to operation of the
mall. The difficult cases are those in which the debtor is conducting an activity on the property
which goes beyond the type of activity generally associated with being a landlord, but which is
also somewhat related to this particular property. A marina has been held not to be single asset
real estate, because it involved more than the simple rental of moorings for boats.5 The marina
stored, repaired, and winterized boats. It provided showers, a pool, and other services and
activities to boaters. It also sold gas and operated concessions on the property. All of these
activities went beyond those incidental to operating the real property and constituted a separate
business. Other types of activities which give rise to similar questions include hotels6, golf
courses7, and parking facilities.
Other definition issues may arise where there are affiliated debtors. There is no statutory basis for
combining the secured debts of two affiliated debtors where the combination would cause the
aggregate secured debt to exceed $4,000,000. In some cases, one debtor may own the real
property, but conduct no unrelated business thereon, while an affiliated debtor conducts a separate
business on the real estate. Again, there is no statutory basis for considering the business activities
of the two affiliated debtors together in determining whether either of the debtors is a single asset
real estate debtor.
In re The McGreals, a partnership, 201 B.R. 736 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
In re Oceanside Mission Associates, 192 B.R. 232, 234-236 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).
In re Kkernko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) .
Centofante v. CBJ Development, Inc. (In re CBJ Development, Inc.), 202 B.R. 467 (9th Cir. B.A.P.
1996)(owner-operator ofhotel not single asset real estate debtor).
7 In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc. 219 B.R. 391 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997)(golf course not single asset real
estate).
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4. Limit on Secured Debts - The debtor must have aggregate noncontingent, liquidated
secured debts of no more than $4,000,000. Noncontingent debts are debts where the debtor's
liability is not dependent on the occurrence or nonoccurrence ofa future event. Liquidated debts
are debts the amount of which is fixed by an instrument or contract or can readily be determined
from the instrument or contract by calculation. A debt may be noncontingent and liquidated even
if it is disputed. Most mortgage debts will be noncontingent and liquidated.
a. Calculating Amount of Secured Debts - Whether the debtor's aggregate
secured debts exceed $4,000,000 will depend on how the amount is calculated. Should
the entire amount owed to the secured creditor be included, without regard to the value of
the real property which serves as collateral? Or, does the value of the collateral limit the
secured debt owed to the creditor, without any balance in excess of the collateral's value
being treated as unsecured debt? Courts have split on this issue.8
On the one hand, the statutory goal is to provide for expedited and relatively
inexpensive resolution of single asset real estate cases. An interpretation ofsection
101(51B) that requires determination of the collateral's value would be inconsistent with
the goal, and would encourage costly valuation disputes in a case which may simply go
away quietly in 90 days. Also, the debtor should be able to determine at the outset of the
case, without valuation hearings, whether or not compliance with section 362(d)(3),
discussed below, will be required.
On the other hand, 11 U.S.C. 506(a) applies generally to determine the amount
of a secured claim, and provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the value of
the creditor's interest in the collateral. Interpreting "secured debts" in section 101(5JB) in
this manner would be consistent with this general usage. Note that bifurcation of the debt
into secured and unsecured components may present strategic problems for both the
debtor and the secured creditors. In attempting to escape from being treated as a single
asset real estate debtor, the debtor will want to argue that the property, and thus, the
secured debt, has a high value, over $4,000,000. However, when the time comes to
determine the amount of the secured claim for plan purposes, the debtor may wish to
argue for a lower value. The secured creditor may face a similar problem in reverse.
B. Additional Ground for Relief from Stay - Section 362(d)(3) creates an additional ground9 for
relieffrom the automatic stay, applicable only in single asset real estate cases. It provides that the court
should grant relief from stay with an act against single asset real estate10 by a creditor whose claim is
secured by the real estate unless the debtor has satisfied one of two conditions within ninety (90) days from
entry of the order for relief. The 90-day period may be extended by the court for cause by order entered
within the period. The two conditions are that the debtor either (i) have filed a plan of reorganization that
has a reasonable possibility ofbeing confirmed within a reasonable time; or (ii) have commenced monthly
payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by the real estate (other than a claim secured by a
judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate
on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate. The two alternative conditions are discussed below,
in reverse order.
1. Monthly Payments on Secured Debts - Satisfying this condition may raise a number of
questions and issues:
8 Compare In re Oceanside Mission Associates, 192 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) with In re
Pensignorkay, Inc., 204 B.R. 676, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
9 Secured creditors may, and often do, simultaneously seek relief from the stay on the ground oflack of
adequate protection or other cause. 11 U.S.C. §362(3)(1). The cause alleged often is that the Chapter 11 filing was
made in bad faith. Seeking relief under section 362(d)(2) is less attractive, because, at least in the early stage of a
Chapter 11 case, a single asset real estate debtor will be able to argue that the property is necessary to an effective
reorganization.
10 The relief from stay does not extend to acts against the debtor, only to acts against the real estate.
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a. On Which Debts Must Payments Be Made? On a quick reading, the statute
appears to require that payments be made to each creditor holding a mortgage on the real
estate. This is not so, however, because the amount of the required payment is based on
the value of the secured creditor's interest in the real estate. Accordingly, a creditor
whose mortgage is entirely under water will not be entitled to payment. A creditor
holding a matured statutory lien, such as a lien for real estate taxes due and owing, is
entitled to payment. However, such creditors are not usually aggressive in seeking relief
from stay under section 363(d)(3).
b. Payments Not Necessarily Interest - The monthly payments to secured
creditors are not necessarily interest, although the amount of the payments is equal to
interest. Characterizing the payments as interest would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Timbers]] that adequate protection does not entitle a partially secured
creditor to interest, or lost opportunity costs during the period prior to confIrmation ofa
plan of reorganization. Section 362(d)(3) specifies only how the amount of the payments
is determined. How the payments will ultimately be characterized is left to a later phase
of the Chapter II case, usually at plan confIrmation. See paragraph h below.
c. Fair Market Rate - The amount ofany required payment is determined using a
current fair market rate. This is not necessarily the contract rate, although some
mortgagees will so argue. How is the rate to be ascertained by the debtor? The current
fair market interest rate for a mortgage loan will vary depending on the loan's maturity,
its credit quality, the type of real estate involved, and other factors. The average rate
currently charged for various types of mortgage loans may be found in various fInancial
publications, or by talking to a number of local lenders. While a dispute as to the rate
may ultimately have to be resolved by the court, the debtor should usually make payment
in an amount determined using a rate which it believes appropriate, and leave it to the
creditor to seek a judicial determination if it is unsatisfied. Most judges are prepared to
cut the debtor some slack on this issue.
d. Based on Value of Collateral- The monthly payments are to be calculated
based on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate. Section 506(a) applies here,
requiring that the secured creditor's claim be bifurcated into secured and unsecured
components. If the parties are unable to agree on the value of the secured claim, it will be
determined by the court. 12 Again, the debtor should usually make payment in an amount
based on what it believes is the proper value of the secured claim, leaving it to the
secured creditor to seek a judicial determination if it is unsatisfIed.
e. Do Payments Require Prior Court Approval? - The monthly payments
referred to in section 362(d)(3)(B) are being made with respect to prepetition debt, and
almost certainly from the proceeds of cash collateral. Accordingly, the debtor may
require prior court approval to make the payments. 13 A secured creditor will usually not
oppose such approval, since it will be receiving the payments.
f. Relation to Adequate Protection Payments - A secured creditor may be
entitled to adequate protection payments to compensate it for diminution in the value of
its collateral. Or, the debtor may be required to pay real estate taxes, and to keep the
property insured, as a form of adequate protection. Adequate protection payments are
independent of, and cannot be counted against, any payments required under section
362(d)(3)(B).14
United Savings Association ofTexas v. Timbers ofInwood Forest Associates, Ltd. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012.
11 U.S.C. §363(c).
In re LDN Corp., 191 B.R. 320 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996).
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g. Rents - As substantially all of a single asset real estate debtor's gross income
must be derived from real estate, and the debtor may not conduct any business on the real
estate other than its operation and activities incidental thereto, the source of the monthly
payments required by section 362(d)(3)(B) will almost always be rents or other revenues
derived from the real estate itself. A secured creditor holding a mortgage on the real
estate usually also will hold an assignment of rents and other revenues. Assuming that
this assignment of rents and profits is valid and perfected under local law, 11 U.S.C.
§552(b) provides that the creditor will have a security interest in postpetition rents and
other revenues, except to the extent that the court orders otherwise based on the equities
of the case. 15 Is the security interest in rents merely ancillary to the mortgage, or do the
rents constitute collateral separate and independent from the real estate itself? This is not
merely an intellectual question. If the rent does constitute cash collateral separate and
independent from the real estate, what basis is there for allowing the debtors to use the
rent in order to make the payments on the mortgage required by section 362(d)(3)(B)?
Would not using the rent for that purpose deprive the secured creditor of its cash
collateral without adequate protection? If, on the other hand, the assignment of rents is
regarded as ancillary to the mortgage, payment of the rents to the secured creditor may
satisfy section 362(d)(3)(B) and, depending on the facts, the rents paid over may also
count in partial satisfaction of the secured creditor's claim.
h. Characterization of Payments - At plan confirmation (or some other advanced
stage in the Chapter 11 case), it will become necessary to decide how payments which
have been made under section 362(d)(3)(B) should be characterized and applied. If the
secured creditor's claim is fully secured, the payments will usually be characterized as
having been paid as interest on that claim. If the claim was only partially secured, the
issue is more difficult. Section 362(d)(3)(B) does not require that the payments be
treated as interest, but tends to support such treatment. Section 506(b) and Timbers, on
the other hand, tend to support characterizing the payments as principal repayments,
reducing the amount of the creditor's secured claim which must be dealt with under the
plan of reorganization. Courts are split on the issue. 16 The matter is further complicated
by the fact that the value of the real estate, and hence the amount of the secured claim,
may have changed between the date on which the §362(d)(3)(B) payments were
determined and the date of plan confirmation.
"Based on the equities of the case" is an elastic standard and gives the bankruptcy judge considerable
discretion as to how much of the rents a debtor should be required to turn over to the secured creditor. Most
bankruptcy judges permit the debtor to use rents to pay postpetition real estate taxes, insurance premiums and other
direct costs of maintaining and operating the mortgaged property. This is justified on the ground that unless the
property is properly maintained and operated, it is unlikely to continue generating rents for long. The practice also
accords with that followed in many states in mortgage receivership cases brought under state law. Some secured
creditors argue that they are entitled to the gross rents, without deduction for maintenance and operating costs, but
most of them do not appear to have their heart in it.
16 Compare In re Flagler-at-First Associates, Ltd., 114 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990), In re Landing
Associates, Ltd., 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990), and In re Birdneck Apartment Associates II, L.P., 156 B.R.
499 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993), with In re Reddington/Sunarrow L.P., 119 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990), In re IPC
Atlanta L.P., 142 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992), and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Paradise Springs Associates (In re
Paradise Springs Associates), 165 B.R. 913 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). These cases involve the application and
characterization of adequate protection payments, rather than payments made under section 362(d)(3)(B), but the
issues and arguments are similar as to both types of payments. The cases involving adequate protection payments
sometimes characterize the issue as being whether the payments should be applied to the creditor's secured claim or
its unsecured claim. Where payments are made under section 362(d)(3)(B), they clearly are to be applied to a
partially secured creditor's secured claim, not its unsecured claim. The question is whether they are to be applied to
the secured claim as a payment of principal, reducing the amount of the secured claim to be dealt with under the
plan, or of interest. The issues discussed in the cases involving adequate protection payments, however, are
substantially similar to those which arise in cases involving section 362(d)(3)(B) payments.
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i. Fundamental Problem as to Monthly Payments - The questions and issues
discussed above are important in a case where the debtor contemplates making monthly
payments to satisfy section 362(d)(3)(B). It is seldom, however, that the debtor is in a
position to realistically contemplate making such payments. Substantially all of the
debtor's gross income will derive from the property. This income must suffice to meet all
operating expenses, including insurance premiums and real estate taxes. It must also be
sufficient to make the payments required by section 362(d)(3)(B), and to provide
adequate protection for any diminution in value of the property. If the real estate threw
off enough income to meet these needs, it is unlikely that the debtor would be in Chapter
11. Where the single asset real estate is raw land, there will be little or no income
generated, and satisfying §362(d)(3)(B) will be virtually impossible. Where the single
asset real estate is a developed property and is generating income, it is possible, but still
unlikely, that the income will be sufficient. In short, avoiding expedited relief form the
automatic stay through compliance with section 362(d)(3)(B) is usually not economically
practical.
In some cases where the income generated from the real estate is insufficient, there may
be other possible sources, such as payment from funds provided by an affiliate of the
debtor (or other third party). However, even in such cases, the affiliate (or other third
party) will usually prefer not to commit the funds early in the case, at a time when it is
unclear whether a plan of reorganization will be confirmed. The preferable course will
usually be for the debtor to file a plan of reorganization within the first 90 days of the
case, and to commit the funds only in connection with confirmation of the plan.
2. Filing a Confirmable Plan - Rather than commencing monthly payments, a single asset
real estate debtor can prevent a secured creditor from obtaining relief under section 362(d)(3) by
filing, within 90 days ofentry of the order for relief, a plan ofreorganization which has a
reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time. The debtor should file a ,
disclosure statement together with the plan. 17 Most debtors can manage to draft and file a plan
and disclosure statement within the 90-day period. Some actually expect the plan to be confirmed
more or less as filed. Other debtors realize that the plan is not confirmable as filed, but find it
nonetheless in the hope that this will gain them another few months of time during which
something favorable may develop. This hope is often misplaced. If the plan is legally defective,
or is not feasible, a secured creditor will assert that the plan has no reasonable possibility ofbeing
confirmed within a reasonable time, and that it thus does not satisfy section 362(d)(3)(A).
Debtor's counsel should anticipate the issues a secured creditor is likely to raise, and draft the plan
so that it appears to be confirmable. The ultimate goal, of course, is to have a plan which is
actually confirmable. For purposes of withstanding a motion for relief from stay, however, filing
a plan which is facially confmnable will usually suffice. The same legal issues arise in case after
case. It is usually possible to determine the law where a given issue in the circuit or district in
which the case is pending, or the view of the bankruptcy judge to whom the case has been
assigned.
a. Classification and Treatment of Deficiency Claims - One recurring plan issue
relates to the classification and treatment of a partially secured creditor's deficiency
claim. Must the deficiency claim be classified together with and receive the same
treatment as other general unsecured claims? Or, may the deficiency claim be classified
separately, or treated differently, or both? In a single asset real estate case, the aggregate
amount of trade claims and other general unsecured claims is typically small. If the
secured creditor's deficiency claim is classified together with other general unsecured
claims, the secured creditor may control the vote of the class. If the deficiency claim is
voted to reject the plan, it may be impossible for the debtor to confirm the plan, because
the debtor may be unable to obtain acceptance by at least one class of impaired claims.18
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b).
11 U.S.C. §1l29(a)(10) and §1l29(b)(l).
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Also, inclusion of the deficiency claim in the same class as other general unsecured
claims will require that the deficiency claim be given the same treatment as the other
claims. 19 The debtor, who usually will have only a limited amount of cash available,
may be unable to pay a substantial percentage distribution on all general unsecured
claims, including the deficiency claim; and, the result may be that trade creditors are
unwilling to accept the plan. In order to meet these problems, the debtor may wish to
classify the secured creditor's deficiency claim in a separate class, and to provide less
favorable treatment for that claim than for other general unsecured claims. The secured
creditor may vote the deficiency claim against acceptance of the plan; but, assuming that
the class of other general unsecured claims accepts the plan, section I 129(a)(l0) would
be satisfied, and the debtor could seek to cramdown the plan over the secured creditor's
objection.
There are numerous judicial opinions dealing with these issues, and the views expressed
therein are widely divergent.20 Some cases hold that the deficiency claim must be
classified with other general unsecured claims and receive the same treatment under the
plan. Other cases hold that separate classification and treatment of a deficiency claim
may be proper, if the debtor can establish a business or economic justification for the
separate classification, and if treatment of the deficiency claim is not unfairly
discriminatory. Most of the cases frown on separate classification where the debtor's
purpose is to gerrymander the vote to obtain acceptance of the plan by an impaired
class.21 Ifa deficiency claim is separately classified, the debtor may face a dilemma in
deciding how to treat the claim relative to other unsecured claims. If the deficiency claim
receives less favorable treatment than other general unsecured claims, the creditor
holding the deficiency claim will argue that its treatment is unfairly discriminatory. On
the other hand, if the deficiency claim receives the same treatment as other general
unsecured claims, the creditor will argue that the identical treatment establishes that there
was no economic or business justification for separate classification, and that the debtor's
purpose was to gerrymander acceptance of the plan by an impaired class. Whether the
secured creditor's loan was made on a non-recourse basis may be relevant in considering
whether a deficiency claim may properly be separately classified.
If a plan is filed in order to satisfy section 362(d)(3)(A), it should be drafted, to the extent
possible, so that its treatment of a secured creditor's deficiency claim is consistent with
the applicable case law. If there is an opinion at the court of appeals or bankruptcy
appellate panel level in the circuit in which the case is pending, the views expressed in
that opinion will control. If there is no opinion at the court of appeals or bankruptcy
appellate panel level, it will be necessary to ascertain, ifpossible, the views of the
bankruptcy judge to whom the case has been assigned.
b. Alternative Treatment for Secured Creditor's Claim - In drafting the plan,
the debtor should consider including appropriate alternative treatments for a secured
creditor's claim, depending on whether the secured creditor does or does not make the
election available under 11 U.S.c. §1111(b). The appropriate treatment may vary widely
depending on whether or not the election is made. Alternative treatment in the plan may
be omitted where the secured creditor has indicated in advance that it will or will not be
making the election.
19 11 U.S.c. §1123(a)(4).
20 The District of Massachusetts, which has five sitting bankruptcy judges, has generated six decisions on
these issues, the sixth one having been written by a judge from another district who was sitting by designation in a
Massachusetts Chapter 11 case.
21 The leading cases are collected, and these issues are more fully discussed, in Ordin On Contesting
Confirmation, at 3-28 - 3-76 (3d. ed., rev. by Sally McDonald Henry, 1999).
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c. Allocation and Characterization of Pre-Confirmation Payments Made to
Secured Creditor - See 'II(B)(1)(h) above. This is really a subissue relating to the
detennination of the secured creditor's claim.
d. Return of Collateral to Secured Creditor - If the plan contemplates returning
all or part of the collateral to the secured creditor in full or partial satisfaction of its claim,
rather than cash payments to the creditor over time, and if the secured creditor has not
agreed to this treatment, the plan's provisions should be drafted to comply with case law
dealing with when such return ofcollateral is permissible.
e. Post-Confirmation Interest Rate - The secured creditor may be entitled to
post-confinnation interest on the secured component of its claim. More precisely, if the
debtor seeks to cramdown a plan which contemplates deferred cash payment of a secured
claim over time, section I I29(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) provides that the value of the deferred cash
payments, as of the effective date of the plan, must be at least equal to the value of the
secured creditor's interest in the collateral. The discount rate used for detennining the
value of the deferred cash payments as of the plan's effective date is equivalent to a post-
confirmation interest rate to be applied to the amount of the secured claim.
The plan should either state an interest rate, or state that the interest rate will be fixed by
the court in connection with confinnation. If a rate is stated, it should be picked in
accordance with the views and practice of the bankruptcy judge handling the case. A
judge tends to favor a particular procedure for selecting an interest rate over other
procedures which may be favored by other judges. For instance, some bankruptcy judges
prefer to start with a risk-free rate for an obligation (usually a U.S. Treasury Note or
Bond) having a maturity comparable to the period over which payments are to be made
on the secured claim under the plan. This risk-free rate is then adjusted upwards to
reflect that payments under the plan are not in fact risk-free, and the adjusted rate is used
for the post-confinnation interest rate or discount rate. Other bankruptcy judges prefer to
fix the rate on the basis of testimony as to what mortgage lenders are currently charging
on new loans ofcomparable maturity and riskiness. This method of fixing the rate may
appear less theoretical and more market placed than starting with a risk-free rate and then
adjusting it. However, in practice, testimony as to the current market rate may be
difficult to obtain because lenders are not making loans on tenns comparable to the pay
out tenns contained in the plan. No method of detennining a rate is clearly correct or
preferable in all circumstances. What is important is that the rate used by the debtor in
the plan has been detennined in a manner which is generally consistent with the view of
the bankruptcy judge who will be hearing the matter.
f. Negative Amortization - A debtor may file a "negative amortization" plan.
Such a plan underpays a secured creditor's claim during the period immediately following
confinnation, but makes up for this by increasing payments to the secured creditor made
in later years. On an overall basis, if the debtor makes all payments under the plan, the
secured creditor will receive the value of its secured claim, with interest at an appropriate
rate. The problem is that the debtor may fail early on and be unable to make the later
payments. The debtor should detennine whether the judge before whom the case is
pending will pennit negative amortization plans, and, to what extent and for how long
negative amortization will be allowed.
g. Length of Pay Out on Secured Claim - Where the collateral is developed,
income producing real estate, the debtor may wish to satisfy the secured creditor's claim
over an extended period of time, say 25 years. So long as the post-confinnation interest
rate is a proper one, and so long as the plan provides for maintenance of and repairs to the
property as required, and the property has an estimated useful life extending beyond the
maturity of the plan's obligations, a long-tenn payout of the secured claim does not
violate any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Many secured creditors, however, will
strongly object to any plan containing such long-tenn payout provisions. Some judges
are sympathetic to such an objection by a secured creditor, believing that the uncertainty
F-8
...
-
-
I
J
....
inherent in any long-term payout involves more risk than the secured creditor should be
required to take. Judges who hold this belief may instead permit the payout to the
secured creditor be amortized on a 25-year basis, but insist that the plan provide for a
balloon payment which will repay the creditor in full at the end of a shorter period, say, 5
years. If the court before whom the case is pending adheres to this view, the debtor
probably should not file a plan calling for a 25-year payout.
h. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership - The debtor's plan should be drafted to
take account of the Supreme Court's decision earlier this year in Bank ofAmerica
N.TS.A. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.22 LaSalle held that a plan which did
not provide for full payment ofa partially secured creditor's deficiency claim, but did
provide that certain of the debtor's former partners would have the exclusive opportunity
to contribute new capital in exchange for obtaining entire ownership of the reorganized
entity, was not fair and equitable and could not be confirmed. The Court expressly
declined to decide whether or not a new value corollary to the absolute priority rule exists
under the Bankruptcy Code. Even assuming the existence a new value corollary, the
Court held, plans providing equity interest holders with exclusive opportunities free from
competition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the prohibition of section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The proposed plan in LaSalle would have vested equity in the
reorganized business in the debtor's partners without extending an opportunity to anyone
else to compete for that equity or to propose a competing plan. The best way to
determine whether the value being supplied by the former partners represented top dollar
was not to have the determination made by the bankruptcy judge. It was to have value
determined by exposure to a market. The opinion refrained from deciding how market
exposure should be provided, leaving that for later determination by a lower court.
It will take lower courts several years to work out all the ramifications of the LaSalle
opinion. Meanwhile, a debtor in a single asset real estate case should take care not to file
a plan which is inconsistent with the principles enunciated in LaSalle. What alternatives
are open to the debtor?
One alternative is to file a plan which provides for full payment of the secured creditor's
deficiency claim.23 This solution, however, may not be economically possible. The
debtor may not have the necessary resources.
A second solution would be to allow creditors and other parties in interest to file
competing plans. If this approach is taken, can the terms on which competing plans are
filed be limited? Could the court restrict the parties who will have the opportunity to file
a competing plan? For instance, could the court order that competing plans may be filed
only by creditors who voted against the debtor's plan or who filed an objection to
confirmation of the debtor's plan? Could the court require that competing plans contain
terms, other than price terms, which are generally similar to those of the debtor's
proposed plan, on the theory that this will enable the court, and creditors and other parties
in interest to compare competing plans on an apples to apples basis? Should creditors be
allowed to file plans and have them considered along with the debtor's, or would LaSalle
be satisfied if exclusivity were ended only after the debtor's plan failed to be confirmed?
Instead of allowing competing plans, a debtor might attempt to satisfy LaSalle by
including in its plan some sort of auction mechanisms under which creditors or other
third parties would be allowed to bid against the debtor's partners or other equity holders.
This type of arrangement might be preferable to terminating exclusivity, from the debtor's
22 119S.Ct.1411(1999).
23 The holding in LaSalle is not necessarily limited to real estate cases, or to deficiency claims. It would
apply whenever a debtor attempts to cramdown a new value plan on any impaired class ofunsecured claims. In the
context of single asset real estate cases, however, the debtor's concern usually will be with a partially secured
creditor's deficiency claim.
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point of view, because it would introduce competition only as to price. The debtor could
retain significant control as to the terms of the auction and the non-price terms of the
deal. Bankruptcy courts may, however, be unwilling to permit the debtor to retain this
much control, either because they believe it would not meet the test described in LaSalle,
or because they believe that the bankruptcy judge, and not the debtor, should set the
terms ofany auction.
A related issue is what should be auctioned. In LaSalle, the plan provided that some of
the debtor's former partners would make new capital contributions in return for entire
ownership of the reorganized business. This sounds like it is the equity interest in the
reorganized debtor which must be valued by an exposure to market forces. The secured
creditor, however, may be reluctant to bid for a partnership interest, and may prefer to
make a bid for the underlying real estate itself. Or, the secured creditor may have lined
up a third party who is willing to bid on the real estate but is not interested in bidding for
the equity interest. Should the debtor be required to open up the bidding process to
permit bids on the real estate? Or, may the bidding be confined to the equity interest in
the reorganized business?
It will be years before the questions set forth above can be answered with any certainty.
Meanwhile, single asset real estate debtors should consider the issues and draft their plans
so that, at the very least, they are not facially inconsistent with LaSalle.
Miscellaneous Issues Under Section 362(d)(3) -
a. Burden of Proof - The burden ofproofwill usually be on the debtor not the
secured creditor.24 However, the burden ofproofis generally not critical. Most of the
disputed issues will be issues oflaw, and any factual issues are not likely to give rise to a
dispute resolution of which will turn on the burden ofproof. For instance, there is
unlikely to be a dispute as to whether the debtor filed a plan within 90 days after entry.of
the order for relief. Any dispute will likely center on whether the plan has a reasonable
possibility ofconfirmation within a reasonable time, and arguments as to confrrmability
will usually be legal in nature. Similarly, whether the debtor commenced monthly
payments to a secured creditor within 90 days, and the amount paid, will not usually be
disputed. Whether the interest rate on which the payment was based is a current fair
market rate may be disputed, as may be the value of the collateral. Resolution of such a
dispute is unlikely to turn on the burden of proof.
b. Extension of Time Period - The court is authorized to extend the 90- day
period for cause by order entered within the 90-day period. Because the intent of section
362(d)(3) is to protect secured creditors, by requiring that single asset real estate debtors
progress expeditiously to confirmation of a plan if one is possible, a bankruptcy judge is
likely to construe the requirement of cause quite strictly. A motion seeking an extension
should set forth the facts justifYing it in some detail. The motion should also be filed and
marked for hearing well before the 90-day period expires, since the statute requires that
the order granting the extension be entered within the 90-day period. The statutory
provision is clear, and a bankruptcy judge is unlikely to be sympathetic when a debtor
files a motion seeking an extension on the 89th day following entry of the order for relief.
On the other hand, some judges regard statutory provisions requiring that the court act
according to a rigid timetable as unwise, and as an imposition on the court. There is an
analogous provision in section 365(d)(4). A lease of non-residential real property is
deemed rejected unless it is assumed by the trustee within 60 days from the order for
relief, or within such additional time as the court fixes for cause within such 60-day
period. The case law involving section 365(d)(4) illustrates that courts may interpret the
requirement that the extension be granted within the original time period in a less than
literal fashion. The debtor, of course, should not count on such judicial indulgence.
-
-
-
-
-
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24 II U.S.C. §362(g).
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c. Remedy - While a secured creditor is entitled to relief under section 362(d)(3)
unless the debtor has satisfied one of the two conditions specified therein, the relief need
not always be termination of the automatic stay. Instead, the court may modify or
condition the stay.25 Relief short of outright termination is particularly likely where the
court is convinced that the debtor is acting in good faith and is proceeding expeditiously
towards confirmation of a plan. Even though the debtor has commenced payments to the
secured creditor or has filed a plan a bit belatedly, a judge may decline to terminate the
stay on condition that the debtor continue the monthly payments, or proceed to
confirmation of the plan by a date certain.
III. SMALL BUSINESS CHAPTER 11 CASES
The Bankruptcy Code's provisions relating to Chapter 11 cases are more balanced than those relating to single asset
real estate cases. Unlike section 362(d)(3), which protects only a secured creditor's interests, the small business
provisions were intended to assist the reorganization of small businesses capable of reorganization, by stripping
away some of the procedural complexity of a Chapter 11 case, and the resultant expenses, thus enabling a small
business debtor to confirm a plan on a fast track schedule. The provisions have enjoyed somewhat spotty success.
They have been utilized more frequently and successfully in some districts than others. The degree of success which
they have enjoyed in a district appears to depend in large part on the attitude of the bankruptcy judges in that district.
Where judges have encouraged use of the provisions by small business debtors, and have undertaken the extra
administrative burden which supervision of small business cases imposes on the court, the provisions have worked
reasonably well, although many small business debtors still fail. In districts where the court has not encouraged
their use, the small business provisions have not often been utilized.
A. Definition - The definition of a small business debtor is contained in 11 U.S.C. §101 (51 C). It
contains three elements:
1. Person Engaged in Business - A small business debtor must be a person engaged in
commercial or business activities.
2. Real Estate Business Excluded - A person whose primary activity is the business of
owning or operating real estate and activities incidental thereto is excluded from the definition.
Thus, the class of single asset real estate debtors and the class of small business debtors are
mutually exclusive.
3. Limit on Secured and Unsecured Debts - A small business debtor's aggregate,
noncontingent, liquidated, secured and unsecured debts, as of the date of the Chapter 11 petition,
must not exceed $2,000,000. This debt limit, unlike that which applies to single asset real estate
debtors, includes unsecured as well as secured debts.
B. Eliminating the Creditors Committee - On request of a party in interest and for cause, the court
may order that a committee of creditors not be appointed in a small business Chapter 11 case.26 The party
in interest requesting that a creditors committee not be appointed will almost always be the debtor.
Elimination of the creditors committee in a small business Chapter 11 case was intended to benefit the
debtor by eliminating the cost associated with a committee, including the fees of any attorneys,
accountants, or other professionals for the committee. Individual creditors in small business cases may
hold relatively small claims, making it uneconomic for any single creditor to oppose a plan proposed by the
debtor, or to monitor the debtor's activities while the case is pending. A committee, if one is appointed,
may serve as a focus for opposition to the debtor. Also, eliminating the committee eliminates the need for
negotiating the terms of the plan with the committee and makes it easier for the debtor to file and confirm a
plan on an expedited schedule discussed below.
Whether a small business debtor should utilize section 1102(a)(3) is, however, not always clear. First, a
creditors committee may not be formed in a small business case because creditors do not have a sufficient
economic stake in the outcome of the case to make them willing to serve. Ifno committee is likely to be
25 Condor One v. Archway Apartments, Ltd. (In re Archway Apartments, Ltd.), 206 B.R. 463 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1997).
26 11 U.S.c. §11 02(a)(3).
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appointed any way, there is no need for the debtor to utilize section 1102(a)(3). Second, appointment of the
committee is to be dispensed with only for cause. What basis will the small business debtor assert as
cause? If elimination of cost is the basis asserted, the question may then arise whether a committee should
not be appointed, but not authorized to retain counselor other professionals, or authorized to retain them
only to a limited extent. Asserting that a committee should not be appointed because the debtor does not
wish it to investigate the debtor's business and affairs, or does not want to be bothered to negotiate a plan
with the committee is unlikely to create a favorable impression with the bankruptcy judge.
Also, in some circumstances, it may be to the debtor's advantage to have a creditors committee in place. A
favorable recommendation from the committee often will enhance the debtor's ability to gain creditors
acceptance of any plan which may be proposed. If the debtor encounters difficulties during the course of
the case, support of the creditors committee may be useful in obtaining some judicial indulgence, in
blocking the appointment ofa trustee, in opposing a motion to dismiss, and so forth.
A small business debtor should decide whether to seek an order that a creditors committee not be appointed
prior to or immediately following commencement of the Chapter 11 case. The debtor's chances of
obtaining such an order will be materially better if the order is sought before the United States trustee has
begun to contact creditors and to organize a committee.
Finally, section l102(a)(3) is the only small business case provision which applies if the debtor satisfies the
definition, without regard to whether the debtor has made an election to be treated as a small business
debtor, as discussed below.
C. Election To Be Treated As A Small Business Debtor - A debtor who falls within the definition
of a small business will be entitled to the benefits and subject to the burden of special provisions dealing
with plan filing exclusivity and confirmation periods, and with the approval ofdisclosure statements and
the mechanics for seeking acceptances of a plan, only if the debtor expressly elects to be treated as a small
business debtor.27 This election may be made in one of two ways:
First, Official Form 1, the form of voluntary petition used to commence a Chapter 11 case, contains a
section entitled "Information Regarding the Debtor." In this section, the debtor may check a box indicating
that it elects to be considered a small business debtor. Alternatively, if the debtor falls within the definition
of a small business debtor contained in section 101(51C) but does not wish to elect small business
treatment at the time the petition is filed, it may check a second box.
The second way in which a debtor may elect to be considered a small business is by filing a written
statement of election not later than 60 days after the date of the order for relief.28
The election is simple and easy to make but should be made only with care and after due consideration.
Once made, the debtor will be on a fast track schedule which it may be unable to meet. Because this fast
track schedule provides certain advantages to the debtor, it would be unfair to allow the debtor to make the
election, obtain or attempt to obtain its benefits, and then withdraw it if the schedule could not be met.
Accordingly, the election once made may be irrevocable.29
D. Plan Filing Exclusivity and Confirmation Periods - In a case in which the debtor is a small
business and has elected small business treatment, only the debtor may file a plan during the 100-day
period after the date of the order for relief. All plans must be filed within 160 days after the date of the
order for relief.30 The court may, on request of a party in interest made within the respective periods, and
after a notice and a hearing, reduce either the 100-day period or the 160-day period for cause. The court
may also increase the 100-day period, but only if the debtor shows that the need for an increase is caused
11 U.S.C. §1121(e) and §1125(f).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1020. A number of bankruptcy courts have adopted Local Rules elaborating on the
procedure for making the election.
29 In re Win Trucking Co., Inc., 236 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999). In that case, the court held that the
debtor had no right to withdraw its small business election after the time fixed for filing a plan had expired. The
possibility that a withdrawal might be allowed if sought within the plan filing period was left open.
30 II U.S.C. §§II21(e)(I) and (2).
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by circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable) 1 Section 1121(e)(3) does not
provide for any extension of the 160-day period and it has been held that any extension of that period is not
permitted.32 A failure by the debtor to file a plan within the statutory deadline constitutes cause for
dismissal of the case.33 Read quickly and in isolation section 1121(e) seems clear and straightforward. It
is not. The relationship between it and the other subsections of section 1121, and between the debtor's right
to file a plan, and the right of creditors to file and seek confirmation of a competing plan are anything but
clear. For instance, once the 100-day period has expired, maya creditor file a competing plan and then
seek to have that plan confirmed on a fast track schedule parallel to the schedule for the debtor's plan, using
the expedited disclosure statement approval and plan voting procedure provided in section 1125(t),
discussed below? In re Aspen Limousine Services, Inc. 34 held that it was not possible to satisfactorily
reconcile all of the statutory provisions without resort to the scheduling powers conferred upon the court by
section 105(d). The opinion went on to hold that a creditor should be permitted to file a plan after the 100-
day exclusivity period had expired, and would be allowed to seek confirmation of that plan, but only on a
schedule which would allow the debtor priority in proceeding to move swiftly and effectively ahead to seek
and obtain confirmation of its plan.
E. Disclosure Statement and Plan Confirmation - Section 1125(t) establishes an expedited and
simplified procedure for approval of a disclosure statement and solicitation of acceptances of a plan in a
small business case in which the debtor has elected to be treated as a small business. The expedited,
simplified procedure expressly applies notwithstanding subsection (b) of section 1125 which would
otherwise govern these matters. Under section 1125(t):
(1) The court may conditionally approve a disclosure statement subject to final approval after notice
and hearing;
(2) Acceptances and rejections of the plan may be solicited based on the conditionally approved
disclosure statement as long as the debtor provides adequate information to each holder of a claim
or interest that is solicited. However, the conditionally approved disclosure statement must be
mailed to creditors at least ten days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation. .
(3) The final hearing on the disclosure statement may be combined with the hearing on confirmation
of the plan.
Like other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, section 1125(t) does not deal extensively with procedural
details. For instance, it does not specify how conditional approval of a disclosure statement is to be sought
and obtained or who, if anyone, is entitled to notice with respect to conditional approval. Nor does it
specify the details a to how a final hearing on the disclosure statement will be combined with the hearing
on plan confirmation, including when objections to the disclosure statement or to plan confirmation are to
be filed by persons who wish to raise such objections. These procedural issues are dealt with in Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 3017.1, which applies only in small business cases in which the debtor has made the election.
Rule 3017.1 and 11 U.S.c. §105(d), discussed below, also do not spell out the mechanics of obtaining
approval of a disclosure statement and plan confirmation in detail. They do, however, provide the court
with authority to fix deadlines, regulate notices, and otherwise establish an appropriate procedure consistent
with §1125(t).
Not all of the difficulties in operating under section 1125(t) are mechanical and procedural. The small
business provisions were intended to simply the disclosure statements used in small business cases, but
neither section 1125(t) nor any other provision establishes a standard for what information must be
included in a disclosure statement. Presumably, therefore, the definition of "adequate information"
contained in section 1125(a)(1) is applicable. If adequate information means the same thing in a small
business Chapter 11 case as in any other Chapter 11 case, what justifies a small business debtor in omitting
from a disclosure statement any information which would be required were the debtor not a small business?
What standard should a bankruptcy court use in conditionally approving a disclosure statement?
11 U.S.c. §1121(e)(3).
In re Western Steel & Metals, Inc., 200 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).
Id.
187 B.R. 989 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996), ajJ'd 193 B.R. 325 (D. Colo. 1996).
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Also, a process for conditional approval is subject to certain inherent risks, particularly if conditional
approval is sought and obtained on very limited notice. At the [mal hearing on the disclosure statement,
assuming that this hearing is combined with the confirmation hearing, the court may be presented with a
situation in which the debtor has already obtained the necessary acceptances and seeks to confirm the plan.
Suppose that a creditor has objected to failure to include certain information in the disclosure statement,
claiming that the omission of this information renders the disclosure statement inadequate. Will the court,
in ruling on the creditor's objection, be able to put out of its mind the facts that the disclosure statement has
already been conditionally approved, and that the plan is ready to be confirmed if the creditor's objection is
overruled. In cases where the omitted information was clearly important, or where the judge suspects that
the debtor omitted this information knowing that it was material but fearing that its inclusion might lead
some creditors to vote against the plan, the judge would undoubtedly decline to [mally approve the
disclosure statement. In other, closer cases where the significance of the omitted information is less clear,
and the debtor's motives in omitting it do not appear suspicious, a court may be reluctant to withhold final
approval of the disclosure statement.
F. Section l05(d) - Section 105(d) is not limited to small business Chapter II cases, However, it was
added to the Bankruptcy Code along with those provisions as part ofthe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
It authorizes the court to hold a status conference regarding any case or proceeding. It also authorizes the
court to issue an order at any such conference proscribing limitations and conditions to ensure that the case
is handled expeditiously and economically, so long as the limitations and conditions are not inconsistent
with another provision of the Bankruptcy Code or with applicable Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
The matters which the court is authorized to deal with in a Chapter II case include setting dates by which
the debtor, trustee, or other parties in interest may file plans and disclosure statements, and setting dates for
soliciting acceptances of a plan. The court is also authorized to fix the scope and form of the notice to be
provided regarding the hearing on approval of the disclosure statement and to provide for combining the
hearing on approval of the disclosure statement with the hearing on confirmation of the plan.
Section 105(d) gives bankruptcy courts authority to resolve, on a case by case basis, and in a marmer
appropriate to the circumstances of a particular case, many of the procedural issues referred to above.
Moreover, the ability to hold status conferences gives bankruptcy judges the ability to instruct small
business debtors (as well as other debtors) as to their responsibilities in operating as a debtor in possession,
to be sure that the debtors are aware of any scheduling deadlines in proceeding towards plan confirmation,
and to ascertain whether the debtor is acting appropriately in operating its business and in seeking to
formulate and confirm the plan.
Some bankruptcy judges have been more vigorous than others in using the powers granted by section
105(d). It must be recognized that utilizing their powers in numerous small business cases can impose a
heavy administrative burden on the court. Nonetheless, many small business debtors would benefit from
some increased judicial supervision of this type. Whether or not the small business provisions work in
practice may turn on how active the court is in administering the cases.
PENDING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
....
-
35
Pending legislation, if enacted, would modify the Bankruptcy Code's provisions relating to single asset real
estate cases and to small business Chapter 11 cases. The proposed modifications are significant; and, while they
may themselves be subject to change as part of the legislative process, they are worth discussing in their present
form.
A. The Pending Legislation - Separate versions ofbankruptcy reform legislation are pending in the
House and Senate.35 The House version, H.R.833, was passed by the House May 5, 1999. The Senate
version, S.625, was reported to the Senate which considered and acted on a number of proposed
amendments but then adjourned without voting on the Bill. S.625 will be taken up by the Senate when
Congress reconvenes in January, 2000. The provisions in H.R.833 and in S.625 relating to single asset real
estate cases and to small business Chapter 11 cases are not identical but are quite similar. Accordingly
H.R. 833, 106th Congo (1999) (as passed by the House on May 5,1999); S.25, 106th Congo (1999) (as
reported to Senate with amendments May 11, 1999).
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there should be little difficulty in reconciling the two versions of these provisions, assuming that S.625
passes.
B. Changes Relating to Single Asset Real Estate Cases - The proposed changes would modify the
definition of single asset real estate36 and would also revise section 362(d)(3).37 The revision of the
definition is probably more significant than the substantive changes dealing with relief from the automatic
stay.
1. Elimination of $4,000,000 Secured Debt Limit - Section 101(5IB) would be amended
by eliminating the $4,000,000 limit on secured debt. This change would result in far more cases,
and more economically substantial cases, being treated as single asset real estate cases.
2. Family Farmers - Section 101(5IB) would also be amended to exclude family farmers
from the definition of single asset real estate debtors.
3. Changes to section 362(d)(3) - Three changes would be made, two favorable to debtors
and one to secured creditors.
a. Time Period - The debtor would not be required to file a confirmable plan or
make monthly payments on secured debts until the later of 90-days after entry of the
order for relief, or 30-days after the court determines that the debtor is a single asset real
estate debtor.
b. Use of Rents - The debtor would be given the right, in its sole discretion, to use
rents or other income generated before or after commencement of the case by or from the
property to make required monthly payments to a secured creditor. This right would
exist notwithstanding section 362(c)(2), and the debtor would thus apparently be free to
make the payments without prior court approval.
c. Interest Rate - The amount of any required monthly payment would be
calculated using the then-applicable nondefault contract rate of interest specified in the
loan document rather than a current fair market rate. This change should usually result in
a higher rate, to the benefit of a secured creditor. However, the change also eliminates
uncertainty for the debtor and the need for a judicial determination as to what is the
current fair market rate.
C. Changes Relating to Small Business Cases - The proposed changes relating to small business
Chapter 11 cases are quite extensive and detailed.38 They can be summarized as follows:
1. Definition - Section 101(51C) would be split into separate definitions ofa "small
business case" and a "small business debtor," in proposed new sections 101(51C) and 101(5ID).39
The present $2,000,000 limit on aggregate noncontingent, liquidated secured and unsecured debts
would be increased to $4,000,000, and debts owed to affiliates or insiders would be excluded for
purposes of determining whether a debtor falls within the limit. If several affiliated debtors are in
bankruptcy, they would be treated as a group for purposes of the limit, so that, if their combined
debts exceeded the $4,000,000 limit, no member of the group would be a small business debtor. A
person whose primary activity is owning or operating real property is currently excluded from the
definition of a small business debtor. This exclusion would be eliminated, so that some debtors
would be subject to both the single asset real estate and the small business provisions.
2. Disclosure Statements - The proposed changes to section 1125(f)40 state that the court,
in determining whether a disclosure statement provides adequate information, shall consider the
H.R.833 §1l01(5) and S.625 §IIOI(5).
H.R.833 §415 and S.625 §435.
H.R.833 §§401-415 and S.625 §§421-425.
H.R.833 §402(a) and S.625 §422(a).
H.R.833 §833 401 and S.625 §421.
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complexity of the case, the benefit of additional infonnation to creditors and other parties, and the
cost ofproviding additional infonnation. The court may detennine that the plan itself provides
adequate infonnation and that a separate disclosure statement is not necessary. The court may
approve a disclosure statement submitted on standard fonns approved by the court or adopted
under section 2075 of Title 28.41 The proposed changes also clarify existing law providing that
the court may conditionally approve a disclosure statement subject to final approval after notice
and a hearing, that acceptances or rejections ofa plan may be solicited based on a conditionally
approved disclosure statement, and that the final hearing on the disclosure statement may be
combined with the confinnation hearing on the plan. The conditionally approved disclosure
statement will be required to be mailed not later than 20 days (10 days in the present section
I 125(f) before the hearing on confinnation.
3. Plan Exclusivity Filing Deadline and Confirmation Deadline 42. The debtor would be
required to file a plan and disclosure statement within 90 days (100 days in present section
1121(e)(1» after entry of the order for relief, and would have the exclusive right to file a plan
during that period. Any plan filed would be required to be confinned within ISO days after entry
of the order for relief, under a proposed new section 1129(e). The court would be authorized to
extend the 90-day and 150-day periods on a restricted basis. Failure to comply with the deadlines
would constitute grounds for dismissal or conversion of the case.
4. Elimination of Election - Amended sections 1121(e) and 1I25(f), and new section
1129(e), would apply to all small business debtors. The requirement that the debtor have elected
to be treated as a small business debtor would be eliminated.
5. Operational and Reporting Requirements - Under a proposed new section 1115, small
business debtors in possession (or trustees in small business cases) would have to meet a number
of operating requirements.43 Under a proposed new section 308, small business debtors would be
required to file periodic reports containing specified infonnation as to their postbankruptcy
operations and financial condition.44 Failure to comply would constitute cause for dismissal or
conversion of the case.
6. Duties of United States Trustee - Proposed amendments to 28 U.S.C. §586(a) would
impose additional duties on United States trustees.45 They would be required to conduct initial
debtor interviews in small business cases, during which they would instruct the debtor as to its
obligations, investigate the debtor's viability, and inquire as to its business plans. Follow up visits
to the debtor's business premises would be made to ascertain the state of the debtor's books and
records and to verify that the debtor has filed its tax returns. If the United States trustee
detennines that the debtor will be unable to confirm a plan, or finds material grounds for seeking
The bills provide that the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference shall,
within a reasonable period of time after enactment, propose for adoption standard fonn disclosure statements and
plans of reorganization for small business debtors. H.R.833 §403 and S.625 §423. It does not appear that use of the
standard fonns will be mandatory, at least in the sense that bankruptcy judges will be free to approve other fonns in
cases where they think it appropriate. Debtors, however, will probably be strongly encouraged to use the standard
fonns once they are adopted.
42 H.R.833 §§407, 408 and 409 and S.625 §§427, 428 and 429. The House and Senate versions of the
legislation differ as to matters ofdetail, particularly as to the circumstances in which the court may grant extensions.
Floor managers' amendments to S.625 proposed by Senators Grassley and Torricelli would increase the ISO-day
period for obtaining plan confinnation to 175 days.
43 H.R.833 §406 and S.625 §426.
44 H.R.833 §404 and S.65 §424. The bills provide that unifonn rules and fonns to be used by small business
debtors in making their periodic financial and other reports are to be proposed by the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference. H.R.833 §405 and S.625 §425.
45 H.R.833 §410 and S.625 §430.
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dismissal or conversion of the case under section 1112, the United States trustee would be
required to promptly apply to the court for relief.
7. Status Conferences - Present section 105(d) would be amended and strengthened.46
The court would be directed to hold such status conferences as are necessary to further the
expeditious and economical resolution of a small business Chapter 11 case.
8. Dismissal or Conversion - Present section 1112(b) would be amended by adding
numerous specific acts or conditions that would constitute grounds for dismissal or conversion of
a case, or for appointment of a trustee or examiner.47
D. Likely Effect of Proposed Changes - The proposed changes to section 101(51B) will result in
having more debtors, with more substantial assets and liabilities, treated as single asset real estate debtors.
The proposed changes to section 362(d)(3), however, are relatively minor. If enacted, they Will, I believe,
have only a slight effect on the outcome of a single asset real estate case. The proposed changes relating to
small business Chapter 11 cases are more significant. The increase in the debt limit from $2,000,000 to
$4,000,000 will increase the number of debtors who fall within the definition, and elimination of the
requirement that the debtor elect small business treatment will also swell the number of debtors to whom
the special small business provisions apply. Although the additional burdens imposed on debtors seem
generally reasonable when considered one at a time, their cumulative negative impact will be considerable.
Most small business Chapter 11 cases fail even under the present statute. The amendments, if enacted, will
likely result in an increase in the failure rate. (Proponents of the amendments would dispute this, arguing
that the small business debtors who fail would ultimately have failed anyway, and that the amendments will
accelerate the process but not cause an increase in the number or the percentage of debtors who fail.) The
impact of the amendments may depend on how much attention the Untied States trustees (and bankruptcy
judges) are able to devote to the new burdens being imposed on them in small business cases.
H.R.833 §411 and S.625 §431.
H.R.833 §413 and S.625 §433.
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I. Introduction: Global Trade Patterns
International trade is measured in the trillions ofdollars. Just two decades ago,
those figures were significantly less. The explosion in international trade over the last two
decades is the result ofa number of factors, not the least ofwhich is population growth and the
concomitant growth in consumption. Two decades ago, world population was 3.7 billion. On
October 12, 1999, world population crossed the 6 billion mark. It is estimated that world
population will be 7.5 billion in 2020 and 9.2 billion in 2050. 1 This massive growth in
population obviously will fuel the growth of cross-border business activity. That activity,
particularly in the United States and Western Europe, will continue to grow as trade barriers fall,
consumerism increases and multi-national corporations continue to aggressively seek increased
market share in each other's "home" countries. The recent explosion ofcross-border mergers
and acquisitions bright-lines the arrival of a new economic order in which international
corporations have become truly global in scope, permanently transcending the limits of their
national borders.
United States Census Bureau: Appendix 'A' attached.
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As this level ofglobal activity grows and good times rise and fall, one can
anticipate a greater volume ofcross-border insolvencies. If this happens, there obviously will be
a greater need for cross-border cooperation in order to better ensure the preservation of assets
and the protection ofcreditors or, put another way, to prevent the chaos that results from the
piece-meal dismembering ofa debtor's estate. Preparation for such increased activity is
underway. This involves greater acceptance of the concept of"universality", i.e., a common
sharing ofassets on a non-discriminatory basis and the limitation of"territoriality'\ i.e. the
notion that local creditors should be advantaged at the expense of foreign creditors. Progress has
been slow because of the natural reluctance ofany country to cede sovereignty over assets and
creditors located within its borders. However, it is increasingly recognized that nations and the
interests of their multi-national corporations are better served by a more progressive and uniform
system which embraces ''universality''. Consequently, the "territorial" approach is beginning to
yield to a more ''universal'' approach with certain exceptions that recognize local prerogatives.
These changes are embraced in a number of international initiatives and a new proposed Chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code which this paper examines in an appropriate historical context.
J
.J
II. Seeking A "Universal" Solution
An historical analogue to international insolvency cases existed in our own country not long ago.
This, of course, involved interstate insolvencies and serves as a reference point for the broader
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international problems under discussion. The need for a universal approach to interstate
insolvency cases was championed in 1888 by the renowned legal scholar, John Lowell, who
made the following observation in connection with State insolvency proceedings which varied
from one jurisdiction to another.
"It is obvious that, in the present state ofcommerce and communication, it
would be better in nine cases out often that all settlements of insolvent
debtors with their creditors should be made in a single proceeding and
generally at a single place, better for the creditors, who would thus share
alike and better for the debtor because all his creditors would be equally
bound by his discharge".2
A decade later, Lowell's observation was followed by the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which
effectively preempted state insolvency proceedings and became the generic predecessor of the
uniform system under which we operate today in the United States.
This uniform system, which is now embedded in the Bankruptcy Code, works
within a legal framework in which the Federal Government is authorized to enact "uniform" laws
relating to bankruptcr but in which the substantive civil law ofthe respective States generally
govern property rights, contacts, torts and the like.4 That system is further strengthened by the
requirement that each of the several States extend "full faith" and credit to each others' laws.S
r
r
r
r
2
3
s
Lowell, Conflicts ofLaw as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 264 (1888)].
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
Erie v. Tomkins Railroad, 304 U.S. 64,58 S. CT. 817 (1938).
United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.
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A. Comity
Our legal system for dealing with insolvencies is often looked upon with
admiration and anxiety by foreign lawmakers who have the responsibility for making their
systems work more efficiently. The closest paradigm to our system is England and the
Commonwealth counties and the European Union. However, finding a balance between efficient
commerce and jealously guarded sovereign rights within those communities is a difficult task
which is complicated by the need to seek accommodation with other trading partners to ensure a
global, uniform system. As will be seen below, the building blocks for such accommodation are
being put into place. However, as was and still is the case with the United States, international
accommodation in cross-border insolvencies is not the appropriate subject of inflexible
legislative rules. Rather, it is the appropriate subject of international comity, as implemented by
the courts on a case-by-case basis in the various cross border jurisdictions. To be sure, courts
may be provided with mechanisms proscribed by legislative rules, but the balancing of
conflicting local and international rights rests with the courts' reception of the limits of
international comity in a given case. International comity, in this country, has been defined as
follows:
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"the recognition that one nation allows within its territory the legislative,
executive or judicial acts ofanother nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the requests of its own citizens
or ofother persons who are under the protection of its laws.,,6
Comity thus requires a balancing of the insolvency laws ofthe foreign jurisdiction
and the convenience, as well as rights, ofcitizens of and those who seek the protection of the
local jurisdiction in which a foreign debtor might have assets. In arriving at a proper "balance"
courts have variously taken a liberal "universal" view or a more restrictive "territorial" view.
B. Early Application of Comity
Early on in our country, comity did not prevent an attitude that was "hostile
towards claims asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against alleged estate property located
in the United States.'" However this earlier "hostility" has been tempered over the years. Prior
to enactment of the bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts provided reliefunder Section 2(a) (22)
of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Chandler Act and subsequent amendments.
Pursuant to Section 2(a)(22), a bankruptcy court was specifically authorized, in its discretion, to
exercise jurisdiction when a debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt outside the United States (or
withhold or suspend the exercise ofsuch jurisdiction). Discretion was based upon principals of
r
r
r
r
6
7
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164, 165, Ct 139, 143 L. Ed. 95 (1895).
In the matter ofToga Manufacturing Limited, 28 B.R. 165, 167, citing Harrison v. Sterry (5 Cranch) 289,
3L. Ed. 1074 (1809); Odgen v. Saunders (12 Wheat) 213, 6 LEd. 606 (1827).
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international comity which recognized, inter alia, that insolvency laws were best served by
preventing a race to the court house.8 However, there was no provision under the 1898
Bankruptcy Act for ancillary assistance through which a foreign representative could marshall
U.S. assets and have them returned to the foreign proceeding. The usual procedure followed to
accomplish this end was to have the foreign debtor file a plenary proceeding in the U.S. and then
move to suspend it under Section 2(a)(22) on the basis of comity.9 The cases decided under
Section 2(a)(22) generally accommodated this approach and adopted a more universalistic view
to the application ofcomity, recognizing that that view usually resulted in greater efficiency in
the administration ofa debtor's estate and fairness to creditors. However, the suspension
procedure was cumbersome and often fraught with procedural problems concerning standing of a
foreign representative. 10 That procedure was reformed by Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code.
.J
J
iJ
-
9
10
Israel British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir 1974), cert.
denied sub nom (and cases cited therein).
Ibid; see also Axona, supra, n. 14, at 605.
See, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d. Congo 1st Sess., pt. II, pp. 69-71 (1973).
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III. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code
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Section 304 ofthe Bankruptcy Code is a unilateral, statutory attempt by the
United States to adopt a procedure which promotes a universalistic approach to cross-border
insolvencies. This provision is the precursor ofextant proposals adopted by various international
bodies. It permits a United States bankruptcy court to offer ancillary, administrative relief to the
non-U.S. debtor. II The stated purpose of the provision is to "enable the foreign trustee to protect
the [foreign] estate against dismemberment by local actions in the United States without the
necessity ofcommencing a bankruptcy or rehabilitation case under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code". 12
The bankruptcy court is given broad latitude in fashioning an appropriate remedy
in a section 304 proceeding. 13 Upon the foreign debtor's filing ofa petition (or after
consideration of a controverted petition under section 304), the bankruptcy court may enjoin
actions affecting assets located in the United States or enforcement ofjudgments against the
r
r
r
r
11
12
13
11 U.S.C. § 304; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 305, 306 concerning, respectively, dismissal or suspension ofa case
involving a pending foreign proceeding and limited appearances by a foreign representative.
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st
Session Part 2, at 71 (1973).
Id.
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debtor. It may also order turnover of the Debtor's U.S. assets or their proceeds to a foreign
representative. Finally, the court may "order other appropriate relief'. 14
A Section 304 petition, however, does not commence a full bankruptcy case and
thus, the powers and benefits derived therefrom are not available. A Section 304 petition
commences limited proceedings designed to operate in aid ofa principal proceeding abroad. The
automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are not triggered automatically by a
Section 304 petition. Rather, the foreign representative must request an injunction or other
appropriate relief. If the relief sought is more extensive than that which would be available in
the foreign jurisdiction, as where for example avoidance powers in the U.S. were more extensive
than the foreign jurisdiction, the reliefwill not be granted because "it is not the purpose of
section 304 to provide remedies not otherwise available to a foreign trustee."IS
In determining whether to grant reliefunder section 304, a U.S. bankruptcy court
is guided by concern for the economical and expeditious administration of the estate, consistent
I
.J
;;;
J
with the following guidelines:
(1) just treatment of all creditors and equity security holders; ..
14
15
11 U.S.C. 304 (b).
In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 677; see also in re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, at 607 n.17
("Early authority suggested Bankruptcy Court's have discretion to authorize utilization of the avoiding
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(3) prevention ofpreferential or fraudulent disposition ofproperty of the
,.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
(2)
(4)
(5)
(6)
protection ofU.S. creditors and equity security holders against prejudice
and inconvenience in processing claims and interests in the foreign
proceeding;
estate;
distribution of the proceeds of the estate substantially in conformity with
the U.S. Code;
comity; and
if the debtor is an individual, the provision ofan opportunity ofa "fresh
start". 16
r
r
r
r
r
f
The enactment of Section 304(c) demonstrates Congress' desire for greater international
cooperation in cross-border insolvencies. The guidelines set forth in Section 304(c) were
designed to give the court the maximum flexibility in handling cross-border cases in an ancillary
context. "Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments and laws ofother
nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders rather than being
r
r
r
r
16
powers under the Code in a §304 ancillary proceeding. (citations omitted). However, later cases and the
commentators have concluded that the avoiding powers under the Code are not available in an ancillary
proceeding. (citations omitted).").
11 U.S.C. §304 (c).
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prescribed with inflexible rules.,,17 This flexible approach was carried over to the provisions of
the proposed Chapter 15 discussed below.
IV. Case Law Application under Section 304
d
J
Case law interpretation of section 304 is generally represented by the inapposite
cases ofIn re Culmerl8 and In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd. 19 and their progeny. The Culmer
courts are more "universal" in recognizing the substantive insolvency laws of foreign
jurisdictions and granting the requested section 304 relief.2° Courts adopting the Toga approach
and have been said to be more "territorial,,21
In re Culmee2 involved the highly publicized voluntary liquidation ofBanco Amrosiano
Overseas Limited in which the Vatican had an interest. Several creditors of the bank's Bahamian
banking subsidiary attached its U.S. assets on August 9, 1982 and one bank set-offbalances
against obligations owing to it. The subsidiary commenced insolvency proceedings in the
j
J
tlJ
17
18
19
20
21
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., lSI Sess. 324-325 (1977), S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2Dd Sess. 35
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5821.
25 B.R 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
In re Koreag, 130 B.R. 705; In re 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674.
In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of
MNS Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373
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Bahamas on August 16, 1982. On September 1982, the Bahamian Liquidator petitioned the
Bankruptcy Court in Southern District ofNew York for reliefunder section 304.
The Bankruptcy Court first considered whether the requested reliefwould
promote equality ofasset distribution in the Bahamian liquidation proceeding. It analyzed
Bahamian insolvency law and concluded that that law required orderly, equitable asset
distribution among all creditors, thereby satisfying the criteria of §304 (C)(l).23 The Bankruptcy
Court then concluded that the Bahamas Supreme Court would serve as the most efficient and
economical forum for administering the estate; that the debtors records and officers were in the
Bahamas; that the Bahamian Liquidator remained subject to the order ofthe Bahamas Supreme
Court; and that many of its principal creditors had supported the Bahamian petition. The
considerations led the Bankruptcy Court to conclude that the Bahamas had a greater interest in
the debtors' liquidation than did the United States. The court found that Bahamian liquidation
law satisfied section 304 (c) (2) since creditors were protected from prejudice and inconvenience
in the processing of their claims24• The Court also found that the Bahamian liquidation laws
r
r
r
r
22
23
24
25 bankr. 621.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. At 630. These laws allowed claim proofs to be submitted by mail and provided adequate notice,
disclosure and due process protections.
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prohibited fraudulent conveyances and preferences, like the United States Bankruptcy Code.25
The court found that distributions from the estate under the Bahamian Companies Act would be
in substantial accord with a distribution under the U.S. Code.26 For all of these reasons, the court
held that comity should be granted to the Bahamian liquidation proceeding.27 Although it was
argued that comity was only one element of Section 304(c) the court noted that "all of the factors
listed in section 304 (c) have historically been considered within a court's determination to
afford comity to a proceeding in a foreign nation.,,28
The Bankruptcy Court permanently enjoined all proceedings against the debtor's
U.S. assets and ordered all such assets turned over to the foreign liquidator. In so doing, the
Bankruptcy Court reasoned that it was facilitating the cross-border administration of the debtor's
estate through local Bahamian administrators. In that connection, the Culmer court also cited the
long held U.S. doctrine that anyone who conducts business with a foreign corporation subjects
J
J
j
J
25
26
27
28
Id. (satisfying §304 (c) (3».
Id. at 630-31 (satisfying §304 (c) (4».
Id. At 631. In Culmer, comity was given central prominence in assessing the guidelines for applying
section 304; see also In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 Bankr. At 608 (comity is the "guiding
factor" for the section 304 (c) determination).
Id. At 629.
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himself to the foreign government's laws and, hence, implicitly to the foreign government
insolvency laws in the event that the corporation files for bankruptcy.29 The court found that no
undue prejudice or inconvenience to U.S. creditors would result because the order and priority of
asset distribution remained substantially the same in both jurisdictions. The court noted that the
English Companies Act formed the basis for the Bahamian liquidation rules and that those rules
were substantially similar to the American bankruptcy law.30
In re Toga31 addressed disputes between Toga, a Canadian corporation, and Hesse, its
exclusive U.S. sales representative. Hesse, a creditor ofToga, obtained a judgment against it and
r served garnishments on Toga's account debtors in the United States on June 10, 1982. Hesse's
r garnishments were disputed by another creditor to the extent that that creditor alleged it had a
,. superior lien. Involuntary bankruptcy proceedings were commenced against Toga in Canada on
,
October 14, 1982. On December 14, 1982, the Canadian trustee sought filed ancillary
r
proceedings in the United States under section 304 and requested the bankruptcy court in the
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
29
30
Id. At 632.
Id. At 631. Like Culmer, several courts have concluded that bankruptcy laws derived from the English
Companies Act are substantially similar to the American bankruptcy laws. See In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891, 904
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Cayman Islands) ("After Reviewing the (Cayman Island) Companies Law, this
court fmds it appropriate to grant reliefunder section 304 in an effort to best assure an economical and
expeditious administration of (the debtor's) estate. It is not necessary that the Companies Law be a carbon
copy of the Bankruptcy Code; rather, it must be ofa nature that it is not repugnant to the American laws
and policies - and clearly it is not."); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. at 612-13
(Hongkong); and Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, affd 614 F.2d 1286
(2d Cir. 1979) (Canada).
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Eastern District ofMichigan to enjoin all actions against Toga's local assets by its United States
creditors. The trustee also sought a turnover of all garnished sums held in custody by a local
court pending resolution of the disputes between Hess and a secured Canadian creditor.32
There is little question but that Hesse, as a judgment lien creditor whose lien
became perfected more than 90 days prior to the commencement of the Canadian proceedings,
would have had a secured status if the bankruptcy proceedings had been in the United States,
subject, ofcourse, to the conflicting claim of the other secured creditor. In Canada, however,
Hesse would only have held an unsecured claim under the authority ofCanadian Credit Men's
Trust Assoc. Ltd. v. Beaver Trucking, Ltd.33 Thus, although Hesse would not have been greatly
inconvenienced by having to pursue its claim in Canada and would have received ''just
treatment", the Court denied the relief sought because Hesse would not have enjoyed th~ same
distributive rights under both United States and Canadian Law.34
J
J
:i
~j
..
31
32
33
34
28 B.R. 165.
Id. At 166.
1959 S. C.R. 311 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
In re Toga, 28 B.R. at 168-69.
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v. Critique of Culmer and Toga
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Commentators have viewed the Toga decision as being unduly restrictive in that
the Bankruptcy Court required as a condition to relief an almost "mirror image" between
Canadian and United States bankruptcy laws.3s Recent cases have also criticized the Toga
court's view ofcomity.36 In the Axona Case37, the court noted that the "Limited focus in Toga
on the minor substantive differences between Canadian and U.S. law prevented the Court from
considering the full scope and procedural fairness ofCanadian law. This case (Toga) is simply
an example of 'the court's paramount concern with the protection of the rights ofU.S.
creditors. ",38 The Axona court concluded that the Toga view of comity was incongruous with
the flexibility required for international bankruptcies and asserted that the goal ofcreditor
equality in transnational bankruptcies mitigates against the Toga view of comity favoring
r
r
r
r
35
36
37
38
See Gallagher & Hartje, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has it fostered development of an
"International Bankruptcy System"?, 22 Colum. 1. Transnat'l L. 541,566 (1984).
See In re Koreag, 130 B.R. 705; In re Axona Int'I, 88 B.R. 597.
In re Axona International Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597.
Id. At 611 (quoting Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 35, at 566).
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protection oflocal creditors.39 The court in Axona, was the same court that decided Culmer. In
the Axona case, Axona's Hong Kong liquidators filed an involuntary case on February 9, 1983
under Section 303(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose ofutilizing Sections 547, 548
and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code to set aside alleged preferential and fraudulent transfers ofU.S.
assets to U.S. creditors. Chemical Bank ofNew York was paid on a pre-petition debt by Axona
on or after November 15, 1982 and within the U.S. preference period. After arriving at a
settlement with a number ofparties including Chemical Bank) the Hong Kong Liquidator moved
to suspend the Section 303 proceeding and return the settlement proceeds to Hong Kong. In the
settlement, Chemical reserved the right to challenge the bankruptcy courts' administration of the
estate asserting, in effect, that the plenary case could not be suspended or, alternatively, that the
Liquidator was limited to filing a Section 304 ancillary proceeding. Chemical also asserted that
the relief could not be granted because it would result in Chemical being treated unfairly and
comity would not permit such result. The court held that it could suspend the proceeding and
send the proceeds to Hong Kong since Section 2(a)(22) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 permitted
suspension and was the forerunner of Section 305 pursuant to which suspension was sought. The
court also held that all of the requirements of Section 304(c) had been met and
if
-
jj
J
J
39 Id. at 623 see also, Comment, 1988 Developments and the Conflicts Arising Under Section 304, 6 Bankr.
Dev. J. 345, 370 (1989).
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that U.S. law and Hong Kong law were dissimilar only in minor respects which did not prejudice
Chemical. Axona addressed the issue, raised by Chemical Bank, of Chemical Bank's rights under
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking ofprivate property without just
compensation, to wit: the taking of the payment to Chemical which was included in the
Settlement Agreement. Citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford4o and quoting from
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, the Axona court dismissed this issue out ofhand stating
that it had long been settled that "The filing of ... a [bankruptcy petition] has a profound effect
upon the rights of the creditors".41 The court also observed that the "taking" was accomplished
by private agreement.
The Koreag case is another case critical ofToga. In that case, on May 5, 1989,
a U.S. creditor obtained an ex parte attachment ofa bank account belonging to a Swiss bank.
The Swiss Bank had been placed in liquidation proceedings in Switzerland on April 27, 1989.
The Swiss Liquidator filed a Section 304 proceeding on January 5, 1990, eight months after the
attachment had been obtained. Finding that the facts in Toga and Koreag were "strikingly
similar", the Koreag Court found Toga "protectionist", quoting Axona. The court ordered the
return of the attached bank account to Switzerland. The attaching creditor's claim that it would
not be recognized as a secured creditor in Switzerland was dismissed by the court which
r
r
r
r
40
41
295 U.S. 555, 55 S. CT. 854
4 Cl. Ct. 237, 246 aff'd 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 909, 106 S. Ct. 279.
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observed that the creditor, having done business in Switzerland with the liquidated Swiss bank,
had to expect to be governed by Swiss rules.
Toga, however, is not the lone sentinel of "protectionism" in the exercise of
comity under Section 304. Papeleras is another such case, although it can be distinguished on its
facts. In Papeleras, the court dismissed the section 304 ancillary proceeding brought by a
Spanish Liquidator appointed in Spain. Although the Papeleras court did not view comity as the
central factor in a section 304 (c) analysis, the ancillary proceeding was dismissed only after an
extensive examination of the factors enumerated in section 304 (c) revealed that under Spanish
law, the Spanish liquidation proceeding would not recognize the u.S. creditor's claim because it
had not been liquidated when the Spanish proceeding had been commenced. Additionally, the
creditor received no notice of the foreign proceeding and was thereby denied the opportunity to
participate in the liquidation proceeding in Spain. The court also found that the U.S. creditor's
attachment lien would not have been recognized in Spain. The court concluded that due to the
"omissions of Spanish law and the lack ofcandor by (the debtor) and liquidators," the principles
of §304 (c) mandated a dismissal of the ancillary proceeding.42
-
-
...
42 Id. at 590-95
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Although Toga and its approach has been said to be antithetical to Culmer, the
fact is that Culmer and its progeny, except for Koreag, do not appear to involve ''vested''
property rights ofU.S. creditors that would be "divested" in the foreign jurisdictions to which the
property is being returned pursuant to Section 304. In Culmer, the attached property was
attached within the 90 day U.S. preference period as distinguished from the garnishment in Toga
which had become "perfected" within the preference period. It is also noted that in Axona, the
order returning the property to the foreign jurisdiction stipulated that U.S. creditors having a
priority under Section 507 ofthe Bankruptcy Code were required to be paid from the proceeds of
the returned property.
The foregoing cases are discussed at some length because they represent samples
ofextant case law in ancillary proceedings and will continue to be of influence under the newly
proposed Chapter 15. What is clear from the foregoing is that comity, while stated as a broad
principle, is applied on a case by case basis by the trier of the facts. Discussed below is a case in
which the trier of the facts had the opportunity to see the "before" and "after" effects of the
application comity.
Drexel Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari arose in the Southern District ofNew
York in 1985. In that case, which does not appear in the extensive literature on the subject of
cross-border insolvencies, Wahab Muhammad Galadari and his Trading Companies were placed
in receivership by Royal Decree in Dubai, U.A.E.. Drexel and another U.S. company, Refco,
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instituted suit against Galadari and his companies in the Southern District ofNew York where ..
jurisdiction was not disputed. The Dubai Receivers requested the District Court in New York to J
,
stay the New York suit and defer to the Dubai proceedings, thereby requiring Drexel and Refco ,j
to pursue their claims in Dubai. The District Court issued the stay on the basis of international
-
comity, making the following finding:
In Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard (1883) [citation omitted],
Supreme Court held that the "true spirit of international comity" required
American Courts to defer to a Canadian bankruptcy procedure that
blocked the pursuit ofindividual claims. In Clarkson Co. V. Shaheen,
(1976), [citations omitted] the Court ofAppeals held similarly, and added
that allegations of fraud interposed to defeat comity must be demonstrated
by "clear and convincing evidence." These cases establish a presumption
that American courts should defer to bankruptcy proceedings in other
countries which are essentially fair.43
However, Dubai had no statutory scheme for insolvency which was simply regulated on a Royal
Decree, ad hoc, basis. The second circuit reversed and remanded the case for a hearing, making
the following observation which is set forth at length because it is particularly instructive:
Because the Dubai decree appears to be Dubai's first attempt to frame an
insolvency law, our courts have had no experience with Dubai bankruptcy
practices and procedures. In that respect, this case is unlike Clarkson Co.,
v. Shaheen, supra, 544 F 2d 624, relied upon by the court below. In
Clarkson, this Court gave deference to proceedings in Canada, "a sister
common law jurisdiction with [bankruptcy] procedures akin to our own. Id
at 630. Here, the district court is sending Drexel into uncharted territory.
In fairness to Drexel, therefore, it should have been afforded reasonable
discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Although the committee did not
bring an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding under 11 U.S.C. §304, that
.Ii
J
j
43 610 f. Supp. 114, 120
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section provides guidance in this area by analogy. Under section 304 (b),
if a party in interest controverts the section 304 (a) petition, the court can
enjoin the continuation ofan action only after a trial or hearing. The court
then must decide whether to grant relief on the basis of the factors
enumerated in section 304 (c). See in re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982). In addition, general case law suggests that, when there
are disputed issues ofmaterial fact, a motion to dismiss an action on a
basis of international comity should not be granted without an evidentiary
hearing [citations omitted]. We conclude that the facts relating to the
Dubai proceedings and its consonance with domestic law andJ>ublic
policy were sufficiently in dispute to warrant further inquiry.
After extensive hearings as to the efficacy of the Dubai proceedings and evenhanded treatment of
creditors, including the right to appeal, the District Court stayed Drexel's and Refco's actions
and Drexel and Refco submitted their claims in the Dubai proceedings. In 1991, six years after
the initial stay, Drexel and Refco, frustrated by their inability to have their claims adjudicated in
Dubai, requested the District Court to lift the stay. In its opinion, the Court took the Dubai
following observation:
In an unusual "second" look the District Court revisited its original findings and made the
Receivers to task for acting as judges and adversaries in respect ofDrexel's and Refco's claims.
r
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In 1987, this Court expressed the view that the proceedings in Dubai will
be conducted substantially in accordance with bankruptcy procedures in
the United States. [citations omitted]. United States Bankruptcy Law
requires that the functions ofa trustee be separate and distinct from that of
the presiding judge.***It is clear that, under United States law, a trustee
may not serve in the dual capacity ofjudge and trustee. Thus, a system of
checks and balances is used to protect the integrity of the process....... * By
contrast this Court finds that the Dubai proceedings do not provide any
The Drexel Lambert Group, Inc., v. Galadari 777 F 2 d 877 (2nd Cir. 1985).
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similar protection to creditors. For example, the Committee [of Receivers]
acts both as trustee (collecting the assets of the estate and detennining
which claims are to be disputed) and as the court (detennining which
disputed claims are to be approved, the amount to be paid on each claim
and whether to discharge the debtor). This court would not condone a
bankruptcy proceeding where the judge were both the tired of the facts and
law and the trustee. However, in Dubai, the Committee [of Receivers]
admittedly sits as both the trustee and judge. Thus, the Dubai proceeding
does not adequately protect creditors or the integrity of the process and
offends our notions ofdue process and fundamental fairness. The evil
inherent in the Committee's [ofReceivers] dual roles is compounded by
the fact that the Committee [of Receivers] has unilaterally appointed [its
own] advisors [names omitted] The Committee's [of Receivers]
appointees have proven to be partial adversaries and adverse witnesses
rather than impartial assistants to a fact-finding body. In sum, the Dubai
proceedings are not in substantial confonnity with our notions of
fundamental fairness and due process. Accordingly, if the Committee [of
Receivers] has not decided [the] claim[s] by April 16, 1991, this court will
lift the stay of this action so that [they] may proceed in this Court.4S
The Dubai Receivers entered a judgment against Drexel and Refco within the time frame
required by the District Court. That judgment was promptly appealed in 1991. In June, 1998, a
Tribunal in Dubai ruled that the Receiver's judgment was not appealable - a position that the
Receivers themselves espoused during the course of the Dubai appeal, not withstanding their
representations that their judgments were appealable. To date, the Receivers have paid out $600
million. Drexel and Refco have not been paid.
Thus far, we have examined the application ofcomity in the United States in
several cross-border contexts. We have seen that our courts generally take a liberal review in
-
+
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4S The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. A.W. Galadari 127 Bankr. 87,105-106.
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sending property back to a foreign country. We now tum to the application of comity by foreign
countries to request from the United States.
VI. Ancillary Proceedings Outside the United States
There is no foreign statutory framework which would extend to a United States
trustee the same ancillary relief as provided for in Section 304 ofthe Bankruptcy Code. Section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the bankruptcy court and U.S trustees jurisdiction over a
debtor's property ''wherever located".46 But that provision, for all practical purposes, is
recognized only on an ad hoc basis which is dependent upon the policy judgment of the foreign
courts in jurisdictions in which the assets are found. This policy judgment, in tum, rests on the
foreign court's application of the ''universality'' theory or the ''territoriality'' theory.
In Felixstone Dock & Railway Co v. U.S. Lines, Inc.,47 the English High Court,
on that basis of international comity was asked to intervene where local creditors in the United
Kingdom had obtained Mareva injunctions restraining depletion of the debtor's U.K. assets
below sums sufficient to satisfy their claims. Refusing to lift the injunctions, the Court stated:
"... even ifan appeal to comity has any force (which is doubtful) it is
improbable, with one possible exception, that the liquidator's authority
would be recognized as extending beyond those affairs of the company
which are local to the country where the appointment was made. The
exception is where there is no likelihood of a liquidation in the country of
incorporation."
r
r
,.
,
•
46
47
11 U.S.C. §541 (a).
(1989) 2 W.L.R. 109.
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Although the High Court acknowledged the importance of the United States Chapter 11 case, it
did not treat this circumstance as overriding. In its ruling, the English court found that the
English creditors would have been treated equally in a liquidation, but would be discriminated
against in a chapter 11 reorganization. The court stated that in the chapter 11 reorganization, in
which the debtor was retrenching from its overseas activities, the English assets would be
"ploughed into the [debtor's] general funds" and that the English creditors would not benefit
from this repatriation of funds to the United States.48 The court felt that it was commercially
inevitable that the United States creditors, who would be dealing with the restructured debtor,
"would be paid offat least in part in order to induce them to carry on doing business" with the
restructured debtor. On the other hand, the English creditors would receive no such benefit. In
reality, the Mareva injunctions invested local creditors with property rights in the U.K. which,
once obtained, the High Court was loathe to dilute.
The U.S. Lines case was truly global in nature. The Company, which had over a
billion dollars ofcreditors, operated container ships which circumnavigated the globe returning
goods to ports oforigin in the United States. Unfortunately, ships could be seized in ports all
over the world by creditors. If those creditors could have been stayed, U.S. Lines might have
-
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48 (1989) 2 W.L.R. 109.
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had a chance to reorganize. Instead, it was liquidated and creditors, other than those with liens
on the ships and those attaching assets overseas received very little. The reasoning of the
r English court presumably would have reached the same conclusion if the U.K. assets had been
"ploughed back" into the liquidation proceeding but U.K. creditors, while receiving a pro rata
r
share of liquidation proceeds, would have received significantly less than they received as a
,.
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r
r
consequence of the Marena injunctions.
Subsequent to the U.S. Lines case, the Insolvency Act of 1986 was passed in
England. Section 426 of the Insolvency Act directs English courts having jurisdiction in relation
to insolvency law to "assist the courts having corresponding jurisdiction in any part of the United
r Kingdom or any relevant country or territory.'.49 Thus, if a foreign proceeding originates in a
commentators feel that this provision should be interpreted liberally to more easily grant comity
"relevant country or territory," the English courts may be used to assist that proceeding. To be
to foreign bankruptcy proceeding.5I
considered "relevant", however, a country must be so designated by legislation.50 Some
Insolvency Act 1986 § 426 (10) (d).
See Lewis, Trans-National Insolvencies: Securing the Assistance of the Courts ofEngland and Wales. 4
Insolvency L. & Prac. 155-56 (September/October 1988) (noting seventeen countries designated as a
relevant country or territory including Ireland, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Anguilla,
Cayman Island, The Turks & Caicos Island, The Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands).
Smart. Carrying on Business as a Basis ofRecognition ofForeign Bankruptcies in English Private Law. 9
OxfordJ. ofLegal Stud. 557, 569 (Winter 1989). 76 B.R. 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
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Ancillary situations in which a U.S. representative seeks the return of foreign
assets are for the most part, anecdotal. Two such fairly recent cases are Delta Corp.89 B 11759
(TLB) and In re Paolo Gucci et al 94 B 40614 (JHG). In the Delta Corp. case, which was
commenced in 1989, a U.S. trustee sought recognition in France where he was required to apply
for a judgment as "exequatur". That process ofbeing so recognized was opposed and, while
ultimately successful, cost over $500,000 in legal fees and related expenses and took a year and
three months to conclude. Even then, the trustee faced continuing legal hurdles in actually
obtaining a return ofproperty to the U.S. and did not actually receive the U.S. debtor's property
until just recently, after almost ten years. That same trustee faced a similar problem in Sweden
and the U.K.. In the U.K., solicitors advised the trustee his position would not be recognized
under the applicable U.K. statutory scheme as "an aggrieved person". This problem was also
encountered in the Gucci case where the U.S. trustee was also not recognized and had to obtain
the appointment ofa separate Receiver (Compare: U.S. Lines in which was the "debtor" was an
"aggrieved person"). In the Gucci case, the U.S. trustee also sought to obtain discovery by
having Letters Rogatory issued for use in Switzerland. This attempt at discovery was opposed in
Switzerland on the ground that it violated Swiss public policy. The trustee was eventually
successful, but it took one year to accomplish his objective, at great expense. The Gucci trustee
encountering resistance to marshalling the debtor's assets in France, Italy, Bermuda and Korea.
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Both the Delta Corp., and Gucci experience were described in testimony to Congress urging it to
adopt the UNICITRAL Model Law discussed below
VII. Caveat for U.S. Creditors
U.S. creditors would not enjoy the same advantage as the Felixstone creditors.
Although the automatic stay provisions of Section 362 ofthe Bankruptcy Cody do operate
worldwide, as practical matter, they operate only as to U.S. citizens and other within the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Thus, persons subject to United States jurisdiction proceed at
their peril against a U.S. debtor's assets outside the United States. Any action to attach or seize
assets outside the U.S., though perhaps legal in the foreign forum, would be a violation of the
automatic stay under the United States Bankruptcy Code and consequently, an act subject to the
contempt powers of the United States bankruptcy court.
In the U.S. Lines case, the court enforced its orders through contempt proceedings
in which the debtor, to satisfy monetary sanctions, attached the bank accounts and other United
States assets ofa foreign creditor who had violated the automatic stay overseas.52 In that case,
the Bankruptcy Court imposed on defendants present in the United States a fine of$5,OOO per
day following their instigation ofarrest proceedings against the debtor's vessels in foreign ports.
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The defendants argued, in part, that the Bankruptcy Court was impennissibly "extending" its
jurisdiction by holding in contempt those foreigners who pennissibly seized foreign assets of a
United States debtor outside the jurisdiction of the United States. The Bankruptcy Court
disposed ofthis argument as follows:
"Ifby its argument GAC Marine is asserting that the automatic stay should
not, as a matter ofdiscretion, be enforced against foreign creditors who
transact or do business in the United States, it is plainly apparent, given
GAC Marine's conduct, that to fail to enforce the automatic stay would be
an abuse.s3
VIII. The Maxwell Experience
Thus far we have reviewed requests for ancillary assistance on the basis ofcomity
with some mixed results. We now tum to those situations in which plenary - as distinguished
from ancillary - jurisdiction is involved in cross-border cases. Maxwell Communications, Inc. is
the quintessential case in which dual jurisdiction has been invoked and in which creditors could
have experienced disastrous results if the dual proceeding had not been coordinated on the basis
ofcomity. That was accomplished by the mechanism ofa protocol through which the plenary
proceedings in each court were coordinated without raising untoward jurisdictional disputes.
-
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In United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC. Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Industries, Inc.).
Id. at 296.
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The Maxwell Communications' protocol was the first and most famous of its kind
and the facts were unique. Maxwell was the London holding company of Robert Maxwell. Over
75% ofits assets were located in the United States in various subsidiaries. The U.S. assets
consisted ofpublishing assets which recently had been purchased with loans ofa $3 billion from
a consortium ofLondon based banks. There were few, ifany, U.S. creditors. The U.S.
subsidiaries were solvent.
On December 16, 1991, after failing to reach an accord with its London bankers,
Maxwell filed a Chapter 11 proceeding in the Southern District ofNew York. On December 17,
1991, Maxwell presented a petition for Administration under the Insolvency Act of 1986 with
the High Court ofLondon, requesting that its accountants, Coopers-Lybrand be appointed as
Administrators. This request was contested by the bank consortium and after a hearing before
the High Court, the consortium's choice for Administrators, Price Waterhouse, was appointed.
In the meantime, Maxwell had obtained, ex parte, the appointment ofan examiner in the U.S.
Chapter 11 proceedings who was vested with special powers similar to that of a trustee.
There were now two plenary proceedings with an English Administrator and a
U.S. Examiner asserting "governance" power over the debtor. The options were clear: a motion
to dismiss the Chapter 11 or a negotiated accommodation. Thought also was given to holding
the directors ofMaxwell in contempt in London for having moved ex parte for the appointment
ofan Examiner after the petition for Administration had been filed with the High Court of
G-29
London. Accommodation won out because of the fear that litigation could cause irreparable
damage to the publishing business, the value ofwhich, to a large decree, depended on
maintaining the confidence ofauthors contracted to publish books with Maxwell's subsidiaries.
Thus, arose the Maxwell protocols4•
The Maxwell Protocol essentially recognized the English Administrator as the
"corporate governance" ofMaxwell and the Examiner was recognized as a party in interest in the
English Administration. The Administrator consulted with the Examiner in disposing of assets -
U.S. or English - in excess ofa certain amount. The protocol also provided that on matters of
importance, orders would be sought from both the High Court ofLondon and the U.S.
bankruptcy court. The English Administrator was authorized to retain professionals to assist in
fashioning a plan ofreorganization [or liquidation] in connection with which the Administrator
would consult the Examiner but not be bound by the Examiner's views. The U.S. bankruptcy
court reviewed the fee requests ofprofessionals retained by the Administrators, but they were
paid from London by the Administrators. In addition to the forgoing, a creditors Committee was
appointed in England but, at the request of the Administrators, no Committee was appointed in
the United States by the U.S. trustee who also cooperated.
Appendix B.
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In February, 1993, a joint plan ofreorganization was filed in the U.S. which
incorporated an English law "Scheme ofArrangement". The plan and Scheme provided for the
liquidation ofMaxwell assets and the pro rata distribution ofproceeds to unsecured creditors
worldwide. Claims were to be filed with the Administrators either in the U.S. or U.K. and were
considered to be filed in both cases. Troublesome issues were dealt with in a variety of creative
ways. Post-petition interest on unsecured debt, which is not payable in the U.S. but is required to
be paid in the U.K., contractual or otherwise, was dealt with by taking the highest U.K.
contractual interest rate and paying it to all creditors, thereby negating the unfairness which the
U.S. rule was designed to prevent. Priority claims, which could have been a problem, did not
materialize after a U.S. Priority Claim Bar Order was issued and no priority claims were
asserted. Landlord claims were negotiated out in the U.K. to the satisfaction of the
Administrators.
IX. Comity Wins Out
The entire Maxwell process went very smoothly, except for one problem -
preferences. Just prior to the filings in the U.S. and U.K., three non-consortium banks received
$200 million ofpreferential payments. In England, such preferences are recoverable only if
Maxwell had "intended" that the banks be preferred over other creditors. The chiefwitness was
Robert Maxwell's son who was in or contemplating a criminal prosecution. A decision was
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taken to sue the banks pursuant to Section 547 and 502(d) ofthe Bankruptcy Code. One of the
banks attempted to enjoin the Administrators in the High Court of London from commencing the
U.S. action. The High Court ofLondon held that question of"preference" was a conflict of
interest question and that applicable law was to be determined by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in
the first instance. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court concluded that U.S. law did not apply because the
acts occurred in England thereby requiring dismissal on the basis ofcomity.
x. Other Protocols and the Concordat
Following the Maxwell case, protocols were entered into in a number ofcases.55
In 1996, the International Bar Association, relying on Maxwell and other protocols, adopted a
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat which is intended to be used by courts in different countries
to coordinate cross-border insolvencies. The Concordat has 10 basic principals which promote
the universality concept ofa single forum for all claims and distributions but recognize that there
may be multiple plenary forums or plenary forums combined with ancillary forums. The
Concordat also recognizes that particular jurisdictions may want to determine certain claims and
I
...
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55 In re AlOC Corporation and AlOC Resources AG between United States and Switzerland: U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for Southern District Court ofNew York (April 3,1998); In re Solv-Ex Canada Limited
and In re Solv-Ex Corporation between Alberta Court ofQueen's Bench and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Mexico (January 28,1998); In re Tee-Corom Electronics Inc. between Ontario Court ofJustice
and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District ofDelaware (June 27,1997); In re Nakash: U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District ofNew York and District Court ofJerusalem (May 23,1996);In re Everfresh
Beverages Inc.: Ontario Court of Justice, Toronto and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York (December 20, 1995); and In re Olympia & York Developments Ltd: Ontario Court ofJustice
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preferences on the basis of their own local law. The Concordat has been cited recently as a
"guidance for the treatment ofcross-border problems".S6 The Concordat's principles have been
incorporated into the cross-border protocols in In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc. and In re Joseph
NakashS7 which, respectively, facilitated the coordination of U.S., Canadian and Israeli law in
r
I'
those cases. On a practical level, the Concordat meshes concepts universality and territoriality so
,.
t
as to accomplish what can be practically accomplished on a political scale. The Concordat is a
non-binding guide which is intended to be used to illuminate, on a relatively uniform basis, the
private law expectations of creditors in a global, commercial context.
r
r
XI. Treaties and Other Initiatives
At the moment, there are very few treaties in existence. Those that do exist are
regional in nature. In Scandinavia, the Nordic Convention of 1933 includes Sweden, Denmark,
Havana Convention of 1928, include Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay
Norway and Finland. In South America, the Montevideo treaties of 1889 and 1940 and the
and U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District ofNew York (July, 1993). Selected sample protocols
are annexed as Appendices C, D and E.
In re Hackett 184 B.R, 658 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
F.N. 58, infra.
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and Cuba.58 The United States ofAmerica and Canada attempted to enter a treaty designated
United States ofAmerica-Canada Bankruptcy treaty (1979). That attempt failed. Two parallel
Western European Conventions have also drawn up insolvency agreements; but they are not
fully executed. The first is the Council ofEurope Convention and the second is the European
Union Convention.
A. The Council of Europe Convention.
The Council ofEurope Convention deals with certain limited aspects of cross-
border insolvencies. It permits a liquidator to exercise powers beyond national borders, subject
to approval of the foreign territory and takes a universal approach which recognizes to a single
jurisdiction for purposes of insolvency administration.59 That convention which has not been
fully executed, will be superseded by the European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings. Consequently, it will probably never come into being.
i
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International Solution To International Insolvency: An Insoluble Problem? McKenzie (1997) 26 W Bolt. L,
Rev. 15,16.
Ibid., P. 22
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rehabilitation and a fresh start in the U.S. sense.
than the Council of Europe Convention upon which it was based. It provides for rules of
provide a ''universal'' forum for processing claims while recognizing the territorial prerogatives
liquidator is entitled to exercise his powers in any other member state without much restriction;
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This convention is generally limited to liquidation proceedings but goes further
The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings
Ibid
B.
mandatory jurisdiction which override national rules; all filed proceedings are automatically
recognized but the debtor's center of ''main interests" is the primary jurisdiction and the
applicable; the rules of the convention are limited to its members and do not deal with
proceedings outside the European Union.60 The European Convention, in short, attempts to
the primary proceeding is ''universal'' in nature but ancillary proceedings are recognized as being
"territorial" and the law of the local forum relating to insolvency and the debtor's assets is still
ofother forums that may be involved. Fourteen of the fifteen members ofEuropean Union have
signed the Convention. The U.K. has not. Neither of these conventions effectively provides for
60
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C. The United Nations Model.
Working from the European Council and European Union Convention initiatives,
.J
and the practical and flexible extant protocols, the United Nations Commission onInternational
Trade Law (UNICITRAL) has prepared a Model Law at the suggestion ofpractitioners with
practical working knowledge in the field. 61 The Model Law62 is based upon the proposition that
it is appropriate to facilitate cooperation between various courts was done in Maxwell and other
protocols and thereby to protect the interests ofall creditors worldwide through fair and equal
distribution and efficient administration of assets on the basis of comity. Importantly, the Model
Law also recognizes the principal of"rescuing" viable businesses, a concept which had not
heretofore received much international acceptance. The cross-border insolvency process under
the Model Law requires recognition ofa sister States' insolvency proceedings, permits sister
States' representatives to have access to legal mechanisms in another Model Law states; and
entitles those representatives to limited relief designed to protect a debtor's assets and
distribution thereof to all creditors.63 The Model Law would rely mostly on judicial cooperation
to give effect to its policy goals and would expect that States would individually revise their
domestic laws where necessary. 64 Presumably, local law would continue to be ''territorial''
where appropriate but would otherwise invoke the ''universality'' concept in order to implement
the underlying policy principles of the Model Law. The Model Law has been accepted by a
number ofmember States of the United Nations and probably is the best existing framework for
J
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63
64
UNICITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies Garzon, Gad.
Appendix G annexed hereto.
International Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy, Gaa and Garzon, 31 Int'l Law 273.
Ibidp.274.
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developing a reasonably workable, international approach to cross-border insolvencies. Chapter
15 of the newly proposed and yet to be enacted Bankruptcy Code dealing with cross-border
insolvencies, incorporates many ofthe Model Law concepts. Those concepts are not here
included since many of them are discussed below in connection with the proposed Chapter 15 of
the new Bankruptcy Code which had support from bankruptcy judges in the United States.6S
XII. The New Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments (Chapter 15)
Chapter 15 authorizes a U.S. representative to act in a foreign jurisdiction (section
1505). It authorizes a foreign representative in a "main" foreign proceeding or "non-main"
foreign proceeding to institute an ancillary proceeding in the U.S. bankruptcy courts (§§ 1504,
1507) upon obtaining ''recognition'' of the foreign proceeding (§1515). The gate way to relief
under Chapter 15 and other relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code is the application for
recognition required by §1515 and the determination as to whether the foreign proceeding is a
"main proceeding" or a "non-main proceeding"(§1517). Pending such determination of
recognition, the foreign representative may request a variety of relief including stays of
execution and marshalling ofassets (§ 1519). After recognition, whether the foreign proceeding
is ''main'' or "non-main", the foreign representative may continue to stay execution, stay
commencement ofnew proceedings, examine witnesses, continue to marshall assets and request
r
r
r
r
65 Appendix F, testimony ofHon. Tina Borzman fa.eforl!.The Senate Committee on theludiciary.
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other appropriate relief other than, generally, that involving preferences and fraudulent transfers
(§1521). If the foreign proceeding is a "main proceeding", §362 applies automatically. In
addition, the foreign representative may operate the debtor's business and may exercise the
powers ofa trustee under §549 of the Bankruptcy Code to set aside post-petition transfers.
Providing ancillary relief to a recognized foreign representative is not automatic. The u.s.
bankruptcy court must find such ancillary relief consistent with principals of comity and that
such reliefwill reasonably ensure "just" treatment ofall creditors, protect ofU.S. creditors from
"prejudice" or "inconvenience", prevent "preferential or fraudulent disposition of the debtor's
property", ensure proper "distribution ofproceeds", and, if appropriate, provide a "fresh start"
§(1512).66
Chapter 15 also provides that a foreign representation obtaining recognition under
§1515 has a right ofdirect access to Federal or State Courts (§1509). Chapter 15 also provides
that a recognized foreign representative may participate as a party in interest in any case pending
in regard to the debtor under Title II (§1512), has standing to initiate preference and fraudulent
conveyance actions in such cases (§1523) and has standing to intervene in any State or Federal
case in which the debtor is a party (§ 1524). A ''recognized'' foreign representative is authorized
I
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66 See also 11 U.S.C. §304 (c) for similar requirements.
G- 38
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
to commence an involuntary case against the debtor under §303 of the Bankruptcy Code, or, if
recognized as a representative in a "main foreign proceeding", is authorized to commence a
voluntary case under §301 or 302 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Requesting recognition as a representative ofa foreign proceeding (main or non-
main), which is required to "commence a case under Chapter 15 (§1504), is not pro forma but
also does not require a great deal ofeffort. A certification of the decision commencing the
foreign case or certification from the foreign court are sufficient, provided they are in English.
Notarization is not required - a gift from the Model, the drafters ofwhich have had significant
experience with that the notarization process which can be time consuming. As in the case of the
Model Law, Chapter 15 utilizes the notion of the debtor's "center of its main activity" in
determining whether the foreign proceeding is a "main" proceeding or "non-main" proceeding.
Section 1502 (4) defines the "foreign main proceeding" as the proceeding where the debtor has
the center of its main activity. In determining "recognition" under §151S, the bankruptcy court
may "presume", in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the debtor's registered office or
habitual residence is the "center of the debtor's main interests".
In an unusual provision, Chapter 15 also provides for cooperation and direct
communication between courts, thereby codifying what was accomplished in the Maxwell
protocol and the protocols following it (§§ 1529-30). The drafters have facilitated the filing of an
involuntary, plenary proceeding by a foreign representative by permitting the bankruptcy court to
G- 39
indulge the presumption that, if there is a foreign proceeding or proceedings, the debtor is not
paying its debts as they became due (§ 1531) and therefore is insolvent for §303 purposes.
Finally, §1532 provides for a leveling ofpayments to general unsecured creditors
who may have received, in a foreign proceeding, a greater percentage share of their claims than
u.s. creditors. Such foreign creditor's claim in the U.S. will not be paid until U.S. creditors
catch-up (§1532).67 Chapter 15 does not apply to individual debtors.
In sum, Chapter 15 of the proposed United States Bankruptcy Code not only
reflects another effort to streamline cross-border insolvency cases but, by incorporating the
concepts of the UNICITRAL Model Law, Congress has sent a clear message inviting broad scale
participation in that effort by other nations.
...
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67 See also, 11 U.S.C. §S08.
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FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL OIDII APPOINTINC EXAMINER AND
A£PROVlNG AGREEMENT BETWEEN EXAMINER AND JOINT ADMINISTRAToRS
Thi_ Court having heretofore, on December 20, 1991, ent.~ed
ite Order Appointing Examiner (the "Ix••iner Order"t-.uthorizinq
end directing the appointment of an examiner for MaxwIIl
Communication Corpontlon plc (the "Debtor") 1n the within
procledingl, an4 on January 3, 1992, enterld its Interim
Supplemental Order Appointing Examiner and Approving Agreement
aetween Examiner and Joint Admini_tratorl (the "Interim Order':),
and Richard A. Citlin havin, bee" .ppointed ., examiner (tile
"Examiner"), Ind Andre" Mlrll HOMn, CoUn Craha.. Bird and JonathAn
GUy Anthony Phillip. havin, been appointed joint admlnlltratorl
(the "JOint Ad.tnlltrltor.") of the Debtor pur.uant to the Order
for Joint Adminl,trator. (EXhibit A herlto) of thl Englllh Hiqll
Court of JUltlcl, Chancery Dlvillon, companies Court (Hoffman, J.)
(the "High court") in the cn,UI" adalniatraUon praceedlng (the
"Adminl'tration") involvlfl' the Debtor, and it appearing that
o
~
w
UNITED STATES IANK~U'TCY COURT
SOUTHIRN D!S~ICT or NEW YORK
In re
- MAXWELL COMMUNICATION
CO~PORATION plC,
Debtor.
Ch.pter 11
C••e No. '1 I 15741 (TLI)
there il a d••ire by thi. Court. the High Court, the Examiner, the
Joint Adminiltratorl and the Debtor (i) to harmonize the within
proceeding, with the Adminilltrat.ton and (U) to facilitate a
rehabiUtation and reor,anlaaUon of thl "abtOI:, and upon the
Application of Richard A. Gitlin, Ixaminer, for Entry of Final
Supplementd Order Appointing Examinlr and ApprOVing Agreement
Between Examiner and Joint Adminiltratotl (thl "Application"), and
upon the finding_ of fact in the Examiner Order (without makinq
any other determination or finding aa to the alllgations made In
the Motion for Appointmant of Examinlr), and the Hiqh Court havlnq
nrdeted (Exhibit 8 hereto) that••ubject to the approval of this
Court. the Joint Administrators be authorized to conslnt to tile
making of an Order in Iubluntially th... terms, and upon a
he41'S ng (tha "Haarlng" I on the .Application in thU Court, on
'January 15, 1992, and dUI and sufficient noticl of the Kearln?
having been givan, and aftel: due deUberation and lufficient calue
app.arlng tharefore, Zt i. heraby ORDERED thatl
A. The appoint.ant of thl Exa..iner il heraby confirmed ••
of the dati of hia acclptanca of such appointmant and Ul.
remai"ing pl:ovllion. of tha E...inel: Order and the Interim Order
are luper.edad In thair entlraty by thi. Order.
z
~
~
~
~
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B. The Joint Admini.traton and the Ex.miner .hall b.
r.lcognJ.zed .. "partie. in intenlt" in th1l cue within t.he
cc,templation of Bankruptcy Code ,ection 1109(b), and the Joint
~dr.Jniltr.tor. will .upport an .pp1ication by the Examiner for
lea·~ to be heard in the High court in respect of the
Adm! nlstration.
C. The Ex.miner Ih.l11
(1) inve.tig.te the ••••t., liabilities and financlal
condltion·of the Debtor, the opu.tion of .the Debtor"
bUllnel1 .nd the dealr.billty of the continuance of IU~h
bUllne•• , and any other matter relevant to this ca.e or
to the formu1.Uon of • pl.n of reorganization and
report the relult. of .uch inve.tigation •• provided In
Bankruptcy Code lection ~IO'(.)(.). In order to reduce
duplication of effort and the needle.. incurrence of
expen.e, the Exa.lner may, In his dilcretion, defer to
the Joint Admlnl.tratorl with re.pect to matter. beln9
inye.U,.ted by Ue.. (othu than invIIUgauon. n1evant
to tb. formulation of a plan of reorganization) unle••
th. E...lner beUeve. tbat .n independent ot'
.upple.lntal IRyeetlvation by the Examiner 1.
appropriate under the clrcumltance., auch a. whirl th.u
3
may bl a potentll1 conflict of Intere.t. In decidlng
whether to exercile hla di.cretion to conduct an
independent or ,upplemental inve.tlgatlon, the Examiner
Iha11 be mindful of, and Vlve .erioul conlideration to,
the additional coaU and expen.e. that wOlild be involvod
in conducting .uch Inve.tigation. In order to
facilitate the full and cooperative exchange of
Information, the Joint Admini.trator. and the Exam~ner
(including their re.pective profe.ilonals) are
authorized and directed to hold in confidence and not
disclose, except to thl. Court or to the High Court
under auch circulI.tance••0 that the confidential natur.
of luch information wl11 be protected or as otherwll~
required by appl1c.ble 1.w, to thlrd partiea without ,th~
con.ent of the other any information dellgnated as
confidential proYlded by one to the other In connection
with the Inv••ti,ationl de.cribed in this paragraph:
(11) act to barmonl,e, for the benefit of all of the Debtor"
creditor. and .tockholder. and other parti.. In
Intere.t, th. Debtor'. United sute. Chapter 11 cu. and
the Ad_Inl.tratio" .0 a. to .axlmlze the Cebtor·.
DrCIIDKOUI for nhlbl1it.atlon Md reorgen!zat1on:·if appn,rt.e:I.
4
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Protocol.
Administrators, annexed hereto as Exhibit C, ine1udinq without
rocoqnized as the corporate qovernence of the Debtor subject to
the terms of this Order.
theandExaminerthebetweenProtocolThe
The Examiner be and the sam. hereby 11 author!zed,
The Joint. Administrators be and the .ame hereby are
r.
E.
D.
and 331.
limitation paragraph G.5(c) and (d) thereof authorizinq withou~
further notice and a hearin9, pursuant to Sections 363 and 354 of
SUbject to this Court's approval, to appoint or employ pursuant to
Bankruptcy Code section 327, accountants, attorney. and/or othe~
agent. or representative. to a.aist him in the performance o[ hls
duties and the exsrei•• of his power. hereunder, and the Examiner
may .eek compensation tor hi. services and reimbursement of his
custs and expenses in accordance with Bankruptcy Code sections JJO
tho Bankruptcy Code, the transactions provided for therein, is
horeby approved and the Examiner and the Joint Administrators
shall exercis. th.ir power. and authority in accordance with the
(as described on Schedule 2 of the Protocol anneKed
hereto .. Exhibit C) (the "Bank committee") and any
orficial committee appointed in this case, inquire of
major parties in interest 1n the Debtor's case
concerning their respective pOlitionl as to the
resolution of any iSlue. and impedimentl to the
formulation of a plan of reorganization;
IV) mediate any difference' in respect of the positions of
the various parties in interest Vis-a-vis any issuel and
impediments ident.1Ued or arisinq with respect to a plan
canvas, determine and identify the issues end
impediments that must b. reeo1v.d to facilitate a
reorqanization of the Debtor:
liv) with the Joint Administrators, the ad hoc bank committee
of reorganization;
(vi) promote a consen.us among all partie. in interest 10
that • cons.nlual plan of reorqanization may be
propoled, confirmed and consummated consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code; and
,j:::o.
VI
o
(vU) act as • facilitator: 1n re.pect of all of the
foregoing matter,.
5 •
el. The Joint Administrators, the Debtor under the I. Nothing contained herein ... r "*,, "" Preuee1- .hall:
supervi8ion of the Joint Administrators al corporate governanee,
David Shaff.r ("Shaffer"), and the Examiner .hall t.ke luch steps
~s are necessary in good f.ith in order to effectuate the
provisione, spirit and intent of thi. Order.
(i) the tiling of proceedings under the b.nkruptcy -,r
insolvency l.w of Iny juriediction with respect to any
m.mber of the MIO Group; or
(ii) any ••1. or oth.r dilpo.ition of any m.mber of the ~.O
Group, or any mlUdal ....U (I « ; ....u H"" • "'w"
el ., 1••• , '3 Mllll.Ri of any of the foregoing.
subject to the limits of thi. Court's juri.diction, .ach member of
the M,a Group and their re.pective directors and officers shall
not direct, cau.e or cau•• another .ntity to consent to t.he
follOWing, without the consent of the Examiner and the Joi~t.
~~minlstrators ((With concurrent notic. to U.S. counsel for ~~~
Bonk committee)l-0r approv.l of the court in accordance with t~:5
Order:
o
.j::.
0\
H. Pursuant to Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code .nd
7
(i) be con. trued to affect, diminish or increa.e in any way
the juri.diction provided to this Court under Unlt.ed
State. law with re.pect to the within proceedinqs or the
jurisdiction provided under EngUsh law to the High
Court with respect to the Administration;
I U) require the Joint Administrators to do anything or
refrain from doing anything which would or would' be
11kely to result in their being in breach ot any duty
imposed on them by any applic:able law; "c.r~i .. " ....~ ~( l'r'''oc •
(ill) authorize the taking ot any action\whlCh requirp.5
notice and a hearing or court authorization under
the Bankruptcy Code, unless (a) the requirement of
notice Ind a hearing or court authorization has
been met or (b) the action i. taken pur.uant to
paragraph. G.5(c) or G.5(d) of the Protocol; or
(1v) pr.clude any party in inurese from ...king furthH
relief from this court (whether by way of modification
of thil Order, expansion or reduction of the Examiner',
powers, obUlnln9 injunctiv. or mandetory reUer or
otherwis.) •
8
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J. The Joint Administrators .hall concurrently with
dolivery to the Examiner provide to (i) U.S. counsel for the Bank
Committee, and (il) the U.S. counsel for any offieial committee
appointed in this cue, copies of aU notice. or requests for
consent or approval (1ncluding copies of aU materials provided to
justify such consent or Ipproval) .ent or furnished by the Joint
Administrators to the Examiner pursuant to the Protocol (subject
to appropriate confidentiality restrictions), provided that the
S
JoInt Administrators shall have leave to seek relief from thi~
court from the provisions of this paragraph J if the Joinb
Adml nistrators determine in good faith that such disclosure in any
indi·.. ldual case could be prejudicial to the interest. of the
Debtor'S e,tate •
llabi lity for aa, ICUI"...Iter: lSI' ,,,' "lice" 1Il1uaafl~ te this
The Honorable T~a L. Brozman
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDeE
lJ.
... ,:V( ....., .....C(j 1"C,"i"'UI .... ~(;'" H;oI
'"-'C P~.+. fAl.
The Joint Administrators Shill not incur personal1(.
N'''''''l -4.oull/cA .....rti" IM'I , c(.~ _" .~ , ..0.,; .. ;"Jc/'yl~
.fvI.. "I"'r~'" +r.:J c...... ~ ,-,<;0"'( ~ s...-.c c...'/'eJ).-f
1lI.~ tLt ." I"<,.,."n 4,. eo-~~ • ~ Nfl.,I/,). A4 eM.( ~ I.t
,~."kJ. -4. ",.J. l..,. k' f.,. ~ ~~lc c.. ...."":uu. ....
\1.$. c..-sd /.0.... _., • ~vJ. e.-..... ...\~ --I"""~"oJ ~'U 'lWC,
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Qrder or the RED' •••• ' ~&~I"II\&
Oiled: January Il, 1992
New York, New York
.$:>.
-....l
:nD. or MAXWELL COMMtlNlCAnoN CORPORAnON
IN 11m MATID or mE INSOLVENCY Act' 1JI6-
IN 1111 81GB covn or Jt1snCE
CHANCIIY DIVIS10N
~COVJlT
£'"Ui.il.: 3
No. 001_1 0' l.991
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the Jo=~ be II h'beny to CIODSe11% to the lZW:i.aI ot &l:l
Order of the US 8aDkruptcy Coun Nbstanri.aUy ill die form ot tbe
dratl azmaed hereto
me Order of Mr. Justice Hoffmaml dated 20th December 1991 be
disclwled iDsow u it relaces co David Herben Josepb Sbder
AAd it is ordeted dw me COltS of the JOUlC~ of die US
~ aDd _ .. lids app_ bo _ .. dIo _ ..
'V
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I
~
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. . ": .
.
..
JlCM)'~ ORDEIl
UPON the awliClJioll of ADdmr MIn HoawI, CoUll OrUim Bin! IDd
JOIWIwl au, Amhoay P!IiWpI, tIM Joim AdmiDisU'llOn of Muwell
Cotl1lZNDic::uioa Corparaioa pic (tIM -eompuy') by ordiDary awlic:uioD dated
the '1 •. day of to.".:sj( 1991
AND UPON HEAJUNO e:.au.t1 for tbI awlicams ud Coumel for IUdwd
A. OidJD tIM En'" appaiDd by tbI Uaited s.. 8aDIauptcJ Court.
Soumtnl DiaricI of Nft York ('"tIM US 8utnIptq Courti ('"tIM USEn.'"
ADd ...... till AmdDhI of CoUll Orabam Bird SWOrD die
'\ J. dar of ~ 1991 ud EnD DaDie1 F1aIdIa
SWOrD the 1; ., of 1991
rr IS HEREBY ORDERED dlallUbjecl to die IppI'Oftl of tIM US
8aDIauptcJ Coan of • Order IUbIumiIDJ ill die fonD of die dnft IDIICUd
hereto:
3 tile Jomt AdmiDislncon of me Compaay IDd the US !.aminer have
Iibeny to awly to the Coun Ul mae proceedillp
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PROTOCOL
The examiner and the Joint Admlnlltratora her.by agree, lub/ect to entry by the
Bankruptcy Court of the Final Supplemental Order Appointing ExamIner Ind ApprovIng
Agreement Between examiner and Joint Admlnlltrator. (th. "PropOied Order") to which thIa
Protocol II an exhibit, u followe:
A. Annexed hereto u SChedule 1 It a lilt of entJtl.. th8t .,.. Inte9r~ p.rta of the
butl.,..... of Macmillan, Inc. rMacmlllan") and 0fIlcIaI Aktlne BuIdeI,lnc. rOAQ" whether
lubeldlertel or aflIliattl thereof (a.ldentllltd on Sohtdule1 hereto, the "MIO Qroup· u may be
varied from tlme to time by further agr..ment between the Exemlntr and the Joint Admlnl8tratorl
lubJect to the approval, or furth.r ord.r, of the Bankruptoy Court)•
B. WIth rllpect to thote m.mbll'l of the MIO Qroup that .,.. Identlfted wlth an
lSterlak on Schedule 1hereto (the "MIO AtIIIlltel"), the JoInt Admlnlltratol'l hive UPl'llled the
need to analyze theIr duties and reeponllbilltl..U'lder Englllh or ather appllcabl.llw concemlng
the potentl~ rlghtl of the lharthold.ra and cradItora of the MAO AIIUIItet and the Joint
AdmlnlltratOl'l and the ex.mIner Igrae to work together In good faith to effectuate the current
dealre and Intent for DavidS~r ("Shatrer") to continue OVWHelng the MIO Group, u provided
In paragraph C hereof, without caUllng the Joint Admlnlltrltorl to be In breach of their dutlel
and reeponalbilltiea under Engllh or other applicable law, wIttl the Joint Admlnlstratora and the
Examiner retervlng the right to leek r~11f from the Bankruptcy Court In the event the foregoing
cannot be accomplllMd.
C. Subject to paragraph G.3(1) hereof, ShatTer thlll (I) remlln the Chairman, Prelld.nt
and Chief exacutlve Offtcer Of Macmillan, Inc., (19 rern~n the Chairman of omcl~ Airline Ouldel,
Inc. ("OAG"), (III) be paid by OAO and Macmillan, and (Iv) be employed by the Dabtor but WIthout
the Joint Admlnlltrators adopting or the Debtor alumlng hie contract of employment, It being
the current de.lr. and Intent (Iubject to p.,..greph G.3(1) hereof) that hll management rol.
Include overae.lng management of the MiO Group.
D. The Joint Admlnlstratora and the EICImlner ahall con.un and together agr.e 1'10
the appropriate compolltlon of the boerdl of dlrectol'l of Macmillan and OAG. The Debtor under
the direction of the JoInt Admlnlltretol'l, In Ita capaclly u the ultimate parent company.of the
MaO Group, .h~1 procure the appointment of new boardI of directors for Macmillan and OAG.
proYlded that lubject to paragraph 0.3(1) hereof (I) Shafler Ihlll be a member of both board.,
(19 the Joint Admlnlltrato", Ihlll conault WIth Shaffer u to whither It may be appropriate to
appoint one or more membera of operating rMnagement of Maemnlan or OAG to their r••pectlve
boardl, PII) the remaining membere of the rHpeetIve boardl shill be Independent, outside
dlrectora of dlltlnctlon, and (Iv) the Joint AdmInIatratora and the ElCAmlner .~I have conaented'
to each propo18d appointment.
E. Should the Joint Admlnlltratora coneIder It appropriate to commence lnIolvency
or other almller proceedlnga In rtlpect of ., or Iny of the Inttrmedllttl holding campanl••
betwe.n the Debtor and the MIO Broup, they may commence euch proceedlnga IUbJect to
giving IUch prior notice u II reIIonable In all the c1rcumat.ancea of the commencament of luch
proceedingl to the Eumlner. and In that ewnt they thai. or they lhall Clute the Debtor to.
2
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lub/ect to prlor consultation with thl examiner, commence parallel proceedlngl under Chapter
'1 In the United State. with re,plct to .uch Intermediate holding companlel In which lvent the
Joint AdmlnlltratOra Ind ttIe Exmllner Ihlll apply to thl Bankruptcy Court for an Order In rlllllon
to IUch companlNappolntlng thl Examiner to .erve In .uch CUI' and otherwl.lln .ubltantlally
the laml tlrms II the terms or the PropoIICl Ordlr Insafar II they mlY b. relevant.
F. The Debtor and thl examiner may rlllln on I Joint bllli (lub/8ct to approval by
the Bankruptcy Court of thlapectfto Joint retention application) an Inveltment banker or national
and Intematlonll rlputatlon lelectld by the Jalnt Admlnlltratora and the ExamIner.
G. The Joint Admlnlltratora and thl EutnJner ahaIl eDrcIlt their pOW8rI and
authority In Iccordlnce WIth the following:
1. WIth reeplct to the Debtor. ttIl Joint Admlnlstratora and the Debtor et the dlrlctlon
or the Joint Admlnlltrltors lMi:
(I) Ixcept II provided In 1hIa Protoaol and the Propoeed order, attempt, In
good faith, to obtain ttIe prtor epprovaI of the Examiner and thall obtain
thlappreMI or the Bankruptcy Court to borrow funde or p1lC1ge or charge
any .... or the Debtor:
(II) In good faith attempt to obtain thl oonalnt or ttIe Eumlnll' prtor to
...kIng to COIMIt the Debtor'e CUI to a cu. under Chapter 7 or thl
hnkNptoy Code and IhaII obtain the approval or the BankNptcy Court
to any luch convel'llon:
3
2.
OIQ obtain ttl. prior con.ent ofthe examiner or, having firIt Ittempted In good
faith to obtain luch conaent. approval or thle Court prior to filing a plan of
rlorganlzatlon for the Dlbtor dullng ttIe period In which the Debtor hu the
exclu.tve rtght to file a plan or reorganlZltJOn rPlln") and .11k Icceptance
of .uch a Plan a. provided In Section 1121 or the Bankruptcy Code.
WIth relped to the MaO Group, and reglrdle.. of whether authorIZation to tlke
.uch action Ie othlrwt.. required form thl. Court or the Engll.h High Court, the
Joint AdmlnlltratOre and the Debtor ner the dlrecUon of the Joint Admlnlltratora
"'111, In good f81th, attempt to obtain the co,,"nt or the examiner and shall obtain
the approval or the Bankruptcy Court prior to:
0) commencing, or caUlIn; to b. commlnced or conaentlCl to, bankruptcy
or InloMtncy proceedlngt (Whether In"'e United Stat•• or e.awhlr.) with
rapect to any mamblr' of "'e MaO Group;
QQ In any Chapter 11 cue Involving any memblr or ",. MaO Group, acting
to convert or ...k to convert luch cael to I cue under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptoy Code;
(UQ caUllng My member or the MaO Group to borTOW fundt;
(Iv) ClUilng any member or the MaO Group 10 pledge or charge any ....ta;
(v) Clullng any member or the M&O Group to 1111 or dlapoll or any ahllt.
or other ...... outalda the ordinary COUl'H or butlna•.
4
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3. The Joint Admlnlltratora and the Oebtor under the direction of the Joint
Admlnietrlltora lhall attempt In good filth to obtain the prior conaent of the
ExamIner and, It IUch con..nt II not given, Ihan obtain thl approval of the
Bankrilptcy Court prlor to:
(I) replacing, 1Irl"g, or materlilly redUcing thl operating responllbllnlu Of
Shaffer (WIthout otherwl..detrlctlng from the Joint Adminlltratora' powera
and authorfty u corporate governance of the o-btor):
OQ lIXIrclelng the voting rlghtB of the Debtor or the M&O Group with relpect
to atock Of any member of the MAO Group, except that IUCh conaent or
apprOYll Ihd not be required to eurel.. the voting rlgh1l of atock ot
Mao AtIInat.. to the utlnt:
(1) thl Joint Admlnl*atora hive 11m conaultad with the ExImIner
concemlng luch lIXIrclee: and
(2) IUCh votk1g rtgtltI.e not lIXIrcleed In a mannar lnoonalstent with
the provIaJona, eplrlt or Intent Of thll ordlr:
(HI) tiling a plan of reorgantzllllon under Chapter 11 tor any member of the
M&O Qroup (to the utlnt that any of them It the lubJIct of a Chapter 11
cal) during the period In which IUch member hu the lXduelvl rlght to
till a plan of reorganization and I..k acetptance Of .ueh plan .. provided
In Seotton 1121 of the Benkruptey Code;
6
(iv) Clullng any member of thl M&O Group to commence material legal
proceedlngl;
(v) except II provldld In paragraph 0, procuring the Ippolntment of any
director Of any member of the M&O Group:
(vi) cauelng the Debtor or any ot Ita lub.ldlarle. to take any action which II
Int.nded to or 1M renonllbly anticipated conllquenctl of which would
havl I material adverte Impact on any algnltlcant member Of the MaO
Group.
4. The Joint Admlnlltratora may, without the prior conl.nt of the Examiner Ind
without giving prlor notice to him, carry out Invtltlgatlone Into the flnanclal
deillngi of the membtra of the MAO Group provided that the Joint Admlnlstratora
thlll report on the dltl/II of .uch mItltra to the Examiner at weekly or auch othlr
Intervall .. may be agreed between the Joint Admlnlltratol"8 and the Exlmlner.
S: WIth r"plct to tha lublldlarle. and afllllat.. of the Debtor that ere not mlmba,.
of the MaO Group (the "Other Sublldlarlea, or any ather ...ttI outBid_ the M&O.
Group,
(a) The Joint Admlnlltratora Ind the Debtor under the direction of the JoInt
Admlnlltratora Ihlll, In good tilth, attempt to obtain the prior conllnt Of the
Ex8mlner and lhall obtain the approval of tha Bankruptcy Court prior to:'
Q) d~ng of Ihartl In any of the Other Sublldlarln or any othar ...etl
outelda the M&O Group or ClUlI any Of the Other Sub.ldlarl.. to dllPOII
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of any Ultte, for a conl/d.ratlon, In anyone CUI, In IxceSS of
E2S,ooo,ooo;
QQ causing any of the Othlr Subl/d/arl.. to borrow fundi or pl.dge or charge
,any or ItI ...11I to I.eurl Indebtlcl"..1 (If the aggregate or all IUGh
borrowlngl, p1.dg.. and charg.. for any lingle other Sublldlary I. In In
amount .xceedlng £25,000,000 at any one time) or lend money to Othar
Sublldlarl.. (If the aggr.gate amount 10 loanlcl by any lIngle OII'I.r
Sublldllry lhall excelcl £2&,000,000 at any on. tim.); or
PII) caullng any Other Sublldlary to commence a cu. under the Bankruptc¥
Coda or ftlt a petition for r.1Ief under S.ctlon 304 or ttl. BankrUptcy Cod•.
(b) Tl'l. Joint Admlnlltratore and the Debtor under the direction of the JoInt
Admlnlllratore lhall, In good filth Ittempt to obtain the prior conlent or the
Exlmlner Ind, If luch COntent II not given, Ihlll obtlln thl .pprOVII of the
Bankruptcy CoWl, prior to tllng a plan or reorganization uncIer Chapter 11 for any
or the Other Sublldlarl.. (to the extent that any or them II the IUbJ'ct of •
Chapter 11 08U) during the patlocI In whIch the ralevant company hu the
'xcIu11v8 right to ftll I plan or raorganlzatlon and to ...k eccaptanca of IUch a
plan u provldlclln S.ellon 1121 of the Bankruptcv Code.
(e) Thl Joint Admlnlltratorl and the Debtor under the direction or thl Joint
AdmlnlltratOrI mey, lubjact to prior notItIcatIon to the Examiner:
7
(I) IxerCll1 the voting rlghtl or the relevant company with relpeet to stock or
any of the Other Sublldlarlta other than to etract matte" cover.d by
Claull (d) below;
(IQ dlepoee or ,ham In any or the Other Sublldlarl.. or any other ..,atl
outside the M&O Group, or ctIUM any or the Other Sublldlert.1 to dlepol'
Of any UIItI, for a conlldtratJon. In any one CII8, In IXCIU Of
£7,000,000 but not UCIIdlng £25,000,000;
PIQ ctIUI. any or the Other SubIIdllrlaa to bol'lVW fundi or pIIclg. or charg.
any or ItI lIINtI to MCUrI Incr.bled"," (If the aggregate or all luch
borrowl., pledgee and chargM for any lingle 0lhIr Subeldlary II In an
amount exceeding £7,000,000 but not IlCCHdlng £25,000,000 at any Onl
tml) or lind money 10 Other $ubIIdIIrtN (If the aggregata amount 10
Ioantd by any lingle 0tI'ltr Subeldlary II In 111 amount uceedlng
£7,000,000 but not exceeding £2&,000,000 at any onl tImt);
(Iv) OIUII any or the OtherI~ to oommence materIa1 legal'
pracHd/ngl:
(v) commanoe. C*JII to be commenclcl or conalnttd to, bll1kruptcy or
IneolYenGy pfOCllcllngl wIIh regard 10 any or 1he 0tI'ltr SubIIdIarI...
(d) Tl'le JOint AdmlnllhtOf'l and the Debtor under the dractlon or the JoInt
Admlnlltratotl may without the prlor coneent or the ExamInIr and without giving
prior notice to him:
e
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p) cause any of the Other Sub.,dlarll. to borrow fundi or pledg. or ch8rge
any Of ItI ..Itta to ••eure Ind.bt.dn... (If th. aggregate Of an IUch
borrowing., pledge. and Chug.. for any .'ngl. Other Subeldlary II In an
amount not exceeding £7,000,000 at any onl tlml) or lind money to Other
Sublidlerl.. (If the aggregate amount 10 loan.d by eny Ilngla other
SUb.,dlary II In an amount not tx08tdIng £7,000,000 at any on. time);
(Iij dllpOle of .her.. In any of the Other Sublldlarl.. or any other ..tete
outIlde the MaO Group, or caule any Of the Other Subaldillfll to dl.poee
Of ....til, for. coneldlndlon,ln any one CUI, not exce.dlng £7,000,000
QII) caUl. any of the other Subeldillfel to replace, fire or materldy reduce the
operating r..ponelbllltlil Of any exlCUllve ofIIcer; and
(Iv) carry out IlMItIg.Uone Into the f1nanclll dlallngl Of any of the Other
SubaldJart..: provld.d that, wlth ,"pect to .ach of the mattere C\llIcrlbed
In thll paragraph G.5(d), the Joint Admlnlatratorl.hlll report on the d.talla
of 'UCh matt.,. to the Examlntr It weekly or .uch other Interve'l U may
b. eg....d b~en the Joint Admlnlatndore ..,d the Exlmlner.
(e) For th. purpoell of thll CIIUI. G.I5, "consideration" In relation to the all. of
.h.ree m.anathe coneld.r.t1on for Iht .her.. plus the amount of Inter-company
d.bt repaid.
8. The Joint AdmlnlltrltOl1 and the Eumlntr confirm that (I) the obJectlYe of the
pettlel II for the Debtor'l Chapter 11 plan and the Joint Admlnl8tratore' propollIIl
8
Dated:
In the Adrrd.-d;"V'iitloii to provide for ....ntI.,1y .'mller arrangemente with reepect
to the MaO Group, Qij during the period .pecllled In paragraph G.1(11l), the
Examln.r will be conlult8d with rllpect to and be Involved In the formul.tlon and
negotiation of any pIlIn Of reorglnlzltlon In Chllptlr 11 that the Debtor under the
direction of the Joint Admlnlttraton or the Joint Admlnlstratofl propoae to file .t
any tim. and aft.r .uch period the Joint Admlnlltrttol1 wli keep the Examiner
informed of any plan and wiD coneult with the examiner with reeptCl to the
formulation thereof, end QIl) Shllflttr ('ubjlet to paragr~ (1.3(1) hereof) wlU .110
be conlult8d wtth, Ind hit vIeWI will be ooneldered, wtth reapect to~ .uch plan:
January 115, 19Sl2
New York, New York
11/ RIcbard Gm'n
RIchard Gitlin, examiner
leLAndrew MnHomen
Th. Joint Admlnlatratol1
by Andrwt MIIfc Hom."
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
"Protocol"); and it appearing from the affidavit of service
ORDER
AUTHORIZING CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE OF AIOC RESOURCES AG
TO EXECUTE CROSS-BORDER LIQUIDATION PROTOCOL
WITH THE SWISS BANKRUPTCY OFFICE
Bankruotcy Office") entitled "Cross-Border Liquidation Protocol
For AIOC Resources AG, ~ al.," a copy of which is attached in
its substantially final form as Exhibit 1 to this order (the
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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, that the requirement in
:T !S HEREEY FUR7HER ORDERED, that the re:ief sOt:;ht
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
lsI Tina L. BroZllaJl
IT !S HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, that the Trustee is
incorporated herein ?y reference as if f~lly set for herein; NC~
this Court having rendered its decision at the Hear:'::;, -"" .. __ ..
decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law are herecy
Dated: New York, New York
April 3 , 1998
AIOC Resources AG; and
authorized and direoted to execute the Protocol on behalf of
hereby au~horized :0 ~ake such actions and execute such
R~le 9013-1(b) of the Local Rules for the United States
in the Motion is granted in its entirety; and
!T IS HEREBY FURTHER'ORDERED, that the Trustee is
application filed shall have an accompanying memorandum of law
7HEREFORE,
is hereby waived and dispensed with.
documents as may be necessary and appropriate to implement and
effectuate the Protocol; and
3ankruptcy Court for the Southern Districi of New York that any
Case N~s. 96 3 ~:e9:
and 9E 3 4:S96 ,::3:
Chap~er :.:
Deb~ors. (Join~ly Adm~nis~e=ed)
filed with this court that due and sufficient notice of the
Motion has been given to the United States Trustee, Counsel to
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and all parties
who have requested notice pursuant to Rule 2002 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; and a hearing having been held
before this Court (the "Hearing"); and based upon the pleadings
herein, the evidence presented at the Hearing and the arguments
of counsel; and due deliberations having been had thereon; and
AIOC CORPORATION and~!oe kisOURCES AG,
Upon the motion (the "Motion") of Edward G. Moran,
chapter 11 trustee (the "Trustee") in the cases of AIOC
Corporation and AIOC Resources AG (collectively, the "Debtors"),
for an order of this Court pursuant to sections 105(a) of title
!n re
-
:.: of the Uni~ed States Code, authorizing the Trustee t~ exe=~te
C) that certain agreement between the Trustee and the Swiss
I
~ Eankruptcy for the Canton of Zug, Switzerland (the "Swiss
- 2 -
credi~ors that have filed: claims in the Swiss Proceedin; a:'lC ;b'
a;p~oved i~ acc::dance w::~ :~e laws 0: Sw:~ze=land, as :=:::~s:
CROSS-BORDER LIQUIDATION PROTOCOL
FOR AIOC USOURCES, AI; , et &1. ~" . The Chap:er 11 Cases were comrne:'lced as plenary
!. ::rlERV:EW
Mr. Edward G. Moran, ~he d~ly appoi~~ed tr~s~ee :~~e
proeeed:'ngs by the filing 0: involuntary peti~ior.s en Apr:':
199c wit~ the Ur.:'~ed Sta~es Bankruptcy Co~rt for t~e So~~~er:'l
"C!':.ao:.er 1: T~us:.ee" and, al,:e:::a-::""lely, a \'~": ':"r:. -:::e
baraf:r".:.p-=.::y cases 0: A:OC Cc:p~::a~:"on t"~"i and ;..:::,.:
?es::.:.=ces AG ("Resou::-::es" a::.:i, co::'e::~:"ve:y, the ":~a:)~e~
Jeb~=rs": pendi~g i~ ~~e Sou:her~ Cis~rict of New Yerk wi~h
ass:';:'led case r.umbers 96-3 .;1695 (:he "Core. Chapter 1: Case":
a~d 9E-3-4l89€ :~he "Resources Cha~~er l: Case" a:'!d,
Cis~ric~ of New York (the "3ar.kruetcv Cour~"). The Chap~er
::ases '",ere assigned ~e ~:'e Honorable Tina :.. Broz:r.a~., C:-.:'ef
~:'l:'~ec S~ates Bankr~ptcy JUd;e of the Bankruptcy Court. By
Order cf t~e Bankruptcy Co~rt da:ed Sep~e~er 17, 1996, t~e
:~ap~er :: :rustee was vested with the authority to act as t:'e
==rperate g=vernar.:e cf the :~apter 11 Debtors.
:=~r~ :or ~~e :an~on of Zug, Switzerland (the "Swiss Court":.
i~~::~:'l~ary pe~i~ion or. August 13, 1996 before the distri:~
o
I
Vl
0'1
::c::e::~ive:y, the "C~a~ter 11 Cases"), a~d the Ba:'!kr~ptcy Of::'ce
for t~e Canto:'! of Z~g, Sw:'tzerla:'ld (the "Sw:'ss Bankruetev
:~::'=:," a:,:e=::a-:':"vely, a \'~" ar::::i, colleco::'vely \<--i1:t: the
5. The Swiss Proceeding was commenced by the filing of an
:~ap:e~ :: !~~s~ee, ':~~ "?a::ies"), the d~ly appoi~ted trustee
'- ~~e case of Resources pe~d:':'!g in t~e Kantor. of Zug
Swi~zerland wi~h the ass:'gned case number 1996/:S0 (the "Swiss
?ro::eedinc"~ hereby agree, subject to (i) entry by the
Bankrup~cy Court (defined below) of a final Order apprOVing this
:~erea:~er, the Swiss Court referred the Swiss Proceed:'ng to the
Swiss Bankruptcy Office :0= administration as.a plenary
proceeding pursuant to the laws of Switzerland. The Swiss
Bankruptcy Office assigned the Swiss proceed:'ng to Herr Bernhard
Hausler for administration.
agree~ent and (ii) the decision of the Swiss Bankruptcy Office C. The Chapter 11 Trustee and the Swiss Bankruptcy Office
to approve this agreement being (a) transmitted by letter to the each need to analyze under United States, Swiss and other
Throughout this Agreement, a claim that has been filed is
deemed to include, but not be limited to, claims which have
been filed in either the Resources Chapter 11 Case or the
Swiss Proceeding whether or not such claim has been
subsequently withdrawn.
2
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applicable law their duties a~d responsibilities concer~i~; ~he
pc~e~~ial rights of t~e creditors ane, where applica=:e,
shareholders of che ~eso~rces Group (as defined below; and ~he
(iv) to establish a coordina~ed litigation stra~egy
~ith respe:: to any rna::e~ whic~ ca~~c~ be =es=:~e=
through good faith efforcs in ~he first instance;
Chapter 11 Trustee a~d Swiss Bankruptcy Office have agreed to
work together in good faith to effect~ate an order~y and
(v) to establish a coordinated strategy tc marsha: ar.~
liqUidate any remaining assets, wherever located, of
Reso~rces and/or any member of che Resources Grou~;
:o~~ittee J of the Section on 3~siness Law of the International
have each reviewed the pri~ciples proposed in the ar~icle of
Bar Association entitled Cress-Border Insolvency Concordat (~he
eq~itable liquidatio~ of the ~esources Group. (vi) to establish a coordinated and fair mecha~is~ fordistributing assets to creditors of Resources Which,
inter alia, (a) is consis~e~t wi~h, to the ex~e~t
possible, the laws of the'Uniced Scates and
Swi~zerland that establish au entitlement for priority
i~ distrib~tions among unsecured creditors of these
insolvency proceedi~gs,2 and (0) provides an
essentially ratable distrib~tion, co the extent
p~ss:b:e, to c~e=~:c=s 0: Resources whe=ever :o=ate::
!ruscee and the Swiss Ban~r~ptcy OfficeThe Chapterc.
"Co~cordat"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibic ~,
and believe tha~ a~ agreement upon general administrative
(vii) to adopt a framework of general principles to
address :ssues tha~ are likely to ar:se in connection
~ith the ad~inistrati~n of these cross-border
insolvency proceedi~gs.
o
~a~:e=s ~s essen~~a: :0 ~he :rderly and ef:icient adm:nist=a::c~ :he Cha~ter :~ :rustee and the Swiss Bankruptcy Office
I
Vo
-..J
cf these cross-border insolvency proceedings. sha:: exercise their powers a~c authority in accordance with
The Chapcer 11 Trustee and the Swiss Bankr~ptcy Office paragraphs !II-VI hereof.
confir~ chat their objective in entering into this agreement is
co harmonize the administration of the Chapter 11 Cases and the II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Swiss Proceeding in order: A. Annexed hereto as Schedule 1 is a list of all known
(i) to promote international cooperation and respect
for comity among the bankruptcy courts, the duly
appointed representacives and any other competent
authority involved in the Resources Chapter 11 Case
and the Swiss Proceeding;
subsidiaries or affiliates of Resources (collectively, and as
may be varied from time to time by further agreement between the
Chapter 11 Trustee and the Swiss Bankruptcy Office, the
(ii) to facili~ate, for the benefit of all of the
creditors of Resources and other interested parcies,
wherever located, the fair and efficient
administration of the Resources Chapter 11 Case and
the Swiss Proceeding;
"Resources Groue"). The members of the Resources Group that are
incorporated under the laws of Switzerland are each identified
(iii) to establish a coordinated claims reconciliation
process;
See, ~, 11 U.S.C. § 507; Article 219 of the Swiss Debt
Enforcement and Bankr~ptcy Law.
3 4
with an asteris~ on Schedule 1 a~d shall be referred to as a
·Sw~ss Subsid~arv" a~d collec:~vely, the "Swiss S~bs!d!ar~es".
claims filed in :he Resources Chapter 11 Proceed~ng and the
Swiss ?roceedin;.
All other members of the Reso~rces Gro~p l~s~ed o~ Sched~:e ~. r~ :~=~~e=a~=e 0: ?=in=iple ,: ~: ~~e :=nc~==a:, a
shall be referred to as a "Non-Swiss Subsidiary" and
collectively, ~he "Non-Swiss Subsidiaries".
=:a:~ ~as bee~ :::ed i~ bo~~ ~~e Resoc==es :hapte= 11 ?===ee~:~;
and :he Swiss Proceeding, ei:her in tr.e sa~e or a di::ere~:
3. Annexed here:o as Schedule 2 is a lis~ of enti~ies arn=~~~ a~d/o= p=io=i~y, :o~:ow:ng ~he a::owa~ce o~ suc~ =:a:~,
o
v.
00
:ha: are ~repet~tion co~mercial lenders to the Resources Group
:c=llect~vely, :he ·Reso~rces Banks"). ~he Resources Banks that
are organized under the laws of Swi~zerland are each iden:ified
~i:~ a~ asterisk on Schedule 2, a~d shall be referred to as a
"Swiss Ba~k" and collectively, the "Swiss Banks". All ether
Resources Banks listed or. Sched~le 2 shall be referred to as a
"~=n-Swiss Bank" and collectively, the "Non-Swiss Banks".
:n :~r:herance of ~ri~ciple 4c of the Concordat, the
:~ap:er :: :r~s:ee will seek approval of the Bankruptcy Cour~
an: the Swiss 3ankr~ptcy Office will take whatever actions are
required under Swiss law to have any and all claims allowed in
one proceeding recognized in both the Resources Chapter 11 Case
the ~older of such cla~~ shall be ent~tled to (i) a dis~ribu:ion
:r:~ assets 0: Resources, wherever located, as though a si~;:e
c:a~~ ~ad beer. :i~ed ~n either proceeding, and (~i) a ratable
re:o?ery :ro~ assets of Resources not greater than wo~ld be
pe=~~:ted ~nder ~he :a~s of both the Un~ted S:ates and
s·...·:..'::e= :and ...
~~e=e ~c::=e :5 =e~~:=ed :0 be given, nct~ce sha:: be
a::==ded :~ ~=i~i~;, a~d a ?a=:y sta:: p=cvide advance ~=::ce t:
the other Party in ac::rda~:e w~:h the law govern~~g the
respec:ive case in which the Party is appoi~ted unless
circumstances reasonably prevent the giving of such advance
notice and, in such even~, s~bjec: to prOViding notice as soon
thereafter as practicable.and the Swiss Proceeding without the need for add~tional filings
by any creditor that has not filed a claim in both proceedings.) F. In furtherance of principle 3A, 3C and 3D of the
Towards that end, the Chapter 11 Trustee and the Swiss
Bankruptcy Office shall exchange periodically a register of the
Principle 4C of the Concordat provides in relevant part
that "[a] claim should be filed in one, and only one,
plenary forum, at :he election of the holder of the clai~."
5
Concordat, each Party, any creditor of Resources and the
O:ficial Corrmittee of ~n~ecured Creditors in the Chapter 11
Principle 4C of the Concordat provides in relevant part
~hat "[il= a claim is filed in more than one plenary foru~,
distribution must be adjusted so that recovery is not
grea~er than if ~he claim were filed in only one forum."
6
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Cc~rt and ~he Swiss :ourt frc~ refusir.; to approve or take an
Cases shall have ~he righ~, but not the obliga~io~, to (i)
appear ~~ al: proceedings i~ ~he ;eso~==es Chap~e~ 1: ?~o=ee=:~;
I. No~hing in ~his agreement shal~ preven~ the 3a~krupt=y
a~d in the Swiss Proceeding, ~o the extent s~=h ac~ic~ shal: ac~:o~ required by ~h:s ag=ee~e~t if sc=~ ac~:cn wc~:d be
be i~c~~sis~e~~ wi~h local la~, a~d (::: ~ave ac=ess ~c a:: ~a~~~es:ly con~ra~y ~c public po:icy.
do=u~e~ts w~ich are of pub:ic record i~ any proceedi~;.~
a~ amo~n~ ~~ bo~h ~.s. :c:lars and Swiss ==a~=s, ~he :==eig~
G. Where a transac~ion sha~: require the co~p~~a~ion of
In case a ~atter is not spe:ifically prOVided fer
te=e:~, the pa~~ies sha:l ac~ i~ a ma~ner desiqne~ :0 p=c~o:e
~he gea:s of Paragrap~ I(E) ~ereof.
c~rrer.cy exchange ra~e to be applied :0 s~=h ~ransac:ic~ sha::
be the midrange cf ~he Swiss =ranc to e.s. Dc:la: conversion
",,'O'SOiIBC"'S ~""IVIS"'ONS
Office wi:l joi~tly oversee and ad~inister the orderly winddown
rate for Augus: :3, :996. This ra~e s~all be deemed to be
:.2~35 Swiss =rancs ~o : ~.S. :olla:.
.r... The Chapter ~l Trustee and the Swiss Bankruptcy
H. Where a transac~io~ calls for funds to be transferred of Resources. For the avoidance of doubt, except as otherwise
o
VI
\0
_~ ~esc~=:es, sc=~ f~~ds sha~: be (i) rnai~tai~ed in an ~~~e=es:
bearin; ac=ou~: :oca:e= in Switze::a~d if the funds being
transferred arise from a so~rce within Switzerland, (ii)
provided for herein, transactions relating to the disposition of
Resources' assets will be subject to the joint jurisdiction of
the 3a~kr~p:cy Cour~ and the Swiss Bankruptcy Office.
main~ained in an interest beari~g account locatetl i~ the United
B. Each ?ar~y shall atte~p~ in good faith to obtain
States if the funds being transferred arise from a source within
~he uni~ed Sta~es, and (iiii ~aintained in an interest bearing
account to be determined by the Parties on a case-by-case basis
in all other instances.
Principle 3C of the Concordat provides in relevant part
that "[a]ll creditors should have the right to appear in
any forum to the same extent as creditors of the forum
s~ate, . . . without subjecting themselves to jurisdiction
in that forum .•.. " Principle 3D of the Concordat
prOVides in relevant part that "[i]nformation pUblicly
available in any forurr. shall be pUblicly available in al:
:o=a."
7
the consent of the other Party prior to taking any of the
fo:lowing actions:
1. disposing of shares or interests in any entity in
the Resources Group or causing Resources to dispose of
any assets;
2. seeking or consenting to the substantive
consolidation (or merger, if applicable) of Resources
with any other entity;
3. causing Resources or any entity in the Resources
Group to take any action which is intended to or the
reasonably anticipated consequences of which would
have a materia~ adverse impact on any member of the
Resources Group.
8
C. No~withstanding t~e preceding two pa=ag=a;ts, a~: ~I:(E) (1) (c) hereef) for all claims filed in the S~iss
Pa~ty ~ay a=~ w~~hou~ ~he ?=~c= :c~se~~ 0: t~e c~he= Pa=~y as P~o~eed~~g o~~y. !he Pa=:~es sha:: joi~:ly de:e=~~~e ~~~=~
~ho~;~ such consent were given and (excep~ as o~~er~~se ~r:~~ded :a=~y shall adr.inis~e= the c:airns =e=~n=~:ia:ic~ p===ess {as
he=e~~j wi~hou~ ;ivi~q prio= nct~ce ~c the o~he= ?a=~y C~ a~y ~ere :~:ly described ~n paragraph I:: (E) (1) (c) here;;::; ::= :r.e
~a~~er wr.ich does no~ req~ire not~ce to be ;~ven ~o in~eres~ed claios of credi~ers, where any such c=ed~tor ac:ua:ly :~led
par~~es ~nder the la~ gevern~ng tr.e respec~ive case in ~h~c~ ~he clains in both the Resources Chapter 1: Case and t~e S~~ss
Party ~s appointed. ?roceed~ng.
The ?a=~ies s~a~: coordinate rnec~a~is~s :0: b. :ho:ce o~ Law: The cla:~s =ecc~cilia::on
p=ovid~~g dist:ibut~c~s a~d =ecoveries to c:edito:s 0: Reso~=:es precess shal~ be a~T.ir.~s:ered in accordance ~itr. t~e procedural
~~ere7er located w~e:her suc~ distribu~ions and recoveries are and substant~ve laws (beth bankruptcy and nonbankruptcyl
ac=:~p:~shed purs~a~: ~= a ~:a~ of =eor;aniza~i~~,c d~s~=ib~~icn gcverr.~r.; the =espec~ive case ~r. wh~ch the Party ~s appointed
plan and :~nal acce~nt, or otherwise. unless considerations 0: coo~~y otherwise require.
tc:
=esp:~si=::::y sha:: ~n=:ude, bu: no: be limi:ed :0, :he rigt~
Cl
0'1
o
The =la~~s recenc~l~atior. process :er clai~s
filed ~n ~~e Reso~rces :~ap:er :~ :ase7 and/or ~n t~e Sw~ss
Prcceed~ng shall be a~~nis~ered as follows:
c. C~t~es: Each ?arty's authority ar.d
hereof) for claims filed in the Resources Chapter 11 Case only.
The Swiss Bankruptcy Office shall administer the claims
reconciliation process (as more fully described in paragraph
process (as more fully described in paragraph 111(E) (1) (c)
(3) fix and allow the amount and priority of
asserted claios in accordance with paragraph
III (E) (3) (a) hereof:
(:) reconc~le the amount of any asserted
cla~m:
(4) object to asserted claims, if necessary.
(2) review the validity of any asserted lien
or priority with respect to an asserted
claim:
Non-3ank Cla~:ns
a. Deleaation of Responsibilities: The
....
:~apter 11 Trustee shall administer the claims reconciliation
See,~, 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
For the avoidance 0: doubt, this Agreement is not intended
to nor shall it be construed to alter the Chapter 11
... (continued)
(continued)
~rustee's duty to reconcile the claims filed in the Corp .
Chapter 11 Case.
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2. Bank Claims
(1) reconc~le the amount 0: any asser:ed
claim:
a. Dele~a:ion cf Res~ons~b~l~:ies: :~e Chap:er
11 :rus:ee shall and :he Sw~ss Bankr~ptcy Office agrees t:
coordinate the administration of the claims recor.ci:~ation
process (the "Bank Reconc~liationProcess") (as more f:.:.l:y
described in paragrap~ III(E) (2) (b) hereof) with respect to all
c:ai~s of the Resources Ban~s. :he C~apter 11 Trustee shall 3.
(2) re.iew the val~dity cf any asser:ed l~en
0= p=:o~::y ~i~~ :espec: ~: a~ asse=:ed
clai~;
(3) fix and allow the a~ount and Fr~:r~ty of
asser:ed claims ~n accordance w~:h paragraph
III (E) (3) (b) ~ereof;
(C) cbjec: :: asserted cla~ms, ~f necessary.
Procedures r:r :~x~n: And Allow~n= Cla~ms:
ha.e pr~~ary respcnsibi:~:y for adr..inistering the cla~ms a. N=~-Sa~k :~airns: F~=t~er:o Pa=a;=a;~
rec:r.c~:~ation process (as ~ore fully described in paragraph
I::(E) (2) (b) hereof) 0: the Resources Banks who have filed a
c:a~~ or claims in t~e ~esources Chapter 11 Case, irrespect~ve
o~ whether such cred~tors have also filed claims in the Swiss
:::~E. ':~, a~y Pa::y ~ay ~~x a~d al:ow a c:ain in ac=o=da~ce
w~:h the laws of the ::.:.r~sdic:~on in whiCh the Party is
appoin:ed without the pr~:r consent 0: the other Party and
w~:ho~t g~ving pr~or not~ce to the ot~er Party.
o ?r:ceed~r.;. :he Sw~ss Bankr:.:.ptcy Office shall have primary b. Bani< ::'aiI:'.s:
0\
-
~es~~~s:=::i:y :o~ a~i~is:e~in; the claims ~eco~ci:iatio~ " , ~here a Resources Bank ~as f~:'ed a
precess (as ~ore fully descr~bed in paragraph III(E) (2) (b)
hereof: of any Resources Bank wh~ch has filed a claim in the
Swiss Proceeding only: provided, however, that the Chapter 11
Tr~stee shall, where appropriate, actively assist the Sw~ss
aankr~ptcy Office in any endeavor contemplated by paragraph
I:I lE) (2) (b) (1) and III (E) (2) (b) (2) hereof.
claim ~n both the Resources Chapter 11 ?roceeding and in the
Sw~ss Proceeding, any compromise reached between the Chapter 11
Trustee and such Reso~rces Bank shall (a) include as a condition
cf effec~iveness tha~ the co~pro~ise is subject to (i) final
court approval in the Res~urces Chapter 11 Case, and (ii) final
approval in the Swiss Proceed~n;, and (b) be cons~ated
b. Duties: Each Party's authority and according to the following procedures:
responsibility shall include, but not be limited to, the right
:0:
11
(a) Bankruptcy Court approval of a
com?romise shall be obtained first in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy
Rules.
12
(b) Promp~:y after receiv:ng ~o~:ce ~_
~he e~~=y c! a~ c=oe~ 0: ~h~ 33~k=up~cy :our~ a;p=o~i~; ~~e
writing ~hat ~he conditions of effec~iveness have bee~
sat:sfied, and of the effec~ive date of ~~e cc~prorr.:se.
co~pro~:se, ~he ~esc~rces Bank s~all: (i) file an a~ended -" _.:-_.=_... (el :f the Swiss 3ar.krup~cy Cffice
o
C1'I
N
in the Swiss Proceed:ng (~he "Amended Swiss Claim") w::ic::' ::st5,
as ~he amou~t of the cla:~, t~e Sw:ss c~rrency eq~:va:ent
ie~ploy:n; the C~rrency Exchange Rate) of the cc~prom:sed
a~o~~t, and (ii) provide notice of ~he filing of the k~ended
Sw:ss ::a:~ to the Chap~er :: :rus~ee and the Sw:ss 3ankr~ptcy
O~f:"=e.
(c) Prorr.ptly thereafter, the Swiss
Bankr~p~cy Gf::oe shall pub:is::' notice in accordance wi~h the
laws of Switzer:and t::'at (i) the Amended Swiss Claim, filed by
~he respect:7e Reso~rces 3ank i~ ccnnection with the proposed
co~promise, was accepted =y ~he Sw:ss Bankruptcy Office, a~d
;ii) :r.~erested parties shall have ~he opportunity to be heard
ir- opposition to the proposed corr.prorr.ise for a period of time
prescribed by the laws of Switzerland. At the earliest
opportuni~y after the concl~sion of the noticed period, the
Swiss Bankruptcy Office shall advise the Chapter 11 Trustee
whetr,er the proposed compromise is finally approved under Swiss
law.
(d) Promptly after notification to the
Chapter 11 Trustee by the Swiss Bankruptcy Office that the
proposed compromise is finally approved under Swiss law, the
Chapter 11 Trustee shall advise the respective Resources Bank in
13
notifies the Chapter :: Trustee tha~ the proposed co~pro~ise :5
net approved under Swiss Law, t::'e Chapter 11 Tr~s~ee sha::
advise ~he respective Reso~r:es Bank in writing that a ccr.di~icn
cf effectiveness has failed and tha~ the proposed co~prornise
s~a:: =e veid a~d 0: no f~=~he: fo=ce anc ef:e:~. The ~~e~~ed
Swiss ::aim shall be deemed withdrawn in the Swiss Proceeding.
(2) Where a Resources Bank has filed a
::ai~ ~~ e::he= p=ocee=:~;, b~: ~o~ bo~h p=oceedings, ~~e
?ar:ies shall employ a claims adjustmer.t process which (i) is
5i~i:ar :~c :he extent pra:~icab:e~ to the process set :ortr. in
paragra;:r. ::::: (E) (b) (i), a:1d (i':') cC:1:orms to the req~iremen:s ~_
the laws of ~he United States and the laws of Switzerland.
IV. :i~i~ation and Investiaations (Non-Claim Related)
The :hapter :1 Tr~stee and the Swiss Bankruptcy Office
shall consult with respect to litigation strategy on a case-by-
case basis. Where appropriate, the Parties shall have the right
(consistent with the laws of the jurisdiction where a particular
litigation is commenced) to pursue, or join in the pursuit of,
claims or causes of action in either proceeding, provided,
however that nothing contained herein shall limit any rights
under substantive law of either the United States or Switzerlar.d
14
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or require the co~sent of the other wit~ respec~ to the VI. SWISS SU3SIDIARY PROVISIONS
corr~encerner.t o~ a~y li~iga~ior.. A. ~he Swiss Sankr~p~cy O~~ice will oversee and
v. NON-S~:SS SJ3S:DI~RY PROVISIONS
a~~inister the orderly winddown o~ the Swiss S~bsidiaries, w:_~
~he assistance of the Chapter 11 :r~s~ee where needed, and may
A. The Chap~er :: Tr~stee will oversee and a~~ir.ister tr-e act without the prior consen~ 0: the Chapter 11 Trustee as
o
I
0\
W
orjerly winddowr. of the ~or.-Swiss Subsidiaries, wi~h ~he
assistance o~ ~he Swiss San~r~ptcy O~:ice where needed, and ~ay
a:: ~~~to~: ~he p=:== :Ohse~: c: t~e Swiss 3a~kr~p:=y O::~:e as
~ho~g~ such consen~ were given ar.d without giving prior notice
~o ~~e Swiss Bankr~p~cy C~~ice on any matter which does not
=eq~i=e no:ice ~o be ;:ve~ := i~~e=es~ed pa=~ies under :he law
qcverr.ing the Cha~ter 11 :rus~ee. T~e Chapter 11 :rustee shall
a::e~p~ :~ ;==d :a~:~ :: =b:a:~ :~e :o~se~t 0: ~~e Swiss
5an~=~p::y ::::ce ;:::= :::
:. disposing 0: s~ares in any Non-Swiss Subsidiary or
causing any Non-Swiss Subsidiary to dispose of any
assets;
2. co~~encing, causing to be commenced or consenting
~o, dissolution, bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings
(whether in the United States, Switzerland or
elsewhere) fer any Non-Swiss Subsidiary;
3. causing any Non-Swiss Subsidiary to commence
material legal proceedings.
~hough such consent were given and without giving prier r.:~ice
to ~~e C~ap~er 11 Trustee Dn any mat~er which does not require
r.c~ice to be given to ir.~erested par~ies under Swiss law. The
S~iss 3ankruptcy O~:ice s~al: a~~empt in good fai~h to obtair.
~~e cor.ser.~ of the Chapter 11 :rus~ee prior to:
:. disposir.; 0: shares in any Swiss Subsidiary or
causing any Swiss SubsLdiary to dispose of any assets;
2. co~men ing, causing to be co~~enced or consenting
to, diss: u~ion, bankr~p~=y or insolvency proceedi~gs
(w~ether n ~he Vni~ed S~a~es, Switzerland or
elsewhere :or any Swiss Subsidiary;
3. causing any S~iss Subsidiary to co~~ence material
legal proceedings.
3. In furtherance of paragraph VI(A) (2), should the Swiss
5ankru~tcy O~fice consider i~ appropriate to commence insolvency
or other similar proceedings in respect of all or any of the
Swis? Subsidiaries, the Chapter 11 ~rustee shall be authorized,
B. The Chapter 11 Trustee shall where appropriate e~fect i: he deems it appropriate under the circumstances and the
the appointment of new boards o~ directors for the Non-Swiss
S~bsidiaries.
lS
governing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, to cause the
co~~encernen~ of a parallel proceeding in the United States for
s~=h Swiss Subsidiary and to apply to the Bankruptcy Court for
16
o
I
C1\
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an Order appo~r.~ir.g the Chapter 11 Trus~ee to serve as =~a~~er
1: ~=~s~ee in sect case.
VI:. COR? PROVIS:Ot\S
A. The Chap~er 11 ~rus~ee wil1 oversee and a~~i~is~er t~e
erder~y wir.ddown of Corp. and may act wi~~o~~ the prior =c~se~t
0: the Sw~ss Bankruptcy Cf:ice and wi~hout giving notice to ~i~,
ex=ep~ ~ha~ the Chap~e= 11 ~=us~ee shall p=ov~de ~c~i=e ~o t~e
Swiss 3ankr~p~cy O::~ce =rior to:
:. seeking or consenting to the substantive
consolidatic~ (or merger i: applicable) of Corp. with
Reso~rces or a~~ Swiss S~bsidiary;
2. causing Corp. to ~ake any action which is in~ended
te, or the reasonably anticipated consequences of
w~ic~ wo~:d, have a material adverse impact on
Reso~rces or any Swiss S~bsidiary;
;. causir.g :or~. to (i) obta~r. con:irmatior. c: a p~ar.
0: reorgan~zat~on, or (b) convert or conser.t to the
conversion of the Corp. Chapter 11 case to a case
under Chapter 7 0: the Bankruptcy Code.
Dated:
Zug, Switzerland
Edward G. Moran
Dated:
Zug, Switzerland
Bernard Hl:iusler
Witness:
Michael N. Go~tfried, Esq.
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AIO: ~radi~; AG*
{Z~;, Sw~~ze=la~d)
SCH£J:JLE :
T~£ RESOCRC£S GRO:JP
SCHEDULE 2
The Resources Banks
u. S. ?=c=eed:r'.;
p=co: 0: ::a:'~ ~
S,,"iss
::a.i:r;
o
0\
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A:OC ;'l:oys Ltd*
:Zug, Switzerla~d)
Sa~~ders Trading (former:y Sibalco Ltd.)
(Gra~d Ca~a~, BW:)
A::: A:=~=a P=ope=~ies :?~y: :~C
:;=~a~~esbu=;, SC~~~ h==i:a'
A:J: Ferr~~s G~~H*
:Z~g, S~i:zerland)
~!:: ==asil Limitada
:~io de :a~eiro, 3raz:~~
;':OC :rading AOZ~
(~!cscow, Russia)
~::: :apa~ ::~::ed
{7:")kyo, :apar:i
.:'.: ?~s:::.:rces ;'.:
:S...·e:i~:1:,
;':0: Ore & Metals AS
~Swede~)
;'.IO: :JI< Limited
i:ondcn, England)
A:OC Ore & Metals GmbH
(Cologne, Germany)
AIOC Ore & Metals AG *
(Lugano, Switzerland)
Sakoc :rading AG*
(Zug, Switzerland)
Baroque Eruxelles Lambert (Suisse) SA
Ba~que Commerciale Pour
L'Europe Du ~ord
Credit Agricole :ndosuez F/K/A
Baroque Indosuez
Ba~q:.:e Natio~ale De Paris
3a~que Natio~ale De Paris (S~isse)
5a~::;~e ?aribas
5a~::;:.:e Paribas (Suisse; SA
Bayeriches Verei~sban~
5::F Bank AG
Caisse Nationa:e De Credit A~ricole
Credit S~isse
Generale Bank
Hill Samuel Bank Ltd.
ING Bank. N.V.
!m:estec
r.redietba~k N.V.
Mees;::ierso:-. I,. V.
Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd.
Rand Merc~ant 3ank
S==:e~e ~ene=ale
Swiss Bank Corporation
Toko Bank
United Overseas Bank
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale
89
22:
1S:
20';
258
, Cl ~__ 0
253
~one Filed
251
256
None Filed:
185
2'35
:84
None FEed
206
90
218
No~e Filed
243
267
271
132
270
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Credit Suisse has !iled a claim in the Corp. Chapter 11
Case which claim has been designated as claim 268.
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VIIo"ITED STATES BANKRt'l'TCY COURT
DISTRICT OF ~"EW ~ICO
~
SOLV-EX Corpontioa
a New Mesa corporiltioa,
85·0283719
Debtor.
Cue No. 11·97·14361 MA
~ ; r.:C : 9 I:-.I~
... ~:: .. :" ...
-'\ ....-
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4. The Debtor believes that approval of the Proposed Protocol by this Court. and the
Canadian Court. will be in the best interest of the Debtor's Estate. will protect the inte:-e5~ ;:~ l:;
parties aJTKted by the U.S. and Canadian proceedings wherever louted. and will protect :.~e
integrity of the process by which the U.S. and Canadian proceedings are a.dministered
S. Furthermore. adoption of the Proposed Protocol will aid the efficacious reorganiu:ion of
o
0'\
-..J
MOTION TO APPROVE CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROTOCOL
COMES NOW the De'blOi' SoIY-Ex Corporation, IiId moves this Court for an order approving
aneS bringing into effect !be lImDS of die proposed Cross-Border IDsolveacy Protocol (the
"Proposed Protoc:olR ). a copy or wtrich is attached hereto IS Exhibit R A", and u reasons thcrdor
sta!e:
l. This Court has inherent power PW1Uant to II U.S.C. 105(a) to enter such order, process or
judgment IS is neeeswy or appropriate to c:any out the provisions or Title XI or the Uni1ed States
Bankruptcy Code.
2. By an order entered by the Court or Queens Bench of Alberta (the ·Canadian Court") on
July 14, 1997, Solv-Ex Corporation and Solv-Ex Canada Limiud were ~h declared to be entities
to which ibe ComptmiU Creditors A""""pmelll Act (Canada) applies, and were authorized by the
Canadian Court to file a rormal plan of compromise or arrangement with their craditors. In tum.
Solv·Ex Corporation and Solv·Ex Canada Limited filed voluntary petitions ror reorganization with
this Court on August I, 1997 under Chapter 11 orTitie 11 of the U.S.C.
3, The Canadian Coun has previously given directions that a submission be made to it on a
cross·border protocol to govern the relationship between the U.S. and Canadian reorganization
proceedings and representations have in tum been made to this Coun that such • cross-border
protocol would be submitted to it
the Debtor and will serve judicial economy.
6. Concurrent approval of the Proposed Protocol is beinl sought ill the Canadian Court and
the Debtor wiD sedt a joint heariD, to be held by this Court IIId the Canadian Court, should any
.objections to the Proposed Protocol be riled.
7. Approval of the Proposed Protocol .. beas .oucbt by cireulatina the same amona the
U.S. Unsecured Creditors Committee, United. TriStar llnource.lJd.. Koch ElCp1oration Canada
Ltd., the Canadian Unsecured Creditors Comm~ and Price Waterhouse. in its capacity as
Monitor for Solv·Ex Corporation and So!y·Ex Canada Limited, in the Canadian proc:eedin&.
WHEREFORE, the undersiped requests that Ibis Court approve and bring into effect the
lennS of the Proposed Protocol.
Submitted by :
HINKLE. COX, EATON, COFFIELD
cl HENSLEY, L.L.P.
Dy: ~('.~
Margaret C. Ludewig
John D. Phillips
Attorneys for Solv-Ex Corporation
and Solv-Ex Canada Limited
SOO Marquette NW. Ste. 800
Albuquerque, NM 17102
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I hereby certify that • ttue
cop)' of the foregoing was mailed Ie'
Leonard Martinez·Metzgu
P.O. Box 601
Albuquerque, NM 17103·0601
U.S. Trustee
James S. Swzynslti
Starzynslti a. StnUser, P.A.
320 Gold Ave SW, Sui1e 100
Albuquerque, NM 17102
Attorney (or the Unsecured
Creditors CommiUee
ltlis ~n. day oCDecenaber, 1997.
~cw.tc,~
''''~'12.
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UNITED STATES BANKRL'PTCY COURT i Chapter II
D1STRlCT OF ~EW MEXICO I Case ~os. 11-97-14362-MA and
I )\.97·1436-MA
In re: i
SOLV-EX CANADA LIMITED : The Honourable Judge ~ark ~cFeeley.
and SOLV-EX CORPORAno~ I USBJ
DEBTORS I
____________________________________________1 ----------------------------------
In the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta ICase No. 9701·10022
Judicial District of Calgary I The Honourtble Justice G.R. Forsyth
IN TIlE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES
CREDITORS ARRANGEMENTACT, R.S.C.
1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN mE MATTER OF SOLV-EX
CORPORATION.A."lD SOLV-EX
CANADA UMITED
CROS~BORDERINSOLVENCYPROTOCOL
WHEREAS Solv-Ex Canada limited ("Solv-Ex Canada") is a corporation
incorporated eccording to the laws of the Province ofAlberta, in Canada, and Solv·Ex Corporation
("Solv-Exj is a corporation incorporated IiCCOrding to the laws of the State ofNew Mexico in the
United States of America (together, the "Corporations"); and
WHEREAS on July 14, 1997, the Corporations made application under the
Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) (the "CCMj for various lcinds of relief (the
"Canadian Proceedingsj. By an order of the Court ofQueen's Bench ofAlberta (the "Canadian
Courtj made July 14,1997, (the "CCM Ord.er") the Corporations were each dec1ared to be entities
to which the CeM applies, and were pcnnittcd to file a formal plan ofcompromise or amngement
with their creditors, and if appropriate, shareholders by November 30, 1997, which date has been
extended to February IS, 1998, or such other date as the Canadian Court might subsequently order;
and
WHEREAS the CCM Order was amended on July 23, 1997 to confinn the
appointment of Price WateThouse Limited as Monitor of the Corporatiom (the "Monitor''), with the
rights, powers. duties and limitations upon liabilities set out in the CCM Order; and
WHEREAS on August 1-, 1997, the Corporatiom filed voluntary petitions for
reoreanization (the "US Proceedings'') in the United Stales Bankruptcy Court for the District ofNew
-2-
Mexico (the "l:S Court") under Chaptet II of title II, United States BanJcruptcy Code, II C.SC.
(the "Bankruptcy Code"), and no trustee has been appointed i.:l the US Proceedings a.,d purs....a.'1t to
Sections 1107 and 1108 ofthe Bankruptcy Code, the Corporations are continu:ng to operate the::
businesses and manage their properties as debtors·in-possession; and
WHEREAS in August of 1997 an Unsecured Creditors Committee was formed (the
"US Creditors' Committee") and OD August IS, 1997 the Canadian Court directed the creation of
a comminee of the Corporations' Canadian creditors (the "Canadian Creditors' Committee"); and
WHEREAS the Canadian Court has given d..i.rec:tions that submissiom be made to
it OD aaoss-bordet Protocol to gOvml the relationship between the US and Canadian nlOrganization
proceedings, and representations have been made to the US Court that such a cross border protocol
lilcewise would be submitted to it; and
WHEREAS Solv-Ex Canada is the general partner and a limited partner in the
Solv·Ex Canada Limited Partnership (the "Solv-Ex Lpn); and
WHEREAS the re1alive interests of Solv-Ex CIMda. Solv-Ex and the Solv-Ex LP
in and to certain leases, and the improvements and equipment located thereon, located near the Town
of Fort McMurray (the ''Fort McMumy Project") are as yet undetermined, as are the liabilities each
has incurred in connection therewith; and
WHEREAS United Tristar Resources Lid. ("tJTS") holds a looA. intere3t in certain
leases related to the Fort McMurray Project. as well as being a 1ooA. limited partner in the Solv·Ex
LP;and
WHEREAS the Corporations, UTS and the Solv·Ex LP have entered into an
agreement with Koch Exploration Canada Ltd. ("Koch'') for the sale ofa significant portion of the
Fort McMurray Project, and it is c:urrently anticipated that such a sale will occur which will enable
the Corporations to propose a distribution and/or a restructuring of debt to parties having valid
secured and un.secured claims, including valid contingent claims (such parties hereinafter referred
to together as "Claimants"); and
WHEREAS a framework of general principles should be agreed upon to address,
among other things, issues that are likely to arise in cOMcction with the cross-border insolvency
proceedings of the Corporations, including, without limitation, (a) the sale to Koch; (b) the
detenninatioD of claims asserted against the Corporations, and the aJlowability and priority status
of such claims; (c) the manner in which claims arising in diffetent jurisdictions should be classified
and dealt with; (d) harmonizing the filing and implementation ofa plan ofnlOrganization under the
Bankruptcy Code and a plan ofamngement under the CCM for each of the Corporations; and (e)
genetal administrative matters; and
.)-
WHEREAS the purpose of this Protocol is to protect the interests of all parties
affected by the US and Canadian Proceedings wherever located and to protect the integrity of the
process by which the US and the Canadian Proceedings are administered; and
NOW THEREFORE, the following terms and provisions shall apply to the US
Proceedings and the Canadian Proceedings:
I. The CorporatiolU will coordinate actions tA1cen in the US and Canadian Proceedings,
s.
-4-
of the Court in which the notice or appearance is filed or made.
The US and Canadian Courts may conduct joint hearings wi~ respect to any maner related
to the conduct, administration, determination or disposition of any aspect of the Canadian
or VS Proceedings where considered by both Courts to be necessary or advisable and in
particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing. to facilitate or coordinate the
proper and efficient conduct ofthe US and Canadian Proceedings. With respect to any such
hearings. unless otherwise ordered, the following directions are made:
o
-..J
o
2.
3.
4.
In addition to effecting notice of any motion upon creditors and other interested parries in
accordance with the practice of the court in which the motion is brought, the Corporations,
the US Trustee. the US aDd Canadian Creditors' Committees. Koc:h and the Monitor, and any
other official representative that may be appointed by the US Court or the c.n.diao Court,
shall receiw DOtice ofaD pmceediDC". Except IS otherwise set forth herein, the Corporations
shall be subject to jurisdiction in both fora for any mattl:r reWed to the US and Canadian
proceedinp.
The Corporations shall act in a manner consistent with the terms of the CCAA, the
Banlauptq Code, and the CCAA Order, IS amended, and in addition:
(a) There sba11 be DO further sales or dispositions ofmaterial assets ofthe Corporations
in the US or Canada without approval ofboth ofthe US and Canadian Courts. For
purposes oflhis Protocol a material asset shall be an asset having a realizable value
to the Corporations in excess of $40,000 (US) or the equivalent amount in Canadian
curreDC)';
(b) The Corporations shall provide such prior advance notice ofan application for joint
approval of a sale or disposition ofmaterial assets, together with an application for
directions as to the use of the proceeds of such sale, as is reuonably practicable
under the cireumstances and as may be requited by the rules ofthe respective Courts
and paragraph 2 hereof.
(c) Subject to the terms of the above refermeed sale to Koch, and the obtaining of any
nec:essuy orders of the US Court, the Corporations shall be eJltitled to sell
DOD-malerial assets without an order ofeither Court provided that such sales shall be
at arm's length and commercially reasonable. The net proceeds of any such sales
shaD be paid to and dealt with by the Monitor for purpose of making payment of
oncoing operating and other alloWllble expenses ofthe Corporations.
All claimants and other interested parties shall have the right to appear in any forum to the
same extent as claimants and other interested parties domiciled in the forum state, regardless
of whether they have tiled claims in that particular forum provided. however, that such
appearanoe or participation may subject such clailJWl1 or interested party to the jurisdiction
6,
a) A telephone linIc shall be established such that both Courts shall be able to
simultllDeously hear the proceedings in the other Court.
b) Ally party intending to rely upon any written evidentiary material in support of a
submission to the Canadian Court or the US Court in connection with any joint
application shall file materials, which shaD be identical insofar as possible and shall
be consistent with the proc:edURI and evidentiary rules and requirements of each
Court, in advance ofsuch application. Ifa party has not previously appeared in or
anomed, or does not wish to attorn to the jurisdictioll of either Court il sbalJ be
entitled to file such material without, by the act of filing, being deemed to have
attomed to the jurisdiction of the Court in which such material is filed, so long IS it
does not request in its materials or submissions any affirmarive relief from the Court
to which it does not wish to attorn.
c) Submissions or applications by any party shan be made only to the Court in which
it is appearing unless spec:iticaDy given leave by the other Court to tM1ce submissioIU
or applications to it.
d) The Justice ofthe Canadian Court and the Judge ofthe U.S. Court who will hear any
such application shall be entitled to communicate with one another in advance of the
said appliclllions, without counsel being present, to establish guidelines for the .
orderly malting ofsubmissions and rendering of decisions by the Canadian and the
U.S. Courts, and to deal with any other procedural, administrative or preliminary
matters.
e) The Justice ofthe Canadian Court and the Judge of the U.S. Court, having heard any
such application, shall be entitled to communicate with one another after any such
application, without counsel present, for the purpote of determining whether
consistent rulings can be made by both this Court and the U.S. Court, and the terms
upon which such rulings should be made, and to deal with any other procedural or
non-substantive maner in relation to such applications.
In order to be entitled to participate in or vote upon any Plan of Arrangement or Plan of
Reorganization, claimants must file proofs of their claims in accordance with the following
procedure:
<a) The claim of a claimant will be dealt with in all respects, including all issues of
quantification, aDowance or disallowanu, c:lassification and treatment of those
L._~," .. l,~._. L"._ L.,., L._ l~.,... L..~...,_ l~.~ l"~'M'" L,_ (~.~ '. L. ,~, l ..~ ... l~c l.~ .", l, .. l,.·_,.. l.~~.,," I
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
claims in any plan of arrangemtllt, in the Canadian Proceedings, and s.hall be
go\'emed by Canadian substantive and procedural law if:
(i) the claim arises from the supply of goods and/or services directly to
the Corporations or either of them in Canada;
(ii) the claim arises from or in COMection with a charge, secured claim
or security interest over real or personal property of the Corporations
or either of them granted or created under Canadian law;
(iii) the claim arises out ora tort committed in Canada;
(iv) the claim arises in respect of real property located in Canada;
(v) the claim arises in respect ofa contract which is by its tenns or by
implication governed by Canadian law.
unless the claims against the Corporations have a substantial connection, as that term
is understood UDder the principles ofprivate int.emationallaw, with the US or another
jurisdiction;
The claims of all other claimants will be dealt with in all respects, including all
is!UCS of quantification, alloWlDCe or disallowance, classifie:ati.on and treatment of
those claims in any plan of arrangement, in the US Proceedings, and shall be
governed by US substantive and procedural law, unless their claims l18ainst the
Corporations have a substantial coMectian, as that term is understood under the
principles of private intemationallaw, with Canada;
Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Protocol it shall be irrelevant
to the determinltion ofwhere claims are to be adjudicated that the Corporations have
disallowed a claim, or that a claimant has participated in any way in the proceedings
in eitherjurisdiction whether by tiling a Claim, an objection to a Disallowance ofthat
claim, a Motion for an Order valuing the claim. or otherwise;
If, in the case of a claim filed in Canada. the Corporations conclude that the claim
should under this Protocol be dealt with in the US Proceedings, the Corporations may
forthwith transmit the claim documents to the US. and immediately notify the
claimant that its claim will be transferred to and dealt with in the US Proceedings.
If such claim was. at the date the notice of transfer was issued by the Monitor.
properly filed in the Canadian Proceedings, the Corporations shall treat the claim as
having been properly filed in the US notwithstanding that such claim might not have
been filed in the US Proceedings, either in a timely manner or at all. and shall,
subject to (f) below, in all respects be entitled to treat the claim as if it had originally
betn filed in the US Proceedings;
If. in the case of a claim filed in the US, the Corporations conclude that the claim
should under this Protocol be dealt with in the Canadian Proceedings. the
Corporations may forthwith tnnsmit the claim documents to Cana.da, and
immediately notify the claimant that its claim will be transferred to and dealt with in
the Canadian Proceedings, The Monitor shall treat the claim as having been properly
filed in Canada nornithstanding that such claim might not have been filed in the
Canadian Proceedings. either in a timely manner or at all. and shall subje~ 10 (f)
below, in all respects be entitled to treat the claim as if it had originally betll filed in
the Canadian Proceedings;
(f) Any claimant wishing to object to its claim having been transferred to the other
jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (d) or (e) above must file an objection to the
transfer of the elaim in the appropriate court in the jurisdiction from which the claim
has been transferred within 18 days after mailings ofootite of traNfer, which notice
shall inform said claimant of the 18 day time limit, failing which it shall be
conclusively deemed to have accepted the transfer;
(g) Each individual claim shall be dealt with by one of the US or Canadian Couru, but
not both. A claimant with two or more separate and distinct claims, which under this
Protocol should be dealt with in different jurisdictions, shall prove each claim in the
appropriate jurisdiction;
(h) The Corporations shall review and deal with all proofs ofclaim properly submitted
in Canada or tnu:lSfmed to Canada pursuant to this Protocol in ICCOrdance with usual
procedures UDder the CCAA IDd the tenns of any plan of llt'lIDIement The
Corporations shall review and deal with all other proofs ofclaim in accordance with
applicable laws of the US and the terms of any plan of reorganiDtion;
(i) Claims procedures for the Corporations shall be conducted pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code. in the US, and pursuant to the CCM and direction of the
Canadian Court, in Canada., and in each case disallowance procedures and appeals
there&om shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the claim is to
be dealt with pursuant to this Protocol;
(j) Appeals from disallowance ofclaims shall be dealt with by the appropriate court in
the jurisdiction in which • claim is proven or to which it may be transferred under
this Protocol in accordance with the law and usual practices in that jurisdiction and
as provided under any plan of arrangement or plan of reorganization.
(k) The validity and quantum of any contingent or unliquidated claim upon which
litigation was commenced in Canada prior to July 14-, 1997, and in the US or
elsewhere prior to August 1-, 1997, shall, notwithstanding anything else herein be
determined by the courts ofthe jurisdiction in which such litigation was commenced
unless the Corporations elect to move the litigation, or have StIch claims detennined,
elsewhere pursuant to a right to do so under the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise.
(I) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this paragraph 6, the Corporations'
o
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objections to the claims of Gee &. Co. and ABN Amro Bank (Switzerland) A.G.
(together, the "AB~/Gee Claims"), if an)', shall be heard by the US Court purSU~.'lt
to the Bankruptcy Code's claims objection procedures. The detennination of the
Corponations' objections to the AB~/Gee Claims sball be limited to the validity of
the ABN/Gce Claims under applicable non-bankruptcy law, and shall not involve
considemions ofthe rights ofGee & Co. and ABN Amra Bank (Switzerland) A.G.
under the CCM or the Canadian Proceedings. The US Court's ruling on the
Corporations' objections to the ABN/Gee Claims shall be binding upon Gee & Co.
and ABN Amro Bank (Switzerland) A.G. and the Corponations in the Canadian
Proceedings, under the common law principles of res judicata. Once the US Court
has ruled on the Corporations' objec:tions to the ABN/Gee Claims, the ABN/Gee
Claims, ifallowed, shall be treated in the plans oft'eOI'gIIIizatin filed ill the US and
Canada in ec:c:ordaau with the~ent of the parties or as determined by further
order ofthe US and Canadian Courts, to be determiDed at a joint bearing of the US
and Canadian Couns.
Claims tbal have been finally allowed. settled, disallowed or determined by the Corporations
or the Courts in one jurisdiction shall be recognized by the Corporations as having been
likewise allowed, settled, disallowed 01" dctenniDed in the other jurisdiction in the same
amoUDt, and the Corponations shall take all appropriate or nec:essary steps to obtain
recognition ofsuch claims in the other jurisdiction.
The court adjudicating upon any disputed or contingeDt cla.im shall decide the value,
allowability, priority and eligibility to vote ofsuch claims filed using a choice oflaw analysis
based upon the choice of law principles applicable in that fonun. A claimant', rights to
collateral and set-oft'will be determined UDder the choice onaw principles applicable in that
forum. No person will be subject to a forum's substantive rules unless under the choice of
law principles applicable in that forum such persons would be subject to the forum's
substantive laws in a lawsuit on the same transaction in a non.insolvency proec:eding.
To the extent pennitted by the laws of the respective jurisdictions and to the extent
practicable, the Corpolttions shall submit a plan of amngemeDt in Canada and a plan of
reorganization in the United States substantially similar to each other. The Corporations
shall coordinate all procedures in connection therewith, including, without limitation, all
solicitation proceedings relating thereto, and all procedures regarding voting, the treatment
of crediton, classification of claims, and the like, and all such procedures will either be
established by the Corporations~ consultation with the Monitor 01" set by applicable law
or further orders of the US Court and the Canadian Court. In order to co-ordinate the
contemporaneous filing ofplans ofammgement and plans ofreorganization the Corporations
shall take the actions necesSllY to seek extensions of the date for the filing of the plans of
arrangement under the CCAA, and of the exclusive time period during which only the
Corporations may file a plan of reorpniation pursuant to Section 1121 of the Banlauptcy
Code.
-I-
10. Except ....ith respect to matters where the Monitor appears before the US Court pursuant to
paragraph 2 hereof, the Canadian Court shall have sole jurisdiction and power over the
~onitor, including without limitation. its tenure in office, the retention and compensatior.
ofthe ~onitor and other <:.nadian professionals, the extent of its liability to the Corponations
and third parties, and the bearing and determination of matters arising in the Canadian
Proceedings under Canadian law. The Monitor and the Monitor's counsel shall be
compensated for their services in accordance with Canadian law, such that the Monitor and
the Monitor's counsel are DOt required to file fee applications in the US Court.
II. Tbe Monitor and its employees, counsel and agents, includiag those retained in the US, sha.1l
be entitled to the same protections and immunities in the US as those granted to them under
the CeM Order, and in particular the Monitor and its employees, counsel and agents sball,
except as spec:ifically otherwise provided in lIlY order made in the Canadian Proceedings,
incur no Uability or obUgmion lIS a result ofthe maIcing ofthe CCM Order,IIS amended, the
appointment ofthe Monitor or carrying out ofthe provisioDJ of such order, save and except
that the Monitor shall be liable for gross negiilence or willful misconduct on its part.
12. The US Court shall have solejurisdiction IDd power over the conduct ofthe US Proceedings,
the compensation ofprofessionals rendering services to the Corporations in the US and the
US Creditors' Committee, and the hearing and determination ofmattm arising in the US
Proceedings.
13. A plan ofarrangement, in Canada, and a plan of reorganization. in the US. shall be binding
upon claimants ill the US and Canada ifboth Ire approved in their respective jurisdictions,
and not ot1ulrwise.
14. Claimants in the US and Canadian Proceedings shall have similar access to relevant
information as to the financial condition, SWUS and activities of the Corponations, the nature
and eft'ect ofany plan ofreorpniZ'Jltion or arrangement, and the status ofproceedings in each
jurisdiction.
IS. Once approved by orders of the US and Canadian Courts, this Protocol may not be amended
or modified in my other way 01" manner (Including, without limitation, pursuant to a plan of
arrangCIDem or reorganization of the Corporations) except by authorization of the US Court
or the Canadian Court as may be necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. Notice
ofany proposed amendment or modification of this Protocol shall be provided by the party
proposing such in accordance with paragraph 2 hereof.
16. Any request for the entry ofan order which is coDtraty to the provisions ofthis Protocol must
be made on notice by the proponent ofthe order in accordance with panagnaph 2 hereof.
17. The Corponations are hereby authoriz.ed and directed to take such actions and execute such
documents as may be nec:essary and appropriate to implement and effectuate this Protocol.
18, This Protocol shall be deemed effective upon its approval by the US Court and the Callad:aIl
Court,
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STIPULATION REGARDING CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PROTOCOL
Everfresh Beverages, Inc. ("Everfresh"), debtor and debtor-in-
possession, and Sundance Beverages, Inc. ("Sundance"), debtor
WHEREAS, on November 17, 1995 (the "Filing Date"),
.....
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WHEREAS, Everfresh manufactures and distributes
juices, juice drinks, lemonade, and related products throughout
the United States and Canada under the brand names of Everfresh,
Rich 'n Ready and, only in the United States, Wagner
(collectively, the "Product"), and maintains offices in Chicago,
Illinois, and Mississauga, Ontario, and operates manufacturing
plants in Warren, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario, Canada; and
businesses and manage their properties as debtors-in-possession,
and the Bankruptcy Court entered an order authorizing the joint
administration of the Debtors' Chapter 11 cases for procedural
purposes; and
Chapter 11 cases (the "Creditors' Committee") and the Creditors'
Committee has selected Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel as
its counsel (the "Committee'S Counsel"); and
WHEREAS, on December 1, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court
appointed an official committee of unsecured creditors in these
WHEREAS, on the Filing Date, the Bankruptcy Court
entered an order (the "Emergency Order") and thereafter on
November 22, 1995, a preliminary order (the "Preliminary
Order"), which orders, among other things, authorized the
Debtors' use of cash collateral and the receipt of discretionary
post-petition financing from The CIT Group/Business Credit, Inc.
Case No. 32-077978
The Honourable Mr. Justice
Farley
Chapter 11
(Jointly Administered)
Case Nos. 95 B 45405 and
95 B 45406 (JHG)
The Honorable Burton
R. Lifland, USBJDebtors.
__________________,x
and debtor-in-possession (jointly, the "Debtors"), filed in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York (together with any other court having jurisdiction over the
bankruptcy cases, the "Bankruptcy Court") ·their respective
voluntary petitions for reorganization (the "Chapter 11 cases")
under Chapter 11 of Title 11, United States Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101 tl~ (the "Bankruptcy Code"); and
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF
EVERFRESH BEVERAGES, INC. OF THE
REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, IN
THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO
EVERFRESH BEVERAGES, INC. AND
SUNDANCE BEVERAGES, INC.,
-----------------------------------xONTARIO COURT (GENERAL DIVISION)
IN BANKRUPTCY
In re:
'DNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------x
-..J
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WHEREAS, no trustee has been appointed in the Chapter
11 cases and pursuant to Sections 1107 and 1108 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Debtors are continuing to operate their
("CITBC"), the Debtors' secured lender, pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the Emergency Order and the Preliminary Order
(together with any further orders concerning cash collateral
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and/or financing, the "Cash Collateral/Financing Order") and
pursuant to the terms of the stipulation and order (the
"Stipulation") between the Debtors and CITBC, as approved by the
Cash Collateral/Financing Order, of an aggregate amount of
$750.000 (the "Advance") for the purposes set forth in a budget
(the "Budget") annexed to the Stipulation, through December 12,
1995; and
WHEREAS. on the Filing Date, Everfresh filed a Notice
of Intention to Make a Proposal (the "NOI") to its creditors
under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of Canada (the "Act") in
which Ernst & Young Inc. was named as trustee und~r the proposal
(the "Trustee"), and Everfresh filed a motion for an order in
the Ontario Court (General Division), in Bankruptcy (together
with any other court having jurisdiction over Everfresh's
insolvency proceeding, the "Canadian Court") seeking the
appointment of Ernst & Young Inc., as interim receiver (the
"Interim Receiver") of the property, business, and assets of
Everfresh situated in Canada, which order was entered
simultaneously with the filing of the NOI (the "Interim Receiver
Order"), a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" (the
proceedings under the Act and pursuant to the Interim Receiver
Order being referred to as the "Canadian Proceeding"); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Interim Receiver Order, the
Interim Receiver has been authorized to borrow from time-to-time
up to an amount not to exceed $400,000 from CITBC for the
3
purposes of carrying out its responsibilities under the terms of
the Interim Receiver Order; and
WHEREAS, on November 27, 1995. Everfresh filed with
the Official Receiver, appointed under the Act, a cash flow
statement (the "Cash Flow Statement"), together with the
Trustee's and Everfresh's reports on the Cash Flow Statement, in
connection with the Canadian Proceeding; and
WHEREAS, it is presently contemplated that all (a) of
the business and assets of every nature, tangible and intangible
arising from or relating to the manufacture, distribution and
sale of the Product in Canada as reflected on the books and
records of Everfresh (the "Canadian Assets") and (b) of the
business and assets of every nature, tangible and intangible
arising from or relating to the manufacture, distribution and
sale of the Product in the United States as reflected on the
books and records of Everfresh (the "US Assets") will be
liquidated through the sale thereof by the Debtors in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Act
for the benefit of all secured, priority, and non-insider
unsecured creditors of Everfresh, with the net proceeds of sale
to be distributed in accordance with priorities established
under the Bankruptcy Code and the Act; and
WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the Debtors have been
engaged in extensive negotiations with a number of potential
buyers regarding the sale of Everfresh's assets in Canada, and
4
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have reviewed letters of intent, and, accordingly, it is
presently anticipated that a sale of Everfresh's assets in
Canada will occur prior to a sale of Everfresh's assets located
in the United States; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to paragraph 29 of the Interim
Receiver Order, the Interim Receiver is ordered to have regard
to the Everfresh Chapter 11 case, to cooperate with actions
taken in the Everfresh Chapter 11 case and to take such steps as
are required to coordinate his administration under the Interim
Receiver Order with the administration of the Everfresh Chapter
11 case, where so doing would enhance the value of the Canadian
Assets and to review the appropriateness or advisability of a
Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol to be submitted for the
consideration of the Canadian Court and the Bankruptcy Court;
"Proposal"); and (f) general administrative matters, similar to
the principles proposed in the article of Committee J of the
Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association
entitled Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (the "Concordat"), a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", and that an
agreement upon such matters is essential to the orderly and
efficient administration of these cross-border cases; and
WHEREAS, the purpose of the protocol proposed in this
Stipulation is to protect the interests of all creditors of
Everfresh (in a situation where there is more than one plenary
forum and no main forum as provided for in Principle 4 of the
Concordat) wherever located and to protect the integrity of the
process by which the Chapter 11 case and the Canadian Proceeding
is administered.
~ and
WHEREAS, a framework of general principles should be
agreed upon to address, among other things, issues that are
likely to arise in connection with the cross-border insolvency
proceedings of Everfresh, including, without limitation, (a) the
sale of Everfresh's Canadian Assets; (b) the sale of Everfresh's
NOW THEREFORE, the Debtors, CITBC, and the Creditors'
Committee by their respective counsel, and Ernst & Young Inc.,
in its capacity as Interim Receiver and Trustee under the
Proposal, hereby stipulate and agree, subject to Bankruptcy
Court and Canadian Court approval, as follows:
have regard to the proceedings initiated by Everfresh under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court and
under the Act in the Canadian Court; (ii) co-operate with
actions taken in both the Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian
Court; and (iii) take steps to co-ordinate their respective
US Assets; (c) the disposition of the proceeds of sale of the
Canadian Assets and the US Assets (together, the "Assets"); (d)
the determination of claims asserted against Everfresh, and the
allowability and priority status of such claims; (e) the filing
and implementation of a plan of reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code and a scheme or proposal under the Act (the
1. The Debtors and the Interim Receiver will (i)
5
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administrations under the Bankruptcy Code and the Act in the
Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Court.
Interim Receiver, and any other official representative that may
be appointed by the Bankruptcy Court or the Canadian Court,
shall receive notice of all proceedings in accordance with the
practices of the respective Courts, and have the right to appear
in all proceedings in any fora, whether in the Bankruptcy Court
or the Canadian Court, subject to paragraph 7 hereof. The
Debtors and the Interim Receiver shall be subject to
jurisdiction in both fora for any matter related to the
insolvency proceedings, but appearing in a forum shall not
subject him/her to jurisdiction for any other purpose in the
forum state, except to the extent otherwise set forth herein too
.....:I
0'\
2.
the contrary .
3.
The Debtors, the Creditors' Committee and the
The Interim Receiver shall be permitted to act in
Chapter 11 cases or the Canadian Proceeding where notice of such
action is required to be given under the applicable laws of
procedures of the governing forum, shall be provided (the
·Notice Procedures·) by overnight mail, overnight delivery
service or facsimile to counsel to the Debtors, Angel & Frankel,
P.C., 460 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022, Attn: Bruce
Frankel, Esq., the :nterim Receiver at Ernst & Young, Inc., P.O.
Box 251 - 21st Floor, Toronto Dominion Centre, Canada M5K 137,
Attn: Alex Morrison, counsel to CITBC, Dewey Ballantine, 1301
Avenue of the Americas 10019, Attn: Stuart Hirshfield, Esq.,
special counsel to the Debtors, Lang Michener, BCE Place, Suite
2500, 181 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5J 2T7, Attn:
Joseph Marin, Esq., Canadian counsel to CITBC, Cassels, Brock &
Blackwell, Scotia Plaza, Suite 2100, 40 King Street West,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada MSH 3C2, Attn: Bruce Leonard, Esq., the
Office of the United States Trustee, 80 Broad Street, Third
Floor, New York, New York 10004, Attn: Catherine Lotrionte,
a manner consistent with the terms of the Interim Receiver Order
under Canadian law, and Everfresh shall be permitted to act in a
manner consistent with the terms of the Act, the Bankruptcy
Code, the Interim Receiver Order, and the ~ash
Collateral/Financing Order, provided, ~, (a) such prior
advance noti~e as is reasonably practicable under the
circumstances of any transaction and hearing thereon concerning
the use, sale or lease of Everfresh's Assets outside the
ordinary course of business (the "Transactions") and (b) prior
notice of those actions proposed to be taken in either the
7
Esq., the Committee's Counsel, Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell &
Hippel, Packard Building, 111 South lSth Street, Philadelphia,
PA 19102-2688, Attn: Lawrence J. Tabas, Esq., and the
Committee's Canadian counsel, Stikeman, Eliott, Commerce Court
West, P.O. Box 5300 - Suite S300, Toronto, Ontario, Canada MSL
1B9 Attn: David Byer, Esq., and all persons appearing on the
notice of appearance list as reflected on the docket of the
Chapter 11 cases and supplied by Everfresh to the Interim
Receiver (the ·Specified Parties·), which foregoing notice shall
be in lieu of notice to all creditors of Everfresh.
8
l~, ~ ,'. L",•.~,_ l_"~,,, L, l, '. "" L~"M L"". L.". l~M. " I"., .~ I,.. '". t.,," , 1".", L, L_, I,..... u' L,u,. l,x., .. I .,
--,
-. -, -, -, -, -, --, -, -, -., -, --, -.., --, -., -, -,
"
to appear in any forum to the same extent as creditors of the
forum state, regardless of whether they have filed claims in
that particular forum. All creditors shall have the opportunity
to file a notice of appearance with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy
Court, the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House, One Bowling
Green, 5th Floor, New York, New York 10004 or to participate in
the proceedings in the Canadian Court; provided, however, that
such filing or participation may subject such creditor to the
jurisdiction in the Court in which the notice or appearance is
shall be publicly available in both fora. To the extent
permitted, non-public information shall be made available to
official representatives of the Debtors, including any official
committee appointed in these cases and shall be shared with
other official representatives, subject to appropriate
confidentiality arrangements and all privileges under the
applicable rules of evidence.
be subject to the sole approval of the Canadian Court.
Transactions relating to the US Assets will be subject to the
o
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4.
filed or made.
5.
6.
All creditors of Everfresh shall have the right
Information publicly available in any forum state
Transactions relating to the Canadian Assets will
otherwise provided for under the Act or the Bankruptcy Code,
notice and requirements for approval and authorization of any
Transactions shall be in accordance with the Notice Procedures
and shall be provided by the Interim Receiver or the Debtors, as
the case may be, to the Specified Parties.
7. All creditors of Sundance must file their proofs
of claim with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, the Alexander
Hamilton U.S. Custom House, One Bowling Green, 5th Floor, New
York, New York 10004. Any creditor of Everfresh may file a
proof of claim in either the Bankruptcy Court or in the Canadian
Proceeding. However, if a creditor files a claim in both the
Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Proceeding, then distribution
to such creditor will be adjusted so that recovery is not
greater than if the claim were filed in only one forum. A
timely filed claim in either the Bankruptcy Court or the
Canadian Proceeding will be deemed timely filed in both the
Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Proceeding. The Debtors and
the Interim Receiver will endeavor to coordinate notice
procedures and establish the same deadline for the filing of
claims against the Debtors in both the Bankruptcy Court and the
Canadian Proceeding, and all other matters regarding the filing,
reviewing and objecting to claims.
sole approval of the Bankruptcy Court. Any Transactions 8. The Bankruptcy Court shall have jurisdiction over
involving the Assets located both in Canada and the United
States will be subject to the joint jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Court. To the extent not
9
all claims governed principally by the laws of the United States
or any of its states. In the event that claims are governed
principally by the laws of Canada, the objection to such claims
10
may be brought in either the Canadian Proceeding or the
Bankruptcy Court, as mutually agreed upon by the Interim
Receiver and the Debtors, or if an agreement cannot be reached,
the Bankruptcy Code and any similar provisions under the Act or
the Interim Receiver Order, it being intended that such Section
508(a) be, to the extent applicable, enforced in both fora.
persons would be subject to the forum's substantive laws in a
lawsuit on the same transaction in a non-insolvency proceeding,
by further order of the Canadian Court. Nothing in this
Stipulation shall be deemed to bind a creditor to the foregoing
forum selection for filing of objections to claims. The
except to the extent set forth in paragraph 12 hereof. Nothing
herein shall limit the right of any party-in-interest to object
to claims to the extent permitted under Section 502(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules nor shall anything
herein alter the substantive rights of any party filing a claim
adjudicating forum shall decide the value, allowability and
priority of claims filed using a choice of law analysis based
upon the choice of law principles applicable in that forum. A
creditor's rights to collateral and set-off will be determined
under the choice of law principles applicable in that forum,
except to the extent set forth in paragraph 12 hereof. No
person will be subject to a forum's substantive rules unless
under the choice of law principles applicable in that forum such
10. The proceeds of all Transactions shall be
Bankruptcy Code, or (ii) the Creditors' Committee under Section
distribution to creditors, including, without limitation, the
priority treatment respectively accorded to such claims under
Neither this Stipulation nor any actions taken pursuant hereto
are intended to nor shall they in any manner prejudice or affect
the powers, rights, claims and defenses of (i) E&Y, the Debtors,
their estates or any of their creditors under applicable law,
distributed in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction
including the Act and any other relevant Canadian law and the
approving such Transactions. The Bankruptcy Court and the
Canadian Court shall apply their respective schemes for
the Bankruptcy Code or the Act. Any proceeds available after
the satisfaction in full of all valid allowed secured claims
1103 of the Bankruptcy Code.
maintained by Everfresh in the United States, in an account
specifically designated for plan funding (the "Account"), which
Account shall be maintained in accordance with Section 345 of
asserted against Everfresh, and the funding of the Budget, and
the Cash Flow Statement as from time-to-time amended shall be
Neither this Stipulation nor any actions taken9.
in any fora.
.....;j
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pursuant hereto is intended nor shall it have any affect on the
rights of creditors, the Interim Receiver, or the estates of the
Debtors with regard to the applicability of Section 508(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The distribution of all monies in the
Account shall be pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy Code
and the Act.
11 12
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12. Except to the extent set forth in an order of the
claims, meaning claims other than priority or secured claims,
shall be determined by the Debtors, as to the Canadian
proceedings after consultation with the-Trustee under the
Proposal.
Canadian Court, all cr~ditors subject to the jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court shall be subject to the avoiding laws set forth
in the Bankruptcy code, and other applicable laws of the United
States which shall be the controlling law of each case to the
extent permitted by applicable international law,_
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in paragraph 8. No
avoiding actions will be taken by the Interim Receiver in Canada
without the express written consent of the Debtors or as may be
directed by the Canadian Court.
13. To the extent permitted by the laws of the
respective jurisdictions and to the extent practicable, the
Interim Receiver and the Debtors shall endeavor to submit a
proposal in Canada and a pl~n of reorganization in the United
States substantially similar to each other and the Debtors, the
Interim Receiver and the Trustee shall endeavor to coordinate
all procedures in connection therewith, including, without
limitation, all solicitation proceedings relating thereto. and
all procedures regarding voting. the treatment of creditors,
classification of claims, and the like, will either be
established by the Debtors after consultation with the Trustee
14. Except with respect to matters where the Interim
Receiver appears before the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to
paragraph 2, hereof, the Canadian Court shall have sole
jurisdiction and power over the Interim Receiver, including,
without limitation, its tenure in office, the conduct of the
liquidation proceedings under Canadian law, the retention and
compensation of the Interim Receiver and other Canadian
professionals, and the hearing and determination of matters
arising in the liquidation proceedings under Canadian law. The
Interim Receiver, and Lang Michener, shall be compensated for
their services in accordance with Canadian principles under
Canadian law, such that the Interim Receiver and Lang Michener
are not required to file fee applications with the Bankruptcy
Court, provided, ~, they be paid as provided for in the
Budget and the Cash Flow Statement to the extent contemplated by
the Cash Collateral/Financing Order, the Interim Receiver be
of the Proposal or be dealr with pursuant to a further order of
the Bankruptcy Court and or the Canadian Court. In order to
coordinate the contemporaneous filing of the Proposal and the
plan of reorganization, the Debtors shall take the actions
necessary to seek extensions from time-to-time of the date for
the filing of the Proposal, and the Debtors shall take the
actions necessary from time-to-time to seek extensions of the
exclusive time period during which only the Debtors may file a
plan of reorganization pursuant to Section 1121 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The classification and treatment of unsecured11.
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compensated under the provisions of the Interim Receiver Order
to the extent consistent with the Cash Collateral/Financing
Order, and notice of such payment is given pursuant to the
Notice Procedures to the Specified Parties. The order entered
by the Bankruptcy Court authorizing the retention of Lang
Michener as Canadian counsel to the Debtors is hereby deemed to
be modified to conform to the foregoing provisions.
15. The Bankruptcy Court shall have sole jurisdiction
and power over the conduct of the Chapter 11 cases, the
compensation of the professionals rendering services to the
Debtors and to the Creditors' Committee in the United States,
and the hearing and determination of matters arising in the
Chapter 11 cases. This Stipulation shall be without prejudice
to the rights of the Debtors to seek the substantive
consolidation of their estates in accordance with the Bankruptcy
Code.
16. This Stipulation shall be binding on and inure to
the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
successors, assigns, representatives, heirs, executors,
administrators, trustees (including any trustees of the Debtors
under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code), and receivers,
receiver managers, or custodians appointed under Canadian law,
as the case may be.
17. This Stipulation may not be waived, amended or
modified orally or in any other way or manner (including,
15
without limitation, pursuant to a plan of reorganization of the
Debtors) except by a writing signed by the party to be bound,
and such approval and authorization of the Bankruptcy Court or
the Canadian Court as may be necessary and appropriate under the
circumstances. Notice of any proposed amendment or modification
of the Stipulation shall be provided by the party providing such
to the Specified Parties in accordance with the Notice
Procedures. This Stipulation may be supplemented from time to
time by the parties hereto as circumstances require with any
supplementing stipulations as approved by the Bankruptcy Court
and the Canadian Court.
18. Any request for the entry of an order which is
contrary to the provisions of this Stipulation must be made on
notice by the proponent of the order to the Specified Parties in
accordance with the Notice Procedures.
19. Each party represents and warrants to the other
that its execution, delivery and performance of this Stipulation
are within the power and authority of such party and have been
dUly authorized by such party, except that, with respect to the
Debtors and the Interim Receiver, Bankruptcy Court and Canadian
Court approval is required.
20. This Stipulation may be signed in any number of
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all
of which together shall be deemed to be one and the same
16
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instrument, and may be signed by facsimile signature, which
shall be deemed to constitute an original signature.
21. The Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Court shall
retain jurisdiction over the parties for the purpose of
enforcing the terms and provisions of this Stipulation or
23. This Stipulation shall be deemed effective upon
its approval by the Bankruptcy Court and the Canadian Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused
this stipulation to be executed either individually or by their
respective attorneys or representatives hereunto authorized.
Cl
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approving any amendments or modifications thereto.
22. The parties hereto are hereby authorized to take
such actions and execute such documents as may be necessary and
appropriate to implement and effectuate this Stipulation.
17
Dated: New York, New York
December 25;,), 1995
ANGEL & FRANKEL, P.C.
Counsel for Everfresh Beverages, Inc.
and Sundance Beve~es, Inc., debtors and
deb~n-pos~~sibn ,
By / IJL:.LU./ / ,I.U{~_
Bruce Frankel ( F 9009)
460 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 752-8000
LANG MICHENER
Special Counsel for Everfresh Beverages,
Inc. and Sundance Beverages, Inc., debtors
and debtors-in-possession
By: --::J;-o-s-e"'p~h---::M""a-r~J.;-:·n--------
BCE Place
Suite 2500
181 Bay Street
Toronto, Ontario, Canada MSJ 2T7
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DEWEY BALLANTINE
Counsel for The CIT Group/Business
Credit, Inc.
d (SH 0099)
d (HM 2667)
301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019
(212) 259-8000
CASSELS, BROC~ ~ BLACKWELL
Canadian Counsel for The CIT Group/Business
Credit, Inc.
By:
--::B'""r-u-c-e--=L'""e-o-n-a-r-d-:----------
Scotia Plaza
Suite 2100
40 King Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5H 3C2
ERNST ~ YOUNG INC.
As Interim Receiver of Everfresh Beverages,
Inc., and Trustee of the Proposal
By:
Alex Morrison
P.O. Box 251
21st Floor
222 Bay Street
Toronto ,Dominion Center
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5k 137
OBERMAYER, REBMANN, MAXWELL ~ RIPPEL
Counsel for the Creditors' Committee
By:
Lawrence J. Tabas
Packard Building
111 South 15th Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-2688
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STIXEMAN, ELLIOTT
Canadian Counsel for the Creditors'
Committee
By:
Kenneth G. Ottenbrecht (KGO I
David Byer
126 East 56th Street
11th Floor, Tower 56
New York, New York 10022
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TESTIMONY OF HON. TINA BROZMAN BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
REGARDING PROPOSED CHAPTER 15 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
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Iestlmony of 110a L, BroxmDn. Chjef Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for the SQuthem
District of Ne" York Defore the Senate Judiciaa' Subcommittee in Connection witb tbe
Beadnl OD tbe Bankmptcy Code and Iotemational Trade
Cross-border insolvencies have confounded debtors, creditors. practitioners and jurists
alike for decades. We have watched as jurisdictional battles and territorial approaches impaired
the possibility of saving viable enterprises and jobs and substantially reduced the returns that
creditors received on their claims. U.S. creditors have been particularly hard hit because of the
frequent loss of going-concern values and because U.S. debtors in possession have been viewed
with hostility in foreign venues, preventing the repatriation of assets for U.S. creditors. Private
efforts by international bar associations to promote standardized insolvency laws have failed
because their proponents aimed to harmonize substantive law, too weighty an undertaking for a
first step. We are poised to improve dramatically the stalUS quo.
In 1994, the United Nations Commission on International Trade law, known by the
acronym UNCITRAL, received a clarion call from a multinational group of bankers, judges,
regulators, Insolvency professionals and academics to develop a more modest solution - one that
would achieve three goals: cooperation between courts, recognition of forelen proceedings and
access to foreign proceedings by estate representatives. In May of this year, UNCITRAL
accomplished that.objective, approving a Model Law for enactment by member states of the
United Nations. Three features of the Model Law are especially important to the U.S. First, the
Model Law recognizes debtors in possession as proper estate representatives (an outcome which
we generally have been unsuccessful in obtaining); second, the proposed law contains an automatic
stay once foreign proceedings arc recognized, ending the dissipation of assets by local creditors
and staying the debtor from wholesale disposition or movement of assets; and third, the Model
Law expresses as one of its fUndamental goals enhancing the possibility of reorganization.
Adoption of the Model Law in other nations will go a long way toward furthering our national
objectives.
Under the auspices of UNCITRAL and INSOL International, I have chaired the first two
Multinational Judicial Colloquia On Transnational Insolvency. I appear today as the Chair of the
ludicial Section of INSOL International. In addition, I am the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, which is home to the great majority of our
transnational cases, and, as such, I have firsthand experience in numerous cross-border casC.'!.
At the first Judicial Colloquium, one theme was commonly articulated by judges from civil
law jurisdictions, who have less discretion than judges from common law jurisdictions like our
own; they all agreed that some form of legislation was critical to enable them to cooperate as they
wish to do in transnational insolvency cases. Legislation is just as desirable for U.S. judges,
because it elimina~ unnecessary and costly appeals respecting the power of the bankruptcy judge
to harmonize U.S. and foreign proceedings. In addition, the legislation would afford to our estate
representatives the statutoI)' authority to seek assistance in foreign courts, ending claims that they
are exceeding their statutory prerogatives and adding immeasurably to our ability to repatriate
assets in appropriate cases.
The second Judicial Colloquium considered an actual draft of the Model Law shortly
before the final draft received UNCITRAL's approval. At the conclusion of a day and one-half
of discussion, one of our evaluators, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Leif M. Clark. from Texas.
summarized the conclusions of the group respecting the importance of a legislative solution:
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•At the outset all of us agree on one basic point •.. and that is that this effort and
cooperation is vital in the cross-border arena. In most jurisdictions judges will in
the main simply not feel comfortable inventing law on a case by case basis. Our
hats must be off to the pioneers who dared to try something new and pave the way
for this process. But the best way to ensure that most judges follow that lead is, it
seems to us, to give them the statutory authority to do so. The express provision
for judicial cooperation may thus appear to be innocuous on its face but is in reality
one of the most important features of the UNCITRAL effort.•
Notwithstanding the clear benefits which we will receive from enactment of the Model Law
domestically, there is an even more important reason for its adoption. The international
community Is looking to the United States for leadership. If we do not act affrrmatively on this
legislation, I have grave fears that it will receive no attention overseas. Just as we have led the
way in aeating ad hoc solutions for the problems of large transnational cases, we must lead the
way in enacting a marc comprehensive and long-lasting solution capable of governing not only
o the large, newsworthy cases but the smaller, less remarkable, multinational cases which, with the
~ globalization of commercial enterprise, increasingly are becoming the bread and butter of our
business banlauptey dockets. This should substantially reduce the fear of U.S. creditors that they
will lose out to creditors overseas who seize a bankrupt debtor's assets with impunity; that if a
foreign enterprise fails, they will receive no notice of the right to participate in Its insolvency
proceedinas: and that shrewd debtors can utilize lcchnology to remove assets beyond the reach of
our courtS. Indeed, at the second Judicial Colloquium, one of the Norwegian judges expressed
frustration about just such a case, where he was unable to follow the debtor's assets around the
world as the debtor deftly moved them from nation to nation.
If, through our leadership, we convince our trading partners to enact this legislation, we
will have done a great deal to maximize asset values for all creditors, rehabilitate viable
3
enterprises and preserve employment for our own citizens. In short, with the explosion of
International commerce fostered by rapidly changing tcchnology and initiatives such as NAFTA,
we simply cannot afford not to enact this legislation.
I thank you for the opportunity of addressing you.
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TITLE IX ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER
~
SEC. 901. AMENDMENT TO ADD CHAPTER 15 TO TITLE II, UNITED
STATES CODE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting atter chapter 13 the following:
"CHAPTER 15-=ANCIUAR~OTHER CROSS-BORDERC
"S.".
"1501. Purpo.. and ,co~ of application.
"SUBCHAPTER I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
"1502. D.finition,.
"1503. IntO'national oblilationl of the United SIal...
"1504. Com_nc.ment of ancillary COlt.
"1505. Authoritation 10 act in a forei,n country.
"1506. Public poliC)' ."".ption.
"1507. AdditionalOl,istance.
"1508. Interpretation.
"SUBCHAmR U Access Of fOReraN REPBESeNTATTYES AIVD
CRED/roRS ro THE COl/RT
"1509. Ri,ht of direcl acc....
"1510. Limil.d juri.diction.
"1511. Commenc.ment ofCOl. undO' Itction 301 or 303.
"1512. Participalion ofa forei,n repre••nlatiue in a COl. under Ihi. lill•.
"1513. Acce.. offoreign creditora to a COlt undO'lhi"ill•.
"1514. NotiflCOtion to foreign credilora conc.rnint a COl. undO' this tirl•.
"SUBCHAPTER III RECOGNITfilit FORElGN PROCEEDING AND
"1515. Application for reCOlnition ofa foreign proceedint.
-1516. Prt,umptioru conctrni,., recognition.
"1517. Order recornitint a foreign proce.dint.
"1518. Sublfqwnt information.
"1519. Rel~f that may be ,ranl.d upon ~tition for reCOfnition of a forei,n proceed.
i",.
"1520. Effect, of recomition ofa foreign main proceedi",.
"1521. R.I~fthat may be /fNlnt.d upon reco,nition ofa foreitn proceedint.
"1522. Prot.ction ofcreditora and other inlere.t.d ~raonl.
"1523. Actio,.. to avoid oct, t:ktrimtntal to creditor,.
"1524. IntO'uention "" a foreitn representatilJt.
"~UBCHAn'ER ry""COOP"AI~'1II:lt;flll"ilN COURTS AND fOREIGN
"1525. Coo~ration and direct communication betwe.n the court and fortitn court.
or fOrtll" n:prruntotilJtI.
-1526. Cooperation and dlnet communication between the trusttt and (orr;'" court.
or foreign r£."rrltntatiufI.
"1527. Form, of coo~ration.
"~UBCHAPTERV-CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS
"1528. ComnvlK'tnvnt of c CCUt und,r thi. titlt after recognition of a forri,,. mai,.
proceedin(.
"1529. Coordi1l4tion of G ca. under thil title and a fortign procttding.
"1530. Coordination of more Ihan I foreim proceedi",.
"1531. Prtlumption ofin,ollJfncy band on recognition ofa fortign rnai,. proceeding.
"1532. Rule ofpayfMnt in concurrent proceeding',
"§1501. Purpose and scope o(application
"(a) The purpose of this of chapter is to incorporate the Model
Law on Cross·Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mecha·
nisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with the ob·
jectives of-
"(1) cooperation between-
"(AJ United States courts, United States Trustees,
trustees, examiners, debtors, and debtors in possession: and
"(B) the courts and other competent authorities of for-
eign countries involved in cross·border insolvency cases:
"(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment:
"(3) fair and efficient administration of cross·border insol-
vencies that protects the interests of all creditors, and other in-
terested entities, including the debtor:
"(4) protection and maximization of the value of the debt·
or's assets: and
"(5) facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled busi·
nesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving employ-
ment.
"(b) This chapter applies where-
"(1) assistance is sought in the United States by a foreign
court or a foreign representative in connection with a foreign
proceeding:
"(2) assistance is sought in a foreign country in connection
with a case under this title:
"(3) a foreign proceeding and a case under this title with
respect to the same debtor are taking place concurrently: or
"(4) creditors or other interested persons in a foreign coun·
try have an interest in requesting the commencement of; or par-
ticipaling in, a case or proceeding under this title.
"(c) This chapter does not apply to--
"(1) a proceeding concerning an entity identified by exclu-
sion in subsection 109(b):
"(2) an individual, or to an individual and such individ-
ual's spouse, who have debts within the limits specified in sec-
tion 109(e) and who are citizens of the United States or aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States:
or
"(3) an entity subject to a proceeding under the Securities
Investor Protection Act, a stockbroker subject to subchapter III
of chapter 7 of this title, or a commodity broker subject to sub·
chapter N ofchapter 7 of this title.
"SUBCHAPTER I-GENERAL PROVISIONS
"§1502. Definitions
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term-
"(1) 'debtor' means an entity that is the subject of a foreign
proceeding;
"(2) 'establishment' means any place of operations where
the d.btor carries out a nontransitory economic activity;
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-(3) 'foreign court' means a judicial or other authority com·
petent to control or supervise a foreign proceeding;
"(4) 'foreign main proceeding' means a foreign proceeding
taking place in the count/')' where the debtor has the center of
its main interests;
-(5) 'foreign nonmain proceeding' means a foreign proceed-
ing, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking place in a
count/')' where the debtor has an establishment;
-(6) 'trustee' includes a trustee, a debtor in possession in a
case under any chapter of this title, or a debtor under chapter
9 of this title; and
-(7) 'within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States'
when used with reference to property of a debtor refers to tan-
gible property located within the territo/')' of the United States
and intangible property deemed under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law to be located within that territo/')', including any
property subject to attachment or garnishment that may prop·
erly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal or State
court in the United States.
"11503. International obligation. of the United State.
"To the extent that this chapter conflicts with an obligation of
the United States arising out of any treaty or other form of agree·
ment to which it is a party with 1 or more other countries, the reo
quirements of the treaty or agreement prevail.
"11504. Commencement ofancillary ca.e
-A case under this chapter is commenced by the filing of a peti-
tion for recognition ofa foreign proceeding under section 1515.
"11505. Authornation to act in a foreign country
"A trustee or another entity, including an examiner, may be au-
thorized by the court to act in a foreign count/')' on behalf of an es·
tate created under section 541. An entity authorized to act under
this section may act in any way permitted by the applicable foreign
law.
"11506. Public policy e%Ception
-Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refu.ing to
take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be mani-
festly contra/')' to the public policy of the United States.
",1507. Additional as.i.tance
"(a) Subject to the specific limitations .tated elsewhere in this
chapter the court, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, to pro-
vide additional assistance to a foreign representative under this title
or under other laws of the United State•.
"(b) In determining whether to provide additional assistance
under this title or under other law. of the United States, the court
shall consider whether such additional assistance, consistent with
the principles ofcomity, will reasonably assure-
"(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or inter-
ests in the debtor's property;
-(2) protection ofclaim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in suchforeign proceeding;
"(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of the debtor;
"(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor's/roperty sub-
stantially in accordance with the order prescribe by this title;
and
"(5) if appropriate, the rrovision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individua that such foreign proceeding con-
cerns.
"11508. Interpretation
"In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its inter-
national origin, and the need to promote an application of this
chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes
adopted by foreign jurisdictions.
"SUBCHAnER 11 ACCESS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATTYES
AND CREDITORS TO THE COURT
"11509. Ritht ofdirect acce••
"(a) A foreign representative is entitled to commence a case
under section 1504 by filing a petition for recognition under section
1515, and upon recognition, to apply directly to other Federal and
State courts for appropriate relief in those courts.
"(b) Upon recognition, and subject to section 1510, a foreign
representative has the capacity to sue and be sued, and shall be sub·
ject to the laws of the United States ofgeneral ayplicability.
-(c) Subject to section 1510 of this title, a foreign representative
is subject to laws ofgeneral application.
"(d) Recognition under this chapter is prerequisite to the grant-
ing of comity or cooperation to a foreign representative in any State
or Federal court in the United States. Any request for comity or co-
operation by a foreign representative in any court shall be accom·
panied by a .worn statement setting forth whether recognition
under section 1515 has been sought and the status of any such peti·
tion.
"(e) Upon denial of recognition under this chapter, the court
may issue appropriate orders necessa/')' to prevent an attempt to ob·
tain comity or cooperation from courts in the United States without
such recognition.
",1510. Limitedlurl.diction
"The sole fact that a foreign representative files a petition under
section 1515 does not subject the foreign representative to the juris-
diction ofany court in the United States for any other purpose.
"1.1511. Commencement orca.e under .ection 301 or 303
"(a) Upon recognition, a foreign representative may commence-
"(1) an involunta/')' case under section 303; or
-(2) a volunta/')' case under section 301 or 302, if the for.
eign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding.
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"(b) The petition commencing a case under subsection (a) must
be accompanied by a statement describing the petition for recogni-
tion and its current status. The court where the petition for reco$ni-
tion has been filed must be advised of the foreign representative's
intent to commence a case under subsection (a) prior to such com-
mencement.
"61512, Pa~ciPX(ioA£' q foreign repre.entative in a ca.e
un er t .. tit e
"Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign represent-
ative in that proceeding is entitled to participate as a party In inter-
est in a case regarding the debtor under this title.
"11513. Acce.. offoreien creditor. to a ca.e under this title
"(a) Foreiln creditors have the same rights regarding the com·
mencement of; and participation in, a case under this title as do·
mestic creditor•.
"(b)(l) Subsection (a) does not change or codify present law as
to the priority of claims under section 507 or 726 of this title, except
that the claim of a foreign creditor under those sections shall not
be given a lower priority than that of general unsecured claims
without priority solely because the holder of such claim is a foreign
creditor.
"(2)(A) Subsection (a) and paragraph (1) do not change or cod·
ify present law as to the allowability of foreign revenue claims or
other foreign public law claims in a proceeding under this title.
"(B) Allowance and priority as to a foreign tax claim or other
foreign fublic law claim shall be governed by any applicable tax
treaty 0 the United States, under the conditions and circumstances
specified therein.
" 15 4. Noti cation to orei n creditors concernin a ca.e
un ert .. tit e
"(a) Whenever in a case under this title notice is to be given to
creditors generally or to any class or category of creditors, such no·
tice shall also be given to the known creditors generally, or to credi-
tors in the notified class or category, that do not have addresses in
the United States. The court may order that appropriate steps be
taken with a view to notifying any creditor whose address is not yet
known.
"(b) Such notification to creditors with foreign addresses de-
scribed in subsection (a) shall be given individually, unless the
court considers that, under the circumstances, some other form of
notification would be more appropriate. No letters rogatory or other
similar formality is reqUired.
"(c) When a notification of commencement of a case is to be
given to foreign creditors, the notification shall-
"(1) indicate the time J!eriod for filing proofs of claim and
specify the place for their flling; .
"(2) indicate whether secured creditors need to file their
proofs of claim; and
"(3) contain any other information required to be included
in such a notifICation to creditors pursuant to this title and the
orders of the court.
"(d) Any rule of procedure or order of the court as to notice or
the (lling of a claim shall provide such additional time to creditors
with foreign addresses as is reasonable under the circumstances.
"SUBCHAPTER Ul RECOGNITION Or! FOREIGN
.PROCEEDING AND RELiE
"§I515. Application for recopition ofa foreign proceedin,
"(a) A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition
of the loreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has
been appointed by filing a petition for recognition.
"(b) A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by-
"(1) a certified copy of the decision commencing the foreign
proceeding and appointing the foreign representative;
"(2) a certificate from the foreign court affirming the exist·
ence of the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of the for.
eign representative; or
"(3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs (1)
and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court of the exist·
ence of the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of the for.
eign representative.
"(c) A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied by a
statement identifying all foreign proceedings with respect to the
debtor that are known to the foreign representative.
"(d) The documents referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub·
section (b) must be translated into Enylish. The court may require
a translation into English ofadditiona documents.
"11516. Presumption. concerning recognition
"(a) If the decision or certificate referred to in section I515(b)
indicates that the foreign proceeding is a foreign proceeding as de·
fined in section 101 and that the person or body is a foreign rep-
resentative as defined in section 101, the court is entitled to so pre-
sume.
"(b) The court is entitled to presume that documents submitted
in support of the petition for recognition are authentic, whether or
not they have been legalized.
"(c) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor's reg·
istered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is
presumed to be the center of the debtor's main interests.
"11517. Order recogni:"n, a (oreign proceeding
"(a) Subject to section 1506, after notice and a hearing an order
recognizing a foreign proceeding shall be entered if-
"(1) the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding or
foreign nonmain proceeding within the meaning of section 1502;
"(2) the foreign representative applying for recognition is a
person or body as defined in section 101; and
"(3) the petition meets the requirements of section 1515.
"(b) The foreign proceeding shall be recognized-
"(1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is taking place in the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests; or
o
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"(2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has an
establishment within the meaning of section 1502 in the foreign
country where the proceeding is pending.
"(c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be
decided upon at the earliest possible time. Entry of an order rec·
ognizing a foreign proceeding shall constitute recognition under this
chapter.
"(d) The provisions of this subchapter do not prevent modifica·
tion or termination of recognition if it is shown that the grounds for
granting it were fully or partially lacking or have ceased to exist,
but in considering such action the court shall give due weight to
possible prejudice to parties that have relied upon the granting of
recognition. The case under this chapter may be closed in the man·
ner prescribed for a case under section 350.
"§1518. Subsequent information
"From the time of filing the petition for reco(nition of the for.
eign proceeding, the foreign representative shall file with the court
promptly a notice of change of status concerning-
"(I) any substantial change in the status of the foreign pro·
ceeding or the status of the foreign representative's appointment;
and .
"(2) any other foreign proceeding regarding the debtor that
becomes known to the foreign representative.
519. Relie that ma be nted u on etmon or reeo i·
t on a a rei n rocee In
"(a) From the time of filing a petition for recognition until the
petition is decided upon, the court may, at the request of the foreign
representative, where relief is urgently needed to protect the assets
of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, grant relief of a provi-
sional nature, including- .
"(1) staying execution against the debtor's assets;
"(2) entrusting the administration or realization of all or
part of the debtor's assets located in the United States to the
foreign representative or another person authorized by the court,
includinl an examiner, in order to protect and preserve the
value of assets that, by their nature or because of other cir·
cumstances, are perishable, susceptible to devaluation or other·
wise in jeopardy; and
"(3) any relief referred to in paragraph (3), (4), or (7) of sec·
tion 1521(a).
"(b) Unless extended under section 1521(a)(6), the reliefgranted
under this .ection terminates when the petition for recognition is de·
cided upon.
"(c) It is a ground for denial of relief under this section that
such relief would interfere with the administration of a foreign
main proceeding.
"(d) The court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act of a
governmental unit, including a criminal action or proceeding, under
this section.
"(e) The standards, procedures, and limitations applicable to an
injunction shall apply to relief under this section.
"§1520. Effect. ofrecopition ofa foreign main proceeding
"(a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign
main proceeding-
"(1) section 362 applies with respect to the debtor and that
property of the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States;
"(2) a transfer, an encumbrance, or any other disposition of
an interest of the debtor in property within the te"itorial juris-
diction of the United States is restrained as and to the extent
that is provided for property of an estate under sections 363,
549, and 552; and
"(3) unless the court orders otherwise, the foreign represent·
ative may operate the debtor's business and may exercise the
powers of a trustee under section 549, subject to sections 363
and 552.
"(b) The scope, and the modification or termination, of the stay
and restraints referred to in subsection (a) are subject to the excep-
tions and limitations provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of sec-
tion 362, subsections (b) and (c) of section 363, and sections 552,
555 through 557, 559, and 560.
"(c) Subsection (a) does not affect the right to commence indi-
vidual actions or praceedings in a foreign country to the extent nec-
essary to preserve a claim against the debtor.
"(d) Subsection (a) does not affect the right of a foreign rep-
resentative or an entity to file a petition commencing a case under
this title or the right of any party to file claims or take other proper
actions in such a case.
52 • Relie that ma be ranted u on reeo r·
elgn procee Ing
"(a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or
nonmain, where necessary to effectuate the purpose of this chapter
and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the credi-
tors, the court may, at the request of the foreign representative,
grant any appropriate relief, including-
"(1) staying the commencement or continuation of individ·
ual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor's
assets, rights, obligations or liabilities to the extent they have
not been stayed under section 1520(a);
"(2) staying execution against the debtor's assets to the ex·
tent it has not been stayed under section 1520(a);
"(3) suspending the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise
dispase of any assets of the debtor to the extent this right has
not been suspended under section 1520(a);
"(4) providing for the examination of witnesses, the taking
of evidence or the delivery of information concerning the debt-
or's assets, affairs, rights, obligations or liabilities;
"(5) entrusting the administration or realization of all or
part of the debtor's assets within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States to the foreign representative or another per-
son, including an examiner, authorized by the court;
"(6) extending reliefgranted under section 1519(a); and
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"(7) granting any additional relief that may be available to
a trustee, except for relief available under sections 522, 544,
545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a).
"(h) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or
nonmain, the court may, at the request of the foreign representative,
entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor's assets located
in the United States to the foreign representative or another person,
including an examiner, authorized by the court, provided that the
court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in the United States
are sufficiently protected.
"(c) In granting relief under this section to a representative of
a foreign nonmain proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the
relief relates to assets that, under the law of the United States,
should be administered in the foreign nonmain proceeding or con-
cerns information required in that proceeding.
"(d) The court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act of a
governmental unit, including a criminal action or proceeding, under
this section.
"(e) The standards, procedures, and limitations applicable to an
injunction shall apply to relief under paragraphs m, (2), (3), and
(6) ofsubsection (a).
"§1522. Protection of creditor. and other intere.ted per.on.
"(a) The court may grant relief under section 1519 or 1521, or
may modify or terminate relief under .ubsection (c), only if the in-
terests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the
debtor, are sufficiently protected.
"(h) The court may subject relief granted under section 1519 or
1521, or the operation of the debtor's business under section
1520(a)(2) of this title, to conditions it considers appropriate, in-
cluding the giving of.ecurity or the filing ofa bond.
"(c) The court may, at the request of the foreign representative
or an entity affected by relief granted under section 1519 or 1521,
or at its own motion, modify or terminate such relief.
"(d) Section H04(d) shall apply to the appointment ofan exam-
iner under this chapter. Any examiner shall comply with the quali-
fication requirements imposed on a trustee by section 322.
"§1523. Action. to avoid act. detrimental to creditor.
"(a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign rep'
resentative has standing in a case concerning the debtor pending
under another chapter of this title to initiate actions under sections
522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a).
"(h) When the foreign proceeding is a foreign nonmain proceed-
ing, the court must be satisfied that an action under subsection (a)
relates to assets that, under United States law, should be adminis-
tered in the foreign nonmain proceeding.
"§1524. Intervention by a foreign repre.entative
"Upon recognition ofa foreign proceeding, the foreign represent-
ative may intervene in any proceedings in a State or Federal court
in the United States in which the debtor is a party.
"§1525. j,
court an rei n court. or orei n-re--reunTcit1ve.
"(a) Consistent with section 1501, the court shall cooperate to
the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign rep-
resentatives, either directly or through the trustee.
"(h) The court is entitled to communicate directly with, or to re-
quest information or assistance directly from, (oreilln courts or for-
eign representatives, subject to the rights ofparties In interest to no-
tice and participation.
" 1526. Coo erotion and direct communication between the
tru.tee an orel n cou • or orel n re re.enta'
!!£!!
"(a) Consistent with section 1501, the trustee or other person,
including an examiner, authorized by the court, shall, subject to the
supervision of the court, cooperate to the maximum extent possible
with foreign courts or foreign representatives.
"(h) The trustee or other person, including an examiner, author-
ized by the court is entitled, subject to the supervision of the court,
to communicate directly with foreign courts or foreign representa-
tives.
"§1527. Form. ofcooperation
"Cooperation referred to in sections 1525 and 1526 may be im-
plemented by any appropriate means, including-
"(1) appointment of a person or body, including an exam-
iner, to act at the direction of the court;
"(2) communication of information by any means consid-
ered appropriate by the court;
"(3) coordination of the administration and'supervision of
the debtor's assets and affairs;
"(4) approval or implementation of agreements concerning
the coordination ofproceedings; and
"(5) coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the
same debtor.
"§ a· ca.e under this title a er rec.
o mllon 0 a rei n main TOCee Ing
"Mer recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a case under
another chapter of this title may be commenced only if the debtor
has assets in the United States. The effects of such case shall be re-
stricted to the assets of the debtor that are within the territorial ju-
risdiction of the United States and, to the extent necessary to imple-
ment cooperation and coordination under sections 1525, 1526, and
1527, to other assets of the debtor that are within the jurisdiction
of the court under sections 541(a) of this title, and 1334(e) of title
28. to the extent that such other assets are not subject to the juris-
diction and control ofa foreign proceeding that has been recognized
under this chapter.
o'"o
"f1529. Coordination of a ca.e under thi. title and a foreign
proceeding
"Where a foreign proceeding and a case under another chapter
of this title are taking place concurrently regarding the same debtor,
the court shall seek cooperation and coordination under sections
1525, 1526, and 1527, and the following shall apply:
"(1) When the case in the United States is taking place at
the time the petition for recognition of the foreign proceeding is
filed-
M(A) any relief granted under sections 1519 or 1521
must be consistent with the relief granted in the case in the
United States; and
"(B) even if the foreign proceeding is recognized as a
foreign main proceeding, section 1520 does not appl"
"(2) When a case in the United States under thiS title com-
mences after recognition, or after the filing of the petition for
recognition, of the forei,'n proceeding-
"(A) any relie in effect under sections 1519 or 1521
shall be reviewed y the court and shall be modified or ter-
minated if inconsistent with the case in the United States;
and
"(B) if the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceed-
ing, the stay and suspension referred to in section 1520(0.)
shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent with the re-
liefgranted in the case in the United States.
"(3) In grant1' ,extending, or modifying relief granted toa representative 0 a foreign nonmain proceeding, the courtmust be satisfied t at the relief relates to assets that, under the
law of the United States, should be administered in the foreign
nonmain proceeding or concerns information required in that
proceeding.
"(4) In achieving cooperation and coordination under sec-
tions 1528 and 1529, the court may grant any of the relief au-
thorized under section 305.
'" 1530. Coordination ofmore than 1 foreign proceeding
"In matters referred to in section 1501, with respect to more
than 1 foreign proceeding regarding the debtor, the court shall seek
cooperation and coordination under sections 1525, 1526, and 1527,
and the following shall apply:
"(1) Any relief granted under section 1519 or 1521 to a rep-
resentative of a foreign nonmain proceeding after recognition of
a foreign main proceeding must be consistent with the foreign
main I'roceeding.
M(2) If a foreign main proceeding is recognized after rec-
ognition, or after the filing ofa petition for recognition, ofa for-
eign nonmain l'roceeding, any relief in effect under section 1519
or 1521 shall be reviewed by the court and shall be modified
or terminated if inconsistent with the foreign main proceeding.
M(3) If, after recognition of a foreifn nonmain proceeding,
another foreign nonmain proceeding IS recognized, the court
shall grant, modify, or term{nate relief for the purpose of facili-
tating coordination of the proceedings.
tion of insolven
'orel,n maIn proceedjn
MIn the absence ofevidence to the contrary, recognition of a for-
eign main proceeding is for the purpose ofcommencing a proceeding
under section 303, proof that the debtor is generally not paying its
debts as such debts become due.
'" 1532. Rule ofpayment in concurrent proceedin,.
"Without prejudice to secured claims or rights in rem. a creditor
who has received payment with respect to its claim in a foreign pro-
ceeding pursuant to a law relating to insolvency may not receive a
payment for the same claim in a case under any other chapter of
this title regarding the debtor, so long as the payment to other credi-
tors of the same class is proportionately less than the payment the
creditor has already received. M.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters for title 11,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating
to chapter 13 the following:
M15. Ancllla,.,. and Other Cro••·Bonkr Cue , 150IM•
SEC. 992.~gt.m OTHER CHAPTERS IN TITLE II VNlTED
(a) AI'PUCABIUTY OF CHAPTERs.-Section 103 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended-
(l) in subsection (a), by inserting before the period the fol-
lowing: M, and this chapter, sections 307, 304. 555 through 557,
559, and 560 apply in a case under chapter 15"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
M(j) Chapter 15 applies only in a case under such chapter, ex-
cept that-
"(1) sections 1513 and 1514 apply in all cases under this
title; and
"(2) section 1505 applies to trustees and to any other entity
(including an examiner) authorized by the court under chapters
7, 11, and 12, to debtors in possession under chapters 11 and
12, and to debtors under chapter 9 who are authorized to act
under section 1505.M.
(b) DEFlNITloNs.-Paragraphs (23) and (24) of title 11, United
States Code, are amended to read as follows:
"(23) 'foreign proceeding' means a collective judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an in-
terim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in
which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject
to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of
reorganization or liquidation;
"(24) 'foreign representative' means a person or body, in-
cluding a person or body appointed on an interim baSis, au-
thorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganiza-
tion or the liquidation of the cUbtor's assets or affairs or to act
as a representative of the foreign proceeding;".
(c) AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE.-
(l) PROCEDURES'-Section 157(b)(2) of title 28, United
States Code, is amended-
(A) in subparagraph (N), by striking Mand" at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (0), by striking the period at the
end and inserting M; andM; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
M(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters
under chapter 15 of title 11.".
(2) BANKRUPTCY CASES AND PROCEEDINGs.-Section
1334(c)(l) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by strik-
ing "Nothing in" and inserting "Except with respect to a case
under chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in".
(3) DUTIES OF TRUSTEES.-Section 586(0.)(3) of title 28,
United States Code. is amended by inserting "15," after "chap-
ter".
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NOT SO FAST
On December 1, 1999, sixteen amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure became effective. See House Doc. 106-53.1 This paper highlights two sets
of changes.
Rule 7001 (7). Plan Injunctions.
For years, chapter 11 plans have included injunctions of various kinds.
Invariably, plan proponents have violated Rule 7001 (7) which requires an injunction to
be obtained by commencement of an adversary proceeding. Unlike Rule 7001 (8) which
allows subordination under a plan to be done without filing a complaint, before
December 1, 1999 Rule 7001 (7) contained no such exception. Arguably, injunctions
issues in violation of the Rule were void or voidable. Effective December 1, 1999, Rule
7001 (7) was amended to excuse compliance with adversary proceeding requirements
when an injunction is sought under a chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 plan. This amendment
automatically applies in all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after December 1, 1999
and "insofar as just and practicable" in all cases then pending.
Rule 7062. Automatic Stay of Orders.
For many years there has been confusion over the application of Rule 7062's
automatic stay to certain orders, including orders confirming plans. Effective December
1, 1999, Bankruptcy Rules 7062, 3020, 3021,4001, 6004, 6006, and 9014 were
amended to specify when orders are stayed automatically. These amendments apply in
all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after December 1, 1999 and "insofar as just and
practicable" in all cases then pending. Rule 9014 has been amended to delete the
reference to Rule 7062, so unless the court orders or the rules provide otherwise, in
contested matters the default option is that orders will not be stayed but will be effective
immediately on entry. Rule 7062 is amended so that it applies in adversary
proceedings without reference to the former exceptions for categories of contested
matters.
Specific exceptions have been adopted under Rules 4001, 6004, 6006, and
Rules 3020 and 3021. Prior to December 1, 1999, orders granting relief from the
1 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.88&filename=hd053.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/106 cong doc
uments.
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automatic stay were not stayed automatically. Rule 4001 now provides that unless the
court orders otherwise, an order granting relief from the stay under Rule 4001(a)(1) is
automatically stayed for 10 days after entry. This stay does not apply to orders granted
ex parte under Rule 4001 (a)(2). Nor does the stay affect the time within a notice of
appeal must be filed under Rule 8002. Because foreclosure can moot an appeal, the
new rule gives the estate a meaningful chance to request a stay pending appeal.
Rule 6004 has been amended to automatically stay for 10 days from entry,
unless the court orders otherwise, an order authorizing the use, sale, or lease of
property other than cash collateral. Prior to December 1, 1999, no order authorizing the
use, sale, or lease of any property of the estate was stayed automatically. Similarly,
under the amendment, an order authorizing the use of cash collateral is not stayed
automatically. Careful attorneys, however, will be sure to get separate orders
authorizing the use of cash collateral. If an order authorizing the use of cash collateral
is part of an order authorizing the use, sale, or lease of collateral other than cash
collateral, it is possible that the "plain meaning" of the Rule will stay the entire order.
Rule 6006 has been amended to automatically stay for 10 days from entry,
unless the court orders otherwise, an order authorizing a trustee to assign a lease under
§ 365(f). Prior to December 1, 1999, orders assuming or assigning executory contracts
or unexpired leases were not stayed. Now an assumption order remains unstayed, but
an assignment order will be stayed in order to give the non-debtor party to the contract
or lease an opportunity to request a stay pending appeal.
Prior to December 1, 1999, it was unclear whether orders confirming plans were
automatically stayed under Rule 7062. See In re Ewell, 958 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir.
1992) (questioning whether previous version of Rule 7062 applied to judicial sales).
Under the amendment to Rule 3020(e), effective December 1, 1999, an order
confirming a chapter 9 or chapter 11 plan is stayed automatically for 10 days from entry,
unless the court orders otherwise. This amendment will give parties opposing
confirmation the opportunity to seek a stay pending appeal. A corresponding
amendment to Rule 3021 provides that distribution under a confirmed plan may be
made after confirmation except as provided in Rule 3020(e). Presumably while the
order is stayed, distribution may not be made. To avoid controversy in cases
commenced before December 1, 1999, confirmation orders entered on or after
December 1, 1999 should specify whether it is just and practicable for the order
confirming plan to be stayed under the amended rule.
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National Bankruptcy Conference
Section by Section Analysis ofH.R. 833 as passed by the House of Representatives
[Last Revised May 26,1999)
TIJ1.E Ie
Sec. 101. Conversion.
This section permits a court to convert a case from chapter 7 to chapter 13 with the debtor's
consent, rather than requiring that the debtor~ conversion.
Sec. 102. Dismissal or conversion.
Courts must presume that a case is abusive if the debtor's income is sufficient to pay at least
$6,000 over 5 years after deducting the debtor's expenses, private school costs for a dependent
child ifless than S10,OOO per year, secured debts and priority debts. The debtor's expenses shall
be determined using the IRS collection standards (excluding payments for debts). The debtor
also may subtract an additional 5% of the IRS allowance for food and clothing if doing so is
"reasonable and necessary." In addition, the debtor may deduct estimated administrative
expenses and attorneys' fees. In determining whether to dismiss a case, the court "may not take
into consideration" whether the debtor has made or continues to make charitable contributions.
All chapter 7 debtors must file a statement of "current monthly net income"l along with
calculations to determine whether the case is presumptively abusive. The presumption ofabuse
may be rebutted only by showing extraordinary circumstances that require additional expenses or
adjustment of income that makes the debtor unable to pay $6,000 or more over 5 years. Each
item must be documented and accompanied by a detailed explanation to which the debtor attests
under oath.
I"Current monthly net income" includes income from all sources within the prior 180 days,
excluding reparations for war crimes and crimes against humanity and excluding benefits under
the Social Security Act, divided by six to obtain a monthly figure.
This means test establishes a safe harbor that precludes all parties from bringing ability to pay
motions against debtors with incomes equal to or less than the regional median household
income.2 There is another safe harbor against creditor actions providing that only the court,
United States trustee, or trustee may bring motions to dismiss or convert cases under section
707(b) if the debtor has income less than the highest nailimal median family income for a family
ofequal or lesser size, with upward adjustments for families with 4 members.3
Notwithstanding these safe harbors, chapter 7 trustees are required to review all materials filed
by every chapter 7 debtor and determine within 10 days after the section 341 meeting whether
the debtor's case should be presumed abusive. The trustee must bring a motion in a
presumptively abusive case if the debtor's income is not less than the highest national median
family income for a family ofequal or lesser size (with upward adjustment for families with
more than 4 members, and with the household income for one earner being used for an
individual with no family members).
When determining whether to dismiss or convert a case for abuse, courts also may consider
whether a case has been filed in bad faith and the totality ofcircumstances. A totality ofthe
circumstances analysis includes consideration ofwhether the debtor filed the case primarily to
reject a personal services contract.
This section charges the Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees to submit a
report on the utilization of the IRS expense standards, the impact ofthose standards, and
recommendations for amendments v/ithin 3 years after the date ofenactment.
If a trustee prevails on a section 707(b) motion and the debtor's attorney is found to have
violated Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure, the court shall assess damages
against the counsel for the debtor, which may include reimbursing the trustee for costs and
attorneys' fees. The signature ofan attorney on the bankruptcy petition shall constitute a
certificate that the attorney has performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that
gave rise to the petition and determined that the papers filed by the debtor are well grounded in
fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification ofexisting law
and do not constitute an abuse ofchapter 7.
The court may award a debtor reasonable costs if a creditor's section 707(b) motion was not
substantially justified or the creditor brought the motion solely for the purpose ofcoercing the
debtor to waive a right provided or guaranteed by the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, this provision adds another chapter 13 plan confinnation requirement: the debtor must
have acted in good faith when he filed a chapter 13 petition for relief.
2 For households with more than 4 individuals, there shall be an upward adjustment of$583 per
p,erson (this originally was a per month adjustment, but now appears to be a per year adjustment).
The creditor safe harbor provision refers to na1i.!uW median~ income. The total safe
harbor provision refers to~ median household income. In some instances, there will be a
gap between the two.
::r::
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Comments: This means test deprives courts ofsufficient discretion to identify debtors with
substantial repayment ability and is based on an unrealistic repayment schedule - 5 years -
when 3 yearplans already are highly susceptible to failure. It is inefficient to require that the
trustee certify every debtor's ability to pay, including those below the safe harbor income level.
The IRS collection allowances. which are not mandatory in the tax context. are not appropriate
as a template to determine whether debtors deserve chapter 7 bankruptcy relief The Hyde
amendment would have enabled a judge to determine necessary and reasonable expenses for a
debtor and the debtor's dependents to assess whether the debtor has the ability to pay. Adoption
ofthe IRS' inflexible and rigid standards will cause many honest families to lose the benefit ofa
fresh start under chapter 7.
Some ofthe problems with the IRS standards can be set out briefly. Because some ofthe
allowances are based on income as well as family size, the IRS expense standards give a higher
food allowance to a single high income person than to a low incomefamily of6. The means test
permits homeowners to deduct their entire mortgage payments regardless ofthe amount, in
addition to the portion ofthe IRS housing allowance that is not attributable to the mortgage
payment. However, the means test does not make clear how much ofthe IRS housing allowance
may be claimed by homeownersfor housing-related costs. In any event. this portion ofthe test
favors homeowners with high mortgage payments over homeowners with low mortgage
payments, and gives leastfavored status to families who rent their dwellings.
The transportation allowance affects similarly situated debtors differently as well. The test
disfavors people without any cars who rely on public transportation and creates perverse
incentives by benefitting high income debtors with one or more late-model cars. Each case will
need individualized scrutiny ofthe extent to which the debtor is permitted to deduct "other
necessary expenses"for child care, health care. dependent care ofelderly, taxes, union dues.
and similar expenses.
The required calculation ofcurrent monthly net income (a 6 month average) may overstate or
understate the amount ofincome actually available to pay creditors. For example. ifthe debtor
had an income of$5.000 per monthfor 3 months.followed by 3 months ofzero income, that
debtor will be presumed to have monthly income of$2,500 when in reality she has none. In
addition, including the income ofa nondebtor spouse may create a marriage penalty on debtors.
The problems with including nondebtor spouse income are heightened by the exclusion ofthe
expenses ofa separated spouse.
All attorneys representing parties in bankruptcy cases are already subject to Rule 9011 ofthe
Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure. Like Rule II ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.
Rule 901 I penalizes attorneys for sanctionable behavior. The bankruptcy system should hold
lawyers answerable to the standards applicable to all lawyers who practice in federal court.
Sec.t03. Notice ofalternatives.
nus section amends 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) so that an individual seeking bankruptcy relief must
obtain a written notice prescribed by the United States trustee before the commencement of a
case. This written notice must contain a brief description ofbanlauptcy optiOns (e.g., chapter 7
versus chapter 13) and credit counseling services approved by the United States trustee. Notice.
also must state that concealing assets or providing false information leads to criminal sanctions.
Comments: Increasing consumers' awareness ofalternatives to bankruptcy is desirable. In some
districts, however. such as the Central District ofCalifornia. a significant portion ofconsumer
debtors are pro sefilers. These pro sefilers may not lenow to comply with the requirements
imposed by this provision and section 302 ofthis bill (prebankruptcy counseling requirement).
Sec. 104. Debtor financial management training test program.
nus section instructs the Executive Office for United States Trustees to consult with a wide
range of individuals with expertise in the field ofdebtor education, develop a financial
management training curriculum and materials, and establish pilot programs in 6 judicial districts
for a one year period beginning not later than 270 days after enactment of this Act, during which
the curriculum and materials are available to individual debtors. During this one year period, the
Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees must evaluate the effectiveness ofthe
curriculum and materials as well as other preexisting consumer education programs. Not later
than three months after concluding the evaluation, the Director must submit a report to Congress.
Comments: To maximize the benefits ofa pilot program, it may take several years to assess
whether the program prevents peoplefrom repeating the mistakes that led them intofinancial
trouble and bankruptcy. In addition. because appropriations will be necessary to implement this
provision, section 104 should not become effective until the later ofOctober 1,2000 or one year
afier the date ofenactment ofthis bill.
Sec. 105. Definitions.
nus section introduces new terms into the bankruptcy lexicon such as "bankruptcy assistance,"
"assisted person," and "debt relief agency" for application to sections 106, lS4, and ISS of this
bill that impose requirements and restrictions on lawyers. bankruptcy petition preparers, and
other entities falling into the definition ofdebt relief agency.
Comments: These definitions seem to encompass a wide range ofparties, such as bookstores.
which may extend the application ofthe subsequent sections beyond their intended scope.
Sec. 106. Enforcement.
Under this section, a debt relief agency must disgorge fees or waive unpaid fees if it fails to
perform the promised services, misrepresents the benefits ofbanlcruptcy. or provides
inappropriate advice. nus section also authorizes civil penalties and injunctive relief.
Sec. 107. Sense oUbe congress.
nus provision states that "[i)t is the sense of the Congress that States should develop curricula
relating to the subject ofpersonal finance, designed for use in elementary and secondary
schools."
Sec. 108. Discouraging abush'e reaffirmation practices.
L .._ (~ ...~.. l .._. L~ .. l-_.._ t ..~... I." .4 l .. "" l.~... ,.. L L~~~ t,~_". l_,.~. l,~= 1-_, t_ L.~"c" L._. l~.~
'-, ...., -, --, .. --, --. --, '-' -, "
,.., J -, -, ---, J -, ~-,
~
-...J
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 524 to provide that a debtor is entitled to a hearing regarding
a reaffinnation of an unsecured debt, during which the court would decide whether "the
agreement is an undue hardship, not in the debtor's best interest, and not the result of a threat by
the creditor to take any action that cannot be legally taken or that is not intended to be taken."
However, this requirement is waivable by debtors represented by counsel. This provision does
not authorize hearings for reaffirmation of unsecured debts owed to credit unions or nominally
secured debts.
Comments: This provision does not substantially change current law, which has proven to be
inadequate in screening reaffirmations ofdebt that the debtor cannot afford and that impede the
debtor's ability to satisfy critical postbankruptcy obligations. This problem is heightened if
creditors are permitted to bring section 707(b) motions and rely on additional exceptions to
discharge, the threat ofwhich may be used as leverage to extract reaffirmation agreements. If
reaffirmations are not otherwise restricted. reaffirmation review should be mandato'}'for at
least all unsecured and nominally secured debts. It would be helpful to enhance disclosures of
the costs as well.
Sec. 109. Promotion of alternative dispute resolution.
This provision does not address alternative dispute resolution as that term is generally defined,
but rather attempts to induce parties to restructure debts outside of bankruptcy. It authorizes a
court to reduce an unsecured consumer debt claim by up to 20% if the debtor proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the creditor holding the claim refused to negotiate a reasonable
alternative repayment schedule offered by the debtor at least 60 days before the filing of the
petition if that repayment schedule would have resulted in the repayment of at least 60% of the
debt over a reasonable period. The court's authority to reduce claims on this basis does not
apply to nondischargeable debts. This provision also protects payments from avoidance as
preferential transfers if the payments were part of an alternative repayment plan created by an
approved credit counseling agency.
Comments: Funher study is necessary to determine whether this provision is necessa'}' or
desirable. As a technical matter, the appropriate burden ofprooffor bankruptcy proceedings
and contested matters is by a preponderance ofthe evidence, not clear and convincing evidence.
Grogan v. Gamer. 498 U.S. 279,11 I S. Ct. 654 (1991).
Sec. 110. Enhanced disclosure for credit extensions secured by a dwelling.
This provision authorizes the Federal Reserve to study whether consumers who obtain high loan
to value mortgages receive adequate information about the income tax deductibility of interest on
the unsecured portion of such loans, and whether additional disclosures are necessary.
Comments: This provision is less direct than section 207 ofH.R. 3150 as passed by the Senate
last year (now S. 945), which would have required that home equity loan solicitations and
applications notify potential borrowers that tax benefits ofhome equity lending are limited to the
ponion that is secured by the value ofthe collateral. Enhanced disclosure is critical to
educating consumers and decreasing the likelihood ofinsolvency and bankruptcy.
Sec. 111. Dual use debit card.
This provision authorizes a study ofexisting protections that limit consumers' liability for
unauthorized electronic fund transfers. Not later than 2 years after enactment of this bill, the
Federal Reserve must issue a report on its findings and issue regulations accordingly.
Comments: This amendment is less proactive than section 208 ofH.R. 3150 as passed by the
Senate last year, which would have amended the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to delineate the
circumstances in which consumers are liable for unauthorized electronicfimd transfers.
Sec. 112. Enhanced disclosures under an open-end credit plan.
This section amends the Truth in Lending Act to require disclosures, including several examples
ofhow long it would take to payoff a debt if the consumer makes only the minimum monthly
payment, the amount of the minimum payment expressed as a dollar amount and the date by
. which it must be paid, penalty rates, and "payment holidays." In addition, the amendment
makes clear that these disclosures apply to credit card solicitations and applications on the World
Wide Web. Creditors must provide a worksheet annually to help the borrower to determine his
household income and debt obligations. The Federal Reserve must study whether consumers
receive adequate information about borrowing, particularly in open end credit plans such as
credit cards, to submit a report to Congress within two years after the date ofenactment, and to
require additional disclosures if necessary.
Comments: The proposed generic disclosures may not be as useful to consumers as disclosures
based on a borrower's actual balance and terms.
Sec. 113. Protection of savings earmarked for the postsecondary education of children.
This provision exempts S50,OOO for one dependent child or S100,000 total in an education IRA.
Sec. 114. Effect of discharge.
Under this section, a creditor's willful failure to properly credit repayment plan distributions
violates the injunction automatically imposed by II U.S.C. § 524 when a debtor receives a
discharge. If an individual debtor is injured by the failure ofa creditor to comply with the
reaffirmation agreement requirements in sections 524(c) and (d) or a creditor's willful violation
of section 524(a)(2), the debtor may be entitled to recover costs, attorneys' fees, and damages.
However, an action to recover for violations of the discharge injunction "may not be brought as a
class action."
Comments: This provision appropriately imposes sanctions on panies that willfully violate the
discharge injunction and reaffirmation procedures. which has been a persistent problem under
current law. See. e.g., Night ofthe Living Debt; Discharged Bills Come Back - Often fl/egally --
to Haunt Bankruptcy Filers, THE WASHINGTON POSTp. HOI (September 13. 1998) (citing
postbankruptcy collection practices ofcertain retailers that have admitted to such conduct).
Regardless ofone's views on class action lawsuits as a general matter. it is not clear why this
specific type ofclass action is being singled out for differential treatment.
~
00
Sec. 115. Limiting trustee liability.
This provision imposes statutory limitations on case trustees' liability. A trustee may not be sued
unless he acted with gross negligence (defined as reckless indifference or deliberate disregard of
trustee's fiduciary duty), and the plaintiffmust get bankruptcy court pennission before suing the
trustee personally. A case trustee may not be sued in any capacity for acts taken in connection
with detennining a debtor's ineligibility or for disseminating statistics and information regarding
a case unless trustee has actual knowledge that the information is false.
Comments: This provision should clarify that it applies notwithstanding section 959(b) oftitle
28 so that its requirement to obtain leave ofcourt is not contradictory.
Sec. 116. Reinforce the fresh start.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(17), the exception to discharge for court costs. but
deletes a reference in earlier versions ofthis amendment clarifying that the exception to
discharge applies only to prisoners.
Comments: This exception to discharge was added to the Bankruptcy Code in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of1995. Pub. L. 104-/34. and the language should reflect its intended
scope ofapplication to prisoners.
Sec. 117. Discouraging bad faith repeat filings.
Under this provision. the automatic stay terminates 30 days after the filing of a petition for relief
under title 11 by an individual if the individual was a debtor in another case that was dismissed
within the previous year. A party in interest may seek an extension of the stay by showing that
the later case is in good faith. A case presumptively is not in good faith if the debtor filed more
than one previous case within the year, if a prior case was dismissed after the debtor did not file
the requisite documents without substantial excuse, if the debtor did not provide adequate
protection, if the debtor did not perform the terms ofa confirmed plan, or if the debtor's financial
condition and personal affairs have not changed substantially since the last case was dismissed.
In addition, a case presumptively is not in good faith as to a particular creditor if the creditor
sought relief from the automatic stay in the prior case and that action was pending upon
dismissal or had been resolved in the creditor's favor. A presumption that a case is not in good
faith is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. The automatic stay does not apply at all to
the case of an individual who has been a debtor in two or more dismissed cases within the
previous year. although a party in interest may request that a stay be imposed by showing that the
case is in good faith (with presumptions similar to those listed above).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports restrictions to deter abusive repeat
filings. subject to some minor technical revisions. The standardfor rebutting a presumption
should be by a preponderance ofthe evidence. as is generally the standard in bankruptcy
matters. not clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 118. Curbing abusive filings.
This section establishes standards for the application of in rem orders that make the automatic
stay inapplicable to an identified property interest in future cases. This order may be issued upon
a court finding that the filing of a bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors involving the transfer ofan interest in real property or multiple bankruptcy
filings affecting that property. An in rem order remains in effect for two years. although parties
may obtain relief from an in rem order for good cause or changed circumstances. In addition,
this provision makes the automatic stay inapplicable to any act to enforce a lien against property
ofa debtor who is ineligible for bankruptcy reliefpursuant to II U.S.C. § 109(g) or a prior court
order. A government agency that accepts notices of interests or liens in property must accept a
certified copy of in rem order.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. To resolve a slight
inconsistency. the reference in section 362(d)(4) should be changed so that the two-yearperiod
in that provision runs from the date ofthe entry ofthe order, not the recording. This can be
accomplished by striking "not later than 2 years after that recording" and inserting "not later
than 2 years after the entry ofthe order". The proposed automatic stay exception that permits
lien enforcement against the property ofindividuals ineligible for bankruptcy may lead to some
wrongful repossessions andforeclosures.
Sec. 119. Debtor retention of personal prope~'security.
This section prohibits the "ridethrough" of secured debt obligations in chapter 7. If a debtor does
not redeem or reaffirm a debt secured by personal property within 45 days after the first meeting
ofcreditors, the creditor may take any action against the property permitted under applicable
nonbankruptcy law unless the court determines on the motion ofa trustee within the 45 day
period that the property is of consequential value to the bankruptcy estate. This section also
clarifies that redemption requires payment in a single lump sum.
Comments: This provision makes a substantial change to the law andpractice in several circuits
while it codifies the law ofother circuits. Ifthis provision is retained. some minor refinements
would be helpful. For example, ifthe debtor is contesting the validity of or is seeking to avoid.
the security interest (similar to the proposed section 521(c) that creates an exceptionfor
voidable security interests). or if the debtor attacks a security interest as being invalid under
state law. the property should not be abandoned to the creditor. With respect to redemption. it is
appropriate to clarify that a debtor must provide a lump sum payment to the party holding a
security interest in that property.
Sec. 120. Relief from the automatic stay when the debtor does not complete intended
surrender of consumer debt collateral.
This section authorizes automatic stay relief without court permission if a debtor fails to file a
statement of intention or to follow through on the debtor's statement of intention (unless the
statement specifies reaffirmation and the creditor refuses to reaffirm on the original contract
terms). except if the court determines on the motion ofa trustee that the property is of
consequential value or benefit to the estate, in which case the court must order adequate
protection for the creditor and the debtor must deliver the property to the trustee.
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Comments: This provision should be revised to provide that a debtor's failure to file a statement
ofintention or to follow through on a statement ofintention triggers abandonment ofthe
property to the debtor, and the creditor may exercise its rights except to the extent that it seeks to
enforce ipsofacto clauses triggered by the bankruptcy or insolvency ofthe debtor. The trustee
mayface liabilityfor accounting and storing items delivered by the debtor. It may be preferable
to require delivery only at the request ofthe trustee.
Sec. 121. Giving secured creditors fair treatment in chapter 13.
According to this section, the holder of an allowed secured claim retains its lien until the debtor
pays the entire debt (including the unsecured ponion) or until receipt of a chapter 13 discharge.
Comments: Current law is divided on whether a lien is released when the allowed secured
claim has been paid offor when the repayment plan has been completed. See In re Johnson, 213
B.R. 552 (Bankr. N.D. nl. 1997) (collecting cases split on question oflien retention). This
provision may encourage some debtors to remain committed to their repayment plans. It may
also result in a higher rate ofrepossessions ofcollateral.
Sec. 122. Restraining abusive purchases 00 secured credit.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 506 so that debts panially secured by personal propeny
purchased by an individual debtor within 5 years before the filing ofa bankruptcy petition are
not bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims in chapter 7, II, 12, or 13. If the allowed claim
is secured only by the personal propeny so acquired, the value of the personal propeny and the
amount of the allowed secured claim "shall be the sum of the unpaid principal balance of the
purchase price and accrued and unpaid interest and charges at the contract rate," If the claim is
secured by other propeny as well, the value of the security shall be "not less than the unpaid
principal balance of the purchase price of the personal propeny and unpaid interest and charges
at the contract rate," If the individual is a debtor in a subsequent case \\ithin two years after the
date the original petition was filed, the value of the allowed secured claim will be calculated in
the same manner as in the prior case.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision that eliminates the
stripdown ofpartially secured debt and includes accrued interest and penalty charges. This
provision diverts value from general unsecured creditors in favor ofundersecured creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code should give creditors what they otherwise would receive under state law;
treating a creditor as fully secured when that creditor's interest is substantiall.v undersecured
deviates from this fundamental principle. /fthis provision is adopted notwithstanding these
concerns, the five year period should be reduced to 90 days and should exclude retail charge
card debts.
Sec. 123. Fair valuation of collateral.
Under section 123, the allowed secured claim for a debt secured by personal propeny is
determined by the collateral's replacement value, defined as the price a retail merchant would
charge for property of that kind, age, and condition, with no deductions for marketing or sales
costs.
Comments: In Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, _ U.S. -' 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997), the
Supreme Coun held that "replacement value" is the appropriate standard. However, the
Supreme Coun also made clear in footnote 6 that debtors - and consequently, unsecured
creditors - should not pay for attributes that they did not receive and that did not have to be
expended by the creditor, such as the costs ofmarketing and reconditioning. Failing to deduct
for those costs is inconsistent with the goal of maximizing returns to unsecured creditors. Most
propeny acquired for personal family or household purposes do not have an easily detetmined
replacement value as defined in this provision because retail merchants dealing in new goods
rarely sell used goods as well. Second-hand stores carry a restricted range of items that may not
be comparable to the item ofpropeny to be valued. IfCongress chooses to legislate in this area,
Congress might consider providing that the fair valuation ofcollateral in bankruptcy is the value
ofthe propeny in the hands of a creditor following foreclosure, which reflects what the creditor
realistically would receive under state law.
Sec. 124. Domiciliary requirements for exemptioos.
Under this section, to be subject to the exemption laws of a state, a debtor must be domiciled in a
state for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. If the debtor
did not live in any state for 730 days, the debtor must use the exemptions of the state in which he
resided during the 180 days, or the majority of the 180 days, before the 730 day period.
Comments: This amendment no longer leaves people without exemptions ifthey have lived in a
statefor less than 730 days, but does nothing to limit the ability ofa debtor who has lived in a
statefor 730 days or morefrom taking advantage of unlimited exemptions, commonly identified
as the largest single abuse ofthe bankruptcy system under current law.
Sec. 125. Restrictions 00 certain exempt property obtained through fraud.
This section provides that the exemption of a debtor's equity in a homestead shall be reduced to
the extent such value is attributable to any ponion ofpropeny that the debtor "disposed of'
within 730 days before the bankruptcy petition date with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a
creditor.
Comments: This provision does not make a meaningful addition to the current bankruptcy laws.
Current law already authorizes the avoidance oftransfers, or the denial ofa discharge
altogether, when debtors transfer property with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
within one year before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition. 1J U.S.c. §§ 548(a)(I), 727(a)(2).
Trustees also may recover constructivefraudulent transfers within one year beforefilingfor
bankruptcy. Id. § 548(a)(2). In addition, using applicable state law, trustees may recover actual
or constructive fraudulent conveyances transfers made within 2, 4, or in some states even 6years
before the bankruptcyfiling. Id. § 544(b). This provision fails to close the loophole in current
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bankruptcy law: fraudulent transfer laws do not protect creditors in the cases ofindividuals who
amass considerable wealth in exemptproperty but do not make any transfers. To prevent
debtors from discharging their debts while retaining property ofhigh value. a cap should be
imposed on all homestead exemptions.
Sec. 126. Rolling stock equipment.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. §§ 1168 and 1110 to provide even greater protections to creditors
secured by rolling stock equipment and aircraft and lessors of the same. These amendments
require that a trustee or debtor-in-possession perform all obligations and cure all defaults in
accordance with the terms of such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, and
required that a trustee surrender property if the vendor or lessor makes a written demand and
otherwise would be entitled to take possession.
Comments: The amendment to section I I 10 ofthe Bankruptcy Code legislatively overrules
Western Pacific Airlines. Inc. v. Gatt Capital. 221 B.R. I (D. Colo. 1998). These amendments
expand. but do not dramatically change. the protection for aircraft and rolling stock lessors and
secured creditors that the Bankruptcy Code already prOVides. The National Bankruptcy
Conference generally opposes special interest prOVisions that prOVide preferential treatment for
a panicular ope ofcreditor to the detriment ofother creditors. andfor this reason has
recommended in the past that these provisions be deleted.
Sec. 127. Discharge under chapter 13.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1328 so that a debtor who completes a 3 to 5 year chapter 13
plan may not discharge debts that are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (3)(B),
(a)(4), and (a)(6) (if resulting from a willful and malicious injury by the debtor that caused
personal injury or death).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision to the extent that it
excludes from the superdischarge debts falling under section 523(a)(6} that result from a Willful
and malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury or death. However. ifthe scope of
the discharge in chapter 7and chapter 13 are relatively coextensive by exceptingfrom discharge
credit card debts and cash advances under section 523(a)(2} • the incentive to file chapter 13 is
reduced. Those debts should not be exceptedfrom discharge in chapter 13.
Increased nondischargeability in chapter 13 intensifies the need to address another issue:
separate classification ofnondischargeable claimsfor purposes ofa repayment plan. Courts are
divided on whether chapter 13 debtors may separately classify nondischargeable debts and
commit a higher amount ofdisposable income to those debts. Cf Groves v. LaBarge. 39 F.3d
212 (8th Cir. 1994) (fact that a debt is nondischargeable is insufficient to warrant separate
classification under section 1322(b)(I)} with In re Tucker. 159 B.R. 325 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993)
(permitting separate classification ofnondischargeable debts). Ifa chapter 13 debtor is not
permitted to commit concentrated ponions ofincome to debts that will survive the repayment
plan. a debtor who completes a repayment plan may be faced not only with the residual debt. but
with substantial accrued interest as well. Thus. a restriction on nondischargeability should be
accompanied with a provision permitting separate classification ofnondischargeable debts or a
provision imposing a moratorium on interest accrualfor the duration ofa repayment plan.
Sec. 128. Bankruptcy judgeships.
This provision authorizes temporary judgeships and requires disclosure ofjudges' travel
expenses.
See. 129. Additional amendments to title 11, United States Code.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) to explicitly except from discharge debts resulting
from drunk boating and amends 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) to give priority status to allowed claims for
death and personal injuries resulting from drunk boating or drunk driving.
Comments: All priority debts must be repaid in full in the course ofa chapter 13 plan. Hence.
granting priority status to this or any other type ofdebt decreases the likelihood that chapter 13
debtors with a debt ofthis kind will be able to confirm a plan and repay any debts in chapter 13.
The amendment to section 523(a)(9} duplicates an amendment made in section I I I2 ofthis bill.
Sec. 130. Amendment to section 1325 of title 11, United States Code.
Under this section, the disposable income available for distribution to unsecured creditors in a
chapter 13 plan must be calculated under the new means test as set forth in section 102 ofthis
bill. The amendment also provides for an explicit deduction of foster care, disability, and
support payments for a dependent child.
Comments: Using the IRS expense standards and the means test-calculation generally will be
troublesome in chapter 13 and likely yield a lower success rate. In addition. the means test is
based on a 5-year payment schedule. which willfurther exacerbate the failure rate. This
provision is inconsistent with section 606 ofthe bill. which requires 5-year plans onlyfor debtors
with income above the national median. Additional problems produced by the means test may be
found in the discussion ofsection 102 ofthis bill.
13.
Sec. 131. Application of the codebtor stay only when the stay protects the debtor.
This section provides that the stay protecting codebtors in chapter 13 cases terminates 30 days
after the date of the order for relief if a debtor did not receive the consideration for the claim "to
the extent that the creditor proceeds against the individual that received that consideration or
property not in possession of the debtor that secures that claim." The codebtor stay also is lifted
postconfirmation when a debtor's plan provides for surrender or abandonment of the debtor's
interest in personal property subject to a lease. These new rules are inapplicable when the debtor
is primarily obligated to pay the creditor under a legally binding divorce decree or separation
agreement.
Sec. 132. Adequate protection for investors.
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This section adds another exception to the automatic stay permitting a securities self regulatory
organization to commence or continue an investigation or action, other than for monetary
sanctions, without first seeking court approval.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes provisions that prefer a
panicular type ofcreditor over other creditors. The expansion ofexceptions to the automatic
stayfor regulatory actions through this bill and section 603 ofthe Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Appropriations Act. 1999. Pub. L. No. 105-277 (striking 1I U.s.c. § 362(b){4) and
(b)(.5) and replacing them with a new provision), heightens the importance ofimposing explicit
limitations to narrowly define the police and regulatory power statutorily to exclude actions
taken for purely pecuniarypurposes. making thefollOWing amendment necessary:
Section 362 oftitle 11. United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thefollowing-
(i) In this section. "police and regulatory power" excludes any act. action. or
proceeding that affects property oforfrom the estate to secure or satisfy. in whole or in pan. a
debt.
Sec. 133. Limitation on luxu'1' goods.
This section amends 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(C) to presumptively except from discharge any debts
of5250 or more owed to a single creditor for cash advances or luxW)' goods or services within
90 days before the bankruptcy filing. This provision expands current section 523(a)(2)(C) in two
ways. It extends the presumptive time period from 60 to 90 days and it permits a \\ider range of
debts to be presumed nondischargeable by lowering the threshold from S1,000 to $250.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes proVisions that prefer one
type ofcreditor over others. This provision limits chapter 7debt relieffor debtors ofall income
levels and expands nondischargeabilit)'for the benefit ofcredit card lenders. Three months
worth ofcash advances taken in reasonable amounts for necessities easi~v can exceed S25 O. If
Congress decides to amend section 523(a)(2)(C) to substantial~v reduce the dollar threshold (the
current threshold is 51.075) triggering a presumption ofnondischargeabilityfor credit card
debts. the presumptive period should be shortened to 30 days and should exclude cash ad\'Qnces.
Sec. 134. Allowing a debtor to retain leased personal prope~' by assumption.
Under this section, leased personal property is not property of the estate and is not protected by
the automatic stay once a lease is rejected or not timely assumed by the trustee. This section also
offers a procedure by which debtors can assume leases themselves. In individual chapter II and
chapter 13 cases, the lease is deemed rejected at the conclusion of the confirmation hearing, with
similar consequences.
Comments: Leases rejected or not timely assumed should be abandoned to the debtors. and
debtors should be prOVided with an opportunity to cure defaults.
Sec. 135, Adequate protection oflessors and purchase money secured creditors,
Under this section, a chapter 13 debtor must make cash payments at the contract rate to lessors
and creditors with debts secured by personal property until the creditors start to receive plan
payments. The section also authorizes a lessor or creditor to retain any property rightfully
obtained prior to the bankruptcy filing until adequate protection payments are commenced,
notwithstanding otherwise applicable turnover requirements.
Comments: The Bankruptcy Code already authorizes adequateprotection against the declining
value ofcollateral. Ifmore is necessary to insure payment ofsecured creditors pending
confirmation ofa plan. the adequate protection provision ofS. 625 should be considered. That
amendment provides that courts may instruct tru.stees to distribute payments to fully secured
creditors and lessors prior to confirmation and that those payments are credited against the
principal debt.
Sec. 136. Automatic stay.
This section creates new exceptions to the automatic stay that expand the ability ofresidential
landlords to take action against debtors without first seeking leave from the court. Landlords
may continue eviction or unlawful detainer actions if the lease terminated prepetition, if the
debtor does not paid rent after the commencement of the case, if the debtor filed a previous case
within the last year and failed to pay postpetition rent during the course of that case, if the
eviction action is based on "endangerment to property or person or the use of illegal drugs."
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes exceptions to the automatic
stay that prefer one type ofcreditor to others. This provision gives wide latitude for landlords to
evict individualsfilingfor bankruptcy even ifthe debtor is making rent payments postpetition. If
a provision to protect landlords is thought to be necessary. this provision should be replaced
with a provision authorizing landlords to receive expedited relieffrom the automatic stay. The
follOWing provision is an example: Section 362 oftitle 1I, United States Code is amended by
adding at the end thereof- 0) Ifa lessor ofresidential real property makes a requestfor relief
under subsection (d) ofthis section and the debtor has not paid rent that first became due after
the commencement ofthe case. the stayprovided by subsection (a)(3) ofthis section is
terminated with respect to the lessor 20 days after request is filed. unless the debtorfiles and
serves upon such lessor a wrillen objection to the request.
Sec. 137. Extend period between bankruptcy discharges.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) to prevent a chapter 7 debtor from receiving a
discharge ifhe received a discharge in a prior case under chapter 7 or II commenced within
eight years before the filing of the petition in the instant case. If a chapter 13 debtor previously
received a discharge under any chapter within the prior five years before the instant case
commenced, he cannot receive a discharge even ifhe completes a new repayment plan.
Comments: This provision imposes a longer bar on the receipt ofa discharge after a successful
chapter 13 repayment plan than after the discharge in chapter 7.
Sec. 138. Definition of domestic support obligation,
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This provision adds a definition of "domestic support obligation" to II U.S.C. § 101, the general
definition section of the Banlauptcy Code. The new definition includes any debt, whether
accrued before or after the banlauptcy filing if: the debt is owed or recoverable to a spouse,
exspouse, child, legal guardian, or a governmental unit; the debt is in the nature ofalimony,
maintenance, or support, regardless of its designation, established or subject to establishment by
reason of a separation agreement, divorce decree, property settlement agreement, court order, or
determination made by a governmental unit; and the debt has not been assigned to a
nongovernmental unit, other than a debt collector. This definition is relevant to subsequent
provisions that give certain rights to the holders ofdomestic support obligations and impose
additional requirements on debtors who owe these obligations.
Sec. 139. Priorities for claims for domestic support obligations.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 507(a), the provision that detennines priorities in distribution
among expenses and debts. The amendment moves domestic support obligations from "seventh
priority" to "first priority." Because the definition of domestic support obligation now includes
debts owed to the government, those government debts are entitled to "first priority" as well.
However, the amendment specifies that any first priority distribution should first be applied to
satisfy the claims of support recipients and then to government units.
Comments: Right now, the expenses ofadministering the bankruptcy estate are entitled to "first
priority. " See 11 U.s.c. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b). The Bankruptcy Code gives first priority to
administrative expenses to enable the trustee to incur the expenses necessary to liquidate
property and make distributions to creditors, including support recipients. Ifa debtor has
Significant support obligations. and support is "first priority. " the trustee will not be able to
liquidate and distribute property. Instead, the trustee may have to "abandon"propert)~give it
back to the debtor- rather than distributing the proceeds to support recipients. Thus, while it
may be legally correct to say that this bill puts child support "first" under section 507 ofthe
BanJ.:Tuptcy Code, that statement is somewhat misleading. Apartfrom the issue related to
subordination ofadministrative expenses movingfrom "seventh priOrity" to "first priority"
makes little practical difference: the debts that have second through sixth priorities almost never
appear in consumer cases. Those priorities deal with debts ofgrain storagefaciliT)' operators.
debts offishermen, employee wage claims, retail layaway claims, and the like. Taking all factors
into consideration, this amendment would have an effect infewer than 1% ofall chapter 7 cases.
Sec. 140. Requirements to obtain confirmation and discharge in cases involving domestic
support obligations.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a) and 1325(a), provisions that set forth the requirements
for confirmation ofplans of reorganization in cases under chapter II and chapter 13. Under this
amendment, the debtor cannot confirm a plan of reorganization unless the debtor has paid all
domestic support obligations that "become payable" after the banlauptcy petition is filed. In
addition, this section amends II U.S.C. § 1328(a), the provision that determines whether a
chapter 13 debtor may discharge his debts. Under this amendment, the debtor cannot obtain a
discharge after completing payments under a chapter 13 plan unless he certifies that all domestic
support obligations have been paid.
Comments: Requiring that the debtor pay allpast due support owed to the fWvemment as a
condition ofdischarge may heighten collection difficulties for a former spouse and children who
are trying to collect continued support because the debtor will not have discharged his other
debts. Language in this amendment regarding confirmation may be construed in certain
instances to require that a debtor pay all past due support debts before confirmation ofa plan;
doing so may be infeaSible. The amendment should refer to support obligations that "first
became due" posrpetition.
Sec. 141. Exceptions to automatic stay in domestic support obligation proceedings.
This section adds additional exceptions to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C, § 362(b). According
to these amendments, the automatic stay does not enjoin actions to impose or enforce wage
orders for domestic support obligations, the interception of tax refunds, the enforcement of
medical obligations, or actions to withhold, suspend, or restrict licenses ofthe debtor for
delinquency in support obligations.
Sec. 142. Nondiscbargeability of certain debts for alimony, maintenance, and support.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) to except from discharge all domestic support
obligations. This section also makes a substantial change to II U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). This
provision currently permits a court to find that a property settlement (that is not in the nature of
support) is excepted from discharge~ the court fmds (1) that the debtor does not have the
ability to pay the obligation or (2) that discharging the debt would result in a benefit to the debtor
that outweighs the detrimental consequences to the ex-spouse or children. The amendment
eliminates these two conditions so that all property settlements will be nondischargeable.
Comments: There will be times when this change to the treatment ofpropert)· settlements will
work hardship on spouses and children collecting support. A custodialparent and child mayfile
for bankruptcy after they have difficulty collecting payments from an ex-spouse and thus cannot
meet their day to day obligations. As a result ofthis amendment. somefinancially troubled
spouses and children who file for bankruptcy because they have not been receiving their support
payments will be unable to discharge debts they may owe to their wealthier spouses as a result of
a properT)' settlement. In addition, some ex-spouses do not receive support because they are
financially independent or have remarried andjoinedfinancial stable households. Another
scenario that reveals the odd effects ofthis amendment is when a debtor has been married and
divorced twice. The first former spouse may need child support from the debtor. The second
former spouse may be wealthy and remarried and does not receive support from the debtor but
has a propeny settlement with the debtor. lfthis amendment becomes law, the support
obligation to the first spouse and the propeny settlement to the second spouse would both be
nondischargeable and have the same status after bankruptcy; ifthe debtor lacks suffiCient funds
to pay both, the support recipient, who has fewer resources to seek collection, may suffer.
1._ , I ~ .. L.~ t, .. 1 I ....,." I'~'-$ 1" 1 I*=-, t.~ L, t.". -, l_~. l-~.,_. l_ . l ,.~.
1 ---. -, <-, -., -, -, -, ~,
.,
-, -, -, --, -, ", -, -, -,
::I:
I
.....
w
Sec. 143. Continued liabilit}· of property.
This amendment pennits nondischargeable domestic support obligations to be collected from
property - even property that state law makes exempt from collection or attachment -- after
bankruptcy.
Comments: This provision overrides wage exemptions. property exemptions. and state laws
protecting tenancies by the entireties. It is unclear whether this provision actually will benefit
families or whether it instead wilJ benefit govemment agencies. particularly because overriding
homestead exemptions may have the effect ofremoving families from their homes.
Sec. 144. Protection of domestic support claims against preferential transfer motions.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 547, the provision that allows avoidance, and ultimately
recovery, ofpre-bankruptcy transfers that were "preferential." The amendment prevents a
trustee from seeking recovery ofa prepetition "domestic support obligation."
Comments: With respect to actual support recipients. this amendment does not substantially
change current law. A 1994 amendment protects ex-spouses and children from having to give
back ''preferential'' support payments. See 11 U.s.c. § 547(c){7). The amendment changes
current law by insulating preferential payments made to govemmental units. Insulating those
payments to the govemment may. in some cases. hurt an ex-spouse and child ofthe debtor
because those funds otherwise would be available for ongoing support payments and instead
have been applied to old support debts preferentially paid to the govemment.
Sec. 145. Clarification of meaning of household goods.
This amendment adds a definition of household goods to II U.S.C. § 101 and states that
household goods includes "tangible personal property normally found in or around a residence,
but does not include motorized vehicles used for transportation pwposes."
Comments: This amendment codifies the prevailing case law. See. e.g., In re McGreevy. 955
F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1992) (defining household goods as items ofpersonal property Opicallyfound
in or around home and used by debtor or his dependents to support andfaCilitate day-to-day
liVing within home. including maintenance and upkeep ofhome).
Sec. 146. Nondischargeable debts.
This section adds an exception to discharge when the "debtor incurred the debt to pay such a
nondischargeable debt \\ith the intent to discharge in bankruptcy the newly-created debt." It
makes nondischargeable all debts incurred to pay nondischargeable debts within 90 days
regardless of the debtor's intent.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this expansion ofthe exceptions to
discharge. For a credit card debt to be nondischargeable. a creditor should be required to
prove each element offraud by the preponderance ofthe evidence. As a technical mauer, the
reference in the amendment to section 727 should be deleted. Section 727 deals with objections
to a chapter 7 debtor receiving a discharge ofdebts overall, not the nondischargeability ofa
particular debt.
Sec. 147. Monetary limitation on exempt property.
This section imposes a $250,000 cap on larger or unlimited homestead exemptions provided by
state law, but pennits states to opt out from the cap, which renders the cap useless.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the imposition ofa cap on otherwise
unlimited exemptions. Experience with the opt-out provision in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, however, has shown that the cap wilJ not serve its purpose ifan opt-out opportunity is
prOVided. We can be confident that states with generous or unlimited exemptions wilJ opt out of
the cap. If Congress believes it is appropriate to permit unlimited exemptiOns. it should
consider providing a modest federal floor on exemptions.
Sec. 148. Bankruptcy fees.
This section authorizes courts to waive bankruptcy filing fees for indigent chapter 7 debtors.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this amendment. The Judicial
Conference pilot program demonstrated that fee waivers enabled the most needy individuals to
obtain debt relief
Sec. 149. Collection of child support.
lbis section imposes duties on trustees in chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases to assist support
recipient creditors of the debtors in detennining how they can enforce their rights.
Comments: This provision parallels additional domestic support obligation provisions that were
added to S. 625. Authorizing support recipients to request information regarding the debtor's
location from a creditor should be coupled with a requirement that the creditor produce that
infonnation.
Sec. 150. Excluding employee benefit plan participant contributions and other propert)·
from the estate.
This provision excludes from the property of a business debtor's estate amounts intended to be
forwarded to employee benefit plans under ERISA.
Comments: This provision appears to duplicate protections already prOVided under ERISA.
Sec. 151. Clarification ofpostpetition wages and benefits.
This provision clarifies that postpetition wages and payments for services, including employee
benefits, are explicitly included among the actual and necessary costs ofpreserving the estate
that are entitled to administrative expense priority. It also includes wages and benefits
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attributable to a debtor's violation ofthe law, regardless ofwhen the original unlawful act
occurred or whether any services were rendered.
Sec. 152. Exceptions to automatic stay in domestic support obligation proceedings.
Under this provision, the automatic stay exception for withholding income applies ifit is for
payment of a domestic support obligation owed directly to the spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor unless the court finds that such withholding would render a repayment plan infeasible.
Sec. 153. Automatic stay inapplicable to certain proceedings against the debtor.
nus provision creates an automatic stay exception for actions relating to child custody, domestic
violence, or dissolution of marriage.
Sec. 154. Disclosures.
nus provision was removed by the Judiciary Committee and reinserted on the House floor. It
requires that panies offering ban1auptcy assistance provide certain notices and disclosures to
debtors, including statements delineating the responsibilities undenaken by debt relief agencies
in the ban1auptcy process. The disclosures must notify the debtor that anyone providing
bankruptcy assistance must provide information regarding the valuation ofassets at replacement
value, the determination ofmonthly income, and the determination of exempt propeny.
Comments: Misinfonnation andfalse advertising aboUl bankruptcy should be discouraged. This
provision. however. in some respects is overbroad it appears to instruct nonattorney petition
preparers to give legal advice. A more targeted approach is section 221 ofS. 625. which
imposes meaningful restrictions to prevent petition preparers from engaging in the unauthori=ed
practice oflaw.
Sec. 155. Debtor's bill of rights.
nus section imposes additional requirements on panies providing bankruptcy assistance and
prohibits a debt relief agency from making a untrue or misleading statement that the agency
should have Imown was untrue or misleading.
Comments: Again. section 221 ofS. 625 prOVides a more targeted and effective solution to the
problem ofmisrepresentation regarding bankruptcy.
TITLE II.
Sec. 201. Reenactment of chapter 12.
nus section reenacts chapter 12.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference has submitted a statementjointly with the
Commercial Law League ofAmerica and the American College ofBankruptcy that endorses
freestanding bills that make chapter 12 pennanent. Ensuring the continuation ofthe famil,l'
fanner reorganization chapter ofthe Bankruptcy Code should not be tied to bankruptcy reform
generally.
Sec. 202. Meetings of creditors and equity security bolders.
Under this section, the coun is authorized to waive the requirement ofa section 341 meeting of
creditors after notice and a hearing if the debtor files a prepackaged plan ofreorganization.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this prOvision. which will enhance
the efficiency ofprepackagedplans ofreorganization. However. the Conference recommends
that the proposed section 341(e) reads in accordance with the following amendment: Section 341
oftitle 11. United States Code. is amended by adding at the end the following- "(e)
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) in a case under chapter 9 or 11 ofthis title in which a
plan has been filedfor which. before the meeting ofcreditors or equity security holders under
this section. a hearing on conjinnation has been scheduled. on the request ofa party in interest
and after notice and a hearing. the coun may order that the United States trustee postpone the
meeting pending the hearing on confinnation. and. ifthe plan is confinned. order that the
meeting not be held. "
Sec. 203. Protection of retirement savings in bankruptcy.
nus provision amends II U.S.C. § 522 to exempt qualified retirement funds that are exempt
from taxation under various provisions ofthe Internal Revenue Code. nus provision makes the
automatic stay inapplicable to wage deductions for pensions, profit sharing or other such plans to
the extent that those amounts are used solely for payments relating to a loan from an ERISA
qualified plan, except for debts incurred within I year prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. In
addition, loans borrowed from retirement plans are excepted from discharge under section
523(a), except for loans made within I year prior to filing the ban1auptcy petition. Finally,
section 1322 is amended to provide that a chapter 13 plan may not "materially alter" the terms of
a loans from retirement funds.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. It would be helpful to
add the following language to the end ofthe section 1325 amendment: "For purposes ofthe plan
only, any such loan shall be treated as a nonrecourse loan secured by the assets ofthe
applicable pension. profitsharing. stock bonus. or otherplan. No plan established under sections
401.403, 408(A). 414. 457. or 501(c) ofthe Internal Revenue Code of1986 or pennitted under
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act may be disqualified as a result ofthe repayment
ofany loan to such plan made in accordance with a confinned plan under this chapter. ".
Sec. 204. Protection of refinance of securit)· interest.
nus provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) so that a transfer is deemed to be made at the time
such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee if the transferee perfects its
interest within 30 days, rather than 10 days.
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Comments: This extension ofthe relation-backperiod may harm the interests ofand trap
creditors who extend credit in reliance on the lack ofa perfected security interest in specified
collateral.
Sec. 205. Encutory contracts and unexpired leases.
Notwithstanding the title of this provision, this amendment addresses only unexpired leases of
nomesidential real property, not executory contracts or other types ofleases. Section 205
amends 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) so that a debtor in possession or trustee must assume or reject a
nomesidential real property lease within 120 days after the order for relief. On the request of the
trustee/debtor in possession or lessor for cause, the court may extend the period for another 120
days. Thereafter, the court may not grant extensions unless the lessor consents. Section 217 of
the bill addresses damage claim that may result when a lease is timely assumed under this
provision but later events lead to rejection.
Comments: This provision will preclude the reorganization ofsome businesses. particularly
seasonal businesses. and will force some debtors in possession to make premature decisions
regarding their leases. to the potential detriment ofother creditors ifthe business ultimately is
liquidated. See In re Klein Sleep Prods., 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996) (obligations under assumed
lease are entitled to administrative expense priority iflease is later rejected). Ideal/y. section
205 instead should read as follows: Section 365(d)(4) oftitle 11. United States Code. is amended
by adding at the end the follOWing - "The court may extend the period during which the trustee
or plan proponent must elect to assume or reject a lease ofnonresidential real property until no
later than the date ofentry ofthe order confirming the plan. but such assumption or rejection
shall occur on or before the earlier of- (A) the effective date ofthe plan; (B) conversion ofthe
case; or (C) dismissal ofthe case. ". "
Sec. 206. Creditors and equit)' security holders committees.
Section 206 clarifies that courts may review appointments to creditors' and equity security
holders' committees to ensure adequate representation ofcreditors or equity security holders.
This provision also authorizes the court to expand the membership ofa committee to include a
creditor that is a small business if the court determines that the creditor holds claims that are
disproponionately large when compared to the creditor's annual gross revenue. A committee
must provide creditors access to information and the court may compel the committee to produce
additional repons and disclosure.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the explicit authorization ofcourts to
review appointments to committees to ensure adequate representation, which resolves a split in
the case law and recognizes that adequate representation is a question oflawfor which parties
should have legal redress.
Sec. 207. Amendment to section 546 of title 11, United States Code.
This section prohibits a trustee from avoiding a warehouseman's lien for storage, transpottation
or other costs incidental to the storage and handling ofgoods, notwithstanding the trustee's
otherwise applicable power to avoid those liens under 11 U.S.C. § 545.
Comments: To the extent that a statutory lien protected by this provision would be ineffective
against a bona fide purchaser, the National Ban1auptcy Conference opposes this amendment.
Sec. 208. Limitation.
This section extends the period provided by 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(I)(B) from 20 to 45 days.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes the unwarranted expansion of
reclamation rights that is prejudicial to the interests ofother creditors and to the estate.
Sec. 209. Amendment to section 330(a) of title 11, United States Code.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 330(a) so that the factors guiding couns in awarding
compensation apply specifically to examiners, chapter 11 trustees, and professional persons.
When determining trustees' compensation, the court "shall treat such compensation as a
commission based on the results achieved."
Comments: To more effectivelyfulfill the intent ofthis provision. 11 U.S.c. § 330 should be
revised to strike the first (A) after paragraph (3) to avoid the extraneous reference (there are two
paragraphs designated (A) and the first is unnecessary). Paragraph (2) ofthis amendment
should added as a new subparagraph (F) in section 330(a)(3) that reads "whether the
compensation is reasonable compensation as a commission based on the results achieved. "
Paragraph (1) ofthis amendment then should be deleted as unnecessary. Thus. section 209 of
this bill should read asfollows: Section 330(a)(3) oftitle 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by deleting thefirst "(A)" that appears; (2) in subparagraph (D) by striking "; and" at the
end; (3) in subparagraph (E) by inserting "and" at the end; and (4) by adding at the end the
following: "(F) whether the compensation is reasonable as a commission based on the results
achieved. ".
Sec. 210. Postpetition disclosure and solicitation.
This section permits postpetition solicitation ofvotes prior to court approval of a disclosure
statement in a prepackaged plan of reorganization, but only for holders ofclaims solicited prior
to commencement of the case in accordance with applicable nonban1auptcy law.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. To fulfill the intent of
the amendment, it should be revised to read asfollows: Section 1125 oftitle 11, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the follOWing - "(g) Notwithstanding subsection (b), an
acceptance or rejection ofthe plan may be solicitedjrom a holder ofa claim or interest ifsuch
solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and ifthe solicitation began before the
commencement ofthe case and was in compliance with any applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule,
or regulation governing the adequacy ofdisclosure in connection with the solicitation or, ifthere
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is not any such law. rule. or regulation. the solicitation occurred after disclosure ofadequate
information to the solicited holders. ..
Sec:. 211. Preferences.
This provision broadens the availability of the ordinary course ofbusiness defense to preference
actions under II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) by de-coupling the requirement that a transaction be in the
ordinary course ofbusiness between the debtor and creditor and in accordance with ordinary
business terms for the industty at large. This means that the recipient of a payment that was not
in the ordinary course between the debtor and the creditor will not be required to return the
payment for the benefit ofall creditors. This section also precludes trustees from bringing
preference actions to recover less than S5,OOO in aggregate transfers to noninsider creditors in
cases that do not involve primarily consumer debts.
Sec:. 212. Venue of certain proceedings.
This section amends 28 U.S.C. § 1409 so that a trustee may commence a preference action to
recover a nonconsumer debt of less than SI0,000 only in the district in which the noninsider
creditor resides.
Sec. 213. Period for filing plan under chapter 11.
This section limits the ability ofa debtor in possession to obtain extensions of its exclusive right
to file a chapter II plan to 18 or 20 months, respectively. The amendment provides no discretion
for judges to permit longer periods of exclusivity under appropriate circumstances.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. This amendment does
not proVide the requisite flexibility to permit longer periods ofexclusivity under compelling
circumstances. Although plans are confirmed more quickly now than in the 1980s. the
exclusivity period in successful larger cases averages longer than 18 to 20 months. Inflexible
limits on exclusivity will squelch negotiations long before the exclusivity periods expire. as
creditors exert leverage with the threat ofa competing plan. Debtors in possession may be more
likely to seek confirmation ofnoneonsensual plans. a costly and undesirable result. Under the
J994 amendments. district courts havejurisdiction to hear appeals from orders increasing the
exclusivity period. 28 U.S.c. § J58(a){2), which should be utilized to address unwarranted
extensions ofexclusiVity.
Sec. 214. Fees arising from certain ownership interests.
Section 214 amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) to expand this exception to discharge by
encompassing condominium fees and assessments regardless of whether the debtor or a tenant
continues to occupy the unit.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes exceptions to discharge prOViding
preferential treatment for certain creditors to the detriment ofothers without a sound policy
justification. Ifa debtor is not using the condominium due to foreclosure or other
circumstances. condominium fees for that period should not be exceptedfrom discharge. as they
are not distinguishable from obligations owed to other creditors.
Sec:. 215. Defaults based on nonmonetal')' obligations.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) to clarify the requirements to cure non-monetary
defaults on executory contracts and leases, an issue that arose in part from the line ofcases
culminating in Worthington v. General Motors Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 113
F.3d 1029 (91h Cir. 1997). According to this amendment, a trustee's requirement to cure does not
apply to a penalty rate or penalty provision relating to a default arising from a failure to perform
nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract or under an unexpired lease ofreal or
personal property, but this waiver does not apply to executory contracts that transfer a right or
interest under a filed or issued patent, copyright, trademark, trade dress, or trade secret. The
trustee's requirement to cure also does not apply to the satisfaction ofany other provision
relating to a default arising from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under a
nonresidential real property lease or executory contract, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure
such default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time ofassumption and, in the case
ofan executory contract, if the court determines based on the equities ofthe case that the
requirements to cure should not apply with respect to such default. In addition, this section
eliminates the now-defunct provisions in section 365 addressing aircraft gate and terminal leases.
This section also makes a conforming change regarding nonmonetary defaults to II U.S.C. §
1124(2), which governs the impairment of claims and interests in chapter II.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision generally. but opposes
the language that excludes intellectual property contracts from its scope. The intellectual
properry exception does not take into consideration the possibility that the debtor is the
intellectual property licensor rather than the licensee. Ifthe licensor cannot assume the
contract. the nondebtor parry may be deprived ofrights ucept to the extent protected under
section 365(n). Moreover, ifthe debtor is the licensee. there is no reason why a technical
prepetition default on a nonmonetary.' obligation. such as going dark or a conducting a going out
ofbusiness sale. shouldjustifyforfeiting the debtor:S access to the intellectual property as long
any other defaults have been cured. Ifsome additional protection is desired. the balancing test
used in the provision for executory contracts should be suffiCient. It is appropriate to eliminale
the defunct provisions addressing aircraft gate and lerminalleases. but this deletion requires
renumbering and cross referenCing oflhe remaining paragraphs ofthose subsections.
Sec. 216. Sharing of compensation.
This section permits fee sharing in connection with a bona fide public service anomey referral
program operating in accordance with nonbanlcruptcy law and rules ofpersonal responsibility.
Sec. 217. Priority for administrative expenses.
This provision limits the priority for an administrative expense claim resulting from a lease that
is assumed but subsequently rejected within the year. It should be read in conjunction with
section 205 of the bill, which limits the time for assumption or rejection of a nonresidential real
property lease.
Comments: This provision limits some ofthe effects ofsection 205 ofthis bill. which imposes
short time limitations for the assumption or rejection ofnonresidential real property leases.
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Whether it is desirable to cap damages in this context but not others is an issue that merits
further study.
Sec. 218. Nondischargeability of certain educational benefits and loans.
This provision applies the exception to discharge for student loans, which currently applies to
government insured loans and loans made by not for profit organizations, so that it applies to all
student loans, including loans made by the for-profit private sector.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this further expansion of
nondischargeability. Congress just expanded the student loan exception to discharge last fall to
eliminate the discharge ofolder student loans as an offsetfor other expenditures in the Higher
Education Amendments. This current expansion applies to student loans made by regular
commercial lenders and thus the justification behind the student loan exception to discharge - to
protect government and nonprofit programs - is not applicable. Those who borrow to improve
themselves should not be treated worse in bankruptcy than those who borrowed to spend on
current consumption.
Sec. 301. Definition of disinterested person.
This section amends the definition ofdisinterested person in II U.S.c. § 101(14) to eliminate the
per se disqualification of investment bankers previously retained by the debtor.
Sec. 302. Miscellaneous improvements.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § 109 so that an individual may not be a debtor in bankruptcy
unless the individual has received credit counseling within 90 days before the date ofthe
petition. Credit counseling includes, at a minimum, participation in a briefing that outlines the
opportunities for counseling and assists that individual in an initial budget analysis. Debtors
must file a certificate from the credit counseling service and a copy of the debt repayment plan, if
any. The prebankruptcy counseling requirement does not apply if the United States trustee
determines that the approved services for that district are not reasonably able to provide adequate
services to those seeking counseling as a bankruptcy prerequisite. This determination must be
reviewed by the United States trustee on an annual basis. The United States trustee may approve
only credit counseling agencies that satisfy the standards in regulations promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission and are accredited by the Council on Accreditation or an equivalent
third party nonprofit accrediting organization. The counseling requirement also may be waived
by the court if a debtor certifies that he had exigent circumstances and unsuccessfully attempted
to obtain counseling services for a sequential 5 days or that exigent circumstances require filing
before the expiration of that 5 day period. This exemption expires 30 days after the debtor files a
petition for relief.
This section also conditions receipt ofa chapter 7 and chapter 13 discharge on the completion of
a financial management course. The requirement does not apply if the United States trustee
determines that the approved courses are not adequate to service those individuals who are
seeking education as a condition of discharge. The United States trustee may approve programs
or courses only if they satisfy regulations promulgated by the Executive Office for United States
Trustees.
As an unrelated matter, this section defines the debtor's principal residence, stating that it is "a
residential structure, including incidental property, without regard to whether that structure is
attached to real property," and also includes multi-unit dwellings. Incidental property is defined
as "property commonly conveyed with a principal residence" and "all easements, rights
appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights,
escrow funds, or insurance proceeds" and "all replacement or additions." Moreover, a mortgage
retains antimodification protection if a debtor lived in a residence within the 180 days prior to
bankruptcy, even ifhe does not live there as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.
This provision creates an exception to the automatic stay for the postponement, continuation, or
delay of a prepetition foreclosure proceeding or sale until a prepetition default is fully cured
under chapter 13. It also provides that a mortgage is protected against modification in chapter
13, even if the debtor does not reside in the property at the time of filing, if the debtor used the
property as a principal residence at any time within 180 days prior to the bankruptcy.
Finally, this section contains a business bankruptcy amendment. It amends II U.S.C. § 546(g)
so that when a court authorizes the debtor to ship goods back to a creditor, the creditor's rights
are subject to the prior rights of any third parties in the goods.
Comments: Courts should retain adequate discretion to waive the prebankruptcy counseling
requirement ifit would be an undue hardship.
The implementation ofa mandatoryfinancial management course should be deferred until
completion ofthe pilot programs established in section 104 ofthis bill.
The definition ofdebtor 's principal residence should exclude mobile homes, which depreciate
and are subject to extensions ofcredit priced like consumer loans instead ofmortgage loans.
Sec. 303. Extensions.
This provision extends the Bankruptcy Administrators' program in Alabama and North Carolina.
The districts in those states therefore would not be part of the U.S. trustee program.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this amendment, which encourages
nonuniformity and undermines the efficacy ofthe United States Trustee system. This provision
gives rise to Constitutional concerns, which may affect this legislation in its entirety. See Angelo
v. Victoria Farms. Inc., 38 F.3d 1525 (9'h Cir. 1994) (delaying implementation ofUnited States
trustee program in North Carolina and A/abama violates United States Constitution).
Sec. 304. Local filing of bankruptcy cases.
This section amends 28 U.S.C. § 1408 to provide that in the case ofa corporation, the domicile
and residence of the debtor are conclusively presumed to be in the location of the debtor's
principal place of business. Place of incorporation would no longer be an independent basis for
venue.
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Sec. 305. Permitting assumption oC contracts.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § 365(c) to make clear that the ability of a debtor in possession
to assume a contract is not dependent on whether the debtor in possession would be permined to
assign that contract.
Comments: This amendment sensibly changes the result ofthe opinions like Perlman v. Catapult
Entertainment (In re Catapult Entertainment), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999), which held that a
debtor in possession could not assume patent license that is nonassignable underfederal
nonbankruptcy law. It would be helpful to extend the application ofthis amendment to chapter
12 as well.
DTLEIV!
Sec. 401. Flexible rules Cor disclosure statement and plan.
This section permits courts to waive or modifY the requirement that a small business chapter 11
debtor in possession file a disclosure statement that is approved as a prerequisite to soliciting
votes on a plan ofreorganization. The provision permits the court to conditionally approve
disclosure statements and to combine the disclosure statement hearing with the confirmation
hearing. The proposed standard for approval ofdisclosure statements (balancing the complexity
of the case, the benefit of additional information to parties in interest, and the cost of providing
additional information) is extended to all chapter 11 debtors.
Comments: It is appropriate to apply rhe proposedflexible standard ofdisclosure statement
approval to all chaprer 11 debtors.
Sec. 402. Definitions.
This section amends the definition of small business debtor to apply in cases involving debts of
$4 million or less and include single asset real estate debtors only if they fall within that debt
cap.
Comments: This definition incorporares approximate(v 85% ofall chapter 11 cases.
The National Bankruptcy Conference and the Commercial Law League ofAmerica
formulated a revised version of the small business provisions in Title IV that addresses many of
the problems identified in this section by section analysis. The revised small business provisions
are anached as Appendix E to the National Bankruptcy Conference March 17, 1999 testimony to
the Subcomminee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Comminee
and also are available on request.
Sec. 403. Standard form disclosure statement and plan.
Section 403 orders the Advisory Comminee on Bankruptcy Rules oCthe Judicial Conference of
the United States to devise and adopt uniform forms for disclosure statements and plans of
reorganization for debtors falling within the small business definition. The section advises that
the rules should achieve a practical balance between parties' reasonable needs for complete
information and economy and simplicity for debtors.
Comments: Standardforms for disclosure statements should be developed carefully to take into
account the distinctions in disclosure necessaryfor various types ofbusiness debrors,
Sec. 404. Uniform national reporting requirements,
This provision requires that a small business debtor file periodic financial reports, including
information on profitability, projected cash receipts and disbursements, comparisons ofactual
receipts and disbursements with prior projections, whether the debtor is in compliance with
postpetition requirements and has filed tax returns and paid taxes and other administrative
claims, and other maners in the best interest ofall parties.
Comments: Papers ofthis nature should befiled with the United States trustee, not with the
courr. This provision should be simplijied and combined with section 406 ofthis bill.
Sec. 405. Uniform reporting rules and Corms Cor small business cases.
This provision gives responsibility to the Advisory Comminee on Bankruptcy Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States to propose for adoption the establishment of rules and
forms to elicit information regarding such maners as the debtor's profitability, cash receipts and
disbursements, and whether the debtor is timely filing tax returns and paying taxes and
administrative claims when due.
Sec. 406. Duties in small business cases.
Section 406 imposes duties on the small business debtor in possession to file additional
information, anend through a responsible individual meetings with the United States trustee and
the court, timely file all schedules and statements of financial affairs unless the court grants a
limited extension due to extraordinary and compelling circumstances, file all repons, maintain
insurance, timely file tax returns, pay all administrative expense tax claims, establish separate
deposit accounts for taxes and deposit funds within I day thereafter or a responsible time set by
the court (unless the court waives this requirement), and allow the United States trustee to
inspect the business premises and books and records.
Comments: This provision differs from prior versions by permitting courts to waive some
requirements in compelling circumsrances. "Compelling," however, imposes a high threshold to
waiver. Waiver for "reasonablejustijication" may be an appropriate alternative. Morefeasible
deadlines should be set for these duties, and many ofthe required documents should be
submitted to the United States trustee, not the court. Mentioning requirements to pay taxes
1".... t. t ... l. l 1 . t I l L (, ... ,- t. l., . ". t L l l~
L, .. L
~-, -,
-. -, -, -,
-, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, , -, -, -, -,
::c
I
.....
\0
might create a negative implication regarding a debtor's other duties not mentioned in this
provision. such as the duty to pay wage claims.
See. 407. Plan rl1iDg and confirmation deadlines.
This section requires that a small business debtor file a plan of reorganization within 90 days
after filing for bankruptcy. To obtain an extension of up to 60 days, the debtor must demonstrate
prior to the expiration of the deadline that there are no grounds for dismissal or conversion and
that there is a reasonable likelihood of reorganization. Other extensions are possible if the debtor
proves "by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that the court will
confirm a plan within a reasonable time." This provision contains an exception to these
requirements for cases with active creditors' committees.
Comments: This provision substantially limits the extent to which chapter I I debtors can
negotiate with creditors andformulate a plan ofreorganization while imposing a higher
standard to obtain extensions than the standard applicable to larger businesses.
Sec. 408. Plan confirmation deadline.
Under this section, plans of small business debtors must be confirmed no later than 150 days
after the date of the order for relief unless there is an active creditors' committee. Extensions are
available if the debtor meets the burdens for extensions stated in section 407.
Comments: The court should be permitted to grant an extension ofthe plan confirmation
deadline ifdoing so would be in the best interests ofcreditors and the estate. Doing otherwise
will prevent many small businesses from reorganizing even ifby all accounts they are worth
saVing.
Sec. 409. Prohibition against extension of time.
Section 409 amends II U.S.c. § 105(d) to prohibit a court from exercising its discretion to
extend a deadline in a manner inconsistent with sections 407 and 408.
Comments: By negative implication, this provision suggests that the court may override other
statutory deadlines. For this reason, it might be better to delete it.
Sec. 410. Duties of the United States trustee.
Pursuant to this provision, the U.S. trustee (or bankruptcy administrator) is vested with new
statutory duties in small business debtor cases, including the duty to conduct "initial debtor
interviews" during which the U.S. trustee investigates the debtor's viability and business plan.
The U.S. trustee must inspect the debtor's premises, must diligently monitor the debtor's
activities to identify whether the debtor will be unable to confirm a plan, and must promptly seek
relief on discovering material grounds for conversion or dismissal under II U.S.c. § 1112, as
revised by section 413 of this bill.
Comments: Some ofthe duties delineated in this section are appropriate and codify some
current United States trustee practices. However, the assessment ofbusiness Viability should not
fall upon the United States trustee. who already is vested with a variet)' ofadministrative
responsibilities.
Sec. 411. Scheduling conferences.
Section 411 amends II U.S.C. § 105(d) to require courts to hold status conferences as necessary
to further the "expeditious and economical resolution ofthe case."
Sec. 412. Serial filer provisions.
This provision withholds application ofthe automatic stay for a debtor that voluntarily files a
bankruptcy petition within two years after a prior chapter II plan was confirmed, files within
two years after the entry of a dismissal order in a prior chapter 11 case, or if the former owners
ofa prior debtor have transferred the business to a successor entity. To obtain protection ofthe
automatic stay, debtor must prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the new case resulted
from circumstances beyond the control of the debtor not foreseeable at the time the first case was
filed and that "it is more likely than not" that the debtor will confirm a feasible plan, but not a
liquidating plan, within a reasonable time. The provision also limits damages for violations of
the automatic stay based on a good faith belief that there was no stay in a subsequent bankruptcy
case.
Comments: Unlike earlier versions. this serialfiling restriction applies to all chapter I I cases.
Bona fide purchasers ofa debtor's assets that subsequentlyfile for bankruptc)' should not be
subject to the restrictions on the automatic stay. To address this problem. the term "entity" in
subsection (k)(l)(D) should be replaced with "insider." In addition, "in which a discharge is not
entered" should be added to the end of(k)(I)(A); otherwise. ''pending'' is too ambiguous.
Sec. 413. Expanded grounds for dismissal or conversion and appointment of trustee.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 1112(b) to provide that a court shall convert or dismiss a case
or appoint trustee or examiner, whichever is in the best interest ofcreditors and the estate, when
a movant establishes "cause," and to enumerate additional grounds for cause. Requests for
dismissal or conversion shall not be granted if the debtor objects and establishes that "it is more
likely than not" that a plan will be confirmed within a time fixed by statute or by court order;
and, if "cause" is an act or omission of the debtor, that there exists a reasonable justification for
the act or omission and that the act or omission will be cured within a reasonable time fixed by
the court not to exceed 30 days after the court decides the motion (unless the movant expressly
consents to a continuance for a specific period of time or compelling circumstances beyond the
debtor's control justify an extension beyond 30 days). This version of the provision clarifies
that failure to maintain insurance is "cause" only if failure posed material risk to the estate or the
public,limits creditors' rights to pursue certain grounds for dismissal or conversion.
Comments: These Significant changes to I I u.s. C. § I I I2 apply to all chapter I I debtors. not
just small business debtors. Unlike the current language ofsection I I 12. which makes dismissal
or conversion discretionary, dismissal or conversion under the proposed revision are mandatory
upon the presence offactors that may not be sufficiently material to warrant this response. As a
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result, this provision makes one ofthe most dramatic changes to bankruptcy law as it affects
business cases.
Sec. 414. Study of operation of title 11 ofthe United States code with respect to smaU
businesses.
This provision instructs the Small Business Administration, in consultation with other panies, to
study the causes ofsmall business bankruptcies and how the bankruptcy system can be improved
to help small businesses reorganize. This study must be conducted not later than 2 years after the
enactment of this bill, and a repon must be submitted to the House and Senate.
Sec. 415. Payment of interest.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) to provide explicitly that the debtor can make the
requisite payments from rents generated by the property. The section also changes the applicable
interest rate to the nondefault contract rate and amends the deadline so that payments must be
commenced or a plan filed on the later of90 days after the petition date or 30 days after the coun
determines that the debtor is subject to these provisions to account for circumstances in which it
is not immediately determined that the debtor is a single asset real estate debtor.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision.
TlTLEV.
Sec. 501. Petition and proceedings related to petition.
This section clarifies that a chapter 9 petition constitutes an order for relief.
Comments: To effectuate the intent ofthis provision and to avoid an unnecessary hearing, the
text ofsection 501 should be replaced with the follOWing: Section 921 oftitle 11. United States
Code. is amended by - (1) striking subsection (d); and (2) redesignating subsection (e) as
subsection (d).
Sec. 502. Applicability of other sections to chapter 9.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 901 to extend the application to chapter 9 ofcmain
provisions ofchapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code that relate to the liquidation of securities
contracts and the termination of swap agreements.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this amendment.
TITLE VI.
Sec. 601. Creditor representation at first meeting of creditors.
This section permits nonlawyer creditor representatives to appear and panicipate in section 341
meetings, and to represent more than one creditor, notwithstanding local coun rules, State
constitution provisions. or other laws to the contrary.
Comments: This amendment conflicts with the laws ofsome states under which participation at
section 341 meetings is the practice oflaw. See In re Maloney. 209 B.R. 844 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1997) (examining debtor at section 341 meeting constitutes practice oflaw under Pennsylvania
law); but see State Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Committee v. Paul Mason & Assoc.• 46 F.3d
469 (5th Cir. 1995) (administrative functions handled by nonlawyer creditor representatives did
not constitute unauthorizedpractice oflaw under Texas law).
Sec. 602. Audit procedures.
Under section 602, no fewer than lout of250 individual debtor cases in each judicial district
must be selected randomly for audit, with procedures to be set by the Attorney General, although
the audits must be in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and performed by
accountants. Cases also must be audited if the schedules show income and expenses reflecting
greater than average variances from the district norm. Material misstatements could lead to
revocation or denial ofdischarge or criminal referrals.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the implementation ofan audit
process. The audit system does not need to re{v on accountants to conduct every audit./or most
audits will not focus on books and records. To the extent that a preliminary investigation reveals
the needfor an accountant. one could be appointed at that time. Audits also should specifically
target high end cases that vary from the statistical nonn. but not cases that varyfrom the
statistical norm on the low end (e.g., very low income and/or expenses). Casedfiled by
individuals under chapters 11 and 12 also should be audited. Realistical{l·. one out ofevery'
thousand cases should be audited. To complement the auditing proposal. the Advisory
Commirree on Bankruptcy Rules ofthe Judicial Conference ofthe United States shouldpropose
an amendment to Rule 1017 ofthe Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure that strikes
"substantial" and inserts "clear" in lieu thereofand that inserts "or 60 days following the
conclusion ofan audit under section 586(a)(4) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code. whichever is
later" immediately after "341 (a) " each place it appears.
Sec. 603. Giving creditors fair notice in chapter 7 and 13 cases.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 342 to require that notice to a creditor includes account
numbers and specific addresses or agents listed on the "last communication before the filing of
the petition from the creditor to a debtor." This provision also creates a coun filing registry for
designated addresses. In addition, this provision delineates a new set ofdebtor duties to be
added to 11 U.S.C. § 521, primarily comprised of informational requirements, such as tax returns
and income statements. Creditors may request access to documents and couns must comply
within 5 days of such request. This provision also directs the Administrative Office of the
United States Couns to establish procedures safeguarding the confidentiality of tax information
within 30 days after the date of enactment and to submit a repon to Congress on this mater
within a year after the date of enactment.
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Comments: The courtfiling registry should be the primary means ofensuring that notice is sent
to creditors at the address oftheir choosing. The remainder ofthe provision dealing with notice
should be deleted. The informational requirements should not come into effect until the
Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts have implemented a procedure to safeguard
the privacy oftax information.
Sec. 604. Dismissal for failure to timely file schedules or provide required information.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 521 so that cases are dismissed automatically if individual
debtors do not submit all required information within the statutory deadline. Extensions of up to
45 days may be granted if a court finds a 'justification" to do so.
Comments: The need to obtain information from the Internal Revenue Service may hinder a
debtor's ability to comply in a timelyfashion.
Sec. 605. Adequate time to prepare for hearing on confirmation of the plan.
Under section 605,11 U.S.C. § 1324 is amended to provide that a confirmation hearing may be
held no earlier than 20 days (and no later than 45 days) after the section 341 meeting.
Sec. 606. Chapter 13 plans to have a 5-year duration in certain cases.
This section requires that debtors with incomes greater than or equal to the national median
repay their debts in 5-year chapter 13 plans.
Comments: Extending the duration ofsome chapter 13 plans is a curious and questionable
policy decision when two thirds of chapter 13 cases already are not completed. This provision
conflicts with section 130 ofthe bill that requires chapter 13 plans to be structured using the
means test formula, which has the effect of making all plans 5 years.
Sec. 607. Sense of the Congress regarding expansion of Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure.
This provision expresses the sense ofCongress that Rule 9011 should be modified to include a
requirement that all documents, including schedules, should be submitted to a court or trustee
only after the debtor or the debtor's attorney has made reasonable inquiry to verify that the
information is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law.
Sec. 608. Elimination of certain fees payable in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
This section amends 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) to eliminate postconfirmation quarterly United
States trustee fees when the quarterly disbursement is less than $300,000. This amendment
would take effect on October 1,1999.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this amendment.
Sec. 609. Study of bankruptcy impact of credit extended to dependent students.
Section 609 directs the Comptroller General to Wldenake a study not later than 1 year after
enactment of this bill to evaluate how the bankruptcy rate is affected by extensions ofcredit to
postsecondary education students claimed as dependents.
Sec. 610. Prompt relierrrom stay in individual cases.
Under section 610, if courts do not rule on motions for automatic stay reliefwithin 60 days, this
section provides that the stay terminates automatically in the case ofan individual debtor unless
the parties agree to an extension ofthe deadline or the court orders an extension for "good
cause."
Comments: Efforts to establish firm time limits for courts to issue rulings have not been effective
in the past. Issues oftiming should be handled by the AdVisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
ofthe Judicial Conference ofthe United States.
Sec. 611. Stopping abusive conversions from chapter 13.
Pursuant to this amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 348, upon conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7,
claims are considered fully secured unless the claim already has been paid in full,
notwithstanding any valuation or determination of the allowed secured claim in chapter 13.
Prebankruptcy defaults not fully cured are given the same effect as under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: This provision should include an additional amendment so that a debtor seeking to
redeem property in a converted case may app(v to the redemption price all chapter 13 plan
payments and adequate protection payments. This may be accomplished by deleting
subparagraph (C)(i) and by adding the following: Section 722 oftitle 11. United States Code is
amended by adding at the end - In a case that has been converted under section 1307 ofthis
title, the redemption price is the value ofthe collateral less any paymentf made under sections
1307A and 1326 ofthis title.
Sec. 612. Bankruptcy appeals.
This provision authorizes direct appeal to the United States Courts of Appeals from final orders
and judgments, as well as certain interlocutory orders, entered by bankruptcy courts and district
courts. However, these appeals will be heard by non-Article ill bankruptcy appellate panels
unless a party elects otherwise. Circuits may establish joint bankruptcy appellate panels. This
provision also provides procedural guidance by delineating which rules will apply until rules of
practice and procedure are promulgated or amended pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
Sec. 613. GAO Study.
This provision requires that the Comptroller General of the United States conduct a study of the
feasibility, effectiveness, and costs ofdirecting trustees to provide various information to the
Office of Child Support Enforcement, the subject of an amendment in this bill (see "Collection
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of Child Support" above). A report on the study is due not later than 300 days after the date of
enactment.
Sec. 614. Compensating trustees.
This amendment allows the court to award a reasonable fee for trustees' actions resulting in a
case being converted from chapter 7 to chapter 13 if the trustee shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the case was converted or dismissed because ofthe trustee's actions. The fee will
be paid monthly over the life of the chapter 13 plan. The amendment also provides that the
chapter 7 trustee may collect his compensation in a chapter 13 case "even if such amount has
been discharged in a prior proceeding under this title."
Comments: Ifchapter 7 compensation is going to be paid monthly over the life ofthe plan, it
should befactored into the means test that determines whether the debtor has the ability to pay
his debts.
TITLE VII,
Sec. 701. Improved bankruptcy statistics.
This section orders the clerk of each district to compile statistics in a format determined by the
Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts, which will be collected by the Administrative
Office and made publicly available and the subject of a report to Congress.
Comments: Collecting data is advisable. but all language in this prOVision prescribing the
method ofcollection and reporting should be deleted. The manner ofcollection and reporting
should be developed by a balanced group ofexperts in the field ofdata collection and
bankruptcy.
Sec. 702. Uniform rules for the collection of bankruptcy data.
This section instructs the Attorney General to issue rules requiring uniform forms for final
trustee reports and periodic reports by debtors in possession and trustees in chapter II cases.
Sec. 703. Sense of the Congress regarding availability of bankruptc)' data.
Section 703 expresses the sense ofCongress that all data held by bankruptcy clerks should be
released in electronic form to the public on demand and that the bankruptcy system should use a
single set ofdata definitions and forms to collect data nationwide.
Comments: Before taking steps to make this data widely available. Congress should evaluate the
privacy considerations and whether laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act impose
restrictions on this activity.
TITLE V1II,
Sec. 801. Treatment of certain liens.
This section exempts ad valorem real or personal property tax liens from subordination under II
U.S.C. § 724(b)(2), except that ad valorem tax liens would remain subordinated to priority wage
claims. Although other tax liens remain subject to subordination. section 801 requires that a
trustee first exhaust unencumbered assets of the estate and surcharge collateral under section
506(c) for the reasonably necessary costs and expenses ofpreserving and disposing ofthat
property. Section 801 also amends II U.S.C. § 505 to divest bankruptcy judges of their
authority to determine the amount or legality ofany ad valorem tax after expiration of the
applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision to the extent that it
exempts ad valorem tax liens from subordination under section 724(b). However, the remainder
ofthe provision is objectionable. References to II U.S.c. § 507(a) should be adjusted to reflect
amendments in this bill that reorder the priorities setforth in that provision.
Sec. 802. Effective notice to government.
This section sets forth extensive parameters and details for providing notice to governmental
units.
Comments: The filing registry contemplated in proposed section J42(e) may be an appropriate
mechanism to ensure adequate notice. However, the remainder ofthe provision is unduly
oppressive and make compliance difficult even ifthe IInit receives actual notice. Form ofnotice
is generally addressed by the Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure. In light ofthe fact that
the United States government has requested to be treated as a single unit for other purposes.
such as setoff. these noticing requirements seem to go to the other extreme.
Sec. 803. Notice of request for a determination oftaxes.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 505(b) to require that any request for a determination oftax
liability under that section be made in a manner designated by the governmental unit.
Comments: This provision would be unobjectionable ifthe information were published in a
central registry to enable compliance. Absent a central registry. this provision is troublesome
because it creates a new bureaucracy that unnecessarily makes compliance extremely difficult.
Sec. 804. Rate of interest on tax claims.
This provision establishes the minimum rate of interest for most tax claims as the Federal short-
term rate rounded to nearest full percent, determined under Internal Revenue Code section
1274(d) for the calendar year in which a plan is confirmed. plus 3 percentage points. The
interest rate on ad valorem taxes is subject to determination under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: This provision departs from its original intent to prOVide a uniform rate ofinterest.
The interest rate on ad valorem taxes in some cities is well over 20%. Section 804 should be
revised to prOVide that the rate ofinterest on all tax claims, including ad valorem tax claims. is
the federal tax deficiency rate under 26 U.S.c. § 662I(a)(2), as originally proposed by in the
bankruptcy bill first introduced by Representative Gekas and his co-sponsors last year.
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Sec. 80S. Tolling of priority of tax claim time periods.
Section 805 authorizes the tolling ofcertain time periods in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A). This
provision also adds an extra 6 months to the tolling period under section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and tolls
the 240-day period under section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) for the duration of an installment payment
agreement, which could add years to the tolling period.
Comments: To the extent this provision tolls the priority and nondischargeability periodfor the
duration ofa prior bankruptcy case, this provision helpfully codifies current case law. However,
the additional six-month period and tolling for installment payment agreements give may go
farther than necessary and may harm the interests ofother creditors.
Sec. 806. Priority propert)' taxes incurred.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(B) by striking "assessed" and replacing it with
uincurred."
Sec. 807. Chapter 13 discharge offraudulent and other taxes.
This section further restricts the scope of the chapter 13 "superdischarge" so that a debtor who
has completed a repayment plan may not discharge remaining taxes falling under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(1 ).
Comments: This provision is controversial. It may eliminate the incentivefor debtors with
substantial tax debts to repay some ofthose debts. along with other debts, in a chapter 13 plan.
Sec. 808. Chapter 11 discharge of fraudulent taxes.
Section 808 amends 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) so that chapter 11 plan confirmation does not discharge
a corpQrate debtor (but not any other type ofdebtor) frQm tax debts on which the debtor made a
fraudulent return or which the debtQr willfully attempted to evade or defeat.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference urges deletion ofthis section. The
reorganized debtor is a separate entityfor other tax purposes that should not be liable for these
obligations. Most chapter I I corporate debtors are insolvent and often controlling ownership is
transferred to creditors under a plan ofreorganization. Creditors should not be punishedfor the
failures ofprior ownership or management.
Sec. 809. Stay oftax proceedings.
This section provides an exception to the autQmatic stay for appeals frQm cenain court and
administrative decisions determining a tax liability of the debtor.
Sec. 810. Periodic payment of taxes in chapter 11 cases.
This section requires periodic payment Qfpriority tax claims in regular installment payments in
cash, "but in no case with a balloQn prQvision and nQ more than three months apan. beginning nQ
later than the effective date of the plan and ending on the earlier of five years after the petitiQn
date or that last date payments are to be made under the plan to unsecured creditors." In
addition, the petition date, not the assessment date, is the starting point for the payment period.
Comments: Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978. taxing authorities exercised virrual veto
power overplans ofreorganization. The 1978 Code was a compromise to make reasonable
accommodations for rehabilitation. Ifenacted, this provision may require that other creditors.
such as support creditors in the chapter I I case ofan individual debtor, wait years for
repayment. Ifretained, the provision should be redrafted to correct its problems. The prOVision
should clarify that "regular payments" do not have to be equal. According to the plain
language ofthe provision, tax debts may not be deferred at all ifother unsecured creditors are
paid in full at confirmation. This may be an unintended result.
Sec. 811. Avoidance of statutory tax liens prohibited.
Section 811 amends 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) to codify that "superpriority" rights accorded to some
purchasers by the Internal Revenue Code and parallel state and local law provisions may not be
used by a trustee to avoid tax liens in stocks, securities, motor vehicles, inventory, certain goods
purchased at retail, and cenain household goods.
Comments: There are preferable methods ofclarifying the reach ofa bonafide purchaser.
Section 545(2) should be clarified to give the trustee the status ofa hypothetical bonafide
purchaser without knowledge or notice ofa lien, who takes possession ofthe item purchased and
has not relinqUishedpossession. This status wouldpreservefor the benefit ofall creditors those
items ofproperty on which the filed tax lien does not take priority in all circumstances under
nonbankruptcy law. A similar change could be made to the definition ofpurchaser in section
544(a).
Sec. 812. Payment of taxes in the conduct of business.
This section requires that postpetition taxes be paid in the ordinary course ofbusiness, that ad
valorem real propeny taxes be paid when due, and that administrative period tax liabilities be
paid without a precipitating request from the governmental unit. This section also amends 11
U.S.C. § 506 to pennit ad valorem taxes to be surcharged against collateral. This section permits
deferred tax payments in the event that a chapter 7 estate is administratively insolvent or that a
tax was not incurred by a properly appointed chapter 7 trustee.
Comments: It is reasonable to require that an operating chapter I I debtor pay taxes in the
normal course as a business expense, which is why 28 U.S. C. § 960 already prOVides that any
officers and agents conducting business under authority ofa United States court shall be subject
to all taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as ifit were conducted by an
individual or corporation.
Sec. 813. Tardily filed priority tax c:laims.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) so that late filed tax claims are entitled to distribution
under that subsection to the extent they are filed on or before the earlier of 10 days following the
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mailing to creditors ofthe trustee's report summary, or the date on which the trustee commences
distribution.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision.
Sec. 814. Income tax returns prepared by tax authorities.
Under this section, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I)(B), "return" includes returns filed by
the governmental unit or a wrinen stipulation to judgment entered by a nonbanlauptcy tribunal.
Comments: It is unclear why the amendment provides that the return must have been filed in a
manner permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law. This clause may cause confuSion and is not
necessary to effectuate the primary component ofthis section.
Sec. 815. Discharge of the estate's liabili~' for unpaid taxes.
This provision adds the banlauptcy estate to the list ofparties protected from a tax claim once a
governmental unit fails to respond to a request for a determination of taxes under 11 U.S.C. §
505(b).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision.
Sec. 816. Requirement to file tal: returus to confirm chapter 13 plans.
Section 816 requires that debtors file tax returns for the three years before banlauptcy prior to the
first meeting ofcreditors. The section makes some allowance for extensions of the applicable
deadlines.
Comments: Debtors who are not required to file tax returns under tax law should be exempted
from this requirement. The standardfor extensions oftime should be based on the
preponderance ofthe evidence (the standard generally applicable in banlcruptcyproceedingsJ.
not clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 817. Standards for tax disclosure.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1125 to require that disclosure statements contain a "full
discussion" ofthe tax consequences ofa plan ofreorganization.
Comments: To the extent that the disclosure oftax consequences is necessary to provide
adequate information. this provision is unnecessary because adequate information already is
required by JI U.s.c. § 1.125. In the event that the tax consequences are not necessary or
relevant to the creditors' decision making. mandating disclosure may unnecessarily increase
cost and delay in the plan confirmation process. contrary to the goal ofexpediting chapter JJ. It
might be preferable to replace the term "afull discussion" with "adequate information
regarding".
Sec. 818. Setoff oftax refunds.
Section 818 amends 11 U.S.C. § 362 to permit the government to set offuncontested income tax
obligations against income tax refund rights without seeking court permission.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. Absent setoff. the tax
refund would be cash collateral subject to turnover and use by the estate. As long as the debtor
in possession provides the taxing authority with adequate protection, this source ofliqUidity
should remain available.
TITLE IX.
Sec. 901. Amendment to add chapter 15 to title 11, United States Code.
This section creates a chapter 15 ofthe Banlauptcy Code to deal with ancillary and other cross-
border cases.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the establishment ofa chapter to
deal with ancillary and other cross border cases to the extent consistent with the statutory
language developed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
Sec. 902. Amendments to other chapters in title 11, United States Code.
This section amends other provisions of the Banlauptcy Code to reflect the addition ofchapter
15.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the adoption ofconforming
amendments to the extent consistent with the statutory language developed by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law.
TITLEX.
Sec. 1001. Treatment of certain agreements b~' conservators or receivers of insured
depository institutions; Sec. 1002. Authority of the corporation with respect to failed and
failing institutions; Sec. 1003. Amendments relating to transfers of qualified fmancial
contracts; Sec. 1004. Amendments relating to disaffirmance or repudiation of qualified
financial contracts; Sec. 1005. Clarifying amendment relating to master agreements; Sec.
1006. Federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act of1991.
These provisions make amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act regarding the
definitions and treatment ofvarious financial contracts.
Sec. 1007. Bankruptcy code amendments.
(a) Definitions offorward contract, repurchase agreement, securities
clearing agency, swap agreement, commodity contract, and securities contract.
This subsection provides revised defmitions ofthe above listed contracts and parties.
(b) Definitions of financial institution, financial participant, and
forward contract merchant.
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1bis subsection revises the definitions of financial institution and forward contract merchant and
provides a definition of financial participant.
(c) Definition ofmaster netting agreement and master netting agreement participant.
Subsection (c) amends 11 U.S.C. § 101 to add broad definitions ofmaster netting agreement and
master netting agreement panicipant. The definition of master netting agreement encompasses
rights of netting, setoff,liquidation, termination, or closeout not only with a variety of financial
instruments, but with security agreements and credit enhancement as well.
Comments: This provision is unobjectionable to the extent it protects single product netting and
is objectionable to the extent it permits and expands cross product netting.
(d) Swap agreements, securities contracts, commodity contracts,
forward contracts, repurchase agreements, and master netting agreements under
the automatic stay.
1bis subsection revises the exceptions to the automatic stay for setoffby financial panicipants of
claims against payments due, and adds an additional exception to section 362(b) to permit cross
product netting without violating the automatic stay.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it permits cross product netting.
(e) Limitation of avoidance powers under master netting agreement.
1bis subsection amends 11 U.S.c. § 546 to preclude a trustee from avoiding a transfer made by
or to a master netting agreement participant under or in connection with any master netting
agreement, except if the transfer was made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it limits the ability ofa trustee or
debtor in possession to recover cross product nelling transfers under the avoiding powers.
(f) Fraudulent transfers ofmaster netting agreements.
1bis subsection amends 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) to insulate certain transfers to master netting
agreement panicipants.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it insulates cross product nelling
from fraudulent transfer avoidance actions.
(g) - (j)Termination or acceleration of securities contracts; Termination or acceleration of
commodities or forward contracts; Termination or acceleration ofrepurchase agreements;
Liquidation, termination, or acceleration of swap agreements.
The aforementioned subsections amend 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, and 560 to refer to
termination, acceleration, and liquidation.
(k) Liquidation, termination, acceleration, or offset under a master
netting agreement and across contracts.
1bis subsection adds 11 U.S.C. § 561, which prohibits the application of the stay, avoidance, or
any other limitations on a contractual right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, or offset under a
master netting agreement and across contracts.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent it exempts cross product nellingfrom
the avoidance powers. the automatic stay. and other otherwise applicable provisions.
(I) Munjcipal banlquptcjes
1bis subsection applies the securities contract liquidation provisions to chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy cases.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision.
(m) Ancil1;uy proceedings.
Pursuant to this subsection, cases ancillary to foreign proceedings are subject to all Bankruptcy
Code provisions relating to securities contracts, commodity agreements, forward contracts,
repurchase agreements, swap agreements, or master netting agreements.
Comments: The provision seems designed to ensure that a broad section 304 injunction is not
issued against holders ofthe listed instruments just they are exemptedfrom the broad automatic
stay under section 362 in a domestic bankruptcy case. The section as worded is far broader and
may have unintended consequences. It cannot relate to the bankruptcy avoidingpowers.
because those powers are not available in a section 304 proceeding in any case. /fit is intended
as some sort ofchoice ofla...... provision. it is impossible to tell what its effects are meant to be. It
should be re-worded to refer solely to exemptionfrom broad injunctive relief In addition, it is
objectionable insofar as it includes cross-product netting. as with other provisions in this title.
(n)-(o) Commodity broker liquidations; Stockbroker liquidations.
These two subsections add 11 U.S.C. §§ 767 and 753 to address the liquidation ofcommodity
brokers and stockbrokers. Under these provisions, the exercise ofrights by a broker or
participant would not affect the priority of unsecured claims held by brokers or participants after
the exercise oftheir rights or the applicability of the commodity broker and stockbroker
liquidation provisions.
(P) ~
This subsection makes conforming amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 553 to reflect the exceptions to
the general rules ofsetoff provided for financial instruments. It creates a carveout to the
exception to the right to setoff in section 553(a)(3)(C) for rights arising under provisions dealing
with financial contracts. This subsection also amends 553(b)(1) to add additional references to
these provisions.
(q) Securities contracts, commodity contracts, and forward contracts.
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This subsection clarifies the language in several Bankruptcy Code provisions by replacing
references to a variety ofparties with the tenn "financial participant."
Sec. 1008. Recordkeeping requirements.
This section amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to authorize the FDIC to prescribe
regulations that require detailed recordkeeping by insured depository institutions with respect to
qualified financial contracts.
Sec. 1009. Exemptions from contemporaneous execution requirement.
This provision amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act section 13(e)(2) to provide that an
agreement to provide for the lawful collateralization ofbankruptcy estate funds pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 345(b)(2) and other agreements is not invalid solely because the agreement was not
executed contemporaneously with the acquisition ofcollateral or because of pledges, delivery, or
substitution ofcollateral made in accordance with such agreement.
Sec. 1010. Damage measure.
This section addresses the calculation ofdamages following the rejection, liquidation,
tennination, or acceleration ofcertain agreements relating to financial instruments. It provides
that damages shall be measured as ofthe earlier of the date of rejection or the date ofliquidation,
tennination or acceleration. The resulting damage claim is treated as a prepetition claim,
consistent with other claims arising from rejection.
Sec. 1011. SIPC stay.
This provision adds a new paragraph to section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970 which states that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code stays the contractual rights ofa
creditor to liquidate, tenninate, or accelerate a securities contract, but that a court order may
operate as a stay ofthe foreclosure on securities collateral pledged by the debtor.
Sec. 1012. Asset-backed securitizations.
This section explicitly excludes from "property of the estate" cash, receivables, securities, and
other financial assets transferred by the debtor in connection with an asset securitization under
which investment grade rated securities have been issued. The debtor is considered to have
transferred assets prepetition if the assets were transferred pursuant to a written agreement that
states that the assets were conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of the
debtor, regardless of whether the debtor holds an interest in the issuer or securities held by the
issuer, whether the debtor has continuing obligations to repurchase, service, or supervise the
servicing ofeligible assets, and the characterization of the transfer for other purposes.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. Transactions thaI are
not sales under state law should not be treated as sales byfederal bankruptcy law. This
provision may undercut the ability ofa business to reorganize by leaving it with no cash
collateral. to the detriment ofemployees and suppliers.
Sec. 1013. Federal reserve collateral requirements.
This section changes the statutory references in section 16 ofthe Federal Reserve Act.
Sec. 1014. Severability; effective date; application of amendments.
This section provides that these amendments remain in effect ifprovisions are found to be
unconstitutional. The Act takes effect on the date ofenactment. and the amendments made by
the Act apply to cases commenced or appointments made after the date ofenactment.
IITI,EXI.
Sec. 1101. Defmitions.
This section makes a nontechnical change by amending the definition ofsingle asset real estate
to lift the $4 million debt cap and to exclude family farmers. This section also clarifies that a
transfer includes the creation of a lien, addressing issues raised in the line ofcases culminating in
In re McConville, 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir. 1997).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes the removal ofthe cap on the
definition ofsingle asset real estate, the effect ofwhich is to make the streamlined single asset
procedure applicable to a wide range ofcases for which it was not intended. The National
Bankruptcy Conference suppons the statutory clarification that a transfer ofproperty includes
the creation ofa lien. The word "each" should be deleted and replaced with "every'" in
proposed 11 U.s.c. § JOJ(54)(D).
Sec. 1102. Adjustment of dol1ar amounts.
This section ensures that the dol1ar amounts in section 522(f)(3) (lien on tools ofthe trade
exceeding $5,000 cannot be avoided) and the proposed section 707(b)(5) (safe harbor against
creditor actions) are indexed for inflation.
Sec. 1103. Extension of time.
This section corrects a reference error.
Sec. 1104. Technical amendments.
This section pluralizes a reference in II U.S.C. § 522(b)(l), makes a technical change to II
U.S.C. § 541(b)(4), and slightly broadens the reference to a subsection ofthe Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, which likely has the effect ofmaking more debtors ineligible to file.
Sec. 1105. Penalty for persons who negligently or fraudulently prepare bankruptc)'
petitions.
This section makes a grammatical change, changing the reference to "attorney's" in section
110(j)(3) from singular possessive to plural possessive.
Sec. 1106. Limitation on compensation of professional persons.
Section 1106 amends II U.S.C. § 328(a) to provide that a trustee or committee may employ
professional persons on a fixed or percentage fee basis.
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Sec. 1107. Special tax provisions.
This amendment eliminates a reference to a tax provision that has been repealed.
Sec. 1108. Effect of conversion.
This section changes a reference to "property" in II U.S.C. § 348(f)(2) to "property of the
estate" to conform to other references in that provision.
Sec. 1109. Allowance of administrative expenses.
This section limits the types ofcompensable professional services rendered by an attorney or
accountant that may qualify as administrative expenses. In particular. expenses for attorneys or
accountants incurred by individual members ofcreditors' or equity committees are not
recoverable as administrative expenses.
Sec. 1110. Priorities.
This provision makes punctuation changes to II U.S.C. § 507 and changes "allowed claim" to
"allowed unsecured claim" in section 507(a)(7).
Sec. 1111. Exemptions.
This section makes slight grammatical changes to II U.S.C. § 522(f) and (g).
Sec. 1112. Exceptions to discharge.
This section corrects the inadvertent omission ofa reference to section 523(a)(15) in section
523(a)(3). Section 523(a)(15) is amended to limit the scope of the exception by requiring that
the debt must be owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. This section also
amends section 523(a)(9) to specifically exclude from discharge debts arising from drunken
boating.
Sec. 1113. Effect of discharge.
This section makes teclmical corrections to II U.S.C. § 524(a)(3).
Comments: This provision does not appear to change the existing text ofsection 524(a)(3j.
Sec. 1114. Protection against discriminatory treatment.
Under this provision, II U.S.C. § 525(c) is amended to clarify section 525(c)(I) applies to
~ grants, not all grants.
Sec. 1115. Property of the estate.
This section amends section 541 (b)(4)(B)(ii) (dealing with liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons) to
add a reference to II U.S.c. § 365, to clarify Congressional intent to exclude production
payments from the debtor's estate.
Sec. 1116. Preferences.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 547(b) so that in the event ofan avoided security interest given
by a debtor between 90 days and I year before bankruptcy to a noninsider for the benefit of an
insider, the security interest shall be considered to be avoided as a preference only with respect
to the insider.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this amendment.
Sec. 1117. Postpetition transactions.
This section makes several clarifying changes to II U.S.C. § 549(c) to work in conjunction with
the change to the definition of transfer, discussed above.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this prOVision.
Sec. 1118. Disposition of property of the estate.
This section eliminates a reference to II U.S.C. § 1009, a provision in an earlier version ofthe
1994 amendments that never came into effect.
Sec. 1119. General provisions.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § 901 (a) to add an omitted reference to II U.S.C. § 1123(d).
Sec. 1120. Appointment of elected trustee.
This section clarifies the procedure for the election of a private trustee in a chapter 11 case. The
United States trustee must file a report certifying the election, which terminates the service of a
previously-appointed trustee. Courts are authorized to resolve disputes arising out ofan election.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this prOVision, but recommends that
proposed section I J04(b)(2)(Bj be revised to read as follows: "The court shall resolve any
dispute arising out ofan election under subparagraph (Aj. ..
Sec. 1121. Abandonment of railroad line.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) to eliminate a reference to a repealed provision in
Title 49 and to replace it with a correct reference.
Sec. 1122. Contents of plan.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1172(c)(I) to eliminate a reference to a repealed provision in
Title 49 and to replace it with a correct reference.
Sec. 1123. Discharge under chapter 12.
This section corrects erroneous references in 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) and (c).
Sec. 1124. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
This section corrects erroneous references in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).
Sec. 1125. Knowing disregard of bankruptcy law or rule.
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This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 156(a) to make stylistic changes and to clarify a reference to
Title 11.
Sec. 1126. Transfen made by nonprofit charitable corporations.
This section makes a nontechnical change. It amends 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 1129(a) to require
that all transfers ofproperty in the bankruptcy case ofa corporation or trust (that is not a
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation or tnIst) are in complete accordance with all laws
governing the transfer ofproperty. This section also amends 11 U.S.C. § 541 to provide that
property held by a corporation exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C.§ 501(c)(3) may be
transferred to an entity that is not such a corporation, but only under the same conditions as
would apply had the debtor not filed a bankruptcy case. These amendments, if adopted, would
apply to pending cases. However, a court would consider whether the application ofthese
amendments to pending cases would substantially affect the rights of a party in interest who first
acquired rights with respect to the debtor postpetition.
Comments: 17ze National Bankruptcy Conference opposes these amendments. which will be
relevant to cases involving hospitals and other nonprofit organizations. By negative implication.
these amendments might suggest that other types ofdebtors do not need to follow otherwise
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Subsection (e). which clarifies that the bankruptcy court need not
remand or refer the matter ofa transfer ofproperty to a nonbankruptcy court, creates an
ambiguity regarding the jurisdiction ofthe bankruptcy court and state court in the sale ofthe
assets ofa not for profit debtor. 17ze provision is also ambiguous when it requires that the court
consider whether these amendments "would substantial(v affect the rights ofa party in interest
whofirst acqUired rights with respect to the debtor" posrpetition.
Ifthis provision is adopted, the following technical comments should be considered. References
to "corporation or trust" are not necessary because the definition ofcorporation includes trust.
See 11 U.S.c. § 101(9). Paragraph (l) ofsection 363(d) should begin with thefollowing clause:
"ifthe debtor is a corporation that is not a moneyed. business, or commercial corporation. ".
Similarly. paragraph (15) ofsection I129(a) should begin with the same clause and the phrase
"ofthe plan" should be deleted and replaced with "under the plan".
17ze amendment made by subsection (c) should be made to 11 u.s. C. § 363 (as new subsection
(P)). not to 1l U.S.c. § 541. 17ze latter portion ofsubsection (d) ofthe amendment, which begins
with "17ze parties who may appear, .. should be a statutory amendment that should read as
follows: (e) Standing. • Section 1109 oftitle II, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end: ..(c) 17ze attorney general ofthe State in which the debtor is incorporated, was formed. or
does business may appear and be heard in any proceeding under section 363(P) or 1129(a)(15)
ofthis title. ..
Sec. 1127. Prohibition on certain actions for failure to incur finance charges.
This section makes a nontechnical change and amends section 127 of the Truth and Lending Act
to prevent a creditor from terminating a credit card account prior to its expiration solely because
a customer has not incurred finance charges on the account. The lender may terminate on
account of3 months' inactivity.
See-112S. Protection ofvalid purchase money security interests.
This section makes a nontechnical change and amends 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(3)(B) to give a creditor
30 days, rather than 20 days, to perfect its interest for an enabling loan.
Comments: 17ze perfection period wasjust increasedfrom 10 to 20 days in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of1994. 17zeperiod should not befurther extended without a demonstration that the
longer period is necessary. Ifthis provision is retained. it shouldpermit the lesser ofthe time
allowed by state law or 30 days.
Sec. 1129. Trustees.
This provision makes a nontechnical change and generally incorporates the provisions ofthe
Private Trustee Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2792, which authorizes district court judicial review of
U.S. trustee decisions to remove tnIstees from the panel or to stop assigning cases to a particular
private trustee or to resolve disputes over trustee expenses. Trustees first must exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking federal court review. The failure of the agency to act
within 90 days satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Trustees then may commence an action in
the district court. The legislation also offers a standard ofreview for the district court: the
district court shall affirm the agency decision unless it is "unreasonable and without cause based
on the administrative record before the agency."
IITLEXII.
Sec. 1201. Effective date; application of amendments.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Act and its amendments take effect 180 days after
the date of enactment. The amendments made by the Act do not apply to cases commenced
before the effective date.
Comments: Like the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978, the effective date ofthis bill should be
deferredfor one year.
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National Bankruptcy Conference
Section by section analysis of S. 625 as passed by the Committee on the Judiciary
[Last Revised May 26, 1999)
Title I - Needs based bankruptcy
Sec. 101. Conversion.
This section pennits a court to convert a case from chapter 7 to chapter 13 with the debtor's
consent, rather than requiring that the debtor~ conversion.
Sec:. 102. Dismissal or conversion.
According to this provision that amends section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 7 case
is presumed to be abusive if the debtor's "current monthly net income'" is sufficient to pay over
5 years the lesser of25% ofgeneral unsecured debts or SI5,OOO. The debtor's expenses are
determined using the IRS collection standards (excluding payments for debts). Priority debts and
secured debts coming due in the following 5 years are also deducted. All chapter 7 debtors must
file statements calculating their current monthly net income and ability to pay under the means
test. The presumption ofabuse may be rebutted only by showing "special circumstances" that
require additional expenses or adjustment of income making the debtor unable to pay the lesser
ofS15,OOO or 25% of general unsecured debts over 5 years. Each item must be documented and
accompanied by a detailed explanation to which the debtor attests under oath.
This provision includes a safe harbor against creditor section 707(b) actions for debtors with
below-median incomes. Only the court, United States trustee, or trustee may bring motions to
dismiss or convert cases under section 707(b) if the debtor has income less than the highest
national or State median family income for a family of equal or lesser size (but the safe harbor is
not adjusted upward for families with more than 4 members). Trustees, U.S. trustees and courts
may challenge all cases on ability to pay grounds as well as bad faith and the totality of
circumstances, including whether the case was filed to reject a personal services contract.
Debtors will be entitled to reasonable costs if a creditor unsuccessfully brings a motion to
dismiss or convert that was not substantially justified or that was brought to coerce the debtor to
waive a right. However, this fee shifting provision is inapplicable if the creditor's claim is less
than $1,000. Trustees who prevail in getting a debtor's case dismissed or converted may get
costs and attorneys' fees against the debtor's attorney if the attorney's action in filing chapter 7
for client was "not substantially justified." The provision also imposes mandatory sanctions on
debtors' attorneys who violate Fed. R. Bania. P. 9011 (Rule 11 sanctions).
Comments: This means test deprives courts ofsuffiCient discretion to identify debtors with
substantial repayment ability and is based on an unrealistic repayment schedule -- 5 years --
I"Current monthly net income" includes income received from all sources within the prior 180
days, divided by 6.
when 3 year plans already are highly susceptible to failure. It is inefficient to require that the
trustee certify ability to payfor every chapter 7 debtor, including those below the median income
level who have less repayment ability.
The IRS collection allowances, which are not mandatory in the tax context, are not appropriate
as a template to determine whether debtors deserve chapter 7 bankruptcy relief The Hyde
amendment unsuccessfully offered in the House would enable a judge to determine necessary
and reasonable expenses for a debtor and the debtor's dependents to assess whether the debtor
has the ability to pay. Adoption ofthe IRS' inflexible and rigid standards will cause many honest
families to lose the benefit ofa fresh start under chapter 7.
Some ofthe problems with the IRS standards can be set out briefly. Because some ofthe
allowances are based on income as well as family size. the IRS expense standards give a higher
food allowance to a single high income person than to a low income family with 6 members. The
means test permits homeowners to deduct their entire mortgage payments, regardless ofthe
amount, in addition to the portion ofthe IRS housing allowance that is not attributable to the
mortgage payment. However, the means test does not make clear how much ofthe IRS housing
allowance may be claimed by homeownersfor housing-related costs. In any event, this portion
ofthe test favors homeowners with high mortgage payments over homeowners with low
mortgage payments. and gives least favored status tofamilies who rent their dwellings.
The transportation allowance affects similarly situated debtors differently as well. The test
disfavors people without any cars who rely on public transportation and creates perverse
incentives by benefitting high income debtors with one or more late-model cars. Each case will
need individualized scrutiny ofthe extent to which the debtor is permitted to deduct "other
necessary expenses"for child care, health care, dependent care ofelderly, taxes, union dues,
and similar expenses.
The reqUired calculation ofcurrent month(v net income (a 6 month average) may overstate or
understate the amount ofincome actually available to pay creditors. For example. ifthe debtor
had an income of$5.000 per monthfor 3 months.followed by 3 months ofzero income, that
debtor will be presumed to have monthly income of$2.500 when in reality she has none. In
addition. including the income ofa nondebtor spouse may create a marriage penalty. The
problems with including nondebtor spouse income are heightened by the exclusion ofthe
expenses ofa separated spouse.
All attorneys representing parties in bankruptcy cases are already subject to Rule 9011 ofthe
Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure. Like Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.
Rule 9011 penalizes attorneys for sanctionable behavior. The bankruptcy system should hold
lawyers answerable to the standards applicable to all lawyers who practice in federal court.
Sec. 103. Notice of alternatives.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) so that an individual seeking bankruptcy relief must
obtain a written notice, prescribed by the United States trustee before the commencement of a
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case. This written notice must contain a briefdescription ofbanlcruptcy options (e.g., chapter 7
versus chapter 13) and credit counseling services approved by the United States trustee.
Comments: Increasing consumers' awareness ofalternatives to bankruptcy is desirable. In some
districts, however, such as the Central District ofCalifornia. a significant ponion ofconsumer
debtors are pro sefilers. These pro sefilers may not know to comply with the requirements
imposed by this provision and the proposedprebankruptcy counseling requirement.
Sec. 104. Debtor financial management training test program.
This section instructs the Executive Office for United States Trustees to consult with a wide
range ofindividuals with expertise in the field ofdebtor education and to develop a financial
management training curriculum and materials. Pilot programs must be established in 6 judicial
districts for a one-year period beginning not later than 270 days after enactment of this Act.
During this one-year period, the Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees must
evaluate the effectiveness of the curriculum and materials as well as other preexisting consumer
education programs. Not later than three months after concluding the evaluation, the Director
must submit a report to Congress.
Comments: To maximize the benefits ofa pilot program. it may take several years to assess
whether the program prevents peoplefrom repeating the mistakes that led them intofinancial
trouble and bankruptcy. In addition, because appropriations wi// be necessary to implement this
provision, section 104 should not become effective until the later ofOctober 1. 2000 or one year
after the date ofenactment ofthis bi//.
Sec. 105. Credit counseling.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 109 so that an individual may not be a debtor in bankruptcy
unless the individual has received credit counseling within 180 days before filing for bankruptcy.
Credit counseling includes, at a minimum, participation in a briefing that outlines the
opportunities for counseling and assists that individual in an initial budget analysis. Individuals
filing for bankruptcy must submit a certificate from the credit counseling service and a copy of
the debt repayment plan, if any. The prebankruptcy counseling requirement is inapplicable if the
United States trustee determines that the approved programs for that district are not reasonably
able to provide adequate services to those seeking counseling as a bankruptcy prerequisite. This
determination must be reviewed by the United States trustee on an annual basis. The counseling
requirement also may be waived by the court if a debto.r certifies the existence of exigent
circumstances and the debtor requested counseling services but was unable to obtain services for
a five day period. This exemption expires 30 days after the debtor files a petition for relief. This
provision also offers a rebuttal to the proposed presumptions of bad faith repeat filings if the
prior case was dismissed due to the creation ofa debt repayment plan.
This section conditions a discharge on the completion of an instructional course on personal
financial management, notwithstanding the fact that the pilot program established in section 104
of this bill is not yet completed. Although the requirement may be waived for a chapter 13
debtor if there are no appropriate services available, the requirement may not be waived for a
chapter 7 debtor.
Comments: Courts should retain adequate discretion to waive the prebankruptcy counseling
requirement ifit imposes an undue hardship. The implementation ofa mandatoryfinancial
management course should be deferred until completion ofthe pilot programs established in
section 104 ofthis bi//.
Title IT - Enhanced consumer protection
Subtitle A. Penalties for abusive creditor practices
Sec. 201. Promotion of alternative dispute resolution.
This provision does not address alternative dispute resolution as that term is generally defined,
but rather attempts to induce parties to restructure debts outside ofbankruptcy. It authorizes a
court to reduce an unsecured consumer debt claim by up to 20% ifthe debtor proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the creditor holding the claim refused to negotiate a reasonable
alternative repayment schedule offered by the debtor at least 60 days before banlauptcy if that
repayment schedule would have satisfied at least 60% of the debt over a reasonable period. The
court's authority to reduce claims on this basis does not apply to nondischargeable debts. This
provision also protects payments from avoidance as preferential transfers if the payments were
part of an alternative repayment plan created by an approved credit counseling agency.
Comments: Further study is necessary to determine whether this provision is necessary or
desirable. As a technical maller, the appropriate burden ofprooffor bankruptcy proceedings
and contested matters is by a preponderance ofthe evidence. not clear and convincing evidence.
Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
Sec. 202. Effect of discharge.
Under this section, a creditor's willful failure to properly credit repayment plan distributions
violates the injunction automatically imposed by II U.S.C. § 524 when a debtor receives a
discharge.
Comments: The provision does not amplify the scope ofthe discharge injunction in other
important areas (e.g., i//egal reaffirmations) and thus is less protective ofthe discharge
injunction than the parallelprovision in last year's Senate bi// (section 203). This provision
should apply to plans under chapter 12for fami/yfarmers as well as chapter 13 and chapter 11:
a reference should be added to "sections lJ29. 1225, and 1325 oftitle lJ. ..
Sec. 203. Violations of the automatic stay.
This provision makes it a violation of the automatic Slay to threaten a debtor of an intention to
bring a complaint declaring a debt nondischargeable or to dismiss or convert the debtor's case if
such threats are made for the purpose ofcoercing the debtor to sign a reaffirmation ag:-eement.
However, creditors are not enjoined from a "recitation of the creditor's legal rights."
Comments: To prevent coercive activities. the "recitation ofrights" exception should be deleted.
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Sec. 204. Discouraging abuse of reaffirmation practices.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 524 to provide that a debtor is entitled to a hearing regarding
a reaffinnation ofan unsecured debt, during which the coun would decide whether "the
agreement is an undue hardship, not in the debtor's best interest, and not the result of a threat by
the creditor to take any action that cannot be legally taken or that is not intended to be taken."
However, this requirement is waivable by debtors represented by counsel. This provision does
not authorize hearings for reaffirmation ofnominally secured debts. The provision also
authorizes greater law enforcement on the state and federal levels to address illegal reaffinnation
agreements.
Comments: The law enforcement provisions may help to address illegal reaffirmatiOns.
However. the amendment to section 524 ofthe Bankruptcy Code does not substantially change
the proceduresfor l@ reaffirmations. Current law has proven to be inadequate in screening
reaffirmations ofdebt that the debtor cannot afford and that impede the debtor's ability to satisfy
critical postbankruptcy obligations. This problem is heightened ifcreditors are permitted to
bring section 707(b) motions and re{v on additional exceptions to discharge. the threat ofwhich
may be used as leverage to extract reaffirmation agreements. Ifreaffirmations are not otherwise
restricted. reaffirmation review should be mandatolJ' for at least all unsecured and nominally
secured debts. It would be helpful to enhance disclosures ofthe cosrs as well.
Subtitle B - Priority Child Support
Sec. 211. Priorities for claims for domestic support obligations.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 507(a), the provision that determines priorities in distribution
among expenses and debts. The amendment moves domestic support obligations from "seventh
priority" to "first priority." Because the definition of domestic support obligation now includes
debts owed to the government, those government debts are entitled to "first priority" as well.
However, the amendment specifies that any first priority distribution should first be applied to
satisfy the claims of support recipients and then to government units.
Comments: Right now, the expenses of administering the banlcruptcy estate are entitled to "first
priority." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(I), 503(b). Administrative expenses have first priority so the
trustee may incur the expenses necessary to liquidate property and make distributions to
creditors. If a debtor has significant support obligations, and support is "first priority," the trustee
will not be able to liquidate and distribute property. Instead, the trustee may have to "abandon"
properly- give it back to the debtor- rather than distributing the proceeds. Thus, while it may
be legally correct to say that this bill puts child support "first" under section 507 of the
Bankruptcy Code, that statement is somewhat misleading. Apart from the issue related to
subordination of administrative expenses moving from "seventh priority" to "first priority"
makes little practical difference: the debts that have second through sixth priorities almost never
appear in consumer cases. Those priorities deal with debts of grain storage facility operators,
debts of fishermen, employee wage claims, retail layaway claims, and the like. Taking all
factors into consideration, this amendment would have an effect in fewer than 1% ofall chapter
7 cases.
Sec. 212. Requirements to obtain confirmation and discharge in cases involving domestic
support obligations.
This section provides that the debtor cannot obtain a discharge after completing payments under
a chapter 13 plan unless he certifies that domestic support obligations have been paid, but the
details continue to be under discussion.
Sec. 213. Exceptions to automatic stay in domestic support obligation proceedings.
This section adds additional exceptions to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). According
to these amendments, the automatic stay does not enjoin actions to impose or enforce wage
orders for domestic support obligations, the interception of tax refunds, the enforcement of
medical obligations. or actions to y.ithhold, suspend, or restrict licenses of the debtor for
delinquency in support obligations.
Sec. 214. Nondischargeability of certain debts for alimony, maintenance, and SUPP0rL
This section amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) to except from discharge all domestic support
obligations. This section also makes a substantial change to II U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). This
provision currently permits a coun to find that a property settlement (that is not in the nature of
support) is excepted from discharge~ the coun finds (l) that the debtor does not have the
ability to pay the obligation or (2) that discharging the debt would result in a benefit to the debtor
that oun.veighs the detrimental consequences to the ex-spouse or children. The amendment
eliminates these two conditions so that all property settlements will be nondischargeable.
Comments: There will be times when this change to the treatment ofpropeny settlements will
work hardship on spouses and children collecting support. A custodial parent and child mayjile
for bankruptcy after they have difficulty collecting payments from an ex-spouse and thus cannot
meet their day to day obligarions. As a result ofthis amendment. somejinancially troubled
spouses and children whofile for bankruptcy because they have not been receiving their support
poyments will be unable to discharge debts they may owe to their wealthier spouses as a result of
a propeny settlement. In addition, some ex-spouses do not receive support because they are
financially independent or have remarried andjoinedjinancial stable households. Another
scenario that reveals the odd effects ofrhis amendment is when a debtor has been married and
divorced twice. Thefirst former spouse may need child support from the debtor. The second
former spouse may be wealthy and remarried and does not receive support from the debtor but
has a propert)' settlement with the debtor. If this amendment becomes law. the support
obligation to the firsr spouse and the property settlement to the second spouse would both be
nondischargeable and have the same starus after bankruptcy: if the debtor lacks suffiCient funds
to pay both, the support recipient. who hasfewer resources to seek collection. may suffer.
Sec, 215. Continued liability of property.
TIlls amendment pennits nondischargeable domestic support obligations to be collected from
property - even property that state law makes exempt from collection or attaclunent - after
bankruptcy.
Comments: This provision overrides wage exemptions. property exemptions, and state laws
protecting tenancies by the entireties. It is unclear whether this provision actuall.~' will benefit
families or whether it instead will benefit government agencies, panicularl.v because overriding
homestead exemptions may have the effect ofremovingfamilies from their homes.
Sec. 216. Protection of domestic support claims against preferential transfer motions.
TIlls section amends 11 U.S.C. § 547, the provision that allows avoidance, and ultimately
recovery, ofpre-bankruptcy transfers that were "preferential." The amendment prevents a
trustee from seeking recovery of a prepetition "domestic support obligation."
Comments: With respect to actual support recipients, this amendment does not substantially
change current law. A 1994 amendment protects ex-spouses and children from having to give
back "preferential" support payments received prepetition. See 11 U.s.c. § 547(c)(7). The
amendment changes current law by insulating preferential payments made to governmental
units. Insulating those payments to the government may, in some cases, hurt an ex-spouse and
:I: child ofthe debtor because those funds otherwise would be available for ongoing support
I payments and instead have been applied to old support debts preferentially paid to the
:d government.
Sec. 217. Amendment to section 1325 of title 11, United States Code.Under this section, when
calculating the disposable income available for payment of nonpriority unsecured claims, one
must account for reasonable child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments
for a dependent child.
Sec. 218. Definition of domestic support obligation.
TIlls provision adds a definition of "domestic support obligation" to 11 U.S.C. § 101, the general
definition section of the Bankruptcy Code. The new definition includes any debt, whether
accrued before or after the bankruptcy filing if: the debt is owed or recoverable to a spouse, ex-
spouse, child, legal guardian, or a governmental unit; the debt is in the nature ofalimony,
maintenance, or support, regardless of its designation, established or subject to establislunent by
reason of a separation agreement, divorce decree, property senlement agreement, court order, or
determination made by a governmental unit; and the debt has not been assigned to a
nongovernmental unit, other than a debt collector. TIlls definition is relevant to subsequent
provisions that give certain rights to the holders of domestic support obligations and impose
additional requirements on debtors who owe these obligations.
Sec. 219. Collection of child support.
TIlls section imposes duties on trustees in chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases to assist suppOI1
recipient creditors of the debtors in determining how they can enforce their rights.
Comments: Authorizing suppon recipients to request information regarding the debtor's
location from a creditor should be coupled with a requirement that the creditorproduce that
information.
Subtitle C - Other Consumer Protections
Sec. 221. Amendments to discourage abusive bankruptcy filings.
TIlls provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 110 to bolster the requirements and penalties for nonlawyer
petition preparers, including those employed by lawyers, to ensure that they do not offer legal
advice. In particular, the provision delineates the components ofa mandatory wrinen notice to
debtors regarding what they can and cannot expect from petition preparers. In addition, the
provision authorizes the promulgation ofrules or guidelines establishing the maximwn fee that a
petition preparer may charge for services. The provision also authorizes the court, "as part of its
contempt power:' to enjoin a bankruptcy petition preparer who has failed to comply with a prior
order under section 110 and may impose treble damages under certain circwnstances. Any fines
collected are to be given to the United States trustee to be used for nationwide enforcement of
restrictions on nonla....'Yer petition preparers.
Sec. 225. Sense of the Congress.
TIlls provision states that "[i]t is the sense of the Congress that States should develop curricula
relating to the subject ofpersonal finance, designed for use in elementary and secondary
schools."
Sec. 226. Additional amendments to title 11, United States Code.
TIlls section amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) to explicitly except from discharge debts resulting
from drunk boating and amends II U.S.C. § 507(a) to give priority status to allowed claims for
death and personal injuries resulting from drunk boating or drunk driving.
Comments: All priority debts must be repaid in full in the course ofa chapter 13 plan. Hence.
granting priority status to this or any other type ofdebt decreases the likelihood that chapter 13
debtors with a debt ofthis kind will be able to confirm a plan and repay any debts in chapter 13.
Sec. 227. Protection of retirement savings in bankruptcy.
TIlls provision amends II U.S.C. § 522 to exempt qualified retirement funds that are exempt
from taxation under various provisions ofthe Intemal Revenue Code. TIlls provision makes the
automatic stay inapplicable to wage deductions for pensions, profit sharing or other such plans to
the extent that those amounts are used solely for payments relating to a loan from an ERISA
qualified plan, except for debts incurred within 1 year prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. In
addition, loans borrowed from retirement plans are excepted from discharge under section
523(a), except for loans made within I year prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Finally,
section 1322 is amended to provide that a chapter 13 plan may not "materially alter" the terms of
a loans from retirement funds.
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Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supportS this provision. It would be helpful to
add the following language to the end of the amendment to section 1325: "For purposes of the
plan only, any such loan shall be treated as a nonrecourse loan secured by the assets of the
applicable pension, profitsharing, stock bonus, or other plan. No plan established under sections
401,403, 408(A), 414, 457, or 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or permitted under
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act may be disqualified as a result of the
repayment ofany loan to such plan made in accordance with a confirmed plan under this
chapter....
Title III - Discouraging Bankruptcy Abuse
Sec. 301. Reinforce tbe fresh start.
This section clarifies that the exception to discharge for court costs applies only to prisoners.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this amendment.
Sec. 302. Discouraging bad faith repeat filings.
Under this provision, the automatic stay temtinates 30 days after the filing ofa petition for relief
under title 11 by an individual if the individual was a debtor in another case that was dismissed
within the previous year. A party in interest may seek an extension of the stay by showing that
the later case is in good faith. A case presumptively is not in good faith if the debtor filed more
than one previous case \\ithin the year, if a prior case was dismissed after the debtor did not file
the requisite documents without substantial excuse, if the debtor did not provide adequate
protection, if the debtor did not perform the terms ofa confirmed plan, or if the debtor's financial
condition and personal affairs have not changed substantially since the last case was dismissed.
In addition, a case presumptively is not in good faith as to a particular creditor if the creditor
sought relief from the automatic stay in the prior case and that action was pending upon
dismissal or had been resolved in the creditor's favor. A presumption that a case is not in good
faith is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. The automatic stay does not apply at all to
the case of an individual who has been a debtor in two or more dismissed cases \\ithin the
previous year, although a party in interest may request that a stay be imposed by showing that the
case is in good faith (with presumptions similar to those listed above).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports restrictions to deter abusive repeat
filings. subject to some minor technical revisions. The standardfor rebutting a presumption
should be by a preponderance ofthe evidence. as is generally the standard in bankruptcy
matters. not clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 303. Curbing abusive filings.
nus section establishes standards for the application of in rem orders that make the automatic
stay inapplicable to an identified property interest in furure cases. nus order may be issued upon
a court finding that the filing ofa bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors involving the transfer ofan interest in real property or multiple bankruptcy
filings affecting that property. An in rem order remains in effect for two years, although parties
may obtain relief from an in rem order for good cause or changed circumstances. In addition,
this provision makes the automatic stay inapplicable to any act to enforce a lien against property
ofa debtor who is ineligible for bankruptcy relief pursuant to II U.S.C. § 109(g) or a prior court
order. A governrnent agency that accepts notices ofinterests or liens in property must accept a
certified copy of in rem order.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. To resolve a slight
inconsistency. the reference in section 362(d){4) should be changed so that the two-yearperiod
in that provision runs from the date ofthe entry ofthe order, not the recording. This can be
accomplished by striking "not later than 2 years after that recording" and inserting "not later
than 2 years after the entry ofthe order ". The proposed automatic stay exception that permits
lien enforcement against the property ofindividuals ineligiblefor bankruptcy may lead to some
wrongful repossessions andforeclosures.
Sec. 304. Debtor retention of personal property securit)',
nus section prohibits the "ridethrough" of secured debt obligations in chapter 7. If a debtor does
not redeem or reaffirm a debt secured by personal property \\ithin 45 days after the first meeting
ofcreditors, the creditor may take any action against the property permitted under applicable
nonbankruptcy law unless the court determines on the motion ofa trustee \\ithin the 45 day
period that the property is of consequential value to the bankruptcy estate. This section also
clarifies that redemption requires payment in a single lump sum.
Comments: This pro\'ision makes a substantial change to the law andpractice in several circuits
while it codtfies the law ofother cirCUits. /fthis provision is retained, some minor refinements
would be helpful. For example, ifthe debtor is contesting the validity of, or is seeking to allOid,
the security interest (similar to the proposed section 521(c) that creates an exception for
voidable security interests). or ifthe debtor attacks a securiry interest as being invalid under
state law, the properry should not be abandoned to the creditor. With respect to redemption. it is
appropriate to clarify that a debtor must provide a lump sum payment to the parry holding a
security interest in that property.
Sec. 305. Relief from the automatic stay when tbe debtor does not complete intended
surrender of consumer debt collateral.
This section authorizes automatic stay relief without court permission if a debtor fails to file a
statement of intention or to follow through on the debtor's statement of intention (unless the
statement specifies reaffinnation and the creditor refuses to reaffirm on the original contract
terms), except if the court determines on the motion of a trustee that the property is of
consequential value or benefit to the estate, in which case the court must order adequate
protection for the creditor and the debtor must deliver the property to the trustee.
Comments: The trustee mayface liabilityfor accounting and storing items delivered by the
debtor. It may be preferable to require delivery only at the request ofthe trustee. This provision
should be revised to provide that a debtor's failure to file a statement ofintention or to follow
through on a statement ofintention triggers abandonment ofthe property to the debtor, and the
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creditor may exercise its rights except to the extent that it seeks to enforce ipso facto clauses
triggered by the bankruptcy or insolvency ofthe debtor.
Sec. 306. Giving secured creditors fair treatment in chapter 13.
According to subsection (a), the holder ofan allowed secured claim retains its lien until the
debtor pays the entire debt (including the unsecured ponion) or until receipt of a chapter 13
discharge. Under subsection (b), debts secured by cars incurred within 5 years before
banlauptcy shall be treated as fully secured, regardless of the value of the car. Debts secured by
other items incurred ....ithin 6 months before banlauptcy shall be treated as fully secured,
regardless of the value of the collateral. Subsection (c) adds a definition of debtor's principal
residence, providing that it is "a residential structure, including incidental propeny, without
regard to whether that structure is attached to real propeny." This means that debts partially
secured by depreciating mobile homes may not be modified in chapter 13 repayment plans.
Comments: Current law is divided on whether a lien is released when the allowed secured
claim has been paid offor when the repayment plan has been completed. See In re Johnson, 213
B.R. 552 (Bank. N.D. flI. 1997) (collecting cases split on question oflien retention). This
provision may encourage some debtors to remain committed to their repayment plans. It may
also result in a higher rate ofrepossessions ofcollateral.
The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes the provision that eliminates the stripdown of
partially secured debt and includes accrued interest and penalty charges. This provision diverts
value from general unsecured creditors infavor ofundersecured creditors. The Bankruptcy
Code should give creditors what they otherwise would receive under state law; treating a
creditor as fully secured when that creditor's interest is substantia/~v undersecured deviates from
this fundamental principle. If this provision is adopted norwithstanding these concerns. the five
year period should be reduced to 90 dars, should exclude retail charge card debts, and should
exclude nonpurchase money securiry interests.
The definition ofdebtor's principal residence should exclude mobile homes, which depreciate
and are security for extensions ofcredit priced like consumer loans instead ofmortgage loans.
Sec. 307. Exemptions.
To be subject to the exemption laws ofa state, a debtor must be domiciled in a state for the 730
days immediately preceding banlauptcy, not just the greater ponion of that period.
Comments: This provision leaves ambiguous the rights ofdebtors who have not lived in a state
for 730 days prior to filing for bankruptcy. An additional clause should be added to clarify that
a debtor who has not lived in a statefor 730 days may use federal exemptions. This can be
accomplished by adding at the end ofsection 522(b){2){A), as amended by this provision, the
following: ", but if the debtor's domicile has not been located in one placefor the 730 days
preceding the date ofthe filing ofthe petition, the debtor may exempt from property ofthe estate
the property listed in subsection (d) ofthis section. "
Sec. 308. Residenc~' requirement for homestead exemption.
This section provides that the exemption ofa debtor's equity in a homestead shall be reduced to
the extent such value is attributable to any ponion ofproperty that the debtor "disposed of'
within 730 days before the banlcruptcy petition date with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a
creditor.
Comments: Current law already authorizes the avoidance oftransfers, or the denial ofa
discharge altogether, when debtors transfer property with the actual intent to hinder. delay, or
defraud within one year before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition. II U.S. C. §§ 548(a){l).
727(a)(2). Trustees also may recover constructivefraudulent transfers within oneyear before
filingfor bankruptcy. Id. § 548(a)(2). In addition, using applicable state law, trustees may
recover actual or constructive fraudulent conveyances transfers made within 2. 4, or in some
states even 6 years before the bankruptcyfiling. Id. § 544(b). This provisionfails to close the
loophole in current bankruptcy law: fraudulent transfer laws do not protect creditors in the
cases ofindividuals who amass considerable wealth in exempt property but do not make any
transfers. To prevent debtors from discharging their debts while retaining propert)' ofhigh
value, a cap should be imposed on all homestead exemptions.
Sec. 309. Protecting secured creditors in chapter 13 cases.
Under subsection (a), upon conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7, claims are considered ful1y
secured unless the claim already has been paid in full, notwithstanding any valuation or
determination of the allowed secured claim in chapter 13. Prebanlauptcy defaults not ful1y cured
are given the same effect as under applicable nonbanlauptcy law. Under subsection (b),leased
personal property is not protected once a lease is rejected or not timely assumed by the trustee.
A procedure is offered by which debtors can assume leases themselves. In individual chapter II
and chapter 13 cases, the lease is deemed rejected at the conclusion of the confirmation hearing.
Under subsection (c), the chapter 13 trustee is authorized to make preconfirmation disnibutions
to secured creditors as "adequate protection" payments, the amount of which may be modified
by the coun on notice and hearing.
Comments: Subsection (a) should pennit a debtor seeking to redeem property in a converted
case to apply to the redemption price all chapter 13 plan payments and adequare protection
payments. Subsection (b) should be revised to state that leases rejected or nottime~vassumed
are abandoned to the debtors, with an opportunity to cure defaults.
Sec. 310. Limitation on luxury goods.
Credit card cash advances aggregating more than $750 within 70 days before banlauptcy will be
presumed nondischargeable. Debts to a single creditor aggregating more than $250 for "luxury
goods or services" incurred within 90 days before banlauptcy will be presumed
nondischargeable.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference general~v opposes provisions that prefer one
type ofcreditor over others. This provision limits chapter 7 debt relieffor debtors ofall income
levels and expands nondischargeabiliryfor the benefit ofcredit card lenders. IfCongress
decides to amend section 523(a){2)(C) to substantially reduce the dollar threshold (the current
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threshold is 11.075) triggering a presumption ofnondischargeabilityfor credit card debts. the
presumptive period should be shortened to 30 days and should exclude cash advances.
Sec. 311. Automatic stay.
This section creates new exceptions to the automatic stay that expand the ability of residential
landlords to take action against debtors without first seeking leave from the court. Landlords
may continue eviction or unlawful detainer actions if the lease terminated prepetition. if the
debtor does not paid rent after the commencement of the case, if the debtor filed a previous case
within the last year and failed to pay postpetition rent during the course of that case, if the
eviction action is based on "endangerment to property or person or the use of illegal drugs."
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes exceptions to the automatic
stay that prefer one type ofcreditor to others. This provision gives wide latitude for landlords to
evict individuals filing for bankruptcy even ifthe debtor is making rent payments postpetition. If
a provision to protect landlords is thought to be necessary. this provision should be replaced
with a provision authorizing landlords to receive expedited relieffrom the automatic stay. The
following provision is an example: Section 362 oftitle 11. United States Code is amended by
adding at the end thereof- "(j) Ifa lessor ofresidential real property makes a request for relief
under subsection (d) ofthis section and the debtor has not paid rent that first became due after
the commencement ofthe case. the stay provided by subsection (a){3) ofthis section is
terminated with respect to the lessor 20 days after request is filed. unless the debtor files and
serves upon such lessor a wrirren objection to the request. ".
Sec. 312. Extend period between bankruptcy discharges.
This section amends II U.S.c. § 727(a)(8) to prevent a chapter 7 debtor from receiving a
discharge ifhe received a discharge in a prior case under chapter 7 or II commenced within
eight years before the filing of the petition in the instant case. If a chapter 13 debtor pre\iously
received a discharge under any chapter ~ithin the prior five years before the instant case
commenced, he cannot receive a discharge even if he completes a new repayment plan.
Comments: This provision imposes a longer bar on the receipt ofa subsequent discharge
following a successful chapter J3 repayment plan than after receiving a discharge in chapter 7.
Sec. 313. Definition of household goods and antiques.
This section contains an exclusive list of what items (and how many) are household goods for
purposes oflien avoidance under II U.S.C. § 522(f). According to this list, a piece of electronic
entertainment equipment is not a household good except for "one television, one radio, and one
VCR." A computer is a household good only if it is used primarily for the education or
entertainment of minor children.
Comments: It is nearly impossible to construct an exhaustive list ofgoods that appropriately
accounts for all types of families and circumstances. If statutory guidance is thought to be
necessary, the Senate should consider deleting this provision and replacing it with section 145 of
H.R. 833 as passed by the House.
Sec. 314. Debts incurred to pay nondischargeable debts.
This section adds an exception to discharge when the "debtor incurred the debt to pay such a
nondischargeable debt with the intent to discharge in bankruptcy the newly-created debt." It
makes nondischargeable all debts incurred to pay nondischargeable debts within 70 days
regardless of the debtor's intent (except for debtors owing domestic suppon obligations for
which there are filed claims). Subsection (b) amends 11 U.S.C. § 1328 so that a debtor who
completes a 3 to 5 year chapter 13 plan may not discharge debts that are nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (3)(B), (a)(4), and (a)(6) (if resulting from a willful and malicious injuzy
by the debtor that caused personal injuzy or death), including credit card debts and cash advances
under section 523(a)(2).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this expansion ofthe exceptions to
discharge. For a credit card debt to be nondischargeable. a creditor should be required to
prove each element offraud by the preponderance ofthe evidence. The domestic support
obligation exception creates a preferencefor divorcedfamilies over intactfamilies but would not
work in most cases because it is triggered by the time(vfiling ofa domestic support obligation
claim; over 95% ofall nonbusiness chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases and creditors are directed
not to file proofs ofclaim. Ifthis provision is retained. it should be referenced in JJ U.S.c. §
523(c). like other exceptions to discharge that should be litigated during the course ofthe
bankruptcy case. As a technical marrero the reference in the amendment to section 727 should be
deleted. Section 727 deals with objections to a chapter 7debtor receiving a discharge ofdebts
overall. not the nondischargeabi/ity ofa particular debt.
The National Bankruptcy Conference supports subsection (b) to the extent that it excludes from
the superdischarge debts falling under section 523(a){6) that result from a willfUl and malicious
injury by the debtor that caused personal injury or death. However. ifthe scope ofthe discharge
in chapter 7 and chapter J3 are relatively coextensive byexceptingfrom discharge credit card
debts and cash advances under section 523(a)(2) • the incentive to file chapter J3 is reduced.
Sec. 315. Giving creditors fair notice in chapters 7 and 13 cases.
This provision permits creditors to identify their preferred address for notices from the court and
from the debtor. Failure to give notice to the designated address and to include the debtor's
name, address, and taxpayer identification number will invalidate the legal effect ofthe notice.
This provision also amplifies debtors' duties under II U.S.C. § 521. The additional duties
primarily are informational requirements, such as tax returns and income statements. Creditors
may request access to documents and couns must comply within 5 days of such request. This
provision also directs the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to establish
procedures safeguarding the confidentiality of tax information within 30 days after the date of
enactment and to submit a repon to Congress on this mater within a year after the date of
enactment.
Comments: The court filing registry is a desirable method ofensuring that creditors re-:eive
notice. although it may be infeasible to constantly update the registry. Quarterly or bi-annual(v
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should be sufficient. Failure to include the taxpayer identification number on notices should not
invalidate the legal effect ofnotice. The informational requirements should not come into effect
until the Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts has implemented a procedure to
safeguard the privacy oftax information.
Sec. 316. Dismissal for failure to timely file schedules or provide required information.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 521 so that cases are dismissed automatically if individual
debtors do not submit all required information within the statutory deadline. Extensions of up to
45 days may be granted if a court finds a '1ustification" to do so.
Comments: The need to obtain information from the Internal Revenue Service may hinder a
debtor's ability to comply in a timelyfashion. panicularly ifthe debtor has filed electronically
and thus does not have copies ofhis or her tax returns.
Sec. 317. Adequate time to prepare for hearing on confirmation ofthe plan.
Under this section, 11 U.S.C. § 1324 is amended to provide that a confirmation hearing may be
held no later than 45 days after the section 341 meeting of creditors. In addition. this pro\ision
requires that a plan be filed not later than 90 days after the order of relief, with extensions
available due to circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable.
Comments: The provisions ofthis amendment, taken together. appear to require that the .-:t!r)
confirmation hearing precedes the filing ofthe plan. //c r~ ;.0-'~ ~:'" / ~
Sec. 318. Chapter 13 plans to have a 5-year duration in certain cases.
This section requires 5-year chapter 13 plans for cases converted from chapter 7.
Comments: Given the fact that two thirds of confirmed chapter 13 plans already are not
completed, it is not sensible to increase the length of repayment plans, during which debtors
must dedicate all disposable income. If this provision is retained, it should be redrafted to
require that the plan is the shorter of 5 years or the time necessary to repay 100% ofdebts.
Sec. 319. Sense of the Congress regarding expansion of rule 9011 ofthe Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure.
This provision expresses the sense of Congress that Rule 9011 should be modified to include a
requirement that all documents, including schedules, should be submitted to a court or trustee
only after the debtor or the debtor's attorney has made reasonable inquiry to verify that the
information is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Sec. 320. Prompt relief from stay in individual cases.
Ifcourts do not rule on motions for automatic stay relief within 60 days, this section provides
that the stay terminates automatically in the case ofan individual debtor unless the parties agree
to an extension of the deadline or the court orders an extension for "good cause."
Comments: Effons to establish firm time limits for couns to issue rulings have not been effective
in the past. Issues oftiming should be handled by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
ofthe Judicial Conference ofthe United States.
Sec. 321. Treatment of certain earnings of an individual debtor who fUes a voluntary case
under chapter 11.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(6) so that future income ofan individual debtor in
chapter 11 is property ofthe estate, except in involuntary cases.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this amendment. Postpetition
earnings are propeny ofthe estate in a chapter 13 case. but there are many substantial
differences between chapter 11 and chapter 13 that should be explored thoroughly before taking
this significant step. Capping unlimited homestead exemptions would go a long way toward
increasing creditors' entitlements in the cases ofwealthy individuals, as it would require that
chapter 11 debtors pay their creditors the amount ofequity that exceeded the exemption cap.
This amendment does not take into consideration how the debtor's liVing expenses will be
provided. since some courts have found that they are not administrative expenses. Ifthere are
concerns about the ways in which these provisions operate in the case ofan individual debtor,
those specific concerns should be explored and addressed direct(v. This amendment could be
scaled back to app(v only to the earnings generated by the debtor's business, as opposed to
earnings from the debtor's human capital that is necessary to cover basic necessities.
To the extent that this amendment is perceived to be necessary to control "super-rich"
individuals who use chapter 11 to hidefrom criminal sanctions, it may be he/pfulto consider
that the Bankruptcy Code contains provisions intended to prevent criminals from using
bankruptcy as a shield. For example, the automatic stay does not protect a debtor against police
and regulatory actions, and that exception was recently broadened significantly in the Omnibus
Appropriations bill last fall. See 11 U.s.c. § 362(b){4). In addition, criminalfines and
restitution orders are not dischargeable. Id., § 523(a)(7), (l3).
Title IV - General and Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions.
Subtitle A- General Business Bankruptcy Provisions.
Sec. 401. Rolling stock equipment.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. §§ 1168 and 1110 to provide even greater protections to creditors
secured by rolling stock equipment and aircraft and lessors of the same. These amendments
require that a trustee or debtor-in-possession perform all obligations and cure all defaults in
accordance with the terms of such security agreement. lease, or conditional sale contract, and
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required that a trustee surrender property if the vendor or lessor makes a written demand and
otherwise would be entitled to take possession.
Comments: The amendment to section 1110 ofthe Bankruptcy Code legislatively overrules
Western Pacific Airlines, Inc. v. Gatt Capital, 221 B.R. 1 (D. Colo. 1998). These amendments
expand, but do not dramatically change, the protection for aircraft and rolling stock lessors and
secured creditors that the Bankruptcy Code alreadyprovides. The National Bankruptcy
Conference generally opposes special interest provisions that provide preferential treatmentfor
a particular type ofcreditor to the detriment ofother creditors, andfor this reason has
recommended in the past that these provisions be deleted.
Sec. 402. Adequate protection for investors.
This section adds another exception to the automatic stay permitting a securities self regulatory
organization to commence or continue an investigation or action, other than for monetary
sanctions, without first seeking court approval.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes provisions that prefer a
particular l)pe ofcreditor over other creditors. The expansion ofexceptions to the automatic
stayfor regulatory actions through this bill and section 603 ofthe Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (striking 11 u.s.c. § 362(bj(4) and
(b)(5) and replacing them with a new provision). heightens the importance ofimposing explicit
/imitations to narrowly define the police and regulatory power statutorily to exclude actions
takenfor purely pecuniary purposes. making the following amendment necessary:
Section 362 oftitle 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following-
(i) In this section. ''police and regularory power" excludes any act, action, or
proceeding that affects properl)' oforfrom the estate to secure or satisfy. in whole or in part. a
debt.
Sec. 403. Meetings of creditors and equity security holders.
Under this section, the court is authorized to waive the requirement of a section 341 meeting of
creditors after notice and a hearing if the debtor files a prepackaged plan of reorganization.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. which will enhance
the efficiency ofprepacl«Jged plans ofreorganization. However, the Conference recommends
that the proposed section 341(e) reads in accordance with the following amendment: Section 34J
oftitle JJ, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following - "(e)
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) in a case under chapter 9 or J1 ofthis title in which a
plan has been filed for which, before the meeting ofcreditors or equity security holders under
this section, a hearing on confirmation has been scheduled. on the request ofa parry in interest
and after notice and a hearing, the court may order that the United States trustee postpone the
meeting pending the hearing on confirmation. and, ifthe plan is confirmed, order that the
meeting not be held. "
Sec:. 404. Protection of refinance ofsecurit)' interest.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) so that a transfer is deemed to be made at the time
such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee if the transferee perfects its
interest within 30 days, rather than 10 days.
Comments: This extension ofthe relation-backperiod may trap and harm the interests of
creditors who extend credit in reliance on the lack ofa perfected securil)' interest in specified
collateral.
Sec:. 405. Executory contracts and unexpired leases.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) to replace the 60-day period with a 120-day period to
assume or reject a nonresidential real property lease. After 120 days, the court may extend the
deadline only on the motion ofthe lessor, unlike current law that permits extensions for cause.
Comments: This provision will preclude the reorganization ofsome businesses, particularly
seasonal businesses, and willforce some debtors in possession to make premature decisions
regarding their leases. to the potential detriment ofother creditors ifthe business ultimately is
liquidated. See In re Klein Sleep Prods., 78 F.3d J8 (2d Cir. 1996) (obligations under assumed
tease are entitled to administrative expense priority iflease is later rejected). Ideal~v, section
'105 instead should read asfollows: Section 365(d){4} oftitle 11. United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following - "The court may extend the period during which the trustee
orplan proponent must elect to assume or reject a lease ofnonresidential real property until no
later than the date ofentry ofthe order confirming the plan. but such assumption or rejection
shall occur on or before the earlier of- (A) the effective date ofthe plan; (B) conversion ofthe
case; or (C) dismissal ofthe case. ". "
Sec. 406. Creditors and equity securit)· holders committees.
This section clarifies that courts may review appointments to creditors' and equity security
holders' committees to ensure adequate representation ofcreditors or equity security holders.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the explicit authori=ation ofcourts to
review appointments to committees to ensure adequate representation, which resolves a split in
the case law and recognizes that adequate representation is a question oflawfor which parties
should have legal redress.
Sec. 407. Amendment to section 546 oC title II, United States Code.
This section prohibits a trustee from avoiding a warehouseman's lien for storage, transportation
or other costs incidental to the storage and handling of goods, notwithstanding the trustee's
otherwise applicable power to avoid those liens under II U.S.C. § 545.
Comments: To the extent that a statutory lien protected by this provision would be ineffective
against a bona fide purchaser, the National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this amendment.
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Sec. 408. Limitation.
This section extends the period provided by 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(I)(B) from 20 to 45 days.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes the unwarranted expansion of
reclamation rights that is prejudicial to the interests ofother creditors and to the estate.
Sec. 409. Amendment to section 330(a) of title 11, United States Code.
nus provision amends II U.S.C. § 330(a) so that the factors guiding courts in awarding
compensation apply specifically to examiners, chapter II trustees, and professional persons.
When determining trustees' compensation, the court "shall treat such compensation as a
commission based on the results achieved." In addition, this provision re-Iabels the
subparagraphs to cure a teclmical problem.
Sec. 410. Postpetition disclosure and solicitation.
nus section permits postpetition solicitation of votes prior to court approval of a disclosure
statement in a prepackaged plan of reorganization, but only for holders ofclaims solicited prior
to commencement of the case in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this provision. To fulfill the intent of
the amendment. it should be revised to read asfollows: Section /115 oftitle 11. United States
Code. is amended by adding at the end the following - "(g) Notwithstanding subsection (b). an
acceptance or rejection ofthe plan may be solicitedfrom a holder ofa claim or interest ifsuch
solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and ifthe solicitation began before the
commencement ofthe case and was in compliance with any applicable nonbankruptcy law. rule.
or regulation governing the adequacy ofdisclosure in connection with the solicitation or. ifthere
is not any such law. rule. or regulation. the solicitation occurred after disclosure ofadequate
information to the solicited holders. ..
Sec. 411. Preferences.
nus provision broadens the availability of the ordinary course of business defense to preference
actions under II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) by de-coupling the requirement that a transaction be in the
ordinary course ofbusiness between the debtor and creditor and in accordance with ordinary
business terms for the industry at large. nus means that the recipient ofa payment that was not
in the ordinary course between the debtor and the creditor will not be required to return the
payment for the benefit of all creditors. nus section also precludes trustees from bringing
preference actions to recover less than S5,OOO in aggregate transfers to noninsider creditors in
cases that do not involve primarily consumer debts.
Sec. 412. Venue of certain proceedings.
nus section amends 28 U.S.C. § 1409 so that a trustee may commence a preference action to
recover a nonconsumer debt of less than SI0,000 only in the district in which the noninsider
creditor resides.
Sec. 413. Period for filing plan under chapterll.
nus section litnits the ability ofa debtor in possession to obtain extensions of its exclusive right
to file a chapter II plan to 18 or 20 months, respectively. The amendment provides no discretion
for judges to permit longer periods ofexclusivity under appropriate circumstances.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. This amendment does
not provide the requisiteflexibility to permit longer periods ofexclusivity under compelling
circumstances. Although plans are confirmed more quickly now than in the 1980s. the
exclusivity period in successful larger cases averages longer than 18 to 20 months. Inflexible
limits on exclusivity will squelch negotiations long before the exclusivity periods expire. as
creditors exen leverage with the threat ofa competing plan. Debtors in possession may be more
likely to seek confirmation ofnonconsensual plans. a costly and undesirable result. Under the
1994 amendments. district CoUTts havejurisdiction to hear appeals from orders increasing the
exclusivityperiod. 28 U.S.c. § 158(a)(2). which should be utilized to address unwarranted
extensions ofexclusivity.
Sec. 414. Fees arising from certain ownership interests.
Section 414 amends II U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) to expand this exception to discharge by
encompassing condominium fees and assessments regardless ofwhether the debtor or a tenant
continues to occupy the unit.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes exceptions to discharge providing
preferential treatment for certain creditors to the detriment ofothers without a soundpolicy
justification. Ifa debtor is not using the condominium due to foreclosure or other
circumstances. condominium fees for that period should not be exceptedfrom discharge. as they
are not distinguishablefrom obligations owed to other creditors.
Sec. 415. Creditor representation at first meeting of creditors.
nus section permits nonlawyer creditor representatives to appear and participate in section 341
meetings, and to represent more than one creditor, notwithstanding local court rules, State
constitution provisions, or other laws to the contrary.
Comments: This amendment conflicts with the laws ofsome states under which panicipation at
section 341 meetings is the practice oflaw. See In re Maloney. 209 B.R. 844 (Bank. MD. Pa.
1997) (examining debtor at section 341 meeting constitutes practice oflaw under Pennsylvania
law); but see State Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Committee v. Paul Mason & Assoc.• 46 F.3d
469 (5th Cir. 1995) (administrativefunctions handled by nonlawyer creditor representatives did
not constitute unauthorizedpractice oflaw under Texas law).
Sec. 416. Definition of disinterested person.
This section amends the definition ofdisinterested person in II U.S.C. § 101(14) to eliminate the
per se disqualification of invesunent bankers previously retained by the debtor.
Sec:.417. Factors for compensation of professional persons.
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This provision includes as consideration for compensation whether a professional is "board
certified" or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience. In addition to official cenification
that may be necessary to practice in certain jurisdictions, this provision encompasses non-
mandatory cenification that is offered by a variety ofprivate organizations.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference is opposed to this provision. In determining
the compensation ofprofessionals who assist in a bankruptcy case, judges must be vigilant to
ensure that fees are commensurate with the quality ofservices actually provided. Current law
does not preclude courts from considering certification credentials or other recognition of
expertise or experience to the extent that those factors are relevant and, therefore, current law is
sufficient to accommodate the concerns ofthose seeking to ensure that certification is
considered. Moreover, the fact that a professional is certified by a private organization does not
guarantee competency ofservices in a particular case any more than prestigious degrees,
publications or other honors, and thus it is key to retain court discretion to weigh these factors.
The proposed amendment poses additional issues for attorneys seekingfees; explicitly providing
benefits for private certification may run afoul ofstates' prerogatives to regulate the practice of
law. Certification ofattorneys is generally a function ofstate supreme courts as part oftheir
obligations and duties to regulate the practice oflaw in their respective jurisdictions, and some
states specifically prohibit the listing ofspecialties or certifications by attorneys. In fact. less
than a majority ofstates specifically authorize those specialized listings. To avoid these issues.
it may be preferablefor this amendment to speak more generically in terms ofrecognition for
expertise or experience as opposed to "certification" per se.
Sec. 418. Appointment of elected trustee.
This section clarifies the procedure for the election of a private trustee in a chapter 11 case. The
United States trustee must file a report certifying the election, which tenninates the service of a
previously-appointed trustee. Courts are authorized to resolve disputes arising out of an election.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision. but recommends that
proposed section 1104(b)(2)(B) be revised to read as follows: "The court shall resolve any
dispute arising out ofan election under subparagraph (A). "
Sec. 419. Utility service.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 366 to further define "adequate assurance" (e.g., cash
deposit, letter of credit, prepayment of utility consumption, another form of security agreeable to
the utility) and permits a utility to discontinue service if it does not receive security in a form
satisfactory to the utility within 20 days after the filing. The provision also permits a utility to
recover or setoff obligations against a prepetition security deposit, but does not specify whether
the debt being set off is a prepetition or postpetition obligation. The amendment is supposed to
apply to chapter 11 cases only, but a literal interpretation of the amendment may lead some
readers to conclude that the exclusive definition of adequate assurance applies to all cases.
Comments. The National Bankruptcy Conference generally opposes special interest
amendments that enhance the entitlements ofone type ofcreditor to the detriment ofother types
ofcreditors and to the detriment ofreorganization. This amendment divests courts ofdiscretion
and goes much farther than necessary to provide sufficient protection for utilities. For example
the provision contains a clause requiring adequate assurance to be in a form that is satisfactory
to the utility, even ifthe court determines that anotherform ofassurance is sufficient. In
addition, the definition of "utilit)''' is a subject ofdispute, calling into question the scope ofthis
amendment unclear. Since this amendment gives strong preferential treatment to utilities, more
parties may seek to be treated as a utility instead ofas a party to an executory contract under
section 365 ofthe Bankruptcy Code. Finally, ifthe amendment is intended to apply to only
chapter II cases, that should be clarified to avoid an)' misinterpretation.
Subtitle B - Small Business Banlcruptcy Provisions2
Sec. 421. Flexible rules for disclosure statement and plan.
This section pennits courts to waive or modify the requirement that a small business chapter II
debtor in possession file a disclosure statement that is approved as a prerequisite to soliciting
votes on a plan ofreorganization. The provision permits the court to conditionally approve
disclosure statements and to combine the disclosure statement hearing with the confirmation
hearing.
Sec. 422. Definitions; effect of discharge.
This section amends the definition ofsmall business debtor to apply in cases involving debts of
$4 million or less. In addition, this provision apparently intends to exclude businesses with
active creditors' comminees. Due to a drafting error, however, the provision applies only to
cases with active creditors' comminees. The inclusion in the title of"; effect ofdischarge" also
appears to be an error, as this provision does not deal with that issue.
Comments: This provision contains a drafting error that makes the small business definition
apply onZv to cases with active creditors' committees, which is the opposite ofwhat was
intended. The word "not" should be added before "sufficientZv active and representative" in the
proposed definition ofsmall business.
Sec. 423. Standard form disclosure statement and plan.
This section orders the Advisory Committee on Banlcruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States to devise and adopt uniform forms for disclosure statements and plans of
reorganization for debtors falling within the small business definition. The section advises that
the rules should achieve a practical balance between parties' reasonable needs for complete
information and economy and simplicity for debtors.
2Proposed alternative provisions have been submined by the National Bankruptcy Conference
and Commercial Law League of America.
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Comments: Standardforms for disclosure statements should be developed carefu/(v to take into
account the distinctions in disclosure necessaryfor various types ofbusiness debtors.
Sec. 424. Uniform national reporting requirements.
This provision requires that a small business debtor file periodic financial reports, including
information on profitability, projected cash receipts and disbursements, comparisons ofacrua1
receipts and disbursements with prior projections, whether the debtor is in compliance with
postpetition requirements and has filed tax returns and paid taxes and other administrative
claims, and other matters in the best interest ofall parties.
Comments: Papers ofthis nature should befiled with the United States trustee, not with the
coun. This provision should be simplified and combined with section 426 ofthis bill.
Sec. 425. Uniform reporting rules and forms for small business cases.
This provision gives responsibility to the Advisory Committee on Banlcruptcy Rules of the
Judicial Conference ofthe United States to propose for adoption the establishment of rules and
forms to elicit information regarding such matters as the debtor's profitability, cash receipts and
disbursements, and whether the debtor is timely filing tax returns and paying taxes and
administrative claims when due.
Sec. 426. Duties in small business cases.
This section imposes duties on the smal1 business debtor in possession to file additional
information, attend through a responsible individual meetings with the United States trustee and
the court, timely file all schedules and statements of financial affairs unless the court grants a
limited extension due to extraordinary and compelling circumstances, file all reports, maintain
insurance, timely file tax returns, pay al1 administrative expense tax claims, establish separate
deposit accounts for taxes and deposit funds within I day thereafter or a responsible time set by
the court (unless the court waives this requirement), and allow the United States trustee to
inspect the business premises and books and records.
Comments: Waiver ofthese requirements for "reasonable justification "may be a preferable
standard to "extraordinary and compelling circumstances. " More feasible deadlines should be
set for these duties, and many ofthe reqUired documents should be submitted to the United States
trustee, not the court. Mentioning requirements to pay taxes might create a negative implication
regarding a debtor's other duties not mentioned in this provision. such as the duty to pay
employees.
Sec. 427. Plan filing and confirmation deadlines.
This section requires that the small business debtor file a plan of reorganization within 90 days
after filing for banlauptcy. This period may be shortened on request of a party in interest. To
obtain an extension of the plan filing and exclusivity period, the debtor must demonstrate prior to
the expiration of the deadline "by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not
that the court will confirm a plan within a reasonable time."
Comments: This provision substantia/{v limits the extent to which chapter 11 debtors can
negotiate with creditors andformulate a plan ofreorganization while imposing a higher
standard to obtain extensions than the standard applicable to larger businesses.
Sec. 428. Plan confirmation deadline.
Under this section, plans of small business debtors must be confirmed no later than ISO days
after the date ofthe order for relief. Extensions are available only if the debtor meets the burden
for an extension stated in the previous section.
Comments: The coun should be permitted to grant an extension ofthe plan confirmation
deadline ifdoing so would be in the best interests ofcreditors and the estate. Doing otherwise
will prevent many small businesses from reorganizing even ifby all accounts they are wonh
saving.
Sec. 429. Prohibition against extension of time.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 105(d) to prohibit a court from exercising its discretion to
extend a deadline in a manner inconsistent with sections 407 and 408.
Comments: By negative implication, this provision suggests that the court may override other
statutory deadlines. For this reason, it might be betcer to delete it.
Sec. 430. Duties of the United States trustee.
Pursuant to this provision, the U.S. trustee (or banlauptcy administrator) is vested with new
statutory duties in small business debtor cases, including the duty to conduct "initial debtor
interviews" during which the U.S. trustee investigates the debtor's viability and business plan.
The U.S. trustee must inspect the debtor's premises, must diligently monitor the debtor's
activities to identify whether the debtor will be unable to confirm a plan, and must promptly seek
relief on discovering material grounds for conversion or dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1112.
Comments: Some duties delineated in this section are appropriate and codify current United
States trustee practices. However. the assessment ofbusiness viability should not fall upon the
United States trustee, who already is vested with a variety ofadministrative responsibilities.
Sec. 431. Scheduling conferences.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § I05(d) to require courts to hold status conferences as
necessary to further the "expeditious and economical resolution of the case."
Sec. 432. Serial filer pro\·isions.
This provision is designed to withhold application of the automatic stay for a small business that
files a banlcruptcy petition within two years after a prior chapter 11 plan was confirmed, or
within two years after the entry of a dismissal order in a prior chapter 11 case. If the owners ofa
small business that went through banlcruptcy have transferred the business to a successor entity,
the automatic stay is inapplicable unless the debtor can prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence
that the new case resulted from circumstances beyond the control of the debtor not foreseeable at
the time the first case was filed and that "it is more likely than not" that the debtor will confirm a
feasible plan, but not a liquidating plan, within a reasonable time. The provision also limits
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damages for violations ofthe automatic stay based on a good faith belief that there was no stay in
a subsequent small business banlauptcy case.
Comments: Due to a drafting error. the provision withholds application ofthe automatic stay in
all chapter 11 cases - consumer. business and otherwise - acept when an involuntary
bankruptcy petition is filed against a smaIl business debtor and the debtor or a predecessor has
been in bankruptcy recently. To address this problem. proposed subsection (j) to section 362
should be revised to state that "The filing ofa petition under chapter 11 ofthis title~
operate as a stay in a case in which the debtor -". Bona fide purchasers ofa debtor's assets
that subsequentlyfile for bankruptcy should not be subject to the restrictions on the automatic
stay. To address this problem. the term "entity" in subparagraph (k)(l)(D) should be replaced
with "insider." In addition. "in which a discharge is not entered" should be added to the end of
subparagraph (k)(1)(A) to avoid ambiguity.
Sec. 433. Expanded grounds for dismissal or conversion and appointment of trustee.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 1112(b) to provide that a court shaIl convert or dismiss a case,
whichever is in the best interest ofcreditors and the estate, when a movant establishes "cause,"
and to enumerate additional grounds for cause. Requests for dismissal or conversion shall not be
granted if the debtor objects and establishes that "it is more likely than not" that a plan will be
confinned within a time fixed by statute or by court order; and. if "cause" is an act or omission
of the debtor, that there exists a reasonable justification for the act or omission and that the act or
omission will be cured within a reasonable time fixed by the court not to exceed 30 days after the
court decides the motion (unless the movant expressly consents to a continuance for a specific
period oftime or compelling circumstances beyond the debtor's control justify an extension
beyond 30 days). This section also authorizes the appointment of a trustee instead of conversion
or dismissal if the court detennined this would be in the best interest of the estate.
Comments: These significant changes to 11 U.S.c. § 1112 apply to all chapter 11 debtors. not
just smaIl business debtors. Unlike the current language ofsection 1112, which makes dismissal
or conversion discretionary. dismissal or conversion under the proposed revision are mandatory
upon the presence offactors that may not be sufficiently material to warrant this response. As a
result. this provision makes one ofthe most dramatic changes to bankruptcy law as it affects
business cases.
Sec. 434. Study of operation of title 11, United States Code, with respect to small businesses.
This provision instructs the Small Business Administration. in consultation with other parties, to
study the causes ofsmall business banlauptcies and how the banlauptcy system can be improved
to help smalI businesses reorganize. This study must be conducted not later than 2 years after the
enactment of this bill, and a report must be submitted to the House and Senate.
Sec. 435. Pavment of Interest.
This section ~ends II U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) to provide explicitly that the debtor can make the
requisite payments from rents generated by the property. The section also changes the applicable
interest rate to the nondefault contract rate and amends the deadline so that payments must be
commenced or a plan filed on the later of90 days after the petition date or 30 days after the court
determines that the debtor is subject to these provisions to account for circumstances in which it
is not immediately determined that the debtor is a single asset real estate debtor.
Comments: The National BankruptC}, Conference supports this provision.
Title V - Municipal Bankruptcy Provisions.
Sec. 501. Petition and proceedings related to petition.
This section clarifies that a chapter 9 petition constitutes an order for relief.
Comments: To effectuate the intent ofthis provision and to avoid an unnecessary hearing. the
teJCt ofsection 501 should be replaced with thefoIlowing: Section 921 oftitle 11. United States
Code. is amended by - (1) striking subsection (d); and (2) redesignating subsection (e) as
subsection (d).
Sec. 502. Applicability of other sections to chapter 9.
This provision amends II U.S.C. § 901 to extend the application to chapter 9 ofcertain
provisions ofchapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code that relate to the liquidation ofsecurities
contracts and the tennination of swap agreements.
Comments: The National BankruptC}· Conference supports this amendment.
Title VI - Improved Bankruptcy Statistics and Data
Sec. 601. Audit procedures.
No fewer than lout of250 individual debtor cases in each judicial district must be selected
randomly for audit, with procedures to be set by the Attorney General, although the audits must
be in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and perfonned by accountants.
Cases also must be audited if the schedules show income and expenses reflecting greater than
average variances from the district nonn. Material misstatements could lead to revocation or
denial ofdischarge or criminal referrals.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons the implementation ofan audit
process. The audit system does not need to rely on accountants to conduct every audit. for most
audits wi// notfocus on books and records. To the atent that a preliminary investigation reveals
the needfor an accountant. one could be appointed at that time. Audits also should specificaIly
target high end cases that varyfrom the statistical norm. but not cases that varyfrom the
statistical norm on the low end (e.g.• very low income and/or expenses). CasedflIed by
individuals under chapters 11 and 12 also should be audited. RealisticaIly. one out ofevery
thousand cases should be audited. To complement the auditing proposal. the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules ofthe Judicial Conference ofthe United States should propose
an amendment to Rule 1017 ofthe Federal Rules ofBankruptC}, Procedure that strikes
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"substantial" and insens "clear" in lieu thereofand that inserts "or 60 days following the
conclusion ofan audit under section 586(a)(4) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code, whichever is
later" immediately after "341(aJ " each place it appears.
Sec. 602. Improved bankruptcy statistics.
This section orders the clerk of each district to compile statistics in a format determined by the
Administrative Office ofthe United States Couns, which will be collected by the Administrative
Office and made publicly available and the subject ofa report to Congress.
Comments: Collecting data is advisable. but all language in this provision prescribing the
method ofcollection and reponing should be deleted. The manner ofcollection and reponing
should be developed by a balanced group ofexpens in the field ofdata collection and
bankruptcy.
Sec. 603. Uniform rules for the collection of bankruptcy data.
This section instructs the Anorney General to issue rules requiring uniform forms for final
trustee reports and periodic reports by debtors in possession and trustees in chapter 11 cases.
Sec. 604. Sense of Congress regarding anilability of bankruptc~'data.
This provision expresses the sense of Congress that all data held by bankruptcy clerks should be
released in electronic form to the public on demand and that the bankruptcy system should use a
single set of data definitions and forms to collect data nation....ide.
Comments: Before taking steps to make this data widely available. Congress should evaluate the
privacy considerations and whether laws such as the Fair Credit Reportmg Act impose
restrictions on this activity.
Title VII - Bankruptcy Tax Provisions
Sec. 701. Treatment of certain liens.
This section exempts ad valorem real or personal property tax liens from subordination under 11
U.S.C. § 724(b)(2), except that ad valorem tax liens would remain subordinated to priority wage
claims. Although other tax liens remain subject to subordination, this section requires that a
trustee first exhaust unencumbered assets of the estate and surcharge collateral under section
506(c) for the reasonably necessary costs and expenses of preserving and disposing of that
property. This section also divests bankruptcy judges of their authority to determine the amount
or legality of any ad valorem tax under section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code after expiration of
the applicable period for contesting or redetermining that amount under nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this provision to the extent that it
exempts ad valorem tax liens from subordination under section 724(b). However. the remainder
ofthe provision is objectionable. References to 11 V.S.c. § 507(a) should be adjusted to reflect
amendments in this bill that reorder the priorities set forth in that provision.
Sec. 702. Effective notice to government.
This section sets forth extensive parameters for providing notice to governmental units.
Comments: The filing registry contemplated in proposed section 342(e) may be an appropriate
mechanism to ensure adequate notice. However, the remainder o/the provision is unduly
oppressive and make compliance difficult even ifthe unit receives actual notice. Form ofnotice
is generally addressed by the Federal Rules ofBankruptcy Procedure. 1n light ofthe fact that
the United States govemment has requested to be treated as a single unit for otherpurposes,
such as setoff, these noticing requirements seem to go to the other extreme.
Sec. 703. Notice of request for a determination of taxes.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § S05(b) to require that any request for a determination oftax
liability under that section be made in a manner designated by the governmental unit.
Comments: This provision would be unobjectionable ifthe information were published in a
central registry to enable compliance. Absent a central registry, this provision is troublesome
because it creates a new bureaucracy that unnecessarily makes compliance extremely difficult.
Sec. 704. Rate of interest on tax claims.
This provision establishes the minimum rate of interest on most tax claims as the Federal short·
term rate rounded to nearest full percent, determined under Internal Revenue Code section
1274(d) for the calendar year in which a plan is confirmed, plus 3 percentage points. The
interest rate on ad valorem taxes is subject to determination under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Comments: This provision departs from its original intent to provide a uniform rate ofinterest.
The interest rate on ad valorem taxes in some cities is well over 200AJ. Section 804 should be
revised to provide that the rate ofinterest on all tax claims. including ad valorem tax claims. is
thefederaltlU deficiency rate under 26 V.S.c. § 6621(a){2), as originally proposed by in the
bankruptcy billfirst introduced by Representative Gekizs and his co-sponsors last year.
Sec. 70S. Tolling of priority of tax claim time periods.
This section authorizes the tolling ofcertain time periods in 11 U.S.C. § S07(a)(8)(A). This
provision also adds an extra 6 months to the tolling period under section S07(a)(8)(A)(i) and tolls
the 24o-day period under section S07(a)(8)(A)(ii) for the duration of an instalbnent payment
agreement, which could add years to the tolling period.
Comme1lls: To the extent this provision tolls the priority and nondischargeabi/it)' periodfor the
duration ofa prior bankruptcy case. this provision helpfully codifies current case law. However.
the additional six-month period and tolling for installment payment agreements give may go
fanher than necessary and may harm the interests ofother creditors.
Sec. 706. Priority property taxes incurred.
This provision amends 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(B) by striking "assessed" and replacing it with
"incurred."
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Sec. 707. Chapter 13 discharge offraudulent and other taxes.
This section further restricts the chapter 13 "superdischarge" so that a debtor who has completed
a repayment plan may not discharge remaining taxes falling under II U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
Comments: This provision is controversial. It may eliminate the incentivefor debtors with
substantial tax debts to repay some ofthose debts. along with other debts. in a chapter 13 plan.
Sec. 708. Chapter 11 discharge offraudulent taxes.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § II41(d) so that chapter 11 plan confinnation does not discharge
a cQOlorate debtor (but not any other type ofdebtor) from tax debts on which the debtor made a
fraudulent return or which the debtor willfully attempted to evade or defeat.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference urges deletion ofthis section. The
reorganized debtor is a separate entityfor other tax purposes that should not be liable for these
obligations. Most chapter II corporate debtors are insolvent and often controlling ownership is
transferred to creditors under a plan ofreorganization. Creditors should not be punishedfor the
failures ofprior ownership or management.
Sec. 709. Stay of tax proceedings.
This section provides an exception to the automatic stay for appeals from certain court and
administrative decisions determining a tax liability of the debtor.
Sec. 710. Periodic payment oftues in chapter 11 cases.
This section requires periodic payment of priority tax claims in regular installment payments in
cash. "but in no case with a balloon provision and no more than three months apart. beginning no
later than the effective date of the plan and ending on the earlier of five years after the petition
date or that last date payments are to be made under the plan to unsecured creditors." In
addition. the petition date. not the assessment date. is the starting point for the payment period.
Comments: Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978. taxing authorities exercised vinual veto
power over plans ofreorganization. The 1978 Code was a compromise to make reasonable
accommodationsfor rehabilitation. Ifenacted. this provision may require that other creditors.
such as suppon creditors in the chapter II case ofan individual debtor, wait years for
repayment. Ifretained. the provision should be redrafted to correct its problems. The provision
should clarify that "regular payments" do not have to be equal. According to the plain
language ofthe provision. tax debts may not be deferred at all ifother unsecured creditors are
paid infull at confirmation. This may be an unintended result.
Sec. 711. Avoidance ofstatutory tax liens prohibited.
Section 711 amends 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) to codify that "superpriority" rights accorded to some
purchasers by the Internal Revenue Code and parallel state and local law provisions may not be
used by a U11Stee to avoid tax liens in stocks. securities. motor vehicles. inventory. certain goods
purchased at retail, and certain household goods.
Comments: There are preferable methods ofclarifying the reach ofa bonafide purchaser.
Section 545(2) should be clarified to give the trustee the status ofa hypothetical bona[ule
purchaser without Iazowledge or notice ofa lien. who takes possession ofthe item purchased and
has not relinquished possession. This status would preservefor the benefit ofall creditors those
items ofproperty on which thefiled tax lien does not take priority in all circumstances under
nonbankruptcy law. A similar change could be made to the definition ofpurchaser in section
544(a).
Sec. 712. Payment of taxes in the conduct of business.
This section requires that postpetition taxes be paid in the ordinary course ofbusiness, that ad
valorem real property taxes be paid when due, and that administrative period tax liabilities be
paid without a precipitating request from the governmental unit. This section also amends II
U.S.C. § 506 to permit ad valorem taxes to be surcharged against collateral. This section permits
deferred tax payments in the event that a chapter 7 estate is administratively insolvent or that a
tax was not incurred by a properly appointed chapter 7 trustee.
Comments: It is reasonable to require that an operating chapter I I debtor pay taxes in the
normal course as a business expense. which is why 28 U.S. C. § 960 already provides that any
officers and agents conducting business under authority ofa United States court shall be subject
to all taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as ifit were conducted by an
individual or corporation.
Sec. 713. Tardily filed priority tax claims.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) so that late filed tax claims are entitled to distribution
under that subsection to the extent they are filed on or before the earlier of 10 days following the
mailing to creditors of the trustee's report sununary, or the date on which the trustee commences
distribution.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this provision.
Sec. 714. Income tax returns prepared by tax authorities.
Under this section, for purposes of II U.S.C. § 523(a)(I)(B), "return" includes returns filed by
the governmental unit or a written stipulation to judgment entered by a nonbankroptcy tribunal.
Comments: It is unclear why the amendment provides that the return must have been filed in a
manner permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law. This clause may cause confusion and is not
necessary to effectuate the primary component ofthis section.
Sec. 715. Discharge of the estate's liabilil)' for unpaid taxes.
:r:
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This provision adds the bankruptcy estate to the list ofpanies protected from a tax claim once a
governmental unit fails to respond to a request for a determination of taxes.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this provision.
Sec. 716. Requirement to file tall: returns to confirm chapter 13 plans.
This amendment requires that debtors file tax returns for the three years before bankruptcy prior
to the first meeting of creditors. The section makes some allowance for extensions of the
applicable deadlines.
Comments: Debtors who are not required to file tax returns under tax law should be exempted
from this requirement. The standardfor extensions oftime should be based on the
preponderance ofthe evidence (the standard generally applicable in bankruptcy proceedings),
not clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 717. Standards for tax disclosure.
This section amends II U.S.C. § 1125 to require that disclosure statements contain a "full
discussion" of the tax consequences of a plan of reorganization.
Comments: To the extent that the disclosure oftax consequences is necessary to provide
adequate information, this provision is unnecessary because adequate information already is
reqUired by I I U.S.c. § 1125. In the event that the tax consequences are not necessary or
relevant to the creditors' decision making, mandating disclosure may unnecessarily increase
cost and delay in the plan confirmation process, contrary to the goal ofexpediting chapter 11. It
might be preferable to replace the term "afull discussion" with "adequate information
regarding".
Sec. 718. Setoff of tax refunds.
This provision permits the government to set off uncontested income tax obligations against
income tax refund rights without seeking court permission.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. Absent setoff. the tax
refund would be cash collateral subject to turnover and use by the estate. As long as the debtor
in possession provides the taxing authority with adequate protection. this source ofliquidity
should remain available.
Title VIII • Ancillary and Other Cross Border Cases
Sec. 801. Amendment to add chapter 15 to title 11, United States Code.
This section creates a chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with ancillary and other cross
border cases.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the establishment ofa chapter to deal
with ancillary and other cross border cases to the extent consistent with the statutory: language
developed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
Sec. 802. Amendments to other chapters in title 11, United States Code.
This section amends other provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code to reflect the addition ofchapter
IS.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the adoption ofconforming
amendments to the extent consistent with the statutory language developed by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law.
Sec. 803. Claims relating to Insurance deposits in cases ancillaJ1' to foreign proceedings.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 304 to provide that the court may not grant relief under the new
transnational chapter with respect to any deposit, escrow, trust funds, or other security required
or permitted under any applicable State insurance law or regulation for the benefit ofclaim
holders in the United States.
Title IX • Financial Contract Pro\'isions
Sec. 901. Bankruptcy Code amendments.
(a). (c) Definitjons
This subsection provides revised and new definitions, including definitions ofmaster netting
agreement and master netting participant. The definition of master netting agreement
encompasses rights ofnetting, setoff, liquidation, termination. or closeout, not only with a
variety of financial instruments, but with security agreements and credit enhancement as well.
(d) Swap agreements, securities contracts, commodity contracts,
forward contracts, repurchase agreements, and master netting agreements under
the automatic stay.
This subsection revises the exceptions to the automatic stay for setoffby financial participants of
claims against payments due, and adds an additional exception to section 362(b) to permit cross
product netting without violating the automatic stay.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it permits cross product netting.
(e) Limitation ofavoidance powers under master netting agreement.
This subsection amends 11 U.S.C. § 546 to preclude a trustee from avoiding a transfer made by
or to a master netting agreement participant under or in cOMection with any master netting
agreement, except if the transfer was made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it limits the ability ofa trustee or
debtor in possession to recover cross product netting transfers under the avoiding powers.
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(f) Fraudulent transfers of master netting agreements.
This subsection would amend 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) to insulate cenain transfers to master netting
agreement panicipants.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent that it insulates cross product netting
from fraudulent transfer avoidance actions.
(g) - (j) Termination or acceleration of securities contracts; termination or acceleration of
commodities or forward contracts; termination or acceleration ofrepurchase agreements;
Liquidation, termination, or acceleration of swap agreements..
These subsections amend 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, and 560 to refer to termination,
acceleration, and liquidation.
(k) Liquidation, termination, acceleration, or offset under a master
netting agreement and across contracts.
This subsection adds 11 U.S.C. § 561, which prohibits the application of the stay, avoidance, or
any other limitations on a contractual right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, or offset under a
master nening agreement and across contracts.
Comments: This provision is objectionable to the extent it exempts cross product nettingfrom
the avoidance powers. the automatic stay. and other other....ise applicable provisions.
(I) Ancman' proceedjncs.
Pursuant to this subsection, cases ancillary to foreign proceedings are subject to all BanJcruptcy
Code provisions relating to securities contracts, commodity agreements, forward contracts,
repurchase agreements, swap agreements, or master netting agreements.
Comments: The provision seems designed to ensure that a broad section 304 injunction is not
issued against holders ofthe listed instruments just they are exemptedfrom the broad automatic
stay under section 362 in a domestic bankruptcy case. The section as worded is far broader and
may have unintended consequences. It cannot relate to the bankruptcy avoidingpowers.
because those powers are not available in a section 304 proceeding in any case. Ifit is intended
as some sort ofchoice oflaw provision. it is impossible to tell what its effects are meant to be. It
should be re-worded to refer solely to exemption from broad injunctive relief In addition, it is
objectionable insofar as it includes cross-product netting. as with other provisions in this title.
(m) -en) Commodity broker liquidations; Stockbroker liquidations.
These two subsections add II U.S.C. §§ 767 and 753 to address the liquidation of commodity
brokers and stockbrokers. The exercise of rights by a broker or panicipant will not affect the
priority of unsecured claims held by brokers or panicipants after the exercise of their rights or
the applicability of the commodity broker and stockbroker liquidation provisions.
(0) ~
This subsection makes conforming amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 553 to reflect the exceptions to
the general rules of setoffprovided for financial instruments. It creates a carveout to the
exception to the right to setoff in section 553(a)(3)(C) for rights arising under provisions dealing
with financial contracts. This subsection also amends 553(b)(1) to add additional references to
these provisions.
(P) Securities contracts, commodity contracts, and forward contracts.
This subsection clarifies the language in several Banlauptcy Code provisions by replacing
references to a variety ofpanies with the term "financial panicipant."
Sec. 902. Damage measure.
This section addresses the calculation ofdamages following the rejection, liquidation,
termination, or acceleration ofcertain agreements relating to financial instruments. It provides
that damages shall be measured as of the earlier of the date ofrejection or the date ofliquidation,
termination or acceleration. The resulting damage claim is treated as a prepetition claim,
consistent with other claims arising from rejection.
Sec. 903. Asset-backed securitizations.
This section explicitly excludes from "property of the estate" cash, receivables, securities, and
other financial assets transferred by the debtor in connection ....ith an asset securitization under
which invesnnent grade rated securities have been issued. The debtor is considered to have
transferred assets prepetition if the assets were transferred pursuant to a written agreement that
states that the assets were conveyed ....ith the intention ofremoving them from the estate of the
debtor, regardless of whether the debtor holds an interest in the issuer or securities held by the
issuer, whether the debtor has continuing obligations to repurchase, service, or supervise the
servicing of eligible assets, and the characterization of the transfer for other purposes.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this provision. Transactions that are
not sales under state law should not be treated as sales byfederal bankruptcy law. This
provision may undercut the ability ofa business to reorganize by leaving it with no cash
collateral. to the detriment ofemployees and suppliers.
Sec. 904. Effective date; application of amendments.
The amendments made by title IX apply to cases commenced or appoinnnents made after the
date ofenacnnent.
Title X - Protection of Family Farmers
Sec. 1001 - Reenactment of chapter 12.
This provision re-enacts chapter 12 and makes it permanent.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference supports this amendment.
::r::
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Sec. 1002 - Debt limit increase.
This provision ensures that the debt limit for chapter 12 family fanner eligibility is indexed for
inflation like other dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code, beginning on April I, 2001.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this amendment.
Sec. 1003. Elimination ofrequirement that family farmer and spouse receive over SO (sic.)
percent of income from farming operation in year prior to bankruptcy.
nus section amends the definition of family farmer so that debtors can be considered family
farmers if farming operations provide more than the requisite percentage of their gross income in
at least one ofthe three calendar years preceding bankruptcy.
Comments: Under current law, fanning operations must provide more than 80% ofan
individual:S gross income in the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the fanner
files for bankruptcy. The title ofthis amendment makes it unclear whether there is an intention
to change that percentage to 50"-1>.
Sec. 1004. Certain claims owed to governmental units.
nus section provides an exception to the general rule that all priority claims be paid in full over
the life of a repayment plan. Claims owed to governmental units arising as a result of sale,
transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any fann asset shall be treated as an unsecured claim
that is not entitled to priority. This section pennits a family fanner to request a determination of
the tax effects of the plan from the IRS, in addition to state and local taxing authorities.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference suppons this amendment.
Title XI - Technical amendments
Sec. 1101. Definitions.
nus section makes a nontechnical change by amending the definition of single asset real estate
to lift the $4 million debt cap and to exclude family fanners. This section also clarifies that a
transfer includes the creation of a lien, addressing issues raised in the line of cases culminating in
In re McConville, 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir. 1997).
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes the removal ofthe cap on the
definition ofsingle asset real estate. the effect ofwhich is to make the streamlined single asset
procedure applicable to a wide range ofcases for which it was not intended. The National
Bankruptcy Conference supports the statutory clarification that a transfer ofproperty includes
the creation ofa lien. The word "each" should be deleted and replaced with "every" in
proposed 1/ U.S.c. § JOJ(54)(D).
Sec. 1102. Adjustment of dollar amounls.
This provision ensures that the dollar amounts in section 522(1)(3) (lien on tools of the trade
exceeding S5,OOO cannot be avoided) and the proposed section 707{b)(5) (safe harbor against
creditor actions) are indexed for inflation like other dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code.
See-ll03. Enension ortime.
This section corrects a reference error.
Sec. 1104. Technical amendments.
This section pluralizes a reference in II U.S.C. § S22{b)(I), makes a technical change to II
U.S.C. § 541{b)(4), and slightly broadens the reference to a subsection of the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, which likely has the effect ofmaking more debtors ineligible to file.
Sec. 1105. Penalty for persons who negligently or fraudulently prepare bankruptcy
petitions.
This section makes a grammatical change, changing the reference to "attorney's" in section
1100)(3) from singular possessive to plural possessive.
Sec. 1106. Limitation on compensation of professional persons.
This section pennits a trustee or committee to employ professional persons on a fixed or
percentage fee basis, in addition to an hourly and contingent fee basis.
Sec. 1107. Special taJ: provisions.
This amendment eliminates a reference to a tax provision that has been repealed.
Sec. 1108. Effect of conversion.
This section changes a reference to "property" in II U.S.C. § 348(f)(2) to "property ofthe
estate" to confonn to other references in that provision.
Sec. 1109. Allowance of administrative expenses.
This section limits the types ofcompensable professional services rendered by an attorney or
accountant that may qualify as administrative expenses. In particular, expenses for attorneys or
accountants incurred by individual members of creditors' or equity committees are not
recoverable as administrative expenses.
Sec. III O. Exceptions to discharge.
This section corrects the inadvertent omission ofa reference to section 523(a)(15) in section
523(a)(3), amends section 523(a)(15) to limit the scope of the exception by requiring that the
debt must be owed to a spouse, fonner spouse, or child of the debtor, and amends section
523(a)(9) to specifically exclude from discharge debts arising from drunken boating.
Sec. 1111. Effect of discharge.
This section makes a technical correction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3).
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Sec. 1112. Protection against discriminatory treatment.
This provision clarifies that 11 U.S.C. § 525(c)(1) applies to~ grants, not all grants.
Sec. 1113. Property of the estate.
This section amends section 541(b)(4)(B)(ii) (dealing with liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons) to
add a reference to 11 U.S.C. § 365, clarifying Congressional intent to exclude production
payments from the debtor's estate.
Sec. 1114. Preferences.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) so that in the event ofan avoided security interest given
by a debtor between 90 days and 1 year before bankruptcy to a noninsider for the benefit of an
insider, the security interest shall be considered to be avoided as a preference only with respect
to the insider.
Comments: This amendment could be improved by referring to transfers rather than security
interests. like in H.R. 833. In particular. "a security interest given" should be replaced with "a
transfer made" and "such security interest shall be considered to" should be replaced with
"such transfer may be avoided. "
Sec. 1115. Postpetition transactions.
This section makes several clarifying changes to 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) to work in conjunction with
the amended definition of transfer.
Sec. 1116. Disposition of property of the estate.
This section eliminates a reference to II U.S.C. § 1009, a provision in an earlier version of the
1994 amendments that never came into effect.
Sec. 1117. General provisions.
This provision amends II U.S.c. § 901(a) to add an omitted reference to II U.S.c. § 1123(d).
Sec. 1118. Abandonment of railroad line.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(I) to eliminate a reference to a repealed provision in
Title 49 and to replace it with a correct reference.
Sec. 1119. Contents of plan.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) to eliminate a reference to a repealed provision in
Title 49 and to replace it with a correct reference.
Sec. 1120. Discharge under chapter 12.
This provision corrects erroneous references in 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) and (c).
Sec. 1121. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
This section corrects erroneous references in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).
Sec. 1122. Knowing disregard of bankruptcy law or rule.
This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 156(a) to make stylistic changes and to clarify a reference to
Title 11.
Sec. 1123. Transfers made by nonprofit charitable corporations.
This section amends 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 1129(a) to require that all transfers ofproperty in the
bankruptcy case of a corporation or trust (that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation or trust) are in complete accordance with all laws governing the transfer ofproperty.
This section also amends 11 U.S.C. § 541 to provide that property held by a corporation exempt
from taxation under 26 U.S.C.§ 501 (c)(3) may be transferred to an entity that is not such a
corporation, but only under the same conditions as would apply had the debtor not filed a
bankruptcy case. These amendments, if adopted, would apply to pending cases. However, a
court would consider whether the application ofthese amendments to pending cases would
substantially affect the rights ofa party in interest who first acquired rights with respect to the
debtor postpetition.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes these amendments. which will be
relevant to cases involving hospitals and other nonprofit organizations. By negative implication.
these amendments might suggest that other types ofdebtors do not need to follow otherwise
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Subsection (e), which clarifies that the bankruptcy court need not
remand or refer the matter ofa transfer ofproperty to a nonbankruptcy court, creates an
ambiguity regarding the jurisdiction ofthe bankruptcy court and state court in the sale ofthe
assets ofa notfor profit debtor. The provision is also ambiguous when it requires that the court
consider whether these amendments "would substantially affect the rights ofa party in interest
whofirst acqUired rights with respect to the debtor" posrpetition.
Some technical comments are in order as well. References to "corporation or trust" are not
necessary because the definition ofcorporation includes trust. See 11 U.S.c. § 101(9).
Paragraph (l) ofsection 363(d) should begin with thefollowing clause: "ifthe debtor is a
corporation that is not a moneyed. business, or commercial corporation, ". Similarly, paragraph
(15) ofsection 1129(a) should begin with the same clause and the phrase "ofthe plan" should
be deleted and replaced with "under the plan ".
The amendment made by subsection (c) should be made to 11 U.S.c. § 363 (as new subsection
(P)), not to 11 U.s.c. § 541. The latter portion ofsubsection (d) ofthe amendment, which begins
with "The parties who may appear. " should be a statutory amendment that should read as
follows: (e) Standing. - Section 1109 oftitle 11, United States Code. is amended by adding at the
end: "(c) The attorney general ofthe State in which the debtor is incorporated. was fonned, or
does business may appear and be heard in any proceeding under section 363(P) or 1129(a)(15)
ofthis title. "
Sec. 1124. Protection of valid purchase money security Interests.
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This section makes a nontechnical change and amends 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(3)(B) to give a creditor
30 days, rather than 20 days, to perfect its interest for an enabling loan.
Comments: The perfection period was increasedfrom 10 to 20 days in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of1994. The period should not be extendedfunher without a demonstration that the Jonger
period is necessary. lfthis provision is retained. it should permit the Jesser ofthe time allowed
by state law or 30 days.
Sec. 1125. Enensions.
This provision extends the Bankruptcy Administrators' program in Alabama and North Carolina.
The districts in those states therefore would not be part ofthe U.S. trustee program.
Comments: The National Bankruptcy Conference opposes this amendment. which encourages
nonuniformity and undermines the efficacy ofthe United States Trustee system. This provision
gives rise to Constitutional concerns. which may affect this legislation in its entirety. See Angelo
v. Victoria Farms. Inc.• 38 F.3d 1525 (VA Cir. 1994) (delaying implementation ofUnited States
trustee program in Nonh Carolina and Alabama violates United States Constitution).
Sec. 1126. Bankruptcy judgeships.
This provision authorizes temporary judgeships and requires disclosure ofjudges' travel
expenses.
Title XII .. General Effective Date; Application of Amendments.
Sec. 1201. Effective date; application of amendments.
This provisions makes the bill and its amendments effective 180 days after the date ofenactment,
except as otherwise provided. The amendments will not apply to cases commenced before the
effective date.
Comments: Like the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978. the effective date ofthis bill should be
deferredforoneyea~
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PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES
Accepting a bankruptcy related employment has always had its elements of risk, but with the
passage of time, the risks have multiplied. Most bankruptcy lawyers are well-aware of the dangers
of the administratively insolvent estate and the frustration of the failure to close a deal necessary to
pay creditors in a case. Bankruptcy lawyers are now expected to bear even greater risks, including
disgorgement [a hateful thought and once mostly academic] and possibly jail time, as courts begin to
explore the outer reaches of the strict conflict rules attendant to bankruptcy cases.
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II. THE REPRESENTATION
The incredible prosperity ofthe 1990's has left many bankruptcy lawyers wondering about the
volume and sources oftheir cases in the 21st century. Many of us have retooled to statfthe endless
stream of "workouts", which have replaced what used to be viable Chapter 11 's, while others have
continued to represent clients in court-assisted workouts. Whatever the choice of playing field, the
analysis of the representation early on will help avoid some ofthe serious concerns in getting paid and
keeping payment.
A. Who will be your client- The most elemental, but important, consideration is who will
be your client. Confusion over whose interest you will represent is not unique to
bankruptcy actions but can be particularly troublesome if the "workout" becomes a
court process. Until a matter arrives in the bankruptcy court clerk's office, the lines
of representation may be blurred or conflicts addressed within the spirit of the Canons
of Ethics. Perhaps you represent a closely-held corporate entity or sole
proprietorship. Representation of the owner and the entity may have certain ethical
considerations prior to bankruptcy and may require disclosure and a waiver, but after
bankruptcy you will likely be prohibited from representing both parties which will
result in disqualification and possibly disgorgement of fees paid pre-petition and
maybe post-petition.
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B. Scope ofthe Representation- Ifa matter begins as a "workout", you will likely desire
to complete the representation ifit progresses to a bankruptcy. Certainly you should
only continue the representation if you are experienced in bankruptcy law and can
overcome any of the obstacles to employment and payment.
1- 1
C.
D.
Who runs the show and gives you instructions- This is especially important given a
case that might end up in bankruptcy court. Knowing the chain of command in your
client could highlight early in a case whether you will run into serious conflict issues
over who you represent.
Who will foot the bill- If payment of the fees for your services is coming from a
source other than the direct client, you can bet that full disclosure down the road
could result in challenges to your employment on the basis of conflict or perhaps even
disinterestedness. Anytime a fee or retainer is to be paid by a source other than the
entity you represent, serious potential conflicts can result.
J
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III EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONS
A. The Retention Agreement- The employment of a professional person by the estate
should be written and should outline all of the expectations of the parties, including
the scope ofthe representation, the payment offees, timing of payment and any issues
relating to potential conflicts of interest.
11
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1. Professional Persons- 11 U.S.c. Section 327(a) requires the trustee to seek
court approval before hiring professional persons before they can perform
services for the trustee. The term "professional persons" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code but there is a non-exclusive list of those who are considered
professionals and must be employed under an order of court.
.J
a.
b.
c.
This nonexclusive list includes attorneys, accountants, appraisers,
auctioneers and any other professional persons hired to represent or
assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's or Debtor in
Possession's duties under title 11.
Section 327(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2014 require that an application
to employ a professional person be filed with the Court~ services
are provided. Failure to adhere to this requirement may result in a
denial of fees to the professional despite the bankruptcy court's
latitude in granting nunc pro tunc applications. In fact, Judge Lee of
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District ofKentucky has made
clear that he will rarely, if ever, grant nunc pro tunc applications of
employment. See ti, In re Calumet Farm, Inc., No. 91-51414, Order
and Memorandum Opinion (Bankr. E.D. Ky., Nov. 25, 1992).
An application to employ a professional person must contain a
showing that the employment is "reasonably necessary" to the proper
and efficient administration of the estate.
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Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a) requires that the professional person to be
employed not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and must be
a disinterested person. This subject is discussed below in section IIIB of these
materials.
The retention agreement between the estate and the professional person may
become the subject of great interest in the future. It should be drafted
extremely carefully, avoiding ambiguities and other sources of future
misunderstandings.
A person is not disqualified from employment as a professional person in a
Chapter 7, 12 or 11 solely because of their employment by or representation
ofa creditor, unless another creditor or the United States trustee objects. The
Court will disallow the employment if there is an actual conflict of interest.
See Section 327(c).
Professionals cannot be employed or compensated for performing
tasks that fall within the category of duties outlined in the Bankruptcy
Code as administrative duties of the trustee or debtor in possession's
counsel. For example, in Cle-Ware Indus.. Inc. v. Sokolsky, 493 F.2d
863 (6th Cir. 1974), the Court held that under the Bankruptcy Act,
separate counsel for the debtor and the debtor in possession should no
longer be appointed and attorneys cannot be compensated for
overlapping services.
employ himself as attorney or accountant for the estate if it is in the
best interests of the estate. See Section 327(d).
not employ a person that has served as an examiner in the case. See
Section 327(f).
employ the debtor's attorney, with court approval and for a specified
purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, as
long as the attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to
the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which he is
employed, if it is in the best interests of the estate. See Section
327(e). Note that Section 327(e), intended to govern the employment
of an attorney who has represented the debtor, is a less restrictive
standard than Section 327(c), but limits such employment to a
"specified special purpose."
d.
a.
b.
c.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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B. Disinterestedness
1.
2.
A disinterested person is defined by Bankruptcy Code Section 101(14) as a
person that:
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider1;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of
the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the
petition, an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for
such an investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a
security of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor2 or of an investment
banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph; and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or
of any class ofcreditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or
indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an
investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph, or
for any other reason.
It is Section 101(14)(E) that seems to be the downfall of many chapter 11
practitioners recently. While disinterestedness is a requirement for
appointment, conflicts and/or the existence of an interest materially adverse
to the estate which destroy disinterestedness are often not disclosed, or if
disclosed, not recognized in an attorney's initial (and sometimes subsequent)
,
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1 Bankruptcy Code Section 101 (31) defines "insider" as including, when the debtor is a
corporation, a director or officer of the debtor, a person in control of the debtor, a partnership in
which the debtor is a general partner, a general partner ofthe debtor or a relative of a general partner,
director, officer or person in control of the debtor.
2 In a briefopinion, Judge Lee denied debtor's application to retain the attorney of its choice
because such attorney had, within two years prior, served as secretary of the debtor, although he had
resigned such position prior to the commencement of the case. Although attorney had not received
compensation as an officer of the corporation and did not attend board meetings or perform any
actual duties, the Court, citing the "mechanical application of the disinterestedness standard" denied
the application. InreDoverspikeBros. Coal Co., No. 98-52194, Order (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 18,
1998).
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3 See In re: Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 44 F.3d 1310 (6th Cir. 1995) (if professional is not
disinterested, he cannot be validly employed; if not validly employed under section 327, he is not
entitled to receive compensation under section 330); In re: Eagle-Picher Industries. Inc., 999 F.2d
969 (6th Cir. 1993) (if professional is not disinterested, he cannot be employed; there does not need
to be a showing of an actual conflict); and In re: Middleton Arms, 934 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1991) (if
professional is not disinterested, professional cannot be employed and the exception contained in
section 11 07(b) applies only to those professionals determined to be disinterested solely because of
former employment).
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disclosures. Instead, such issues sometimes arise upon the motion of a
creditor, the United States Trustee, or even competitor of the debtor, after the
attorney has rendered substantial services. Many courts are taking a hard line
on not only disqualifying and ordering disgorgement for attorneys who have
a conflict, but also for attorneys who fail to fully disclose potential conflicts,
sometimes without ever addressing the underlying issue of whether a conflict
exists or the attorney is not disinterested.
The Sixth Circuit trilogy of cases relevant to the compensation of
professionals3 together hold that if a professional is not disinterested as
defined in 11 U.S.c. § 101(14), then that professional cannot be validly
employed under 11 U.S.c. § 327. Without being validly employed under 11
U.S.c. § 327, a professional is not entitled to compensation under 11 U.s.c.
§ 330. In other words, the Sixth Circuit has held that "a valid appointment
under § 327(a) is a condition precedent to the decision to grant or deny
compensation under § 330(a) or § 328(c)" In re Federated, at 1320.
In an opinion allowing counsel for the DIP to accept a mortgage on property
the DIP used, but did not own, over the objection of the United States
Trustee that such would tum counsel into a stakeholder, Judge Bucki of the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York, captured the
problematic nature of disinterestedness:
The concept ofdisinterestedness ... is a goal that professionals
can only achieve in an imperfect form. Much like the concept
of absolute zero in physics, attorneys are unlikely to ever
attain a state of absolute disinterestedness. Indeed, the mere
expectation of compensation will necessarily create some
degree of self interest. Except possibly in the context of pro
bono representation, the employment of counsel will always
create a relationship that is potentially adverse as to the issue
of compensation.... Disinterestedness requires not perfection,
but the absence of such adverse interests as might preclude
counsel from generally exercising independent judgment.
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The adequate assurance of reasonable compensation is a vital
safeguard ofa professional's independent judgment. Without
such assurance, the professional becomes a potential creditor
for whom the risk of nonpayment creates an inevitable
proclivity for diminished enthusiasm.
In re City Mattress Inc., 163 B.R. 687, 688 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1994).
The source and timing of payments of fees is a potential minefield attorneys
must wade through in showing their disinterested status. While the payment
of fees by third parties is allowed with certain procedural safeguards by the
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, See, SCR 3.130 (M.R. 1.8(f)),
courts recognize the risk to the attorney's duty of loyalty and independent
judgment such payments present.
In the bankruptcy arena, some courts have allowed a debtor's stockholders to
individually payor guaranty the debtor's attorney's fees. For example, In re
Lotus Properties LP, 200 B.R. 388 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996), involved the
payment oflegal fees by the general partner of debtor in a single asset chapter
11. It was clear from the outset that the secured creditor would object to the
use of cash collateral for counsel fees and there was no other source from
which the attorney could get paid. The attorney fully disclosed the
arrangement to the court in initial disclosures and included a statement from
the general partner that counsel "will owe its sole legal duty to [debtor] and
will act solely in the interests of [debtor] regardless of whether such action is
in the best interest of[partner]." The U.S. Trustee argued payment by the
general partner was a per se impermissible conflict, but the bankruptcy court
disagreed, discussing the "restrictive" versus "analytical" approaches in
addressing the payment of fees by a third party/insider.
It appears, however, that bankruptcy courts in Kentucky take a much more
restrictive approach. An example is In re BBQ Resources. Inc., Case No. 99-
70103, Memorandum Opinion (Bankr. E.D. Ky., Aug. 13, 1999). In In re
BBQ, counsel for debtor had received an initial retainer from an entity that
was a creditor ofthe debtor and the lessor of equipment used by debtor. The
arrangement was disclosed to the court and employment was initially
approved. Thereafter, a creditor and the United States Trustee objected and
Judge Howard disqualified the attorney from representing the DIP. After
being disqualified, the attorney applied for compensation for the services
provided between the time he was initially employed and the date of the order
setting aside the employment, arguing he had proceeded in good faith and
should not be denied compensation when it is later determined a conflict
existed. Judge Howard held that there was a conflict ab initio and although
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the denial ofall compensation is a harsh remedy, it is the only appropriate one
for an attorney who is not validly appointed due to a conflict. "Simply put,
the attorney takes the risk that the court will finally determine that a conflict
exists and deny the employment of the attorney by the debtor and,
consequently, deny any compensation for services already provided." Id. at
p. 7. Judge Howard went on to state that the Sixth Circuit had made clear
that professionals should be disqualified when there is even an appearance of
a conflict and that the court had no discretion to award fees under section
330(a) when the professional has not met the requirements of section 327(a).
Such fee arrangements present the appearance of a conflict and a potential for
conflict to an extent that some courts flatly prohibit them. Other courts have
held that the payment of fees by a third party constitutes an actual conflict
which disqualifies the attorney from representing the debtor. In re National
Distributors Warehouse Co., Inc., 148 B.R. 558 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
Compare this reasoning to the case onn re First Jersey Securities. Inc., 180
F.3d 504, 509 (3rd Cir. 1999): "In summary, § 327 (a) mandates
disqualification when there is an actual conflict of interest, allows for it when
there is a potential conflict, and precludes it based solely on an appearance of
conflict. "
Bankruptcy Code Section 328(c) provides:
Except as provided in section 327(c), 327 (e), or 1107(b) of this title,
the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and
reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under
Section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time during such
professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this
title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or
represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with
respect to the matter on which such professional person is employed.
(Emphasis added)
The denial or even disgorgement of fees is now not the only penalty
bankruptcy practitioners face. In July, 1999, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's conviction of John Gellene, a partner in a prestigious New
York law firm, and sentence of 15 months of imprisonment and a $15,000.00
fine for failing to disclose his law firm's connection with a creditor of the
debtor he was representing. See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7lh
Cir. 1999).
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In single-asset real estate cases and in attempts to reorganize a debtor that
deals with inventory, bankruptcy practitioners are in a quandry. Taking a
retainer from "cash collateral" is a very sticky situation. While in In re
Addison Properties Ltd. Partnership, 185 B.R. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995),
the court stated that in a single asset case, a security retainer paid from cash
collateral and held until the end of the case might be appropriate, in In re
Woodfield Gardens, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), the
court held that a real estate appraiser and professional engineering firm for the
debtor who held court approved retainers of pre-petition rents collected by
debtor could not be paid out of such retainers on their final fee applications
because these funds constituted cash collateral of the principal secured
creditor.
While there are a wealth ofcases that are all over the board on the use of cash
collateral, one of the most alarming ones is In re Creekstone Apartments
Associates. L.P., 1995 WL 588904 (M.D. Tenn. 1995), where the court held
that mortgagee could maintain a conversion action against counsel for the
debtor and the general partner of the debtor who both received post-default
transfers of rent.
The problem counsel faces is the wording of the language in many of the
security agreements debtor executes to lender. Postpetition, the parties often
agree to a "carve-out" wherein lender allows the use of its cash collateral, but
receives added protection. Such a situation raises complicated questions
regarding the debtor's favoring of that creditor, from simply different
treatment to agreements not to sue the creditor. Another issue is the extent
of disclosures debtor must make regarding creditor's treatment and debtor's
use ofcash collateral. Implicated are Sections 363 and 364 and Bankruptcy
Rule 4001.
Ij
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D. Professionals as Prepetition Creditors ofDebtor
1. In re First Jersey Securities. Inc., 180 F. 3d 504 (3rd Cir. 1999): In this case,
the Third Circuit reversed the district court and the bankruptcy court by
determining debtor's transfer of restricted securities to counsel on the eve of
bankruptcy was a preference and did not fall into the "ordinary course of
business" exception to the statute. The Court emphasized that legal fees
become a claim when the services are rendered, not when the invoice is
prepared or sent. Further, in this case, debtor had never paid counsel, or any
other creditor, with securities. The timing of the payment led to even more
suspicion. As much as this case answers, however, it raises questions as to
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The Duty of Honesty
In Kentucky and across the country, attorneys' failures to conduct themselves with
full candor before the court is resulting in increasingly severe penalties. No longer are
attorneys pocketbooks only being hurt, they are being disciplined by bar associations
and, in the most dire case, serving jail time. Making national news last year was the
fate ofJohn Gellene. Even more recently was the very public disqualification of Hale
& DOff, LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP in the Filene's Basement, Inc.
bankruptcy. These and other interesting cases of note include:
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under what circumstances a debtor's payment of prepetition legal fees will fall
into the "ordinary course of business" exception to the preference statute.
In re Backer, No. 98-50956 (Bankr. ED. Ky., 1998) and In re Advanced
Technologies IntI. Inc., No. 99-50868 (Bankr. ED. Ky., 1999) are two
presently pending cases in which the court ordered counsel for the debtor to
disgorge and waive prepetition fees. The Office of the United States Trustee
has made it clear it does not approve ofsuch curative efforts being used in the
future and takes the stand that the only remedy for the acceptance of
prepetition fees that are arguably preferential is voluntary disgorgement or
disqualification.
United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999): John Gellene, counsel
for debtor, failed to disclose that his firm represented the individual who
owned debtor's primary secured creditor. Further, counsel took affirmative
steps in a course of action to avoid discovery of his failure to disclose.
Gellene was charged with two counts of knowing and fraudulently making a
false material declaration, in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 152 and a violation of
18 U.S.c. § 1623, using a document under oath with knowledge it contained
false information. Counsel was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment and
a $15,000.00 fine. The sentence of the district court was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit.
In re Filene's Basement. Inc., 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1293 and 1301: Two
opinions from the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court granting a motion to
reconsider, vacating prior employment orders and denying applications to
employ Hale & Dorr as attorneys and PricewaterhouseCoopers as financial
advisor and consultant to debtor. This conflict and failure to disclose came
up when a competitor of the debtor filed a motion for reconsideration of the
appointment of the debtor's counsel and financial consultant. Both firms were
disqualified because of their failure to fully disclose.
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In re BBQ Resources Inc., Case No. 99-70103 (Bankr. E.D. Ky 1999):
Counsel for debtor had agreed to be compensated by an entity that was a
creditor of the debtor and the lessor of equipment used by debtor. The
arrangement was disclosed to the court and employment was approved.
Thereafter, a creditor and the United States Trustee objected and Judge
Howard disqualified the attorney from representing the DIP.
In re The Leslie Fay Companies. Inc., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1994):
The Court granted the United States Trustee's motion to disqualifY debtor's
counsel and denied a portion of requested fees due to counsel's failure to
disclose certain connections which rendered counsel not disinterested. The
Court imposed this sanction while recognizing counsel rendered competent
services despite counsel's failure to disclose. The Court expressed concern
for harm to the debtor in losing its chosen counsel after almost two years into
the reorganization.
In re Carlton House of Brockton, 28 BCD 777 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996):
Counsel for creditor's committee suspended from bankruptcy practice for one
year due to false representations of disinterestedness.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wharton, 810 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1991): Attorney
suspended for six months for violating Bankruptcy Rule 1006(b)(3) by
receiving attorney fee before paying filing fee for debtor's petition and then
failing to pay fee after a subsequent check was returned for insufficient funds,
even though additional time was allowed by the court.
Roberts v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 771 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1989): Attorney allowed
to resign and surrender license for six months where he accepted stock in a
corporation owned by the debtor and prepared numerous deeds from the
debtor to the corporation where the bankruptcy judge found the transfers
were made without adequate consideration and set aside some of the
transfers.
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F. Specific Disclosure Rules
1. Bankruptcy Rule 2014- An order approving employment can be entered only
upon application of the debtor or trustee. The application must state
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
the specific facts showing the necessity for the employment,
the name of the person to be employed,
the reasons for the selection,
the professional services to be rendered,
any proposed arrangement for compensation, and
1- 10
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Bankruptcy Code Section 329 disclosures- Any attorney for the debtor in
connection with the case, whether or not they seek compensation from the
court must file a statement specifying
If the compensation exceeds the reasonable value for the services, the court
can cancel the agreement or order return of the excessive payment
Bankruptcy Rule 2019- Unless the Court orders otherwise, every entity or
committee, except creditors, equity security holders and retiree committees,
representing more than one creditor and every indenture trustee must file a
verified statement setting forth
a. the name and address of the creditor or equity security holder,
b. the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of
acquisition thereofunless it is alleged to have been acquired more than
one year prior to the filing of the petition,
c. a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with
the employment of the entity or indenture trustee and in the case ofa
committee, the name or names of the entity or entities at whose
instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was arranged or the
committee was organized or agreed to act, and
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a.
b.
c.
d.
a.
b.
to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest,
their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee,
or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee.
If the employed person is a partnership or corporation, or if a named
professional is employed, any partner, member, or regular associate of
the partnership, corporation or individual may act as attorney or
accountant, without further order of court.
the compensation paid or agreed to be paid,
if the payment or agreement was made after one year before the date
of the filing of the petition
whether the services were rendered or to be rendered in contemplation
of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and
the source of the compensation.
to the estate if the property transferred
i. would have been property of the estate; or
11. was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan
under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11; or
to the entity that made the payment.
r 1-11
d. with reference to the time of the employment of the entity, the
organization or formation of the committee, or the appearance in the
case of any indenture trustee, the amounts of claims or interests
owned by the entity, the member of the committee or the indenture
trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any
sales or other disposition thereof
-
-
;
-
-
4.
5.
6.
The statement must include a copy of the instrument under which the entity,
committee or indenture trustee is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or
equity security holders. There is a continuing duty to supplement the
statement. If there is a failure to comply, the court may hold invalid the
authority, acceptance, rejection or objection made by the entity or committee
who has not complied with this disclosure or Bankruptcy Code Section
1125(b).
Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b)- Within 15 days after entry of the order for relief,
every attorney for a debtor (whether or not such attorney applies for
compensation) must file the statement under Section 329 of the Bankruptcy
Code including any agreement regarding the sharing of the compensation with
any other entity, except a member or regular associate of the attorney's law
firm. The statement must contain the particulars of the agreement, including
disclosures as to the compensation paid or agreed to be paid and the source
of such compensation. There is a continuing duty to supplement this
disclosure in the future within 15 days after any payment or agreement not
previously disclosed.
A willful failure to disclose fee arrangements pursuant to Rule 2016 has been
held by the Sixth Circuit to mandate a denial of all requested compensation.
~ In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996). In re Downs held that ifan
attorney receives compensation from a debtor's creditor, the attorney has a
pecuniary interest materially adverse to the interests of the estate - "a
conflict of interest that requires a denial of all compensation to debtor's
counseL" ld... at 479 (quoting In re Crimson Investments, 109 B.R. 397
(Bankr. D. Az. 1989». Faced with such a situation, the Court "should deny
all compensation to an attorney who exhibits a willful disregard of his
fiduciary obligations to fully disclose the nature and circumstances of his fee
arrangement under § 329 and Rule 2016." Id. The Sixth Circuit denied all
fees and required disgorgement of previously received fees, stating same was
"the only appropriate sanction" in the case.
Nevertheless, an unresolved question remains regarding whether
disgorgement is an appropriate remedy when a third party pays the DIP
attorney's fees, and such payment creates an impermissible conflict. If
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IV. COMPENSATION
Background- Ifall a professional person had to worry about is preparing an invoice
for presentation to and payment by their client, this business would be far easier.
Unfortunately, the road to compensation is a quest, paved with the sweat and tears
of our brethren.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
A.
7.
1.
disgorgement is the proper remedy, who receives the funds, the third party or
the estate? Section 329 perhaps provides some guidance on this issue, giving
a choice of parties to whom the court may order the return of compensation
when such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of services. (See note
2, above). Further, in In re Land, 943 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's order for debtor's counsel to return
a retainer to the third party, not because the compensation exceeded the
reasonable value of services, but because the attorney had never obtained
court approval of employment.
Failure to adequately disclose information on a fee application can itself result
in disgorgement, reduced fees or disqualification. The majority of courts
agree that orders regarding the interim compensation of fees, as well as the
appointment or disqualification of counsel, are interlocutory and not
immediately appealable. For an excellent look at this issue, see In re
Firstmark Corp., 46 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1995).
Limitations on Compensation-
r
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c.
While a professional person may be employed on any reasonable terms
and conditions ofemployment, including a retainer, on an hourly basis
or on a contingent fee basis, the Court may allow compensation
different from the compensation provided in the order after the
conclusion of the employment, if the original terms of employment
turn out to have been improvident in light of unforeseeable
developments. See Section 328(a).
If the trustee acts as his own attorney or accountant, he or she may
only recover compensation for professional services and not those
generally performed by a trustee without an attorney or accountant.
See Section 328(b).
If the Court determines that the professional person is not a
disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the
interest ofthe estate with respect to their employment, the Court may
1-13
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deny allowance of compensation for servi~es and reimbursement of
expenses. See Section 328(c).
Allowable Compensation- The Court, after notice to parties in interest and
a hearing, may award a professional person reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
The Court can on its own motion, or that of any party in interest, award
compensation that is less than that which is requested. See Bankruptcy Code
Sections 330(a)(l) and (2).
-
a. Reasonable Compensation- The Court will consider the nature, the
extent, and the value ofthe services, and take into account all relevant
factors, including -
1.
11.
Ill.
IV.
v.
the time spent on such services;
the rates charges for such services;
whether the services were necessary to the administration of
or beneficial at the time rendered toward the completion of the
case;
whether the services were performed within a reasonable
amount of time commensurate with the complexity,
importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task
addressed; and
whether the compensation is reasonable, based upon the
customary compensation charged by comparably skilled
practitioners in cases other than under Title 11. See Section
330(a)(3)(A).
f
...
b. Unreasonable Compensation-
compensation for
The Court shall not allow
1.
11.
unnecessary duplication of services; or
services that were not
a. reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or
b. necessary to the administration of the case. See Section
330(a)(4)(A).
c. In re Big Rivers, 233 B.R. 768 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999), rev'd and
remanded, in part, Nos. 4:99CV-132-M and 4:99CV-115-M, Orders
entered Oct. 29, 1999 (W.D. Ky. 1999). While this case has presently
been reversed and remanded, in part, by the District Court for failure
to hold a hearing and failure to apply the lodestar approach, Judge
Roberts' opinion criticizing several law firms and other professionals
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is worth noting. Some of the complaints the Judge noted include:
failure to provide detailed descriptions of services rendered;
excessively long phone conferences; excessive and unnecessary
services (for example, billing two hours to draft a memo summarizing
a one hour phone call); duplicative services (two or more attorneys
from the same firm attending and billing for interoffice conferences,
client meetings, hearing and other conferences); billing for secretarial
tasks; and excessive time for preparing the bill. The court
emphasized, "Attorneys must be disabused of the erroneous notion
that they are entitled to compensation as long as the time recorded
was actually expended. Simply put, billable hours do not necessarily
translate into compensable hours."
It is clear that the case onn re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1991),
is controlling authority regarding the determination of the fee award
for counsel for the debtor. Boddy holds that the court should apply
the lodestar method, multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the
number of hours reasonably spend on the case, to calculate the
appropriate fee award. Such award may thereafter be adjusted by the
court on the basis of other factors.
In his Order and Memorandum Opinion entered December 28, 1994
in In re East Kentucky Lumber Co.. Inc., No. 93-60392 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky), Judge Howard explained as follows:
The starting point for determining an award of
attorney fees is the application of the "Lodestar"
method, whereby "the attorney's reasonable hourly
rate [is multiplied] by the number of hours reasonably
expended." In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, at 337 (6th Cir.
1991). It is the Court's task to determine what is
"reasonable".
Courts often apply a 12-factor formula set out in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1974), in making determinations about
"reasonableness" .
In In re Spendthrift Farms. Inc., No. 88-01719, Memorandum Opinion
filed Oct. 24, 1990 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.), Judge Lee disallowed
compensation for services performed prior to order authorizing
retention; for services performed by persons identified only by initials
and for daily totals rather than detailed hours. The importance of the
1- 15
level of detail necessary in bills is clear. In the same opinion, Judge
Lee also disallowed compensation for interoffice conferences and joint
court appearances and disallowed or reduced reimbursement of
expenses for first class travel, transportation costs for firm employees
working in the evenings and overtime expenses for secretarial and
other staff
B. The Fee Application
•r
1
-
1.
2.
3.
Section 330 provides the court may award reasonable compensation to a
trustee or other professional person after notice and an opportunity for
hearing. Regardless ofwhether an objection is filed, because often parties in
interest or the debtor have little incentive to object to compensation
applications, the bankruptcy court has a duty to carefully scrutinize
applications for fees and expenses. See In re: Big Rivers, 233 B.R. 768, 777
(Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1999)("Even though no party-in-interest seriously objected
to the fees of Big Rivers' professionals, the Court has a duty to carefully
scrutinize them.").
The continually increasing involvement of the United States Trustee in the
review ofand objection to applications for compensation is making the award
of compensation more uniform, but the application process more time
consuming. Bankruptcy Code Sections 328, 329, 330 and 331, as well as
Bankruptcy Rule 2016, govern the filing and content of compensation
applications. However, on all cases commenced after October 22, 1994,
practitioners must file fee applications in accordance with the United States
Trustee's Fee Guidelines.
Section 331 allows a trustee, examiner, debtor's attorney or any other
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 to apply for
compensation for services rendered and reimbursement of expenses "not more
than once every 120 days after an order for relief in a case under this title, or
more often if the court permits...".
t
....
J
;
)'
-
v. CONCLUSION
Many bankruptcy practitioners have felt like they are in a catch-22 situation for some time--
caught between a desire to counsel clients in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy and a desire to be
assured payment if bankruptcy does occur. What these materials strive to make clear is that the
increasingly hard line being taken by many courts opens attorneys up to graver dangers than the loss
of a portion of fees. Indictments and disqualification with complete disgorgement of.all fees are
becoming more common. Complete candor with your clients and the court is the only way to
conduct a bankruptcy practice. Anything less is a risk not worth taking.
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APPENDIX 1
APPLICABLE UNITED STATES CODE SECTIONS
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART 1. CRIMES, CHAPTER 9. BANKRUPTCY
* 18 USC, Section 152: Concealment of assets; False oaths and claims; Bribery
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART 1. CRIMES, CHAPTER 79. PERJURY
* 18 USC, Section 1623: False declarations before grand jury or court
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
* 11 USC, Section 101: Definitions
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
* 11 USC, Section 327: Employment of professional persons
* 11 USC, Section 328: Limitation on compensation of professional persons
* 11 USC, Section 329: Debtor's transactions with attorneys
* 11 USC, Section 330: Compensation of officers
* 11 USC, Section 331: Interim compensation
* 11 USC, Section 363: Use, sale or lease of property
* 11 USC, Section 364: Obtaining credit
CHAPTER 11. REORGANIZATION
* 11 USC, Section 1103: Powers and duties of committees
* 11 USC, Section 1107: Rights, powers and duties of debtor in possession
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
pART I. CRIMES
CHAPTER 9. BANKRUPTCY
18 USCS § 152 (1999)
§ 152. Concealment of assets; false oaths and claims: bribery
A person who--
(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court
charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from creditors
or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any case under title 11;
(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under
penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, in or in relation to any case under title 11;
(4) knowingly and fraudulently presents any false claim for proof against the estate of a debtor, or uses
any such claim in any case under title 11, in a personal capacity or as or through an agent, proxy, or
attorney;
(5) knowingly and fraudulently receives any material amount of property from a debtor after the filing of a
case under title 11, with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11;
(6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or attempts to obtain any money or property,
remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any
case under title 11;
(7) in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in contemplation of a
case under title 11 by or against the person or any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the
provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property of
such other person or corporation;
(8) after the filing of a case under title 11 or in contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently conceals,
destroys, mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any recorded information (including books,
documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor; or
(9) after the filing of a case under title 11, knowingly and fraudulently withholds from a custodian, trustee,
marshal, or other officer of the court or a United States Trustee entitled to its possession, any recorded
information (including books, documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of
a debtor,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I. CRIMES
CHAPTER 79. PERJURY
18 USCS § 1623 (1999)
§ 1623. False declarations before grand jUry or court
(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury
as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses
any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing
the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or without the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in any proceedings before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two
or more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need not
specify which declaration is false if--
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations for the offense charged under
this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information
shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant while under oath made
irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to
the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the time he made each declaration believed the
declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the
person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution
under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the
proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary
that such proof be made by any particUlar number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of
evidence.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
11 USCS § 101 (1999)
§ 101. Definitions
In this title--
(1) "accountant" means accountant authorized under applicable [applicable] law to practice public
accounting, and includes professional accounting association, corporation, or partnership, if so authorized;
(2) "affiliate" means-
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that holds such securities-
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly
owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor,
other than an entity that holds such securities--
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under a lease or operating agreement by a debtor, or person
substantially all of whose property is operated under an operating agreement with the debtor; or
(D) entity that operates the business or SUbstantially all of the property of the debtor under a lease or
operating agreement;
3 [Redesignated]
"attorne "means attorney, professional law association, corporation, or partnership, authorized under
app ica e law to practice law;
(5) "claim" means--
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;
(6) "commodity broker" means futures commission merchant, foreign futures commission merchant,
clearing organization, leverage transaction merchant, or commodity options dealer, as defined in section
761 of this title, with respect to which there is a customer, as defined in section 761 of this title;
(7) "community claim" means claim that arose before the commencement of the case concerning the
debtor for which property of the kind specified in section 541 (a)(2) of this title is liable, whether or not there
is any such property at the time of the commencement of the case;
(8) "consumer debt" means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose;
9 "cor oration"--
inC u es--
(i) association having a power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a
partnership, possesses;
(ii) partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible
for the debts of such association;
(iii) joint-stOCk company;
(iv) unincorporated company or association; or
(v) business trust; but
(B) does not include limited partnership;
(10) "creditor" means--
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief
concerning the debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h)
or 502(i) of this title; or
(C) entity that has a community claim;
(11) "custodian" means--
1-21
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under
this title;
(8) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors; or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is appointed or authorized
to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or for the
purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors;
(12) "debt" means liability on a claim;
(12A) "debt for child support" means a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title for
maintenance or support of a child of the debtor;
(13) "debtor" means person or municipality concerning which a case under this title has been
commenced;
(14) "disinterested person" means person that-
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(8) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the petition, an investment banker for
a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or
issuance of a security of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or
employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified in subparagraph (8) or (C) of this paragraph;
and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors
or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in,
the debtor or an investment banker specified in subparagraph (8) or (C) of this paragraph, or for any other
reason;
(15) "entity" includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee;
16 "e U1t securit " means--
s are In a corporation, whether or not transferable or denominated "stock", or similar security;
(8) interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership; or
(C) warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, security, or
interest of a kind specified in subparagraph (A) or (8) of this paragraph;
17 "e ui securi holder" means holder of an equity security of the debtor;
1 'ami arme means--
(A) indivi ua or Individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not
exceed $ 1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of whose aggregate noncontingent, liqUidated debts
(excluding a debt for the principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such
debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a farming operation owned
or operated by such individual or such individual and spouse, and such individual or such individual and
spouse receive from such farming operation more than 50 percent of such individual's or such individual
and spouse's gross income for the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the case concerning
such individual or such individual and spouse was filed; or
(8) corporation or partnership in which more than 50 percent of the outstanding stock or equity is held
by one family, or by one family and the relatives of the members of such family, and such family or such
relatives conduct the farming operation, and
(i) more than 80 percent of the value of its assets consists of assets related to the farming operation;
(ii) its aggregate debts do not exceed $ 1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of its aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for one dwelling which is owned by such corporation or
partnership and which a shareholder or partner maintains as a principal residence, unless such debt arises
out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of the farming operation owned or
operated by such corporation or such partnership; and
(iii) if such corporation issues stock, such stock is not publicly traded;
(19) "family farmer with regular annual income" means family farmer whose annual income is sufficiently
stable and regular to enable such family farmer to make payments under a plan under chapter 12 of this
title;
(20) "farmer" means (except when such term appears in the term "family farmer") person that received
more than 80 percent of such person's gross income during the taxable year of such person immediately
preceding the taxable year of such person during which the case under this title concerning such person
was commenced from a farming operation owned or operated by such person;
(21) "farming operation" includes farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production or raising
of crops, pOUltry, or livestock, and production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state;
!21A) "farmout agreement" means a written agreement in which--
(A) the owner of a right to drill, produce, or operate liqUid or gaseous hydrocarbons on property agrees
or has agreed to transfer or assign all or a part of such right to another entity; and
(8) such other entity (either directly or through its agents or its assigns), as consideration, agrees to
perform drilling, reworking, recompleting, testing, or similar or related operations, to develop or produce
liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons on the property;
218 "Federal de osito institutions re ulato a enc " means--
Wit respect to an Insure eposltory institution (as defined in section 3(c)(2) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act [12 uses § 1813(c)(2)]) for which no conservator or receiver has been appointed, the
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appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3(q) of such Act [1:2_ U_SCS §J§J 3(q)]);
(8) with respect to an insured credit union (including an insured credit union for which the National
Credit Union Administration has been appointed conservator or liquidating agent), the National Credit Union
Administration;
(C) with respect to any insured depository institution for which the Resolution Trust Corporation has
been appointed conservator or receiver, the Resolution Trust Corporation; and
(D) with respect to any insured depository institution for which the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation has been appointed conservator or receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
(22) "financial institution" means a person that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank,
savings and loan association, or trust company and, when any such person is acting as agent or custodian
for a customer in connection with a securities contract, as defined in section 741 of this title, such customer;
123) "forei~n proceeding" means proceeding, whether jUdicial or administrative and whether or not under
bankruptcy aw, In a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business,
or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an
estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization;
(24) "foreign representative" means dUly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative of an
estate In a foreign proceeding;
25 "forward contract" means a contract (other than a commodity contract) for the purchase, sale, or
trans er 0 a commo Ity, as defined in section 761 (8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right,
or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the sUbject of dealing in the forward contract trade, or
product or byproduct thereof, with a maturity date more than two days after the date the contract is entered
into, including, but not limited to, a repurchase transaction, reverse repurchase transaction, consignment,
lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option, allocated transaction, unallocated transaction, or any
combination thereof or option thereon;
26 "forward contract merchant" means a person whose business consists in whole or in part of entering
into orwar contracts as or with merchants in a commodity, as defined in section 761 (8) of this title, or any
similar good, article, service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of
dealing in the forward contract trade;
(27) "governmental unit" means United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality;
foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee
while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a
municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government;
(28) "indenture" means mortgage, deed of trust, or indenture, under which there is outstanding a security,
other than a voting-trust certificate, constituting a claim against the debtor, a claim secured by a lien on any
of the debtor's property, or an equity security of the debtor;
(29) "indenture trustee" means trustee under an indenture;
30 "individual with re ular income" means individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to
enable suc In IVI ua to ma e payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title ttl _uses §§ 1301 et
seq.], other than a stockbroker or a commodity broker;
31 "insider" includes--
(A) if the ebtor is an individual--
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(8) if the debtor is a corporation--
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership--
(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of an elected official of the
debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
(F) managing agent of the debtor;
1-23
UNITED STATES CODE
11 uses § 327 (1999)
§ 327. Employment of professional persons
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's approval, may employ one or
more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or
represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the
trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title L11U$C~§§_191 et seq.].
(b) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under section 721, 1202, or 1108 of this
title, and if the debtor has regularly employed attorneys, accountants, or other professional persons on
salary, the trustee may retain or replace such professional persons if necessary in the operation of such
business.
(c) In a case under chapter 7, 12, or 11 of this title ttlJL$C::L§§J01 et seq., 1201 et seq., or 1101 et seq.],
a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person's employment
by or representation of a creditor, unless there is objection by another creditor or the United States trustee,
in which case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual conflict of interest.
(d) The court may authorize the trustee to act as attorney or accountant for the estate if such authorization
is in the best interest of the estate.
(e) The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ, for a specified special purpose, other than to
represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, if in the best
interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or
to the estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed.
(f) The trustee may not employ a person that has served as an examiner in the case.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER II. OFFICERS
11 USCS § 328 (1999)
§ 328. Limitation on compensation of professional persons
(a) The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title [1J 1J~CS § J102], with the court's
approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103 of
this title [11 USCS § 327 or 1103], as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of
employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding such
terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation provided under
such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to
have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of
such terms and conditions.
(b) If the court has authorized a trustee to serve as an attorney or accountant for the estate under section
327(d) of this title [11 USCS §327(d)], the court may allow compensation for the trustee's services as such
attorney or accountant only to the extent that the trustee performed services as attorney or accountant for
the estate and not for performance of any of the trustee's duties that are generally performed by a trustee
without the assistance of an attorney or accountant for the estate.
(c) Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title [11 USCS § 327(c), 327(e), or 1107
(b)], the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title [11 USCS_§ 327 or 1103] if, at any time
during such professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this title [1J USCS § 327 or
1103], such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to
the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional person is employed.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BA~KRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CtpEDMINISTRATION
SOBCHA· TER II. OFFICERS
11 USCS § 329 (1999)
§329. Debtor's transactions with attorneys
(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title [11USCS§§J01 et seq.], or in connection
with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for compensation under this title [1 LLJ$CS§§ 101
et seq.], shall file with the court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment
or agreement was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services rendered or
to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and the source of such
compensation.
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any
such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to--
(1) the estate, if the property transferred--
(A) would have been property of the estate; or
(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or
(2) the entity that made such payment.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER II. OFFIcERS
11 USCS § 330 (1999)
§ 330. Compensation of officers
(a) (1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to
sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103--
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner,
professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
(2) The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the United States Trustee, the United States
Trustee for the District or Region, the trustee for the estate, or any other party in interest, award
compensation that is less than the amount of compensation that is requested.
(3) (A) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded, the court shall consider the
nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including--
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the
service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title [lllJ§~_~§§lOJ et seq.];
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the
complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; and
(E) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by
comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title [11 USCS §§J 01 et seq.].
(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for--
(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
(ii) services that were not--
(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or
(II) necessary to the administration of the case.
(B) In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow
reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection
with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the
debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.
(5) The court shall reduce the amount of compensation awarded under this section by the amount of any
Interim compensation awarded under section 331, and, if the amount of such interim compensation
exceeds the amount of compensation awarded under this section, may order the return of the excess to the
estate.
(6) Any compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and
skill reasonably required to prepare the application.
(b) (1) There shall be paid from the filing fee in a case under chapter 7 of this title [lLl.J.S.C~ §§ 701 et seq.]
$ 45 to the trustee serving in such case, after such trustee's services are rendered.
(2) The Judicial Conference of the United States--
(A) shall prescribe additional fees of the same kind as prescribed under section 1914(b) of title 28; and
(B) may prescribe notice of appearance fees and fees charged against distributions in cases under this
title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; to pay $ 15 to trustees serving in cases after such trustees' services are
rendered. Beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 [enacted
Oct. 22,1994], such $ 15 shall be paid in addition to the amount paid under paragraph (1).
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, in a case under chapter 12 or 13 of this title, the compensation paid
to the trustee serving in the case shall not be less than $ 5 per month from any distribution under the plan
during the administration of the plan.
(d) In a case in which the United States trustee serves as trustee, the compensation of the trustee under
this section shall be paid to the clerk of the bankruptcy court and deposited by the clerk into the United
States Trustee System Fund established by section 589a of title 28.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER II. OFFICERS
11 USCS § 331 (1999)
§ 331. Interim compensation
A trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any professional person employed under section 327 or
, , 03 of this title [11 USCS§ 327 or 1103] may apply to the court not more than once every 120 days after
an order for relief in a case under this title [11 lJSCS §§ 101 et seq.], or more often if the court permits, for
such compensation for services rendered before the date of such an application or reimbursement for
expenses incurred before such date as is provided under section 330 of this title [1.:1 U~CS§ 3~()1 After
notice and a hearing, the court may allow and disburse to such applicant such compensation or
reimbursement.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
11 USCS § 363 (1999)
§ 363. Use. sale. or lease of property
(a) In this section, "cash collateral" means cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities,
deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than
the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property and
the fees, charges, accounts or other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other pUblic facilities
in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties subject to a security interest as provided in section 552(b) of
this title, whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title.
(b) (1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate.
(2) If notification is required under subsection (a) of section 7A of the Clayton Act [1~LJSCS.;§1Jl§(a)]in
the case of a transaction under this subsection, then--
(A) notwithstanding subsection (a) of such section [15 USCS§ 18a(a)], the notification required by such
subsection to be given by the debtor shall be given by the trustee; and
(B) notwithstanding subsection (b) of such section L15l,JSCS § 18a(b)], the required waiting period shall
end on the 15th day after the date of the receipt, by the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, of the notification required
under such subsection (a) [15 USCS §J8a(a)], unless such waiting period is extended--
(i) pursuant to subsection (e)(2) of such section [15 USCS § 18a(e)(2)], in the same manner as such
subsection (e)(2) applies to a cash tender offer;
(ii) pursuant to subsection (g)(2) of such section [15 USCS § 18a(g)(2)]; or
(iii) by the court after notice and a hearing.
(c) (1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721, 1108, 1203, 1204, or
1304 of this title and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into transactions, including
the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice or a hearing,
and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing.
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this subsection unless--
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
(3) Any hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection may be a preliminary hearing or may be
consolidated with a hearing under subsection (e) of this section, but shall be scheduled in accordance with
the needs of the debtor. If the hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection is a preliminary hearing,
the court may authorize such use, sale, or lease only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the trustee will
prevail at the final hearing under subsection (e) of this section. The court shall act promptly on any request
for authorization under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection.
(4) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the trustee shall segregate and account for
any cash collateral in the trustee's possession, custody, or control.
(d) The trustee may use, sell, or lease property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section only to the extent
not inconsistent with any relief granted under section 362(c), 362(d), 362(e), or 362(f) of this title.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an entity that has an
interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court,
with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest. This subsection also applies to property that is SUbject to any
unexpired lease of personal property (to the exclusion of such property being subject to an order to grant
relief from the stay under section 362).
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in
such property of an entity other than the estate, only if--
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(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate
value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of
such interest.
(g) Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any vested or contingent right in the nature of dower or curtesy.
(h) Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both the estate's interest, under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at
the time of the commencement of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or
tenant by the entirety, only if-
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize significantly less for the estate
than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of co-owners outweighs the
detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale, of electric energy or
of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.
(i) Before the consummation of a sale of property to which subsection (g) or (h) of this section applies, or of
property of the estate that was community property of the debtor and the debtor's spouse immediately
before the commencement of the case, the debtor's spouse, or a co-owner of such property, as the case
may be, may purchase such property at the price at which such sale is to be consummated.
U) After a sale of property to which subsection (g) or (h) of this section applies, the trustee shall distribute to
the debtor's spouse or the co-owners of such property, as the case may be, and to the estate, the proceeds
of such sale, less the costs and expenses, not including any compensation of the trustee, of such sale,
according to the interests of such spouse or co-owners, and of the estate.
(k) At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is SUbject to a lien that secures an allowed
claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, and, if the
holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim against the purchase
price of such property.
(I) Subject to the provisions of section 365, the trustee may use, sell, or lease property under subsection (b)
or (c) of this section, or a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title [1JUSC~§§Jj 01 et seq., 1201 et
seq., or 1301 et seq.] may prOVide for the use, sale, or lease of property, notwithstanding any provision in a
contract, a lease, or applicable law that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor,
on the commencement of a case under this title concerning the debtor, or on the appointment of or the
taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian, and that effects, or gives an option
to effect, a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in such property. .
(m) The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a
sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity
that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of
the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.
(n) The trustee may avoid a sale under this section if the sale price was controlled by an agreement among
potential bidders at such sale, or may recover from a party to such agreement any amount by which the
value of the property sold exceeds the price at which such sale was consummated, and may recover any
costs, attorneys' fees, or expenses incurred in avoiding such sale or recovering such amount. In addition to
any recovery under the preceding sentence, the court may grant judgment for punitive damages in favor of
the estate and against any such party that entered into such an agreement in willful disregard of this
subsection.
(0) In any hearing under this section--
(1) the trustee has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection; and
(2) the entity asserting an interest in property has the burden of proof on the issue of the validity, priority,
or extent of such interest.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 3. CASE ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER IV. ADMINisTRATIVE POWERS
11 USCS § 364 (1999)
§ 364. Obtaining credit
(a) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under section 721, 1108, 1203, 1204, or
1304 of this tit/e, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an
administrative expense.
(b) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain unsecured credit or to incur
unsecured debt other than under subsection (a) of this section, allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title
as an administrative expense.
(c) If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an
administrative expense, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt--
(1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of
this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is sUbject to a lien.
(d) (1) The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt
secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien only if--
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the estate on
which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be granted.
(2) In any hearing under this subsection, the trustee has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate
protection.
(e) The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under this section to obtain credit or incur
debt, or of a grant under this section of a priority or a lien, does not affect the validity of any debt so
incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity that extended such credit in good faith, whether or
not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the incurring of such
debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, were stayed pending appeal.
(f) Except with respect to an entity that is an underwriter as defined in section 1145(b) of this title, section 5
of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U_SCS § 77e], the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 [15 USQ§ §§ZZaaa et seq.],
and any State or local law requiring registration for offer or sale of a security or registration or licensing of
an issuer of, underwriter of, or broker or dealer in, a security does not apply to the offer or sale under this
section of a security that is not an equity security.
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UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHA~TER 11. REORGANIZATION
SUBCHAPTE I. OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION
11 USCS § 1103 (1999)
§ 1103. Powers and duties of committees
(a) At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title [1JLJS~S_§1J92], at
which a majority of the members of such committee are present, and with the court's approval, such
committee may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys,
accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.
(b) An attorney or accountant employed to represent a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title
[11USC.S§ 11.0_2] may not, while employed by such committee, represent any other entity having an
adverse interest in connection with the case. Representation of one or more creditors of the same class as
represented by the committee shall not per se constitute the representation of an adverse interest.
(c) A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title [11 USCS § J10~] may-
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of
the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such committee of such
committee's determinations as to any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or
rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of this title L1LUSC§ § .11 04];
and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.
(d) As soon as practicable after the appointment of a committee under section 1102 of this title [11 USCS §
1102], the trustee shall meet with such committee to transact such business as may be necessary and
proper.
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 11. REORGANIZATION
SUBCHAPTER I. OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION
11 USCS § 1107 (1999)
§ 1107. Rights, powers and duties of debtor in possession
(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter [1 LVSCS §§ 1101 et seq.],
and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights,
other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title [11 USCS §33Q], and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a) (2), (3), and (4) of this
title [11 USCS § 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4)], of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter [11 U_SCS §§
1101 et seq.].
(b) Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title [1 tUSCS § 327(a)], a person is not disqualified for
employment under section 327 of this title [11L!SCS§ 32Z] by a debtor in possession solely because of
such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case.
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APPENDIX 2
APPLICABLE RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE:
RULE 2014. EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONS
RULE 2016. COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
RULE 2019. REPRESENTATION OF CREDITORS AND EQUITY
SECURITY HOLDERS IN CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPALITY
AND CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION CASES
RULE 4001. RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY; PROHIBITING
OR CONDITIONING THE USE, SALE OR LEASE OF
PROPERTY; USE OF CASH COLLATERAL; OBTAINING
CREDIT; AGREEMENTS
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FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
Rule 2014. Employment oC ProCessional Persons.
(a) Application for an Order of Employment. An order approving the
employment of attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, agents, or
other professionals pursuant to § 327, § 1103, or § 1114 of the Code shall
be made only on application of the trustee or committee. The application
shall be filed and, unless the case is a chapter 9 municipality case, a copy
of the application shall be transmitted by the applicant to the United States
trustee. The application shall state the specific facts showing the necessity
for the employment, the name of the person to be employed, the reasons
for the selection, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed
arrangement for compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge,
all of the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party
in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,· the United States
trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee.
The application shall be accompanied by a verified statement of the person
to be employed setting forth the person's connections with the debtor,
creditors, or any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office
of the United States trustee.
(b) Services Rendered by Member or Associate of Firm ofAttomeys or
Accountants. If, under the Code and this rule, a law partnership or corpora-
tion is employed as an attorney, or an accounting partnership or corporation
is employed as an accountant, or if a named attorney or accountant is
employed, any partner, member, or regular associate of the partnership,
corporation or individual may act as attorney or accountant so employed,
without further order of the court.
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FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
Rule 2016. Compensation for Services Rendered and
Reimbursement of Expenses.
(a) Aeplication [or Compensation or Reimbursement. An entity seeking
interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary
expenses, from the estate shall file an application setting forth a detailed
statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred,
and (2) the· amounts requested. An application for compensation shall
include a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or
promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any
capacity whatsoever in connection with the case, the source of the compensa-
tion so paid or promised, whether any compensation previously received
has been shared and whether an agreement or understanding exists between
the applicant and any other entity for the sharing of compensation received
or to be received for services rendered in or in connection with the case,
and the particulars of any sharing of compensation or agreement or
understanding therefor, except that details of any agreement by the applicant
for the sharing of compensation as a member or regular associate of a finn
of lawyers or accountants shall not be required. The requirements of this
subdivisi~n shall apply to an application for compensation for services
rendered by an attorney or accountant even though the application is filed
by a creditor or other entity. Unless the case is a chapter 9 municipality
case, the applicant shall transmit to the United States trustee a copy of the
application.
(b) Disclosure ofCompensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor.
Every attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies fo!
compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States trustee within 15
days after the order for relief, or at another time as the court may direct,
the statement required by § 329 of the Code including whether the attorney
has shared or agreed to share the compensation with any other entity. The
statement shall include the particulars of any such sharing or agreement to
share by the attorney, but the details of any agreement for the sharing of
the compensation with a member or regular associate of the attorney's law
firm shall not be required. A supplemental statement shall be filed and
transmitted to the United States trustee within 15 days after any payment
or agreement not previously disclosed.
1-36
,
j
...
..J
.J
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
;;
,
r
r
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
Rule 2019. Representation of Creditors and Equity Security
Holders in Chapter 9 Municipality and .
Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases.
(a) Data Required. In a chapter 9 municipality or chapter II reorganiza-
tion case, except with respect to a committee appointed pursuant to § 1102
or 1114 of the Code, every entity or committee representing more than one
creditor or equity security holder and, unless otherwise directed by the court,
every indenture trustee, shall file a verified statement setting forth (1) the
name and address of the creditor or equity security holder; (2) the nature
and amount of the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless
it is alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing
of the petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in
connection with the employment of the entity or indenture trustee, and, in
the case of a committee, the name or names of the entity or entities at whose
instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was arranged or the
committee was organized or agreed to act; and (4) with reference to the
time of the employment of the entity, the organization or formation of the
committee, or the appearance in the case of any indenture trustee, the
amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the members of the
committee or the indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts
paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof...Thestatement shall
include a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby the entity, committee,
or indenture trustee is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or equity
security holders. A supplemental statement shall be filed promptly, setting
forth any material changes in the facts contained in the statement filed
pursuant to this subdivision.
(b) Failure to CompLy; Effect. On motion of any party in interest or on
its own initiative, the court may (1) determine whether there has been a
failure to comply with the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule or with
any other applicable law regulating the activities and personnel of any entity,
committee, or indenture trustee or any other impropriety in connection with
a solicitation and, if it so determines, the court may refuse to permit that
entity, committee, or indenture trustee to be heard further or to intervene
in the case; (2) examine any representation provision of a deposit agreement,
proxy, trust mortgage, trust indenture, or deed of trust, or committee or other
authorization, and any claim or interest acquired by any entity or committee
in contemplation or in the course of a case under the Code and grant
appropriate relief; and (3) hold invalid any authority, acceptance, rejection,
or objection given, procured, or received by an entity or committee who
has not complied with this rule or with § l125(b) of the Code.
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FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE
Rule 4001. Relief from Automatic Stay; Prohibiting or
Conditioning the Use, Sale, or Lease of Property;
Use of Cash Collateral; Obtaining Credit;
Agreements.
(a) Relieffrom Stay; Prohibiting or Conditioning the Use. Sale. or Lease
oj Property.
(1) Motion. A motion for relief from an automatic stay provided by
the Code or a motion to prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of
property pursuant to § 363(e) shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014
and shall be served on any committee elected pursuant to § 705 or
appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or its authorized agent, or, if
the case is a chapter 9 municipality case or a chapter 11 reorganization
case and no committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed pursuant
to § 1102, on the creditors included on the list filed pursuant to Rule
1007(d), and on such other entities as the court may direct.
(2) Ex Parte Relief Relief from a stay under § 362(a) or a request to
prohibit or condition the use, sale, or lease of property pursuant to § 363(e)
may be granted without prior n~tice only if (A) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by a verified motion that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damagewill result to the movant before
the adverse party or the attorney for the adverse party can be heard in
opposition, and (B) the movant's attorney certifies to the court in writing
the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the reasons
why notice should not be required. The party obtaining relief under this
subdivision and § 362(f) or § 363(e) shall immediately give oral notice
thereof to the trustee or debtor in possession and to the debtor and
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forthwith mail or otherwise transmit to such adverse party or parties a
copy of the order granting relief. On two days notice to the party who
obtained relief from the stay without notice or on shorter notice to that
party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move
reinstatement of the stay or reconsideration of the order prohibiting or
conditioning the use, sale, or lease of property. In that event, the court
shall proceed expeditiously to hear and determine the motion. .
(b) Use of Cash Collateral.,
(1) Motion; Service. A motion for authorization to use cash colIateral
shall be made in accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on any
entity which has an interest in the cash coll<lteral, on any committee
elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code
or its authorized agent, or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case
or a chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of unsecured
creditors has been appointed pursuant to § 1102, on the creditors included
on the list filed pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as
the court may direct.
(2) Hearing. The court may commence a final hearing on a motion
for authorization to use cash collateral no earlier than 15 days after service
of the motion. If the motion so requests, the court may conduct a
preliminary hearing before such 15 day period expires, but the court may
authorize the use of only that amount of cash collateral as is necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final
hearing.
(3) Notice. Notice of hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall be given
to the parties on whom service of the motion is required by paragraph
(1) of this subdivision and to such other entities as the court may direct.
(c) Obtaining Credit.
(1) Motion; Service. A motion for authority to obtain credit shaII be
made in accordance with Rule 9014 and shaII be served on any committee
elected pursuant to § 705 or appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code
or its authorized agent, or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case
or a chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of unsecured
creditors has been appointed pursuant to § 1102, on the creditors included
on the list pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as the
court may direct. The motion shall be accompanied by a copy of the
agreement.
(2) Hearing.The court may commence a final hearing on a motion for
authority to obtain credit no earlier than 15 days after service of the
I - 39
motion. If the motion so requests, the court may conduct a hearing before
such 15 day period expires, but the court may authorize the obtaining
of credit only to the extent necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable
harm to the estate pending a final hearing.
(3) Notice. Notice of hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall be given
to the parties on whom service of the motion is required by paragraph
(I) of this subdivision and to such other entities as the court may direct.
(d) Agreement Relating to Relief From the Automatic Stay, Prohibiting
or Conditioning the Use, Sale, or Lease of Property. Providing Adequate
Protection, Use of Cash Collateral, and Obtaining Credit.
(I) Motion,' Service. A motion for approval of an agreement (A) to
provide adequate protection, (B) to prohibit or condition the use, sale,
or lease of property, (C) to modify or terminate the stay provided for in
§ 362, (D) to use cash collate~al, or (E) between the debtor and an entity
that has a lien or interest in property of the estate pursuant to which the
entity consents to the creation of a lien senior or equal to the entity's
lien or interest in such property shall be served on any committee elected
pursuant to § 705 or appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or its
authorized agent, or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case or a
chapter 11 reorganization case and no committee of unsecured creditors
has been appointed pursuant to § 1102, on the creditors included on the
list filed pursuant to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as the court
may direct. The motion shall be accompanied by a copy of the agreement.
(2) Objection. Notice of the motion and the time within which
objections may be filed and served on the debtor in possession or trustee
shall be mailed to the parties on whom service is required by paragraph
(1) of this subdivision and to other such entities as the court may direct.
Unless the court fixes a different time, objections may be filed within
15 days of the mailing of notice.
(3) Disposition; Hearing. If no objection is filed, the court may enter
an order approving or disapproving the agreement without conducting a
hearing. If an objection is filed or if the court determines a hearing is
appropriate, the court shall hold a hearing on no less than five days' notice
to the objector, the movant, the parties on whom service is required by
paragraph (1) of this subdivision and such other entities as the court may
direct.
(4) Agreement in Settlement of Motion. The court may direct that the
procedures prescribed in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision
shall not apply and the agreement may be approved without further notice
if the court determines that a motion-made pursuant to subdivisions (a),
(b), or (c) of this rule was sufficient to afford reasonable notice of the
material provisions of the agreement and opportunity for a hearing.
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APPENDIX 3
SAMPLE FORM: Rule 2019 Notice of Multiple Representation
(Three Creditors)
RULE 2019 NOTICE OF MULTIPLE REPRESENTATION
r
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LEXINGTON DIVISION
INRE:
TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL
HOLDINGS, INC.
DEBTOR
INRE:
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
DEBTOR
INRE:
MERIDIAN TRANSPORT COMPANY
DEBTOR
CHAPTER 11
CASE NO. 99-50867
CHAPTER 11
CASE NO. 99-50868
CHAPTER 11
CASE NO. 99-50869
r
r
r
r
r
Comes Fowler, Measle & BelL LLP, and pursuant to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, hereby gives notice that it has been engaged to represent three creditors
in all matters related to the above referenced Chapter 11 proceedings, as follows:
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1. Fowler, Measle & Bell, LLP, by and through Taft A. McKinstry, has been
engaged herein to represent Commonwealth Technology, Inc., 2520 Regency Road, Lexington,
Kentucky 40503. Commonwealth Technology, Inc. is an unsecured creditor herein asserting an
unsecured claim (subject to reservation of rights as set forth in its Proofof Claim filed herein) in the
amount of $791,493.80. The claim was incurred for services rendered by Commonwealth
Technology, Inc. from April, 1988 through February 18, 1999.
J
-
2. Fowler, Measle & Bell, LLP, by and through Taft A. McKinstry, has been
engaged herein to represent Central Bank & Trust Company, 300 West Vine Street, Lexington,
Kentucky 40507 ("Central Bank"). Central Bank is a secured creditor herein asserting a secured
claim in the amount $64,683.58, secured by motor vehicles. The claim was incurred between
October, 1995 and February of 1997. Relief from stay was granted by Order entered herein on
April 29, 1999.
Fowler, Measle & Bell, LLP, by and through Taft A. McKinstry, has been
engaged herein to represent H & R Oil Company, Inc., 1144 Finney Drive, Lexington, Kentucky
40581. H & R Oil Company, Inc. is an unsecured creditor herein asserting an unsecured claim in
the amount of approximately $200,000.00 for breach by Associated Technologies, Inc. of
remediation contract and cost incurred by H & R Oil Company, Inc. to perform said work. The
claim was acquired on or about late 1998.
4. Each of the above-referenced creditors has retained Fowler, Measle & Bell,
LLP and its attorneys and other professionals on an hourly basis. The attorney involved in this
representation on behalf of each of the above-referenced creditors is Taft A. McKinstry.
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5. The undersigned verifies that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of
her knowledge and belief.
Respectfully submitted,
Fowler, Measle & Bell, LLP
By:
Taft A. McKinstry, Esq.
Kincaid Towers, Sixth Floor
300 West Vine Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507-1660
Telephone: 606-252-6700
Attorneys for Commonwealth Technology, Inc.,
Central Bank & Trust Company, and H & ROil
Company, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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APPENDIX 4
SAMPLE FORM: Engagement Letter and Agreement
(Multiple Chapter 11 Debtors)
as follows:
De3l'Sirs:
The Companies and the Pepper F'mn. inr.cnding to be !cgl11Y bound, nave a~ecd
Re: Enfq.m,nt tJ/P'l'p.r Hamillo. LLP Q CDUIU,I!or Ttclur.ologiu
lnlem4lt#NJllltlldJnIJ, (flC., Ad'fJnctG TeeJr/ltl/.Qrt~llnul7f4tilJlId1,Inc.
aNI. .'4flriJJm& Tfdlllport Campg1&1 a CJcQt6T 11 Dfbton-III·POtftfliDfI
~eric!ianTransport Company
2:J6.! Harrod.1burg Road
Suite 4'\-250
Lexington, KY 40504
Attetltion: Dwayne lustic:::. PresIdent
February 23, 1999
Teehnologies IntematiorW Halliinp, Inc.
2365 Harroc1.sourg Road
Suite '\.250
Lexington, KY 40504
Attention: P. Keith ~ally. Prc:sidcnt
Advanc:~d Technologies International, Inc.
136.5 Harrodsburg Ro4d
Suite A-290
L.exingten, KY 40~04
Attention: Brett C. Hensley, Presiddlt
This letter sets forth rh6 aareement (the 41Agreement") by md between
Tcchnologic~ International Holdinp. Inc. (''Tllr'), AdVaac.e4 Tcchnololi~ IncematiooaJ, Inc.
("AIT') and MCfid,ian Trmspon o,mpany ("Meridianll and.. toi~Cf witb TIH and An
hcrem~ ~1Jecuvcly, the "Complniesj pW'luant which fhc, Companies have engaged this Ia.w
rum (the ''Pepper Firm" to commence VOlW2tuy cues urukr Chapter 11 of the B;tnkruptey Co~
(the "BanJauptc~ Cede'") for the Companies and, possibly, certain other afflliat.eJ of the
Companies, in the United States Bankruptcy Coutt (or chc Oi3tr'itt of Oela.ware (the "B~kru~Y
Court") and to represent the Companies u dcbters-in-pcl5C3Jion therein.
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P. Keith ='411y. President
Been C. He:lsJey. President
~wayne J~sti.:.e, Pr:sidcnt
PJ.ge 2
February 2.3. :999
The Companies hereby eng.g= the Pepper Firm to prepare and. rile
voluntary cases (the "BankrUptey Cases") under Chapter 11 of the Bmkruptey Code for the
Companies ana. po.Uibly. c:ertain oUte: atfiliat~ of the Compw~. In th~ BanlcIuptc;y COllrt ana
to M:t as gcn~al Oartkrl.&plCY counsel for the Comp.rues therein. The Pepper Firm hereby accepts
such engagement on the terms ana conditions set forth h=cin.
(~) Subject to the approval of the Bankrupce:y COUlt. the Pepper Firm
shall appear for and represent the Companies a.s their general b:mkruptcy counseltn the
Bankruptcy Cases.
(b) The setViccs to be provided by the Pepper Firm shall include,
without limitation, general advice =nd repreaenwioa coaceming the CQmpamc:s' performan~ of
lhcir legaJ and fiduciary duties under the Bankruptcy Code u dcbtor1-iJi-possessioa;
commencing and repmcftting the Companies inadv~ proceedings mc! contllced matters
before the Bankruptcy Court as neccsauy md &pptapdate to Pfl'tect and. cnfcmc the rights and
:he intere.st$ of rhe CompaniC! and their estatc3; defending any a4versilY proceedings and
contested matters mitiaced in the Smkru~t~y Court apinst the Companic~ 01" their estates; other
set'\'j~ necessary to enable the Companies. as debtOrS-in-pouessiao. to comply with the legal
rcq'oaiNmc:nts of the Blnktupcc1 Code and the PCl1e:al RUles of Bamaupee, Pto:edurc (the
"Bankruptcy Ruler').
(c) The Pepper Pirm has not been engaged, and docs not undettaG. to
appear for orrep~t the Companies OJ my pcnciing or future action or prcc:cdinSIn any swe
court, any federal coUlt other than lba United Stata District Court for the Disuicl of De.la.....an:.
the t:'nite4 Swes 5anknlptey Court (or the Df.5tr:1et ofOe1aw~md the United Stms Court of
Appeals for the Tbircl Circuic in ~eenon with me B~pu:y Case. or any S~ or federal
a.dmini~triUive agency.
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P. Ketth ~a.iJ>'. P!'e~ldent
Bret: C. H~~31ey. P:-esldent
Dl,I,;a~'!:e h.;ti.ce. ?!'esi:ient
Page 3
Fc:i:l:"'~a.t}· 23. t999
(c) If the Court fails to approve me Retention Application. then chi.
Agreement sh~l become null and void md the Pepper Firm .hall fonhwith return the Retainer
(defined below) to the Companies.
(a) The partid rcc:ognize that the Companies must obtain the .lpprOV;u
of the B~kropa:y Court, upon \uch notice l.S 1S required by lhe BanJauptcy RulC!. to engage the
Pepper Firm to rcprc5enc the Companies as debrcrs·in·p033C:lsion in the BatlJcrupte:y Ca.scs.
(b) The Pepper Fum shall prepiU'Ey the Companies shall execute :md
the Pepper firm shall file an appropriit= applIcation (the "Retention Application") W1th the
Bankrupa:y COUrt for approviJ of the engagement o( the Pepper finn co serve a5 bankrupu:y
counsel for the Companie.•.
r
r
r
r
r
•
r
r
r
r
r
J.
4.
Bankruptcy Court A,p"crzvgJ o(Enraum«,,(
Fe" and W'"J'e'
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
(a.) All work in chis matter will be billed at our normal hourly rites
which we traditionally a.c1jwt each llU1uary 1. The current hourly rates of those whom we
presc:ntJy"cxpect to utilize in this matter are in these ranges: partners, S210-34O; a.s.soeiate5,
Sl50-175 and legal wutmts, $100-105. I, as the panncr in charge of lhe enlagement, will
r:view all bills befocc they m sent to a!IUrc that we are delivering our service! a.s effiCIently as
we can. If so authorized by the Administralive Pee Order (defmed. below), our swemenu for
professional f~ and expenses otdinJlily w1lJ be re:u1crec1 to you monthly. Absent spexial
in5U'U~tion!. swcmcnU will provi~ I. SUJ:J1m3lY of the servicc! performed.. We request payml!nt
of our ~ta.tements within thirty (30) days of the statement~.
(b) In bankIuP't'y c:a.sa,. the paymt:nt of compensation i.! subject to
Bankrupu:y Court~~tl. Perlocllca11y. we will be pennir.t.ed and rc.quin:d to fi~ applications
with the Banlau.ptey Court seeking allowan'C of iaterim ~ompeD.satjon and rcunbunem~t of
c:xpenses for .services rendered for me Companies in the BankTlIptcy C~es t.btough a specifu:d
d.1te. At the eonclu.,ion of the Bankzuptc:y Cue.s the Pepper Fum will file a final fee lpplic.acion.
ee) The Pepper Firm may ~so file an appliQticu with the Cowt
'iecking entry of an order (the uA.dmicistrative IU Order'") aumorWng I speci~ admiai&tntive
procedure punuant to which~ Companies would be authorized to pay 411 or a designated.
pc:rccntage of the fees or expense.t billed to the CClmpani~ by the Pepper P"mn·on a monthly
1-47
P. Keith Nally. President
Brett C. Hensley. President
Dwayne Justic~. President
Page 4
February 23. 1999
basis. Any amounts so paid would be subject to review and approval by the Court when the
interim and fina! fee applic:ations refcmd to in paragraph (b) above are filed.
(d) If so authorized pursuant to the Adminisuative Fee Order. we will
also bill the Companies monthly for any expenses incurred in our work and expect such bills to
be paid within thirty (30) days. (Some disbursements are not always available on a current basis
and may require supplemental statements.) In order to allocate these expenses fairly and keep
our billing rates as low as possible, cettain items are charged to the individual clients for whose
benefit they are incurred. For services obcained on your behalf from suppliers outside the firm.
unless you instruct us otherwise. we will ask outside vendors to send bills for their services to our
attention so that we may review them for appropriateness before sending them on to you for
paymenL Unless previously agreed. vendors will be engaged only with your prior approval. 'II-
we are required to use air or rail transportation. our personnel will travel coach class.
(e) If (i) payment of any amount due to the Pepper Fmn either
pursuant to a monthly bill (if authorized pursuant to the Administrative Fee Order) or pursuant [0
an order of the BanJauptcy Court allowing interim compensation or reimbursement of expenses
to the Pepper Fmn. is not made within sixty (60) days after the due date or (ii) if the Pepper Firm
has substantial grounds for believing thal its future bills will not or cannot be paid because of the
financial condition of the Companies' estateS or their inability to acquire adequate working
capital, the Pepper Fum reserves the right to seek to withdraw as counsel to the Companies:
provided, however, no sucb withdrawal shall occur without the prior approval of the Bankruptcy
Court.
.~
J
J
.J
s. Betgiall
(a) The Pepper Fum hereby acknowledges receipt of a cash payment
in the amount of ane Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 150.000). less any amount applied [0
our prepctitioll bills, as an "advanced fee retain.cr" for legal services to be rendered and expenses
incurred by the Pepper Fum OD behalf of the Companies during the Bankruptcy Cases (the
"Retainer"). The Retainer sball be deemccl earned upon receipt by the Pepper Firm subject only
to the Pepper Fum'5 obligation to return such amount of the Retainer. if any. which exceeds the
total amount allowed to the Pepper Fum fer compensation and reimbursement of expenses less
any additional amount paid to the Pepper Fmn from the estate during the BankNptcy Cases.
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(b) The Pepper Fum ma.y. in iu dis,rcnou. either apply the Retainer
a.gainst its monthly bills or ret~n the RewDcr. or a portiOI! thereof, until the aJJo ....·an~ of fir.al
~ompc:ns.tion to the Pepper Finn by the Bankruptcy Court.
(el ShoUld~ BmJcrupt=y Court detanune tha.t the Retatner or any
portion thereof is property of the Debtors' ~WC$. then the Companies h.ereby &rIOt to the Pepper
Firm il lien on and. l Scturity interc"t Lfl the Retainer and the procc:d.s thereof. which shall be
perfected by the Pepper Firm'! possession of the Rl:tainef. a.s security (or tbe claims of the
Pepper Firm for compensalion or reimbursement of expenses incurred in rcpttsenting the
Companles as dcbton-in-possessioa ia the Banlauptcy C~s.
Cd) The Rea:ation Applic2tion shall disclose 211 of the temu and
conditions of the Retainer and request that the Bankruptcy Court approve the tenns of the
Rcwncr. If the Ba.nkzuptey Court fails to .pprave the R.euioer on the terms set forth herein. then
~e Pepper Firm. at its sole option. ma.y Wtthdraw from this cngOigemeat.
G. DiKltnun: o(Cgtgill Maltm
<a> The panic:l acknowledge that the Pepper Fum ~ted as special
Delaware and ~ew York counsc1LO ATI and TechnoJogiea SPE, L.L.C. r7SPE"), i special
purpose liubsidiary of An in c:cnnectiOt1 with five (') sales (collcetivcly, the "Receivable Sales")
in \olthich KentUcky LcUinS t:ndugraund Storage Tank Reimbursement Rc=ivables (the
"Reimbursement Receivables") in the total qx::glte face amount of 533,200,'52.31, which had
been contributed. by ATI to TSPB, wen so14 by TSP,E to Uanm C~jr~ Service», L.L.C.
("Llama") pursuant to Re'imDul'3cment R=ciYlbLc Purctwe and Sale Agruments by and among
Uama, Anand TSPE dated as of Ianuary9. May " rutle l~ Allgust 25 and November 25, 1998
(ccllcttively, the ··Putchuc Agreements". In cocnection with each Re.c:ivable Sale. the Pepper
Firm provided co-Ll~ and Pitch meA, Inc. a written ''true sale'· anc1 unon<onsolida.ticm'· legal
opinion (collectively the "True Sale aDd Nonconsolldatim1 Opinion,") and to LIma anci GC5I,
~rattingly & Atchison, P,S.C. a. written legal opinioa concerning c:etUin c:orporue matters
(together with the True Sue and Nonc.onsolidarion OpinioJP, hereina&t collectively, the "Legal
Opinion~") In the TNe Sale ancl Nonccn.,olid.arion Opirtioas and subj~ to the terms,
conditions. qUillifiations, assumption.• and limitations set fonh thereia, the Pepper Firm advi5cd
the ~c1dcessee$ therein that (i) in. a bankruptcy c:ase in which An or TSPE is a debtor, it would
not be it proper exercise of the ~mknrprcy court's equitable diacl"etion to dilrcgard the separate
existence of An or TSPE, and (ii) a bankrup=y court haviq jurisdiction over An or TSPE
would not be entitled to treat any o( the ~imCuncmcnt R.ea:ivabLes or the ptocccd.s thereof
1-49
? Keith :"aJly. PTCsi=~
arc:~ C. HtMt&Y; itUiwc
Oloitlyr.e !usuet.P'~jdcnt
P1P~
Fcb~1t'Y 23. L999
~~n:r!buted. by ATt to TSP! a.ad. sCllc1 ~,.1'SP! ::r tJama IS ~uet, co be iach:dcd ja, the CJCZU AT!
ar TSl'E pu.m.w CO f 3'41 at:ttc Bal1~P~ CCde or: lJ subject~ the autamatit Itay fTClvilicrns
of j 362(1.) af the C'edoL nr CQn\;%Di&1 .ac;.bo\WlA::Ap aa~ acr- thu c.h. Peppel Firm. m
r~=tinc me Campania u dcbtan-in-pGJlUnoa. my :Ot and .halt nae chaJlen&c, c:oarndic:~
at rcpudi.att aG1 ol tile opirliacu lival by Use Pepper Fum in~~~al "JN110ftJ. &~C'.
~lthU the PCJ'l'et rim I\or ttl. C~mpmicsbe!iav. tl'l~ ~~ P~er Firm' sobliC~OIU 'oln=- the
1.ACI1 Ol'iAiOlU will c:cntliC:l witb Qur impaic me Pepper rlm1" pcr!orma.ac: of iu duucs 15
c::ol,uucl to cAli CClmpanie.a. IS ~:b(Qr.s·in-polnSSIOJL
CD) TJu: Companies' prinwy p~,eUcialllecutl~ lenda' is Blink One
KeawcQ' CUl. "S anJr."). havinC~ lClIAI to d-Compmies ill thc tow agppce ~t1wt4inr
amQ\Ul: of &wro~mat&ly S10,533,000. While the Pener Pinn ha$ net reptuan~4 _ dOd dOC
repmeAt enc Bmk:. !rem time Co Wn&~ Pcppct rum haJ a:pc:.scmcd md. it~tJ.yrcp~cs
eiCher me pcent of the BaU or amc: aftilJata of Che amk in 'Icnous maaen u~b.w1 (G cUD-
Cami'wea or che SaakNp=y Cues. The Peppa' Plan cIoa not n:pte.sw =ci -.i11llocR:P~c
the: Smk. iu puc:1t« Iftyocher atfttiue ofUte Bmk ia C:C&mccdoa with=SIAkm\'tC'Y Casa or
uy om"~ which miJht c:~at1ic ,.,WJ ~. Pepper' Pitm'l eftl11a'1'1a1l benw%da'. Ths fus
canwl an4 m:eivc4 by ttl8 Peppct P"1ml!r= eM vanm wi Qetlet atmIaJ:&I at me Bank 4v=,
~c Jut yeu comprised leu thm aoa pec=1f (1~) '3l cha grau rayenuu af cba Pep~ Fum
~grinC sudl tirnc pcriocL
II you h..".&7 quesU.ons or commatu c:anumttle =7 gf C!\c torqomr,p~ do
-nCle heliwa to aU. Ochc:wi.c p1al& dLe coat.n. tb C=,-nies' llta!mCAllG me cmns a.nA
conditions of r&a lcmr by JipmC die tftdcsa!.'caP1 aucl reaunml it CG cU undcnil11cc1.
~~.~------
MldlJlllt lUcd
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Brett C. Hensley, PresIdent
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February 23. 1999
The unde~igned acknowledge and agree to the foregoing eerms of representation by Pepper
Hamilton, LLP.
~£R1NATIONAL HOLDINGS. !:'le.
(EXECUTIONS CON11NUEDJ
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P. Kl!ith ~a;:~. P!'~sic.ent
8r~!t C. H~:':.i~~)·. Prcstder.t
:lw.l.~~,e kC;:lce. P:"eSlC::nt
Page: 8
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/ LOOIES ~'1EIl.'lhnO~AL. ~C.
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Introduction
Representation of financially troubled entities has always been a challenging area of legal
practice. Several recent trends have begun to impose new duties on counsel for a troubled entity
that are in conflict with the traditional attorney duties owed to the client. In addition to adding
confusion to an already difficult area, these trends threaten to expose attorneys to personal
liability to creditors for actions taken in connection with their representation of the debtor entity.
Corporate Duties to Creditors in the Vicinity of Insolvency!
One of the most significant, but least noticed, trends that threatens the traditional notion
of attorney duties in the insolvency practice is the expansion of the trust fund and fiduciary duty
theories to corporate governance issues.
Traditionally, courts have been extremely hostile to attempts to impose fiduciary duties in
debtor-creditor relationships. Fiduciary duties generally are recognized and imposed only in the
context of relationships that involve special trust or confidence. The lender-borrower
relationship traditionally was viewed as the epitome of an arm's length transaction. The parties
are clearly adverse and have diametrically opposed interests in the transaction. The borrower and
lender bargain over their respective rights and duties, and the courts hesitate to impose additional
rights. Thus, the concept of a fiduciary duty seems particularly inappropriate in the debtor-
creditor context, especially where the debt arises from contract.
Traditional notions of corporate governance also rejected the concept of a fiduciary duty
to creditors. Indeed, the most significant legal aspect of the corporate form is the concept of
limited liability. The shareholders of the corporation were the beneficiaries of the corporate
operations and the corporation's officers and directors owed fiduciary duties to those
shareholders. The officers and directors did not owe a duty to manage the corporation for the
benefit of its creditors.
The new trend of imposing fiduciary duties in cases of insolvency dates to Justice Story's
opinion in Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, #17,944 (1824). That case involved the
(These points are explained in greater detail in the excellent article by Prof. Markell, The
Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues
Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 403 (1997).
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liquidation of a banking corporation. During the course of winding up the affairs of the
company, substantial dividends were paid to the shareholders. When the remaining assets turned
out to be insufficient to pay the debts in full, the unpaid creditors sued. Under the general rule,
upon liquidation of a corporation creditors should be paid in full before shareholders receive a
return on their investment. Justice Story reasoned that the capital of the corporation was a "trust
fund" for the creditors and permitted them to use the trust doctrine of tracing to recover the
dividends paid to the shareholders. The Wood theory subsequently fell into disuse because
corporate statutes and fraudulent conveyance law provided a more direct theory for the recovery
of improperly paid dividends.
However, in recent years, the Wood trust fund theory has been revived and used as the
doctrinal basis for imposing on the directors and officers of insolvent corporations fiduciary
duties that are owed to creditors. The influential courts of Delaware have been leaders in this
trend. For example, in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992), the
Court began by reciting the general rule that "directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the
relevant contractual terms absent 'special circumstances' ...." The Court went on to note that
one of those "special circumstances" was "insolvency." The remaining question for the Court
was whether the "insolvency" exception was limited to situations involving an insolvency or
dissolution proceeding, or whether it extended to situations where the corporation was merely
insolvent in fact. Opting for the later interpretation, the Court stated, "I find that Delaware case
law, primarily, and the ordinary meaning of the word insolvency, secondarily, require me to hold
that fiduciary duties to creditors arise when one is able to establish the fact of insolvency."
This holding creates a difficult situation for officers and directors, and by extension, for
attorneys representing insolvent entities. The first problem is that the courts have yet to spell out
the precise nature of the fiduciary duties owed to creditors. Indeed some commentators take the
view that this budding theory is not really a general rule imposing fiduciary duties; but rather that
the fiduciary duty language is being used to establish specific duties that arise in particular
circumstances. However, to the extent that fiduciary duties are imposed, the officers and
directors are placed in a situation involving hopeless conflicts of interest. In a financially sound
corporation the interests of the shareholders and creditors may be congruent. However, those
interests are likely to be most diverse when the company is financially distressed.
One solution to this conflict would be to say that upon insolvency the fiduciary duties
owed to shareholders are extinguished and replaced by the fiduciary duties owed to creditors.
However, the problem here is in determining when that point is reached. The flipping point for
the duties is easy to determine if the rule is limited to insolvency or dissolution proceedings.
However, if the fact of insolvency is the critical event, then several problems emerge. First, as a
practical matter, it may be very difficult to determine when a state of insolvency exists. Thus,
officers and directors will not know to whom their fiduciary duties are owed until long after the
fact. Even more troubling is the uncertainty as to the meaning of the term insolvency. Does it
refer to equitable insolvency (inability to pay debts), or to legal insolvency (liabilities exceed
assets), or to some combination? [A subsequent unreported Delaware case adopts the equitable
insolvency test. See Francotyp-Postalia AG & Co. v. On Target Technology, Inc., 1998 WL
928382 (Del. Ch. Dec. 24, 1999).] The interpretive and factual problems relating to the
determination of insolvency have long troubled the courts in the fraudulent transfer area.
Perhaps in answer to the uncertainty problem, an unpublished, but widely cited, Delaware
case took the theory to the next logical step. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe
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Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 Del. J. Corp.
L. 1099 (1991), the Court held that fiduciary duties arise when the company "is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency." At that point, "a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue
risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." While this formulation does away
with the difficulty of determining the precise point of insolvency by expanding the scope of the
theory, it exacerbates the problem ofconflicting duties because it necessarily creates a zone in
which duties are owed both to shareholders and to creditors.
The contrary line of cases reads Wood more narrowly. Wood involved the dissolution of
a corporation and, if restricted to its facts, stands for the proposition that directors owe duties to
creditors upon the commencement of a dissolution or insolvency proceeding. See, e.g., Henry I
Siegel Co. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984); Markell, supra at 408.
It is unclear whether Kentucky law recognizes the fiduciary duty theory. Older cases
clearly adopt the trust fund view, that an insolvent corporation owes a fiduciary duty to its
creditors, at least to the extent of prohibiting distributions to shareholders before all debts are
paid. As the Court stated in Louisville Banking Co. v. Etheridge Mfg. Co., 19 Ky. L. Rep 908, 43
S.W. 169, 171 (Ky. App. 1897):
Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together
with their conditional liability to the creditors, places the property in the condition of a
trust, first for the creditors, and then for the stockholders. Whatever of trust there is
arises from the peculiar and diverse equitable rights of the stockholders, as against the
corporation, in its property, and their conditional liability to its creditors. It is rather a
trust in the administration of the assets after possession by a court of equity, than a trust
attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or stockholder.
Some of the older Kentucky cases even contain language asserting that the directors of an
insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to creditors. For example, in Marksberry v. First
Nat 'I Bank ofOwensboro, 194 Ky. 401,239 S.W. 461, 465 (Ky. App. 1922), the Court quoted
the following language from a Louisana case, "The directors of a corporation are trustees, and its
creditors, like the stockholders, are the cestui que trust. On account of that fiduciary relation of
the directors to the corporation and to its creditors, the directors are under a certain moral
obligation to see that its creditors are paid."
However, one of the clearest statements of this proposition, and one that relies upon
Justice Story's analysis, comes from the dissenting opinion in Blake v. Ray, 110 Ky. 705,23 Ky.
L. Rep. 84,62 S.W. 531, 535 (Ky. App. 1901) (O'Rear, dissenting):
But, it is argued, the director is only the trustee of the stockholders of the corporation, and
unless they see proper to avoid his act no one else can complain. This was the original
doctrine. To Mr. Justice Story, to whom the American people owe so much for the
enrichment and enlargement of our equity jurisprudence, are we indebted for the
extension of the principle of the trusteeship of the director to the interests of the creditor
of the corporation as well as to its stockholders. Thomp. Corp. S 4150. In one sense of
the word, the assets of a corporation, especially of an insolvent one, are a trust fund, set
apart, first, for the payment of its debts, and then for distribution of the surplus among its
stockholders. Thomp. Corp. Id. The director must, of necessity, exercise the conscience,
as it were, of the debtor, and conserve its property to the end of the trust imposed upon it.
Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475. This doctrine that the director is a trustee for the creditors as
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well as for the stockholders of the corporation has long been recognized and frequently
applied in this state. Gratz v. Redd, 4 B. Mon. 178 (1843); Widrig & Co. v. Newport St.
Ry. Co., 82 Ky. 511 (1885); Coal Co. v. Lotspeich (Ky.) 20 S. W. 377; Railroad Co. v.
Bowler's Heirs, 9 Bush. 468.
The more restrictive interpretation of the Wood theory - that it is limited to corporate
dissolution - appears to have been adopted in an older Kentucky bankruptcy case. In In re
Federal Coal Co., 31 F.2d 375,378 (E.D. Ky. 1927), the Court stated:
It is, we think, the result of the cases that when a private corporation is dissolved or
becomes insolvent, and determines to discontinue the prosecution of business, its
property is thereafter affected by an equitable lien or trust for the benefit of creditors.
The duty in such cases ofpreserving it for creditors rests upon the directors or officers to
whom has been committed the authority to control and manage its affairs. Although such
directors and officers are not technical trustees, they hold, in respect of the property under
their control, a fiduciary relation to creditors; and necessarily, in the disposition of the
property of an insolvent corporation, all creditors are equal in right unless preference or
priority has been legally given by statute or by the act of the corporation to particular
creditors.
While the idea that an insolvent corporation owes fiduciary duties to its creditors
continues to appear in more recent Kentucky cases, the principle that directors also owe fiduciary
duties to creditors appears to have fallen into disuse
A recent unpublished Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision interpreting Kentucky law
concluded that the Kentucky cases do not go so far as to impose on directors a fiduciary duty to
creditors. Rejecting the argument that the director's obligation to creditors was a non-
dischargeable debt under the section 523(a)(4) "defalcation in a fiduciary capacity" exception to
discharge, the Court analyzed the scope of a director's duties under Kentucky law. The Court
stated:
Peoples Bank's central argument, which the District Court adopted, was that Kentucky
common law creates a trust whenever a corporation is insolvent, and that a director of the
corporation then owes a fiduciary duty not to make payments to shareholders to the
detriment of the insolvent corporation's creditors. We find that Peoples bank has failed to
establish that, under Kentucky Law, the assets of an insolvent corporation form the res of
a trust fund that the directors of the insolvent corporation hold in trust for their creditors.
The cases upon which Peoples Bank reliesfail to establish more than the principle that
an insolvent corporation owesfiduciary duties to its creditors. In Aero Drapery of
Kentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Ky. 1974), Kentucky's highest court
recognized that a fiduciary relationship exists between a corporation and one of its
directors, based on "[t]he position of trust, the freedom of decision, and access to
confidential corporate information" enjoyed by the director ... These cases may
recognize that a corporation has fiduciary duties to its creditors, but they fall far short of
creating the type of clearly defined trusts that existed in In re Johnson, 691 F.2d at 252-
53, and in In re Interstate Agency, Inc. ., 760 F.2d at 124- 25. The mere recognition that
an insolvent corporation or one of its directors owes a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation's creditor's does not create an actual trust fund, as is required by § 523(a)(4).
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Penick (In re Penick), 149 F.3d 1184 (table), 1998 WL 344039 (6th
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
J-4
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
However, even if the current Kentucky authority does not yet recognize the Delaware-
type fiduciary obligations, it appears that no recent Kentucky reported decision has yet addressed
the precise issues raised in the recent Delaware cases. Neither the Geyer nor Credit Lyonnais
opinions have been cited in any Kentucky or Sixth Circuit cases. Thus, it remains to be seen
whether the current trend will be adopted in Kentucky.
Even if the Kentucky courts reject the fiduciary theory, the issue will still present
problems for Kentucky attorneys representing financially troubled corporations. Many
corporations are incorporated under the laws of Delaware. For these corporations, and for
corporations incorporated in states following the Delaware trend, the directors will owe fiduciary
duties to creditors.
Needless to say, the problems that fiduciary duty theory creates for officers and directors
spills over to create problems for attorneys representing financially troubled entities. In addition
to potential liability for conspiracy to breach fiduciary duties, the lawyer for a fiduciary may owe
direct duties to the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.
DIP Counsel's Fiduciary Duties to Creditors in Bankruptcy
Of the many problems facing counsel for a Debtor-in-Possession [DIP], one of the
thorniest theoretical problems is the conflict between the DIP's fiduciary obligation to the
bankruptcy estate and the Debtor's interest in minimizing the plan's payout to unsecured
creditors. This problem is compounded in the typical corporate Chapter 11 case by the fact that a
corporate debtor can speak only through an authorized representative. Thus, while the client is
the corporation that is the Debtor and DIP, the attorney must take his/her instructions from an
individual who is merely a constituent of that organization. That individual's personal interest as
a shareholder or manager of the debtor may well be at odds with the interests of the debtor entity,
and almost certainly will be in conflict with the interests of other parties to the reorganization,
such as the unsecured creditors.
Unfortunately, this already difficult conundrum was turned into an almost impossible
dilemma by the 1988 decision of In re Kendavis Industries International, Inc., 91 B.R. 742
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988). That decision looked through the form of the DIP's attorney's
relationship and held that where the attorney's efforts were designed to advance the interests of
the DIP's controlling shareholders/management, the attorney ceased to be "disinterested" and had
a disqualifying conflict of interest.
Despite all of the sound and fury that followed the Kendavis decision, it appears to have
more bark than bite. Although numerous cases cite Kendavis, and some actually apply it, the
theory generally has been rejected in cases involving only a modest degree of
shareholder/management self interest.
Judge Clark's opinion in the case of In re Office Products ofAmerica, Inc., 136 B.R. 983
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992), took much of the sting out of Kendavis. There the Court limited the
Kendavis theory to extreme cases. The Office Products Court instead focused on the "benefit"
provided to the estate by the legal services. Office Products is the classic example ofmore
elegant solution provided by §330. In applying the "benefit" analysis, the Court also gave the
DIP's attorney substantial leeway to zealously represent the entity client without putting the fee
award at risk. Recognizing the reorganization policy of the Code, the Court focused on whether
and when the attorney knew or should have known that the Debtor's plan could not satisfy the
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Code's confinnation standards.
In addition, the case of In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 191 RR. 738, 754-55 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1996), rejected a Kendavis argument that was based on the allegation that DIP's counsel had
ignored the interests of the Debtors in favor of the interests of the shareholders. Neither the fact
that the attorney took his instructions from management, nor the fact that management and equity
interests were benefited by the attorney's opposition to the appointment of a Trustee, were
sufficient.
Interestingly, most of the recent citations to Kendavis relate to other issues discussed in
that opinion. The case is only rarely cited for the de facto conflict holding, and even then few
cases adopt the absolutist tone of the opinion. Thus, it appears that the Kendavis holding is
quietly fading into nothing more than an exceptional remedy that is available in a rare and
exceptional case of overreaching by management/equity.
Unfortunately, as Kendavis fades away, Rivers and CF Holding raise a new challenge
based on fiduciary theory, rather than "disinterestedness" and conflict of interest. As stated in
Rivers:
The unique circumstances which surround insolvency and the filing of a Chapter 11 case
place the attorney for the debtor in possession in the unusual position of sometimes owing
a higher duty to the estate and the bankruptcy court than to his client. In fact, the status
of the client and the attorney may often overlap in a Chapter 11 case, as the debtor's
attorney must take conceptual control of the case and provide guidance for management
of the debtor, not only to discern what measures are necessary to achieve a successful
reorganization, but to assure that, in so doing, compliance with the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules is sought rather than avoided. Debtor's attorney's duty as fiduciary of the estate
requires an active concern for the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries.
In re Rivers, 167 RR. 288, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (emphasis added), citing, In re
Consupak, Inc., 87 RR. 529 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1988), and In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R.
619,620-21 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 1992). This view has been restated in more recent cases. See, In re
Delta Petroleum (P.R.), Ltd, 193 RR. 99,110-111 (D. P.R. 1996); In re HGlp, 166 RR. 740,
746-748 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).
The fiduciary duty theory often arises from loose and ill-considered language in opinions.
For example, in the Tenth Circuit, the theory began innocently enough in the case of In re
Interwest Business Equipment, Inc., 23 F.3d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1994). There the Court stated
that the debtor in possession and trustee owe fiduciary duties to the estate. Three years later, the
Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel picked up on that statement and distorted it into a
fiduciary duty owed by the attorney for the debtor in possession. In Smitty's Truck Stop, Inc.,
210 B.R. 844, 850 (loth Cir. RA.P. 1997), the Court cited Interwest for the proposition that,
"Because of the unique nature of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor in possession is considered a
fiduciary of that estate." The Court then went on to state, without any analysis, that, "For the
same reason, courts have imposed a fiduciary duty upon counsel for the debtor in possession."
The Panel then stated, "This duty requires the attorney to exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of the estate." Having stretched the law in order to find a fiduciary duty
owed to the estate by the debtor in possession's attorney, the Panel used its new theory to
accomplish a goal much more easily accomplished through proper use of existing provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. The upshot ofthe Panel's analysis was the unsurprising holding
that the attorney has "the duty to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest with the
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estate." Unfortunately, the Panel's use of a fiduciary duty theory to reach that result distorts the
attorney-client relationship and creates much potential for mischief.
The fiduciary duty theory was also adopted by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Second Circuit in Zeisler & Zeisler, P.e. v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. (In re JLM, Inc.), 210
B.R. 19,26 (2d Cir. B.A.P. 1997). There the Court engaged in an analysis of the role of counsel
and held that because of the debtor in possession's duties to creditors, "counsel for the debtor in
possession has fiduciary obligations not ordinarily foisted upon the attorney-client relationship."
As a result, the attorney for a defalcating debtor "may not simply resign where the client refuses
the attorney's advice concerning the client's fiduciary obligations to the estate and its creditors.
Counsel must do more, informing the court in some manner of derogation by the debtor in
possession."
In Rivers, the Court recognized a duty for DIP's counsel to advise the Court and the U.S.
Trustee that an individual Chapter 11 Debtor was not capable ofperforming his obligations as
DIP. In CF Holding, the Court imposed a duty on DIP's counsel to disclose "to the creditor body
and the Court" the potential conflicts of interest of another professional. In re CF Holding Corp.,
164 B.R. 799 (Banke. D. Conn. 1994). While the Rivers case, and possibly the CF Holding case,
could be viewed as exceptional cases, the more extreme application of the theory had already
been expressed in the case of In re James Contracting Group, Inc., 120 B.R. 868, 873-874
(Banke. N.D. Ohio 1990). There, the Court held, "The [DIP's] attorney, as an officer of the court,
has a duty to notify both the U.S. Trustee and the court whenever it becomes evident that a
reorganization is unlikely to succeed." See also, In re Granite Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 159 B.R.
840, 848 (Banke. S.D. Ill. 1993) (DIP's counsel has a duty to bring the DIP's breach of its
fiduciary duties to the attention of the Court).
The James Contracting Court relied on In re Blue Top Family Restaurant, Inc., 110 B.R.
777 (Banke. W.D. Pa. 1990), which had recognized a fiduciary duty on the part of the DIP's
counsel to refrain from pursuing a hopeless reorganization. Blue Top did not impose a duty to
disclose on the DIP's counsel. However, the Court's confusion about the DIP's attorney's ethical
obligations, and a hint of the mischief that might lie ahead, is evident in the Court's statement
that:
Counsel filing cases in this court on behalf of debtors, in order to obtain the relief and
protection accorded by the Bankruptcy Code, stand in ajiduciary relation to their clients,
the prepetition creditors and the postpetition creditors; inflicting further damage on those
parties is a violation of that fiduciary duty.
110 B.R. at 777-778 (emphasis added).
While other cases do not so blatantly confuse the issue of who is the client, numerous
cases recognize a fiduciary duty owed by the DIP's attorney to either the estate or its non-client
beneficiaries. See, e.g., In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 149 B.R. 263, 272 (D. P.R. 1992), aff'd,
7 F.3d 218; In re Chicago Art Glass, Inc., 155 B.R. 180, 185 (Banke. N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Black
Hills Greyhound Racing Assn, 154 B.R. 285, 295 (Banke. D.S.D. 1993); In re Prudent Holding
Corp., 153 B.R. 629, 631 (Banke. E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Doors and More Inc., 126 B.R. 43, 44
(Banke. E.D.Mich. 1991); In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Banke. N.D. IlL), aff'd, 135
B.R. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Coastal Equities, Inc., 39 B.R. 304, 309 (Banke. S.D. Cal. 1984);
e.! Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that client is the
estate, not the debtor, and that counsel has responsibility to determine whether proposed actions
are likely to benefit estate, rather than debtor).
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Only the first hints of this theory have appeared in the opinions of the Kentucky
Bankruptcy Courts and the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals. Although the Courts have set the
stage for this theory by using the term "fiduciary" loosely, they have not yet relied upon the
fiduciary language to create new duties for attorneys. In Mapother & Mapother, P.s. C. v.
Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996), the Court was faced with a clear and
intentional violation by an attorney of the duty to disclose his fee arrangement under section 329
and Bankruptcy Rule 2016. However, although the Court could deny compensation to the
attorney without finding any fiduciary duties, the Court instead used loose fiduciary duty
language to bolster its analysis. Thus, the Court began its analysis by stating that "[T]he
bankruptcy court is vested with the inherent power to sanction attorneys for breaches of fiduciary
obligations." Id at 477. The Court then equated the attorney's statutory disclosure duties with a
fiduciary obligation, stating, "[T]he bankruptcy court should deny all compensation to an
attorney who exhibits a willful disregard of his fiduciary obligations to fully disclose the nature
and circumstances of his fee arrangement under § 329 and Rule 2016." Id. at 479. Finally, the
Court states, "Section 329 and Rule 2016 are fundamentally rooted in the fiduciary relationship
between attorneys and the courts." Id at 480. Thus, although Dmvns imposed no duties beyond
those expressly stated in the Code and Rules, it appears to recognize a fiduciary relationship
between the attorney and the Bankruptcy Court.
Similarly, the Kentucky Bankruptcy Court decision in In re Allied Computer Repair, Inc.,
202 B.R. 877 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996), recognized a fiduciary duty owed to the estate by the
attorney for the trustee. In deciding whether the attorney was entitled to compensation for
pursuing litigation of questionable benefit to the estate, the Court used fiduciary duty language.
The Court stated, "[C]ounsel for the estate does bear a fiduciary duty to the estate which requires
counsel to exercise a certain degree ofjudgment in deciding what matters of litigation to pursue."
Id. at 886. Amplifying the duty, the Court stated, "The attorney, in his or her fiduciary capacity,
bears not only a duty to conserve the estate's net assets, but to 'maximize the value of the estate
.. .''' Id. at 887.
Is there an Office Products type of decision that can provide a path out of the fiduciary
duty swamp? Although still lonely voices in the wilderness, two cases provide hope. The case
of In re Sidco, Inc., 173 B.R. 194 (E.D. Cal. 1994), rejected the fiduciary obligation theory and
refocused the inquiry. The Court stated:
The authorities cited by appellant to create a fiduciary duty of counsel to the estate
is [sic] very weak. These non-binding cases speak of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the
estate in unusual contexts, and not as a general principle. [Citations omitted.] These
cases do not overthrow Judge Dorian's basic tenet that attorneys for debtors-in-possession
have a fiduciary duty to their client, the debtor-in-possession, not to the creditors and
shareholders whose interests may be adverse to the debtor. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 327
guards against concurrent representation of both the creditor and a debtor-in-possession.
Furthermore, it is the debtor-in-possession who ultimately manages the creditors'
and shareholders' interests, while the attorney only advises the debtor. The
debtor-in-possession, not the attorney, acts as the trustee to the estate.
173 B.R. 196-97.
Further support for the Sideo view comes from the ABA's 1994 formal ethics opinion
#94-380. That opinion dealt with the question of whether the fact that the la\\)'er's client is a
fiduciary alters the lawyer's basic ethical obligations. The opinion addresses the duties of a
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lawyer who represents a fiduciary in a trust or estate matter. The opinion states, in part:
When the fiduciary is the lawyer's client, all of the Model Rules prescribing a lawyer's
duties to a client apply... The fact that the fiduciary client has obligations toward the
beneficiaries does not impose parallel obligations on the lawyer, or otherwise expand or
supersede the lawyer's responsibilities under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994). With
respect to the issue of disclosing the client's fiduciary breaches to the court, the opinion states:
A lawyer's duty of confidentiality to a client is not lessened by the fact that the client is a
fiduciary. Although the Model Rules prohibit the lawyer from actively participating in
criminal or fraudulent activity or active concealment of a client's wrongdoing, they do not
authorize the lawyer to breach confidences to prevent such wrongdoing.
* * *
... Clients may owe some duty to third parties, whether it be statute or common law-
based. These clients do not, by virtue of retaining a lawyer, impliedly authorize the
lawyer to breach confidences to protect third parties.
Perhaps the most promising authority is the recent case of Hansen, Jones & Leta, P. C. v.
Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah. 1998). There the Court brought both the Sideo analysis and the
ABA opinion together. The Court began by noting that the fiduciary duty theory "reflects a
relatively recent development in bankruptcy law which is curiously undefined." Id. at 448. The
Court proceeds to deconstruct the theory into two different theories. One is based on the view
that the estate is the client, while the other is based on the view that the attorney's fiduciary
duties are derivative of the client's fiduciary duties. Relying on NLRB v. Bildiseo & Bildiseo,
465 U.S. 513, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (1984), the Court holds that the estate is not a legal person, but
merely a collection of property interests. Id. at 451. Thus, the estate cannot be a client and the
"estate as client" view cannot support the theory. Turning next to the derivative duty theory, the
Court first examines the Bankruptcy Code to determine that it nowhere imposes bankruptcy-
unique fiduciary duties on counsel for the debtor in possession. Those duties are imposed by the
Code only on the debtor in possession. Thus, if the attorney has such duties they must be
derivative of the client's duties. Completing the analysis, the Court turns to the ABA formal
opinion to conclude that the fact that the client owes fiduciary obligations does not impose
parallel obligations on the attorney. !d. at 461.
As noted in the ABA opinion, some state's ethics rules impose disclosure duties on
attorneys that are different from the model rule. A review of the Kentucky version of Rule 1.6
shows that the Kentucky ethics rules do not permit or require disclose of past defalcations by the
debtor in possession.
The Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.6 reads as
follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
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between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(3) To comply with other law or a court order.
Clearly, neither exceptions (b)(I) or (b)(2) apply to the likelihood that a reorganization
will not succeed or to a mere breach of a fiduciary obligation, especially a past breach. Further,
exception (b)(3) should not apply since there is no specific Bankruptcy Code provision
mandating disclosure. The Kentucky comments make clear that while a provision of some non-
ethics law may supersede Rule 1.6, "a presumption should exist against such a supersession."
See Kentucky Commentary, Para. 21.
The Kansas comments confirm the distinction between past conduct and future action.
While a lawyer may not assist the client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent under Rule 1.2,
that rule is not violated where the lawyer was innocently involved in past conduct by the client
that was criminal or fraudulent. The Kentucky comment states, "If the lawyer's services will be
used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer
must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16(a)(1)." Kentucky Commentary, Para. 15. Even after
withdrawal, "the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's
confidences." However, the lawyer may give notice of the fact of withdrawal and may
"withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like." Kentucky Commentary.
Para. 16.
Thus, the proper course for the attorney in a case where the debtor in possession refuses
to follow the attorney's advice regarding its fiduciary duties is to attempt to withdraw. The
notice of withdrawal and the attorney's disaffirmance of prior actions, if appropriate, should be
adequate to alert the Court, U.S. Trustee, and Creditor's Committee of the need for investigation.
The Courts should require no more of bankruptcy attorneys.
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UPDATE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
By
Gerald K. Smith, Esq.1
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The Bankruptcy Code provides inconsistent, incoherent, and incomplete guidance
as to when professionals may be employed.2 Even a cursory review of the statutory terrain
makes this apparent. Perhaps most surprising, the standard for the employment of professionals
by a disinterested trustee of professionals is stricter than the standard for the appointment of the
disinterested trustee. Sections 701(a)(1) and 1104(d) ofthe Bankruptcy Code require that a
trustee appointed by the U.S. Trustee in a liquidation or reorganization case be disinterested. In
contrast, under § 327(a), a professional employed by the disinterested trustee must be
disinterested and cannot hold or represent an adverse interest. The only exception is
employmentfor a special purpose under § 327(c). Although the disinterestedness standard
requires that the trustee not have interests materially adverse to the interests of the estate, any
class of creditors, or any class of equity security holders, the adverse interest must be materially
adverse, not simply adverse as required by § 327(a).
Section 327(a) provides that a trustee may employ professional persons "that do
not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons ...." A
disinterested person is defined in § 101 (14) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition consists of a
I I am a Conferee of the National Bankruptcy Conference and Chair of its Ethics Committee. I was until September
of 1999 a Member, Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy of the Judicial Conference of the United States and
Chair of its Subcommittee on Rule 2014 Disclosure Requirements; Member, Ethics Working Group of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission; and Fonner Chair of the Ethics Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association. In addition to the foregoing "connections," in
keeping with the admonition of Justice William O. Douglas, I make the following disclosures. I am involved in a
general practice, which includes commercial litigation and bankruptcy matters. From time to time, I represent
trustees, debtors-in-possession, creditors' committees, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and other parties-in-
interest in bankruptcy cases. For more than ten years, I have been involved in efforts to improve employment
standards, disclosure standards and employment procedures in bankruptcy cases. I have written and lectured on
these matters and, as a result, I am undoubtedly biased in favor of the views I have come to hold over the years. I
have also been involved in a few disqualification disputes, one of the more interesting of which is discussed in
Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts ofInterest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 793, 863-
65, 878·80 (1997). Although I have no client relationship in connection with this Article, I bring these matters
which may have influenced my views to the attention of the reader. The views stated herein are not necessarily
those of Lewis and Roca or any of the committees or organizations I am, or have been, associated with.
2 The current Bankruptcy Rules provide no guidance other than that relating to employment of relatives of, and those
having certain connections with, judges and the U.S. Trustees. Bankruptcy Rule 5002. For approximately eight
years prior to 1983, the Rules did regulate employment in liquidation, reorganization and arrangement cases. See p.
13 infra.
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series of provisions found in §§ 101 (14)(A-D) specifying a number of relationships which
existed at or before the filing date of the bankruptcy case. But § 101(14)(E) is general and
disqualifies anyone with "an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any
class of creditors or equity security holders by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to,
connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker or for any other reason. ,,3
Without furnishing any supporting authority, the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and the article by
Professor Zywicki assert that judges read materiality out of § 101(14)(E) by importing the "no
adverse interest" requirement of § 327(a) into § 101(14)(e), and that "[a]s a result, the term
'disinterested' has come to be understood to refer to any interest adverse to the estate, creditors,
or the debtor, regardless ofmateriality.'>'1 It is puzzling why this "importation" argument is
made since the "no adverse interest" standard of § 327(a), which is clearly applicable, applies to
personal as well as representational interests and is not qualified by materiality,S although §
327(c) provides that under the Bankruptcy Code, representation ofor employment by a creditor
is not disqualifying,6 absent an objection by a creditor and a finding by the court that the
representation or employment creates an "actual conflict of interest."
Under the definition in § 101(14), a person is not disinterested simply because of
the representation of the debtor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case. Nonetheless, § 327(e)
continues to allow the trustee to employ, for a special purpose, an attorney who represented the
debtor, if the attorney "does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the
estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed."? The draftsman
altered the definition of disinterestedness in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act by deleting the per
se prohibition of employment of prepetition debtor counsel by the trustee. Why this occurred is
uncertain. The result is that prepetition counsel for the debtor is disqualified only if the court
finds that this is an adverse interest under the particular facts. Section 11 07(b) expressly so
states as to the representation of the debtor-in-possession.
Extreme complexity and considerable duplication result from the addition of
"insider" to the list ofper se disqualifications resulting from the definition of disinterestedness.
3 For a general discussion of these provisions, see Gerald K. Smith, supra note 16, at 794-826.
4 Zywicki, supra note I, at 6; Jones/Zywicki Memorandum at 2-3.
5 The "no adverse interest" standard includes both personal and representational interests, while § 10I(14)(E)
literally includes only personal interests or interests held.
6 Section 327(e) allows the trustee to employ an attorney who has represented the debtor for a special purpose, "if
such attorney does not represent or hold an interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on
which such attorney is to be employed." This provision is meaningful only if § 327(a) precludes a trustee from
employing prepetition counsel for the debtor. However, the draftsman deleted this prohibition against the
employment of counsel for the debtor contained in the Bankruptcy Act and the pre-I983 Chapter X Bankruptcy
Rules from the definition of disinterestedness in the 1978 Code. Perhaps the draftsman believed debtor's prepetition
counsel should be disqualified, if at all, only if counsel represented or had an adverse interest under § 327(a).
7 Section 158 ofthe Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, Act of
July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 ("Bankruptcy Act").
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Where several affiliated corporations have bankruptcy cases pending, Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b)
provides for joint administration of affiliate cases. The court is directed to "give consideration to
protecting creditors ofdifferent estates against potential conflicts of interest." Ifjoint
administration is ordered, Bankruptcy Rule 2009 contemplates the possibility of creditors
electing a single trustee or, in the absence of an election, the appointment of a single trustee by
the U.S. Trustee. Under Rule 2009(d), a creditor or equity security holder of one or more of the
estates may seek the appointment of separate trustees if the requesting party-in-interest can
establish that creditors or equity security holders of the different estates will be prejudiced by
conflicts of interest ofa common trustee. However, in a number of situations it will be
impossible to use a single trustee. Even if a trustee of a parent is not considered an equity
security holder of a subsidiary on the basis that the stock is owned in a fiduciary capacity, the
trustee of the parent would be in control of the subsidiary and therefore, an insider under §
lOI(3I)(B)(iii) and not disinterested under § lOI(l4)(A). Furthermore, upon appointment as
trustee of the subsidiary, the trustee would no longer be disinterested as far as the parent's case is
concerned since § IOl(2)(B) provides that the subsidiary is an affiliate of the parent, and
therefore, under § 101 (31 )(E), since the trustee would be in control of the affiliate, the trustee
would be an insider under § 101 (31 )(E) and therefore not disinterested under § 101 (14)(A).
In a major drafting gaff, the phrase "of the debtor" no longer qualifies creditor or
equity security holder. The draftsman is to be forgiven, however, since the "appearance
concept" was abandoned. This should lead courts to the conclusion that there has to be a
materially adverse interest, rather than the appearance of one, but it has been overlooked in the
cases as well as ignored by Professor Zywicki.8 Finally, there was added to § 101 (14)(E) the
phrase "interests of the estate," which causes added confusion concerning the determination ofa
conflict or adverse interest and the duties ofcounsel.9
As far as professionals to be employed by the debtor-in-possession, the only
mention of the subject is found in § I 107(b), which provides that a person is not disqualified for
employment under § 327(a) by a debtor-in-possession solely because of employment by or
representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case. As pointed out above, this
provision of § 1107(b) was not necessary because of the deletion of attorney for the debtor from
§ lOI(14)(D).IO The leading treatise on bankruptcy concluded that § l107(b) evidenced an intent
that professionals employed by the debtor-in-possession need not be disinterested. II
8 E.g.• In re Roberts. 46 B.R. SIS (Bankr. O. Utah 1985). Contra In re Creative Restaurant Management. Inc., 139
B.R. 902 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1992). As pointed out in lnre Creative Restaurant Management. Inc., Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility was abandoned in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Comment to
Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that the reason for the abandonment was that the
appearance of impropriety test was too subjective and it was question begging since impropriety itself was
undefined. Undoubtedly the appearance of impropriety provision was dropped from the disinterestedness standard
for similar reasons in the 1978 Reform Act.
9 II U.S.C. § 101 (14)(E) (1993 and Supp. 1997).
10 Bankruptcy Code § 101(14)(0) provides:
(14) "disinterested person" means person that-
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Loose drafting also characterizes the statutory provisions regulating the
employment of an attorney or accountant by an "official" committee. Section 11 03(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code precludes representation in the same case of "conflicting interests," but adds
that representation of a creditor of the class represented by the "official" committee is not
necessarily an adverse interest:
an attorney or accountant employed to represent a committee
appointed under § 1102 of this title may not, while employed by
such committee, represent any other entity having an adverse
interest in connection with the case. Representation ofone or
more creditors of the same class as represented by the committee
shall not fer se constitute the representation of an adverse
interest.)
(0) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a
director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified in
subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph[.]
Bankruptcy Act § 158 provided:
A person shall not be deemed disinterested, for the purposes of section 156 and section
157 of this Act, if-
(3) he is, or was within two years prior to the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or any such
underwriter, or an attorney for the debtor or such underwriter[.]
Compare Krovit. Gan & Weber v. Michel (In re Crivello), Bankr. Case
No. 97-1646 (7th Cir. 1998) with Michel v. Federated Department
Stores. Inc. (In re Federated Department Stores, Inc.), 44 F.3d 1310
(6th Cir. 1995).
Chapter X Rule 10-202(c)(2)(C) of the 1979 Bankruptcy Rules provided:
-
-
...
(2) A person shall not be deemed disinterested if ... (C) he is, or was within
2 years prior to the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer,
or employee of the debtor or any such underwriter, or an attorney for
the debtor or such underwriter[.]
Part 2, 1979 Collier Pamphlet Edition, p. 509.
II 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 15.
12 Section 1103(b).
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There is no requirement that the counselor accountant for the committee be disinterested or not
hold or represent an adverse interest since § 327 does not apply. However, § 328 of the
Bankruptcy Code states that
The good news is that professionals, including lawyers and accountants, can be employed by the
committee even though they are not disinterested or have an adverse interest, but the bad news is
that they cannot be compensated or reimbursed for expenses if they are not disinterested or have
an adverse interest. So much for the adequacy of the employment provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and the Jones/Zywicki position that all is well, given some modest tuning.
the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and
reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed
under section ... 1101 ... if, at any time during such professional
person's employment under section ... 1103 ... of this title, such
professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or
holds an interest adverse to the interests of the estate with resrect
to the matter on which such professional person is employed. 3
r
r
r
r
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f 2. State Standards.
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Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code nor in the Bankruptcy Rules overrides the
otherwise applicable Rules of Professional Conduct regulating the conduct of professionals
employed in bankruptcy cases. It is on occasion argued that the Bankruptcy Code standards
preempt state standards so that if the bankruptcy judge approves the employment of a
professional under the standards set forth in § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, inconsistent
standards are preempted. Although not precisely on point, the Arizona Supreme Court found no
preemption in In re Neville. 14 Another instance where the attorney for a Chapter 11 debtor was
disciplined under the state rules was In re Breen. 15
The matter of the application of state rules of professional conduct in federal
cases is generally handled under local rules. The current status of local rules in this regard is
discussed hereafter in Paragraph IV(F), Proposed Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct. Although
the possibility of federal rules which would preempt certain state rules is being considered, it
seems fairly clear that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the present Bankruptcy Rules do effect
any preemption.
The focus of the state rules is a little different than that of the federal standards.
The federal standards seek to insure independence and adequate representation, while the state
13 Section 327. A debate is taking place in the cases, spurred on by the U.S. Trustee, as to whether this seemingly
clear discretionary power is inapplicable if it is later held that the person was not disinterested or held or represented
an adverse interest. The theory is that there must be a valid appointment in the first instance.
14 708 P.2d 1297 (Ariz. 1985) (en bane).
r IS 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992).
r
r K-5
rules not only seek to do this, but also seek to protect existing clients and former clients who are
parties-in-interest in a bankruptcy case. The state standards seek to preserve confidences and
avoid any breach of the duty of loyalty.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which is discussed in more detail
at Part IV(C) hereof, did address through its Working Group on Ethics a federal rule regulating
admission to practice before the bankruptcy courts. It concluded that such a rule was advisable,
but eviscerated its recommendation by allowing local rules to condition admission on the hiring
of local counsel. This feather-bedding rule has little justification other than to increase fees and
it thereby runs directly contrary to a century of efforts on the part of Congress and the members
of the Rules Committee to reduce expenses in bankruptcy cases. 16
-
-
More troublesome than the extraordinary diversity of rules regulating admission
to practice before the federal courts, and particular the bankruptcy court, is the incredible
diversity of rules regulating conduct of attorneys. These are essential federal district court local
rules or bankruptcy court local rules, or in some cases, the absence thereof, which impose
standards of conduct separate and apart from those imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. As
pointed out earlier, these are discussed in more detail at Part IV(F), Proposed Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct.
B. Where We Are Going.
-
-
I am not confident there will be any real progress in either Congress or the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules as far as rules governing disclosures and attorney
conduct. I used to optimistically talk about rules for the Twenty-First Century. Perhaps we
should talk about rules for the second half of the Twenty-First Century. The pace of change is
not slow, it is nonexistent.
Perhaps most discouraging is the lack of attention given collective proceedings
and bankruptcy in particular by the American Law Institute and now by the Ethics 2000
Commission of the American Bar Association. Despite clear and convincing input from Dean
Rapoport, it appears that nothing of significance will be proposed as far as bankruptcy cases.
This leaves it up to the courts and the U.S. Trustee. I am equally disappointed
with the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee. As I pointed out in my most recent law review
article, the Executive Director supported the position ofJudge Edith Jones that no significant
change in the disinterestedness standard was required. Although the Office has been vigorous in
its pursuit of standardized reporting for compensation purposes, it has not even updated its
manual as far as employment and disclosure requirements, let alone formulate sensible
guidelines.
16 1 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Chapter 3: Jurisdiction, Procedure and
Administration, Recommendation 3.3.4, at pp. 883-888 (October 20,1997). The portions of the Report dealing with
a national admission to practice are attached as Appendix I.
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I am not too sure the courts are much better. From time to time we have
thoughtful opinions, but by and large the judges seem to be in search of a standard not fully
articulated other than perhaps by Chief Judge Carolyn King in her remarks concerning the
conflict rules of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. If so, there will be a
dramatic change in how reorganizations are staffed. Small, specialty firms will necessarily
represent trustees, examiners and debtors-in-possession. In tum, they will employ as special
counsel those who have the expertise or manpower to handle special problems. Law firms of
any size and those not specializing in bankruptcy matters will, in almost every case, run afoul of
a literal application of the federal and state standards.
II. How We Got Here.
A. Pre-Code.
Prior to the early 1930's, corporate reorganizations were accomplished through
the use of the equity receivership. This technique was condemned by the Protective Committee
Study since it
gave complete control of the reorganization with little or no
judicial oversight, to those who had resort to it, managed its
initiation, and guided its subsequent stages. The not infrequent,
although not invariable, result, where these persons have
conflictive motives and interests, was to make this procedure an
instrument of personal benefit to them, and by that token an
instrument ofdetriment to creditors and stockholders. 17
To address these concerns, the Protective Committee Study recommended an independent
trustee, one free of any "interest." Only through this independent person could there be an
impartial investigation of claims, pursuit of claims, and formulation of a plan providing for those
entitled to participate in the reorganized debtor. To ensure the independence of the trustee, a
bright line test - the disinterestedness standard - was formulated; this standard precluded
appointment of anyone with the specified interests or relationships the Protective Committee had
found troublesome.
At about the time then Commissioner and Director Douglas and his staff were
concluding their work, a group of lawyers, judges, and academics, who became known as the
National Bankruptcy Conference, completed a sixth draft oflegislation which was introduced in
the House ofRepresentatives by Congressman Chandler. IS It recast the reorganization statutes
17 Securities and Exchange Commission Report on the Study and Investigation, Personnel and Functions of
Protective and Reorganization Committees: Part I, Strategy and Techniques of Protective and Reorganization
Committees 29 (May 10, 1937) ("Protective Committee Study").
18 In addition to the Protective Committee Study, several Congressional investigations and the reports thereof, the
Sabath, Thacher and McAdoo Reports, were influential to the legislative efforts of the 1930's.
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enacted in the first half of the 1930's as Chapters X, XI and XII. 19 "Chapter X [was] a blend of
the National Bankruptcy Conference's modest suggestions for revision of § 77B and the
substantial changes recommended by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The key
features, participation of the Securities and Exchan~e Commission and the independent trustee,
were the result of Commissioner Douglas' efforts." 0
Independence of the trustee was to be assured by the disinterestedness standard.
Commissioner Douglas also persuaded Congress that a disinterested attorney should be a
concomitant of the disinterested trustee.21 The trustee was to conduct an investigation and
pursue claims, operate the business and formulate a plan of reorganization. As a great
bankruptcy lawyer, William R. Rochelle, was fond of saying, this was all fine in theory, but it
was hard to find such supermen!22 However, since a management-controlled arrangement under
Chapter XI became the dominant reorganization vehicle, Commissioner Douglas' creation was
not much utilized?3
Until 1938, General Order 44 regulated the employment of counsel. It provided
that "no attorney for a receiver, trustee, or debtor-in-possession shall be appointed" unless the
court is satisfied, after adequate disclosure of "all of the attorney's connections with the bankrupt
or debtor, the creditors or any other party in interest, and their respective attorneys," that "the
attorney represents no interest adverse to the receiver, the trustee, or the estate in the matters
upon which he is to be engaged." General Order 44 continued to apply to the employment of
counsel after the 1938 Chandler Act Amendments, but Chapter X added the requirement that
counsel for the independent trustee must be disinterested. However, in Chapter X cases where
the debtor continued in possession, the lawyer for the debtor-in-possession only had to satisfy the
requirement of General Order 44.
The present rule-making process was initiated with the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Thereafter, the process evolved into its current form
which is, pursuant to enabling legislation, for the Supreme Court to promulgate rules. The
19 Chapter X evolved into
a reorganization statute which furnished much needed protection and shifted control of
the reorganization process away from management and the reorganizers. This was
accomplished by requiring a disinterested trustee in most cases; generally allowing all
interested parties to participate in the formulation ofa plan, with the disinterested trustee
as the focal point; providing a source of independent advice, the Securities and Exchange
Commission; and the establishment of fiduciary concepts applicable to reorganizations."
Commission Report Part I, supra note 20, at 243-44.
2°Id at 243.
21 In )975. the Chapter X Rules, Rule 10-206(a), added accountants so that they, as well as attorneys, had to be
disinterested to be employed by the trustee, except for a special purpose.
22 Rochelle & Balzersen, Recommendation For Amendment To Chapter X, 46 Am. Bankr. L. J. 93 (1972).
23 Commission Report Part I, supra note 20 at 244-45.
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appropriate Advisory Committee and the Reporter for the Advisory Committee draft the rules.
They are circulated to bench and bar and the comments are reviewed by the Advisory
Committee. Revised rules are then submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure which reports to the Judicial Conference. The Judicial Conference then reports to
the Supreme Court with its comments and, after the rules are in final form, the Supreme Court
transmits the rules to Congress. In 1964 the process was made applicable to bankruptcy. The
first Reporter for the newly created Rules Committee was Professor Frank R. Kennedy.24 In any
event, the "straight" bankruptcy rules became effective October 1, 1973 and were applicable to
Chapters I-VII of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. As Professor Kennedy pointed out in his forward to
Bankruptcy Under The New Rules ofProcedure, "under the rule-making legislation enacted by
Congress, all laws that are in conflict with such rules are superseded by them as soon as the rules
become effective. That means that major portions of Chapters I-VII and of Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act and all but five General Orders and ten of the old official forms were superseded
as ofOctober 1 of[1973]." The Chapter XI became effective July 1, 1974 and the Chapter X
rules shortly thereafter on April 28, 1975. Chapter XI Rule 11-22 concerned employment of
attorneys and accountants, but simply made Bankruptcy Rule 215 applicable in Chapter XI cases
"to the employment ofattorneys and accountants for a trustee, receiver, debtor-in-possession or
creditors' committee...." Chapter X Rule 10-206 also made Bankruptcy Rule 215 applicable
"to the employment, in Chapter X cases, of attorneys and accountants by a trustee, receiver, or
debtor-in-possession. But the rule also required that the attorney representing the trustee "shall
be disinterested as specified in Rule 10-202(c)(2). That subdivision of Rule 10-202 simply
tracked the statutory definition of disinterestedness. Bankruptcy Rule 10-206 did contain the
special purpose exception. Bankruptcy Rule 10-206(b) contained a more humane provision as
far as the employment of an attorney who was later determined to be not disinterested. It gave
the bankruptcy judge discretion to deny the allowance of compensation or reimbursement of
expenses, or both, but it required not only that the attorney was not disinterested, but also that the
attorney failed to disclose a material fact on the question of disinterestedness. The Chapter XII
Rules, Rule 12-21, simply made applicable Bankruptcy Rule 215 in Chapter XII cases.
r
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When the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed a
consolidation of Chapters X, XI and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it recommended a
continuation of the disinterestedness standard for an attorney or an accountant employed by the
trustee.2S The Commission also recommended the continuance of the special purpose exception
24 For an interesting discussion of the process and its first achievement, see Bankruptcy Under the New Rules of
Procedure published by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Michigan in 1974, and in particular,
Chapter I thereof, an overview by Professor Frank R. Kennedy.
25 Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (Part
II), H.Doc. 93-137, 93 rd Cong., }SI Sess. 229 (1973) ("Commission Report Part II"). Proposed § 7-109 provided
that: "An attorney or accountant employed by a trustee shall be disinterested unless the administrator, when it is in
the best interest of the estate, authorizes the employment for a special purpose ofan attorney or an accountant who
has been employed by the debtor but who represents or holds no interest adverse to the debtor or the estate in the
matters on which he is engaged." Id. at 229. The Commission's Note I gave the following explanation: "This
section is derived from §157 of the present Act, but the requirement of disinterestedness is imposed on accountants
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of Section 157 of Chapter X. The Commission's only modification of the disinterestedness -
standard was adding the exception that "representation of a creditor or equity security holder,
other than in the [reor~anization case], does not preclude an attorney ... from representing a
disinterested trustee." 6 This exception was based on what was then proposed Rule 10-206(a) of
the Chapter X rules.27 The Commission did not recommend that the Chapter X practice be
changed for counsel for the debtor in a reorganization case when a trustee was not appointed.
Although expressly stated in the Commission's Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, the lawyer for
the debtor-in-possession only had to meet the no adverse interest standard of General Order 44
which was replaced by Bankruptcy Rule 215(a), effective by October 1973.28
As drafted by the staffof the House Judiciary Committee, the 1976 draft of the
1978 Code provided that "the Trustee ... may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons that do not hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons ....,,29 The draft also provided that
representation ofor employment by a creditor was not in and of itself sufficient to disqualify and
contained the special purpose exception.3o
As the drafting of the 1978 Code evolved, two important events occurred which
contributed to the application of the disinterestedness standard to the employment of
professionals by the debtor-in-possession. First, Congress restricted the rule-making power of
the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and deleted the provision that "all laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. ,,31 As a
as well as attorneys. The elements of disinterestedness are found in §I-I 02(22). That definition is derived from
§158 of the present Act, but qualified so that representation of a creditor or equity security holder, other than in the
Chapter VII case, does not preclude an attorney or accountant from representing a disinterested trustee. See
Proposed Rule IO-206(a)." Id
26 Jd, § 102(22), at 2-3 ..
27 Rule IO-206(a) provided:
Bankruptcy Rule 215 applies to the employment, in Chapter X cases, of attorneys and
accountants by a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession. In addition, an attorney
appointed to represent a trustee shall be disinterested as specified in Rule 10-202(c)(2).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court may, when it is in the best interest ofthe estate,
authorize the employment for special purposes to be set out in the order, other than to
represent the trustee in conducting the case, of an attorney who is not disinterested
provided that such attorney represents or holds no interest adverse to the estate in the
matters upon which he is to be engaged.
28 Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (April 24, 1973), Part 2, 1979 Collier Pamphlet Edition, p. 613.
29 Section 327(a).
30 Section 327(c).
31 Section 405(d) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provided that
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result of the 1983 revisions to the Bankruptcy Rules, the rules regulating the employment of
lawyers, Bankruptcy Rule 215, Chapter X Rule 10-206, Chapter XI Rule 11-22 and Chapter XII
Rule 12-21, were abrogated, and the revised Bankruptcy Rules did not address the employment
of professionals except in Rules 2014, 2016 and 5002. Second, Congress added as § 11 07(b)
that "notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment
under section 327 of this title by debtor-in-possession solely because of such person's
employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case." This
provision implied that § 327 controlled the employment of counsel for the debtor-in-possession.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States did not
contemplate any change in regard to the employment ofcounsel for the debtor-in-possession in
reorganization cases. Under the Bankruptcy Act, counsel for the debtor-in-possession did not
have to be disinterested. At the time the respective Subcommittees of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees were rewriting the Commission's Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, the
Bankruptcy Rules regulated the employment of attorneys and accountants by trustees and
debtors-in-possession.
Shortly after the Code was effective, the district court in In re Leisure Dynamics,
Inc., 32 held that the draftsman of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 departed from the Rules by
providing in Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case
under this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the
court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights,
other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title,
and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except
the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) ofthis title,
ofa trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a
debtor in possession solely because of such person's employment
by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the
case.33
The rules prescribed under section 2075 oftitle 28 of the United States Code and in effect
on September 30, 1979, shall apply to cases under title II, to the extent not inconsistent
with the amendments made by this Act, or with this Act, until such rules are repealed or
superseded by rules prescribed and effective under such section, as amended by section
248 of this Act.
See House Report No. 595, 95111 Cong., lSI Sess. 449 (1977); § 247 of Title II of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
32 33 B.R. 121 (D. Minn. 1983).
r 33 II U.S.C. § 1107.
r
r K-ll
The district court found the language of § 1107 clear, but nonetheless referred to
the Senate Report.
This section places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee
in every way. The debtor is given the rights and powers of a
Chapter 11 trustee. He is required to perform the functions and
duties ofa Chapter 11 trustee (except the investigative duties). He
is also subject to any limitations on a Chapter 11 trustee, and to
such other limitations and conditions as the court describes.34
The district court concluded that this restatement of § 11 07(a) evidenced Congressional intent to
have the disinterested standard apply. The court did not consider Chapter X § 188 which was the
source of § 11 07(a). Section 188 provided that the debtor-in-possession was "vested with all the
rights, ... subject to all the duties, and exerciserd] all the powers of a trustee ....35 This was
nearly identical to § 1107(a). No case ever held that § 188 of Chapter X required
disinterestedness on the part of counsel for the debtor-in-possession.36
The result of the case law interpreting § 1107 is incongruous at best. It imposes
on professionals representing a debtor-in-possession a higher standard than that for the
appointment of an independent trustee. This is so since a trustee need only be disinterested,
while the professionals employed must be both disinterested and free of any adverse interest.
However, it is not merely a matter of elegance. The per se disqualification ofa professional who
is a creditor, officer, director, employee, or insider has caused great difficulty, especially as far as
the retention of prepetition counsel for the debtor as counsel for the debtor-in-possession is
concerned. There is no justification for a per se disqualification of debtor's prepetition counsel
because of creditor status unless the claim is of a size or nature that would materially affect the
representation. However, applied "rigidly" or literally, the disinterestedness standard
disqualifies anyone who is unpaid for any work up to the filing of the petition, even though
adequately secured by a cash retainer taken before the filing. The First Circuit struggled with
this absurdity in In re Martin37 and simply ignored the statute.
34 In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc. supra note 53 at 122-23, quoting from S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Congo Second Sess.
at 116 (1978).
35 "A debtor continued in possession of its property shall have all the title, be vested with all the rights, be subject to
all the duties, and exercise all the powers ofa trustee appointed under this chapter, subject, however, at all times to
the control of the judge and to such limitations, restrictions, terms and conditions as the judge may from time to time
prescribe." Bankruptcy Act § 188.
36 "The draftsmen of the Chandler Act Amendments used a drafting convention in Chapters X and XI. Rather than
providing separate rules for trustee and debtor in possession, Chapters X and Xl provided that the debtor in
possession was given the powers of a trustee. In Chapter X the debtor in possession was 'vested with all the rights,
...subject to all the duties, and exercise[d] all the powers of a trustee .' Chapter XI provided that the debtor in
possession had the title and could 'exercise all the powers of a trustee .''' Gerald K. Smith, Disinterestedness,
Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 641 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1995-96) (footnotes omitted).
37 In re Martin, 817F.2d 175 (l'ICir. 1987).
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The problem with the "creditor disqualification" rule is dramatically evidenced by
In re Sharon Steel Corp.38 In Sharon Steel, the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's
authorization of the employment of Price Waterhouse as accountant and financial advisor to the
debtor even though Price Waterhouse was a prepetition creditor of the debtor holding a claim
approximating $875,000. The Trustee objected to the application to employ Price Waterhouse
and appealed to the district court and then to the circuit court. The bankruptcy and district courts
characterized the situation as follows:
Price Waterhouse is most familiar with the debtors' accounting
system and systems in operations. It assisted the debtor in
preparation for the preliminary hearing on the use of cash collateral
in early December. Following that hearing, the debtor's motion to
use cash collateral was interimly denied, but the debtor was given
an opportunity to revise its business plan and to present further
evidence of its ability to operate profitably at a final cash collateral
hearing ... The debtor requires the expertise of Price Waterhouse
to develop and present its revised business plan.
Even if the debtor had the capability of engaging an accounting
firm to replace Price Waterhouse, it would be extraordinarily
expensive and take a substantial length of time to become familiar
with the debtor's needs.
The debtor had no cash to pay a retainer to a new firm and it is
unlikely that a new firm could be engaged without a retainer given
the serious possibility that this estate will have no funds with
which to pay administrative expenses. Further, the debtor is under
time constraints to complete its work and present it to the court.
The economic realities of this case make Price Waterhouse's
appointment imperative. No harm to any other party has been
alleged or can be shown ... Clearly, the failure to appoint Price
Waterhouse would jeopardize any hope the debtor has of
presenting a business plan demonstrating that the debtor has any
chance at reorganization.39
38 154 B.R. 53 (W.O. Penn. 1993).
39 ld at 55, citing 152 B.R. at 450 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Herb Minkel, counsel for the debtor, has informed the
author that Mr. John Logan, then Executive Director of the Office of the U.S. Trustee, appealed to the Third Circuit
in the anticipation that the Circuit would affirm, thus allowing the U.S. Trustee to be more flexible in its application
of the disinterestedness standard.
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The district court also observed that Price Waterhouse had stated in its affidavit
that it would not participate as an unsecured creditor in the Chapter II case or vote its claim in
connection with the confirmation of a plan. The official committee of unsecured creditors had
voted unanimously to support the retention of Price Waterhouse and the secured lenders did not
object, stating that "the cost to replace Price Waterhouse would probably be prohibitive." The
only objection was that of the United States Trustee. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the
Code's disinterested standard clearly precluded employment of a creditor.4o
III. Major Problems - Missing Elements.
A. Meaning Of Adverse Interest Uncertain.
A major omission from the Code is the lack of guidance as to when an interest or
representation is adverse to the estate. There is also a partial overlap of the § 327(a) adverse
interest standard with the material adverse interest standard of § IOI(14)(E). Which controls?
Overlap occurs as to the phrase "interest materially adverse to the interests of the estate," and it
is a narrow overlap in that it only concerns those interests arising from "any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker," although the
catch-all, "for any other reason," could be interpreted literally to make the overlap complete. If
the no interest adverse to the estate standard of § 327(a) controls, the only effective role for
§ 101 (14)(E) is as to "an interest materially adverse to ... any class of creditors or equity
security holders." In those instances, the court should employ a materiality standard since
§ 327(a) does not reach those situations. Another difficulty is the use of the amorphous phrase
"estate." It is an undefined term and perhaps means no more than property and avoiding powers.
If so, the adverse interest standard only relates to representational or personal interests in conflict
with the assets and powers of the estate. Of course, that does include a lot of territory.
The term adverse interest was not used in the Bankruptcy Act ofl89841 until
introduced as part of the definition of disinterestedness by the Chandler Act Amendments of
1938.42 Prior to that, the employment ofcounsel for a trustee was regulated by General Order 44
which precluded employment of an attorney representing an interest adverse to the trustee or the
estate in the matters on which the attorney was to be engaged and which required that the
attorney make appropriate disclosures.43 However, General Order 44 did not define or elaborate
upon what was an interest adverse to the trustee or the estate. Effective October I, 1973, General
Order 44 was abrogated and replaced in liquidation cases by Bankruptcy Rule 215(a) which
closely tracked General Order 44 and conditioned employment of an attorney on the attorney
40 United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1994).
41 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,30 Stat. 544.
42 Act of July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
43 4B Collier on Bankruptcy 1543 (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978).
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holding no interest adverse to the estate in the matters upon which he was to be engaged.44 This
was a significant change in the conflict standard for liquidation cases.
The word "estate" has been substituted in lieu of the reference in
this sentence of the general order to "the receiver, trustee, creditors
or stockholders." The interests of stockholders may not be
identical to those of the receiver, trustee or creditors, but insofar as
the interests of the estate may not embrace those of stockholders,
the substitution of the less comprehensive term is not
objectionable. The representation or holding ofan undisclosed
interest in no way adverse to the estate should afford the court no
basis for denying compensation to an attorney ... because the
interest is adverse to the stockholders. Indeed, effective
representation ofa trustee or receiver by an attorney seems likely
to run counter to the interests of the stockholders in a considerable
number ofcases, and such representation should not be
discouraged by these rules.45
This animus toward stockholders in liquidation cases was not applicable to
reorganization cases since the liquidation rule ofBankruptcy Rule 215 was overridden by the
disinterestedness standard in Chapter X reorganizations. That standard was even handed and
required that the person to be employed not have "an interest materially adverse to the interests
of the estate or ofany class of creditors or stockholders.,,46
Since there is no definition ofadverse interest in the Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy judges have struggled with its meaning and application. In In re Roberts,47 Judge
Glen Clark defined conflict of interest as "representation by a given attorney or law firm of two
or more entities holding or claiming adverse interests or of an equity holding an interest adverse
to that of its attorney, its attorney's firm or the firm's associates.,,48 This approach is inadequate
44 Bankr. R. 215(a) (Law Co-op. 1974).
(a) Conditions ofEmployment ofAttorneys and Accountants. No attorney or accountant for the
trustee or receiver shall be employed except upon order of the court .... If the attorney or accountant
represents or holds no interest adverse to the estate in the matters upon which he is to be engaged, and his
employment is in the best interest of the estate, the court may authorize his employment. Notwithstanding
the foregoing sentence, the court may authorize the employment of an attorney or accountant who has been
employed by the bankrupt when such employment is in the best interest of the estate.
Id
4S Bankr. R. 215, Advisory Committee's Note (Law Co-op. 1974).
46 Chapter X § 158, Collier Bankruptcy Act and Rules, Part 1(1976), p. 307.
47 46 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), ajJ'd in part, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
48Id at 827. See I William J. Norton, Jr., Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 25:3.05 (2d ed. 1996), for additional
cases defining the term.
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since it does not focus on the real issue, the adequacy of the representation. The case foundered
on actual versus potential conflicts and unnecessarily complicated matters by applying the Model
Code's appearance of impropriety standard. In sharp contract, in In re Leslie Fay Companies.
Inc. ,49 Judge Tina Brozman squarely addressed the issue of adequacy of the representation by
finding an adverse interest "if it is plausible that the representation ofanother interest may cause
the debtor's attorney to act any differently than ... without that other representation.,,50
In In re Kendavis Industries International, Inc.,5/ Judge Harold Abramson also
focused on the adequacy of the representation:
This rule requires that an attorney not place him or herself in a
position where he or she may be required to choose between
conflicting loyalties. ... Representation ofa shareholder, officer
or director ofa debtor corporation led to a situation in this case
where Locke Purnell's ability to exercise independent judgment on
behalf of its client, the Debtors, was impaired.52
Judge Abramson disagreed with the concept of "potential conflict,,,53 but created a per se rule
disqualifying a lawyer from representing a corporation as a debtor-in-f,0ssession in a bankruptcy
case if the lawyer represents a person in control of a corporate debtor. 4
Judge Jack Schmetterer in In re American Printers & Lithographers, Inc.,55
recognized the logic of rejecting the distinction between potential and actual conflicts, but found
49 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
50 Jd at 533.
51 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
52 Jd at 752-53 (citation omitted).
53 ld at 754. "The concept ofpotential conflicts is a contradiction in terms. Once there is a conflict, it is actual-
not potential." Jd
54 Jd.
To make the Court's holding more concrete, the Court holds that whenever counsel for a debtor
corporation has any agreement, express or implied, with management or a director of the debtor, or with a
shareholder, or with any control party, to protect the interest of that party, counsel holds a conflict. That
conflict is not potential, it is actual, and it arises the date that representation commences. This holding
would apply equally to partnerships. An attorney who claims to represent a partnership, but also has some
agreement, whether express or implied, with the general or limited partners, or with any control person, to
protect its interest, that attorney has an actual conflict of interest, and is subject to disqualification and a
disallowance of fees.
Jd
S5 148 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1992).
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Judge Abramson's approach "contrary to the well established rule against the formulation of
bright-line per se rules of disqualification."s6 Nonetheless, Judge Schmetterer disqualified the
law firm in American Printers since he found there was a high likelihood that the potential
conflict would become an actual conflict and "no compelling reason which calls for this Court to
set aside the general disfavor of authorities toward employment of professionals with potential
conflicts,,,s7 particularly when "it has not been shown that the pool of potential counsel available
to debtor does not supply available skilled counsel."S8
However, with an earlier nudge from the District Court, Judge Charles Matheson
rejected the potential conflict concept in In re Amdura Corp. S9 In Amdura, Judge Matheson held
the representation of a major creditor of Amdura in unrelated matters was an actual conflict since
the relationship of the client to the lawyer adversely affected the ability of the lawyer to represent
the interests of the debtor-in-possession.,,60
The Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule in In re WF. Development Corp. ,61 holding
that one attorney could not represent both limited and general partners in a bankruptcy case.62
S6/d at 866.
S7 / d at 867.
S81d
S9 121 B.R. 862, 868 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). In Amdura Judge Matheson referred to the District Court's opinion in
Colorado National Bank v. Ginco. Inc. (In re Ginco, Inc.), 105 B.R. 620 (D. Colo. 1988), which reversed his
holding in that case recognizing a distinction between actual and potential conflicts.
The District Court in Ginco set aside the order of appointment. Citing section 327 of the Code, the court
noted the stringent adverse interest test imposed by the statute when it stated:
An attorney may not "hold or represent an adverse interest to the estate" in any matter. In the
pending state litigation FMTG [the attorney] already represents Richard Ginder-the principal shareholder,
officer and debt-guarantor of the corporation. Mr. Ginder may have an equity interest in Ginco and is a
potential target for claims of corporate mismanagement. Under those circumstances, dual representation by
FMTG of the estate and Mr. Ginder is a sufficient conflict to be an adverse interest under both subsection
(a) and subsection (e). Ibid. at 621.
The court rejected the concept of distinguishing between an actual present conflict and a potential conflict.
The court admonished that the liberal language of the Bankruptcy Code must be respected and followed.
The District Court's opinion in Ginco may have been softened somewhat by the opinion of Chief Judge
Finesilver in the Matter ofW. V.s. Investment Joint Venture, Civil Action No. 89-F-33I (D. Colo. January
4, 1990), but only to the extent of saying that an attorney can represent dual clients where their interests are
common in the matter for which the attorney is retained.
Amdura, 121 B.R. at 866.
60 Amdura, 121 B.R. at 869.
61 W.F. Dev. Corp. v. Office ofthe u.s. Trustee (In re W.F. Dev. Corp.), 905 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The court relied not on Judge Abramson's analysis in Kendavis, but on Judge Samuel Bufford's
analysis in In re McKinney Ranch Associates. 63
Because of his fiduciary duties, a general partner of a limited
partnership will always be a potential target of claims by a limited
partnership debtor. A general partner is responsible for the day to
day affairs of a business, and makes the policy decisions that lead
to the financial problems that result in bankruptcy. This may
involve a breach of fiduciary duty or securities law violations. The
general partners may have received preferential or fraudulent
transfers, or have received property of the estate. In addition, a
general partner may have given a guaranty of the partnership debts.
Counsel for the debtor will likely be required to examine the
relations between the partnership and its general partners for
possible claims against them. Thus the potential conflict in the
representation of a general partner ofa limited partnership will
always disqualify an attorney from simultaneously representing the
limited partnership as a debtor in possession or from representing
the trustee of a limited partnership.64
-
As is readily apparent, the courts have had difficulty applying the adverse interest
standard. There are a number of definitions in the case law.65 The result is a lack of uniformity
and uncertainty. This has an impact beyond the litigated cases that come to the attention of the
newspapers, academics, and judges. It affects what happens in the day-to-day practice; it has a
significant impact on choice of counsel. It also substantially increases expenses since new
counsel must represent the debtor. Another consequence of uncertainty and lack of uniformity is
disqualification and the resulting economic loss and adverse publicity, not only to the
professionals involved, but also to the bankruptcy system, including the judiciary.
B. Bilateral Litigation.
-
-
-
State Rules of Professional Responsibility preclude a lawyer from suing a client
represented in an unrelated matter.66 The application of this rule in federal bankruptcy cases
raises two issues. The first is one of federal-state relations or preemption briefly discussed in an
62 Id. at 884.
63 62 B.R. 249 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986), cited in WF. Dev. Corp., 905 F.2d at 884.
64 McKinney, 62 B.R. at 255-256. Judge Bufford apparently was not troubled by the fact that the general partner
managed the partnership and controlled the work performed by counsel.
65 Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts, supra note 16, at 796-799.
66 Infra, Parts II(C) and (D).
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interesting Arizona case. In In re Breen,67 Breen represented Hubbell and negotiated a loan from
Hubbell to Macy secured by real property. Macy defaulted and Hubbell foreclosed. Breen no
longer represented Hubbell and did not handle the foreclosure. Shortly before the foreclosure
sale, Breen filed a Chapter 11 case for Macy without obtaining Hubbell's consent or informing
Hubbell of the intended action. The Disciplinary Committee had given short shrift to the defense
that § 327(c) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts the state rule.68 Section 327(c) provides:
[I]n a case under chapter 7, 12, or 11 of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under this section solely because of
such person's employment by or representation ofa creditor,
unless there is objection by another creditor or the United States
trustee, in which case the court shall disapprove such employment
if there is an actual conflict of interest.69
The Committee stated that "the bankruptcy code does not release an attorney from his or her
duties under the Arizona ethical regulations.,,7o The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
Disciplinary Committee's finding that the filing of the Chapter 11 was "an action directly
adverse,,71 to Hubbell, and the finding that there were differing interests between Hubbell and
Macy.72 The Supreme Court finessed the preemption issue, stating that "the claim that the
bankruptcy code insulated Respondent from his ethical duties is simply wrong.,,73
The second issue is more subtle. It is whether the bankruptcy case as a whole is
civil litigation, thereby implicating the state rule precluding a lawyer from suing one client on
behalf of another. 74
As I have pointed out in my two law reviews on this subject, there is difficulty
with what is sometimes referred to as the "bilateral litigation rule" which provides that an
attorney cannot sue on behalf of a client another client the attorney represents in an unrelated
matter. Difficult questions arose as to the application ofthis rule in bankruptcy cases. If the rule
is applied without qualification, it may preclude an attorney from being involved in a bankruptcy
67 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992).
68Id at 464.
69 11 U.S.C. § 327(c)(1994).
70 Breen, 830 P.2d at 464.
r- 71 Id
72 Id at 465.
r
r
r
r
73Id The court relied on In re Greater Pottstown Community Church ofthe Evangelical Congregational Church,
80 B.R. 706 (Bankr. £.0. Pa. 1987).
74 Infra, Part 11(0), Part 111(0), and Part IV.
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case on behalf of one client if another client in an unrelated matter is a party-in-interest, e.g. a
creditor, in the bankruptcy case.
It is clear that a reorganization case is different than "bilateral" civil litigation.
This was pointed out in the Protective Committee Study nearly sixty years ago. The Report
observed that "[t]he reorganization of corporations is primarily an exercise in corporate finance
and management. Only incidentally are reorganization proceedings law suits; and they are never
law suits in the ordinary sense of procedures designed to settle simple issues between individual
litigants."75
The Protective Committee Study also observed that "[i]t is only after these
broader economic business issues are decided that attention should properly be given to
questions concerning the extent of the participations to be allocated among former security
holders, the problem ofthe 'fair plan' as traditionally understood.,,76
7S Securities & Exch. Comm'n, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and
Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees Part VIII I (1940).
The Protective Committee Study observed that "[t]his is equally true of proceedings under Sections 77 and
77B, and Chapter X, of the Bankruptcy Act, and of proceedings in equity receiverships." Jd at I n.l. The Report
quoted from a 1934 district court opinion, Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 6 F. Supp. 663, 682-83
(N.D. Ill. 1934), as follows:
The conduct of any equity receivership is of necessity largely administrative; it involves more than
a decision of "yes" or "no" upon a single issue or a multiple of single issues presented by appropriate
pleadings. It involves decisions on matters of policy with nice gradations of refined reasoning and
conservative judgment ... often ... questions of policies or courses of conduct concerning which two
apparently equally consistent views may be taken. Such questions and situations constantly recur in the
conduct ofan equity receivership, giving to it a character requiring the exercise of administrative
jurisdiction, as distinguished from decision ofcontroverted or litigated issues.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and
Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees Part VIII I n.l (1940).
The Protective Committee Study delineated "the most important aspects of reorganization." Jd at 2.
Reorganization involves all the problems of corporate finance and management: it requires an
inquiry into the causes of the financial collapse of the corporation; and into its worth if salvaged as a going
concern; and, if reorganization instead of liquidation is determined upon, how this can best be
accomplished upon a basis not only fair but economically sound. The answers to these questions will
necessitate inquiry among other things into general economic factors, competitive conditions in the
industry, its trend ofdemand, and its price policies, as well as inquiry into more immediate questions such
as the quality of the debtor's management. More narrowly, there will have to be inquiry into earnings in
the past and the prediction of future earnings, and chiefly on the latter basis, a determination of what would
constitute a sound capitalization and financial structure.
Jd at 1-2.
76 Jd at 2.
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It is also true that a reorganization is largely consensual. Equity and debt
securities are often altered in both form and substance. The reorganized debtor is often different
than the original debtor. However, although the mechanism exists to "cramdown" a
reorganization, generally speaking affected classes will consent by the requisite majority.
Indeed, one of the functions ofcommittees is to assist in obtaining the requisite consents to the
plan.
But even though a reorganization case differs in important respects from bilateral,
civil litigation, this is not dispositive. The question remains whether the rule precluding a lawyer
from suing a client in an unrelated matter precludes a lawyer from filing a reorganization case if
a party-in-interest is a client in an unrelated matter.
The Bankruptcy Code's adverse interest rule and state disqualification rules as to
simultaneous representation are related but different - like the opposite sides ofa coin. An
example may make this clear. Take the common situation of counsel for a bank in matters not
involving a particular debtor. Bank counsel may be asked by the debtor to file a Chapter 11 case
and represent the debtor-in-possession after the case has been filed. Depending on counsel's
relationship with the bank, the representation of the bank in unrelated matters may constitute an
adverse interest under the Bankruptcy Code which will prevent counsel from representing the
debtor-in-possession.77 And even if counsel clears this hurdle, the other side of the coin must be
considered and absent appropriate consent state rules disqualify counsel from refresenting the
debtor-in-possession on the basis that this would result in a conflict of interest.7
77 In re Amdura Corp., 121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). "The Court questions whether counsel can be said to
be disinterested when they acknowledge their inability to take a position contrary to Continental because, at least as
to W & S, it is unwilling to offend the 'hand that feeds.'" Id. at 867.
The question of whether F & W is "disinterested" within the meaning ofsection 327 ofthe Code
is really one that only F & W can answer. In the Court's view, the firm's past representation of that bank
does not create a conflict within the meaning of327, or otherwise make F & W not disinterested, unless
that law firm, for whatever reason, believes that it would not be able to diligently and zealously represent
the debtors on issues concerning the Continental loan. If the Continental is not the "hand that feeds" F &
W, and if the firm is not otherwise inhibited, then past representation ofthe Continental on matters not
relating to these debtors would not serve to disqualify F & W from acting as counsel for the fiduciary in
these cases.
As to W & S, the same analysis must apply. That firm, however, has openly declared its inability
or, at least, unwillingness to joust with the bank. It appears to the Court, as concluded in the Order, that
issues surrounding the Continental Bank are so pervasive, and the Bank's status as a multimillion-dollar-a-
year client of W & S is so significant, that it is difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to reach the
conclusion that W & S is "disinterested."
Id. at 871.
78 Infra, Part III(D) and Part IV.
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C. Disclosure Requirements Uncertain.
-
-
The only disclosures required by the Bankruptcy Code are in connection with
compensation "paid or agreed to be paid within one year of the filing of a bankruptcy case" for
services rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such
attorney, and the source of such compensation." Although not expressed in the Bankruptcy
Code, obviously additional disclosures were contemplated. This is so since employment often
requires that the person be disinterested and not hold or represent an interest adverse to the
estate.
Disclosures are dealt with under the Bankruptcy Rules. Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b)
basically restates the requirements ofBankruptcy Code § 329. Both Rule and Code Section are
somewhat uncertain as to who must comply. The Rule refers to "every attorney for a debtor." A
debtor is a person "concerning which a case under [title 11] has been commenced.,,79
Nonetheless, both the Rule and Section 329 clearly reach back to the prepetition period; they do
not concern disclosures solely by those representing the debtor postpetition.
Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) also requires that any agreements to share
compensation, other than with a member or regular associate ofan attorney's law firm, must be
disclosed. This is, of course, intended to allow the bankruptcy judge and other parties-in-interest
to make sure there is no violation of the Bankruptcy Code's proscription against sharing of
compensation under Bankruptcy Code § 504(a). These statutory and rule provisions are
designed to allow the court to police and avoid to the extent appropriate contractual provisions
which may unnecessarily increase the cost of bankruptcy proceedings.
The disclosures required under Bankruptcy Rule 2014 are of a different nature.
They are designed to assure independent and fair representation. They are essentially designed
to require disclosure of information relevant to whether the person to be employed is not
disinterested and holds or represents an adverse interest. Bankruptcy Rule 2014, however,
contrary to the required disclosure ofBankruptcy Code § 329 as to fee agreements, does not have
any supporting Code provision. Instead, it takes on the task of defining the required disclosure
all alone and with a one-sentence provision which requires disclosure of "the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee." Although omitted from Bankruptcy Rule 2014, one would assume that professionals
should nonetheless disclose relationships with the bankruptcy judge since Bankruptcy Rule 5004
disqualifies bankruptcy judges from allowing compensation to a person who is a relative or so
connected with the bankruptcy judge as to render it improper for the judge to authorize
compensation. Bankruptcy Rule 5004(b).
Under Rule 2014(a), a professional seeking employment must disclose any
connection the professional has with a creditor or any party-in-interest. In addition, the
professional must disclose any connection the professional has with any lawyer or any
79 Bankruptcy Code § 101(13).
K-22
...
-
-
-
-
,.
i
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
accountant for a creditor or party-in-interest in the case. Under § 11 09(b), party-in-interest
includes an equity security holder. Apparently the drafters of Rule 20l4(a) assumed that the
person to be employed could determine connections with accountants or attorneys for a creditor,
equity security holder or other party-in-interest. How is this possible? Perhaps the Rules need to
be amended to require that the debtor (or in appropriate cases the trustee) identify the
accountants and lawyers ofcreditors and other parties-in-interest in the schedules.
Bankruptcy Rule 20l4(a) requires a disclosure of connections with the debtor,
creditors and any other party-in-interest and their respective attorneys and accountants. The
trustee had a connection with Deloitte, but the trustee could not determine whether Deloitte was
an accountant for a debtor, creditor or other party-in-interest. Without such knowledge, how
could the relationship ofDeloitte to a creditor or equity security holder or other party-in-interest
create a problem?
The rule as written is unsound and its application by the U.S. Trustee and the
courts is causing unnecessary misery to the courts as well as professionals ensnared in its
beguilingly simple language. This reflects badly on courts, lawyers and the bankruptcy system.
At the very least, the rule should eliminate the requirement of disclosure of connections with
attorneys and accountants, replacing this with the requirement that there be disclosure of any
adverse interest. I would also recommend that we define connections. The dictionary definition
is too broad. It is as follows:
1 : the act of connecting: the state of being connected: as a : causal
or logical relation or sequence <the connection between two ideas>
b : (1) : contextual relation or association <in this connection the
word has a different meaning> (2) : relationship in fact <wanted in
connection with a robbery> c : a relation of personal intimacy (as
of family ties) d : COHERENCE, CONTINUITY 2 a: something
that connects: LINK <a loose connection in the writing> b : a
means ofcommunication or transport 3 : a person connected with
another especially by marriage, kinship, or common interest <has
powerful connections> 4 : a political, social, professional, or
commercial relationship: as a : POSITION, JOB b : an
arrangement to execute orders or advance interests of another <a
firm's foreign connections> c : a source ofcontraband (as illegal
drugs) 5 : a set of persons associated together : as a :
DENOMINATION b : CLAN80
More than a decade ago, the Business Bankruptcy Committee and its Ethics
Committee in particular recommended changes in the disclosure requirements. The proposals of
the Ethics Committee which became the proposals of the Section ofBusiness Law were detailed.
They are attached as Appendix 2. Despite the Resolution of the House of Delegates of the
80 Merriam-Webster, Incorporated (1999).
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American Bar Association, Report No. 119A (1991), the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules gave little attention to the proposals.
D. Lack Of Uniformity.
Ofconsiderable importance to lawyers involved in bankruptcy cases in districts
other than those in the state in which they are admitted to practice are rules governing admission
and professional conduct. No national rules governing admission and professional conduct have
been promulgated under the Rules Enabling ACt.81 Rules of conduct are governed by local rules
of the bankruptcy courts, to the extent they are governed. The resulting lack of uniformity is a
serious problem.
Patricia Channon of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
reviewed the local rules of the bankruptcy courts and found that most bankruptcy courts do not
have a local rule concernini professional responsibiIity.82 Bankruptcy courts in thirty-five
districts have no rule at all. 3 Bankruptcy courts for twenty-seven districts have adopted the
district court rule, but provide no text of the adopted rule.84 Bankruptcy courts for six districts
specify the rules adopted by the highest court of the state in which the district is located.85 Two
courts impose standards which vary from those of the states in which the districts are located,
although one of these districts has also adopted the state standard.86 Of the districts that have a
rule, one district requires that attorneys read and become familiar with the state bar's Rules of
Professional Conduct, while another district encourages counsel to be familiar with the discovery
guidelines of the state bar. 87
The recent study by the Federal Judicial Center for the Standing Committee
canvassed the rules governing admission to practice and professional conduct of lawyers in the
federal district courts.88 The study established that rules as to bar membership in the district
81 Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648.
82 Letter from Patricia S. Channon, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Gerald K. Smith, Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules (April 4, 1997) (on file with author). However, nearly every bankruptcy court has
a local rule as to who may practice before the court. Most of the latter rules required that the individual be admitted
to the district court for the particular district in which the bankruptcy court was located.
83 Jd. at I.
84 Jd.
85 [d.
86 [d. at 2.
87 Jd. at Attachment 5.
88 Marie Cordisco, Eligibility Requirement For, and Restrictions On, Practice Before the Federal District Courts
(1995) (unpublished table, on file with the author).
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courts vary significantly among districts.89 All but four districts allow lawyers admitted to
practice in another federal district court or before a state court to seek permission to appear pro
hac vice. The four districts which do not allow such appearances have liberal bar membership
rules.9o The majority of districts allowing pro hac vice appearances require the association of
"local counsel. ,,91
Another recent report by Daniel Coquillette92 reviewed the local rules governing
conduct for the ninety-four district courts. Slightly more than half or forty-eight of these districts
"have adopted local rules and incorporate state standards in states that, in tum, have adopted
some version of the ABA Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct (1983).,,93 Twelve districts or
approximately thirteen percent had rules incorporating state standards from states which had
some version of the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.94 The Eastern and Southern
Districts of California adopted the California Rules ofProfessional Conduct.9s Ten districts
adopted rules referring to an ABA Model, four of which referred to the ABA Code, three to the
Model Rules and one to both.96 The Districts of Montana and the Southern District of Georgia
even referred to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.97 Ten districts referred to both an
ABA Model and to state standards.98 Eleven districts have no local rules governing attorney
conduct, but a number of these districts have standing orders. One district followed neither state
standards nor an ABA Model, but incorporated its own substantially modified version of the
ABA Model Rules.99
89 Every federal district court has a provision in its local rules listing criteria that an attorney must possess to
be eligible to apply for admission to that court's Bar. Fifty-five (55%) federal district courts limit membership in its
Bar to attorneys who are members of the bar of the state or territorial possession in which the district court is located
Eligibility requirements in the remaining thirty-nine districts vary considerably, but some of them do fall
into a number of patterns, all of which qualify a broader pool of applications for admission.
Id. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
90 Id. at 4.
91 Id. at 5.
r 92 Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct 1-2 (July 5, 1995).
931d. at 4.,..
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94 Id.
9S Id.
96 Id. at 4-5.
97 1d. at 5.
981d.
99 Id. at 5.
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In a follow-up Study Coquillette discussed the considerable number of variances
in the local rules. Coquillette concluded that a possible approach to more uniformity among
local rules would be to adopt uniform federal rules for attorney conduct in several key areas,
with other areas to be governed by state standards, was a possible approach to more
uniformity.loo "Obvious candidates for 'national' treatment would be ...: (1) 'Conflict of
Interest,' (2) "Represented Parties,' (3) 'Lawyer as a Witness,' and (4) 'Fees.",IOI Ifa choice of
law category were added, the Study noted that the proposed uniform federal rules would then
cover the issues in almost ninety percent of all reported federal cases since 1990. 102
IV. Recent Developments.
A. Restatement OfThe Law (Third) Governing Lawyers.
The American Law Institute labored for a decade to "express clearly and
completely the legal rules and doctrines that courts apply [to lawyers] ... and to explain the
basis for those rules and doctrines,,103 in its Restatement. Chapter 8 of the Restatement restates
the law of conflicts. The basic rule is that "a lawyer may not represent a client if the
representation would involve a conflict of interest." I04 A conflict exists "if there is a substantial
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by
the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a
third person.,,105 More specific conflict rules are applications of this basic rule, 106 with the
exception of the rule precluding suit against an existing client. IO?
IDO Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct
(December I, 1995). As summarized in its methodology and finding sections, the initial phase of the Study was the
design of a computer search of cases from January 1, 1990 forward. Even that limited period led to a large number
of cases, some 851. These cases were analyzed and sorted into 443 cases involving rules governing attorneys and
408 involving issues of attorney conduct in federal courts governed by Rule 11 and other standards. The largest
category of rules involved were conflict of interest rules. "Rules Analogous to ABA Model Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10
and 1.11 accounted for forty-six percent of reported federal disputes, or 204 cases of 443." Of these conflicting
cases, nearly eighty percent were civil in nature. Jd at 3-4.
101 Jd at 6.
102 Jd
103 Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept ofa Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 195,
196 (1987).
104 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996).
lOS Jd
106 Those of particular relevance to bankruptcy cases are section 206, Lawyer's Personal Interest Affecting
Representation of Client, section 209, Representing Parties With Conflicting Interests in Civil Litigation,
section 211, Multiple Representation in Non-Litigated Matter, § 212, Conflicts oflnterest in Representing
Organization, section 213, Representation Adverse to Interest of Former Client, and section 216, Lawyer With
Fiduciary or Other Legal Obligation to Third Person.
107 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 209(2) (Proposed Final Draft No. I, 1996).
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As will become evident in the discussion of conflict issues in workouts and
reorganizations, the conflicts sections of the Restatement are instructive. However, there is an
important, unresolved issue. All agree that a lawyer may not assert a claim against or defend
against a claim of a client in an unrelated matter. This is precluded by section 209(2). However,
there is sharp disagreement as to whether section 209(2) or section 201 should apply to the
bankruptcy case as a whole.
This sharp disagreement may seem odd to some considering that all agree that a
lawyer has a duty of loyalty to a client. However, it is doubtful that it was ever an absolute duty,
and its less than absolute nature is recognized by the current drafts of the Restatement. The
American Law Institute in its Second Restatement ofthe Law on Agency concluded that the duty
of loyalty is limited by the scope of the agency. I 08 Under this approach a lawyer could be
adverse to the client as to a matter outside the scope of the representation. But this common law
rule has been altered as a result of the widespread adoption of the American Bar Association's
Model Code and Model Rules. The Model Code provides that "[a] lawyer shall decline
proffered employment ... if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing
interests.,,109 The Model Rules preclude representation ofa client "if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client." I 10 Comment I to Rule 1.7 implies that the rule
is grounded in the duty ofloyalty.1I1
In the Restatement, the duty of loyalty is reaffirmed but subtly changed.
Comment b to section 201 of the Restatement makes it clear that underlying the basic conflict
rule of the Restatement is the lawyer's duty ofloyalty to the client.
108 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394 (1958). "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to act
or to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in
matters in which the agent is employed." Id.
109 Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-1 05(A) (1979). A differing interest is defined in the Model
Code as an "interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be
a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest." ld. at 454, Definition 1. While Disciplinary Rule 5-1 05(A)
precludes new employment, Disciplinary Rule 5-1 05(B) provides the same protection against continued multiple
employment. In both situations the problem can be solved by informed consent.
110 Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.7(a) (1995). Model Rule 1.7(a) precludes representation ofa client
directly adverse to another client. Rule 1.7(a) is not limited to conflicts in litigation.
IIIId. at Rule 1.7 cmt. 1.
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict
of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be
declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and
practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to
determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Id.
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A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client
can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in
itself. For example, the principle underlying the prohibition
against a lawyer's filing suit against a present client in an unrelated
matter (see § 109 Comment e) may also extend to situations, not
involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a client's
expectation of the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely.
Contentious dealings, for example involving charges of bad faith
against the client whom the lawyer represents in another matter
would raise such a concern. So also would negotiating on behalf
ofone client when a large proportion of the lawyer's other client's
net worth is at risk. 112
Section 209 sets forth conflict rules for civil litigation. Section 209 covers (1)
representation of two or more clients as co-clients involved in the same litigation and
(2) representation of a client in asserting or defending a claim against another client. Again, the
comments make it clear that a basis for Section 209 is the duty ofloyalty.
Fundamental conflicts of loyalty and threats to client
confidentiality would be inevitable if a lawyer were to represent
clients opposing each other in the same litigation. Many actions
that the lawyer took on behalfofone client would have the
potential for being at the expense of the other. Furthermore, the
public interest in the orderly management of litigation could be
seriously compromised. Thus, the same lawyer may not represent
both plaintiff and defendant in a breach of contract lawsuit, for
example. l13
[T]he lawyer has a duty. of loyalty to the client being sued.
Moreover, the client on whose behalf suit is filed might fear that
the lawyer would pursue that client's case less effectively out of
deference to the other client. Thus, a lawyer may not sue a current
client on behalfof another client, even in an unrelated matter,
unless consent is obtained under the conditions and limitations of
§ 202. 114
112 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 201 emt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. I, 1996).
113 Jd. § 209 emt. e.
114 Jd. § 209 emt. e.
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Section 209(2) of the Restatement provides that "a lawyer in civil litigation may
not ... represent one client in asserting or defending a claim a¥'ainst another client currently
represented by the lawyer, even if the matters are not related." 15 Although the duty ofloyalty is
absolute as to civil suits involving clients asserting claims against each other, the duty is not
absolute as to clients adverse to each other in a context other than that of civil litigation.
Section 201 allows a lawyer to represent one client in a transaction with another client
represented in unrelated matters unless there is a substantial risk that the client represented would
not be adequately represented in some material way.116
The treatment of the duty ofloyalty in section 201 is in sharp contrast to how the
duty is treated in section 209. Section 209 focuses on the duty of loyalty to the client represented
in unrelated matters, while section 201 focuses on the adequacy of the representation of the client
represented. Section 201's only expression ofconcern for the client in unrelated matters is the
statement in comment b that some situations may result in a "significant impairment of a client's
expectation of the lawyer's 10yalty."II? If so, counsel is disqualified from representing the client,
not because of the injured feelings or impairment of the expectation of the lawyer's loyalty to the
client in the unrelated matter, but because the duties to the client in the unrelated matter may
materially and adversely affect the representation of the client. The focus of the basic conflict
rule of section 201 is whether the personal interest of the lawyer or the lawyer's duties to others
will inhibit the representation of the client. See, for example, comment d, entitled
"Representation of Client."
In yet other situations, the conflict of interest arises because
the circumstances indicate that the confidence that a client
reasonably reposes in the loyalty of a lawyer would be
compromised due to the lawyer's relationship with another client
or person whose interests would be adversely affected by the
representation. I 18
Somewhat opaquely comment d refers to the impact on the expectation of loyalty of the client in
the unrelated matter. "The prohibition.of conflicts of interest ordinarily restricts a lawyer's
activities only where those activities materially and adversely affect the lawyer's ability to
represent a client including such an effect on a client's reasonable expectation of the lawyer's
loyalty." I19
115 Jd § 209.
116 Jd § 201.
117 Jd § 201 cmt. b.
118 Jd § 201 cmt. d.
119 Jd
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Section 28 of the Restatement lists the duties ofa lawyer to a client, but the black
letter rule does not mention the duty of loyalty:
To the extent consistent with the lawyer's other legal duties
and subject to the other provisions of this Restatement, a lawyer
must, in matters within the scope of the representation:
(1) proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to
advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the
client after consultation;
(2) act with reasonable competence and diligence;
(3) comply with obligations concerning the client's
confidences and property, avoid impermissible conflicting
interests, deal honestly with the client, and not employ
advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a
manner adverse to the client; and
(4) fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client. l2o
Comment e to section 28 states that "[t]he responsibilities entailed in promoting the objectives of ,.Ii
the client may be broadly classified as duties ofloyalty.,,121 The concluding paragraph of
comment e states that "[t]he duties of loyalty are subject to exceptions described elsewhere in
this Restatement. Those exceptions typically protect the concerns of third persons and the public .J
or satisfy the practical necessities of the legal system.,,122 The Reporter's Note to comment e
refers to other Reporters' Notes on the duties ofloyalty; however, a review of the references
does not reveal any discussion of the duty of loyalty except for that found in section IlIon ..
confidential information and in the conflicts chapter.123
In a communication on.behalfof the NBC to Professor Wolfram in October of ,.Ii
1995, concern was expressed as to "whether a lawyer representing creditors, stockholders or
owners of a debtor in unrelated matters can represent the debtor or other creditors, stockholders
or partners in connection with a bankruptcy case,,124 under the conflict provisions of the
12°Id § 28.
121ld § 28.
122Id. § 28 cmt. e.
123 The Reporter's Note cross-references sections 44,53,56-58, 72, III, 112 and 201-214. Section III defines
confidential client information. Comment b thereto states that "[a] client's approach to a lawyer for legal assistance
implies that the client trusts the lawyer to advance and protect the interests of the client (see § 28(1». The resulting
duty of loyalty is the predicate of the duty of confidentiality." ld § III cmt. b.
124 Letter from Gerald K. Smith to Professor Charles W. Wolfram I (Oct. 18, 1995) (on file with author).
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Restatement. It was pointed out that the limited discussion of bankruptcy matters in Chapter 8 of
the Restatement suggested that a bankruptcy case is a variety of civil litigation. If that is so, did
the Reporters intend to preclude a lawyer "from filing a bankruptcy case, assuming no consent, if
a creditor, Rartner or stockholder of the debtor is a client of the lawyer as to unrelated
matters?" 1 5 Professor Wolfram's response of November 21 and his subsequent letters of
November 27 and December 6, 1995 made it clear that Professor Wolfram viewed the filing ofa
bankruptcy case as the commencement of civil litigation.
The NBC held its spring meeting in March of 1996. At that meeting, the
Conference directed its Committee on Professional Responsibility to continue discussions with
the Reporters and Director Hazard and to urge
that Chapter 8 of the Restatement be clarified to make clear that
conflict of interest principles designed to address non-bankruptcy
"civil litigation", such as those contained in Section 209, should
not automatically be applied to the entirety of a bankruptcy case.
While the conflict of interest principles applicable to civil litigation
may properly be applied to an adversary proceeding or contested
matter where the debtor, trustee or creditors' committee is
asserting or defending against a claim, it should not be presumed
that bankruptcy counsel is materially adverse to individual
stakeholders with regard to other matters in the case. The
appropriate section of the Restatement under which such other
matters should be tested is Section 201, which requires a
determination of the actual risk of material adversity. 126
Professor Wolfram responded that:
We addressed the bankruptcy issues under § 209 in its
Comment d(iii) on pages 662-63 of Proposed Final Draft No.1.
We there specifically refer to the fact that the context of multi-
party litigation such as bankruptcy must be examined before
assessing whether a conflict exists. That seems to be the same
point made in the position paper. I'm curious to know in what way
the two positions don't agree. The position paper is, of course, far
more elaborate (although it remains at a very high level of
generality), but our effort in the Proposed Final Draft has been to
avoid getting into great detail on any practice area. 127
1251d.
126 Memorandum from the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the National Bankruptcy Conference to
Professor Charles W. Wolfram 4 (Apr. 18, 1996) (on file with author).
127 Letter from Professor Charles W. Wolfram to Gerald K. Smith (Apr. 24, 1996) (on file with author).
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In a Memorandum of May 2, 1996 NBC Conferee Donald S. Bernstein suggested
additional commentary.
I have looked at comment d(iii) to Section 209 of the
Restatement (referred to by Wolfram in his letter to you). If!
understand the comment d correctly, the whole comment relates
only to determining whether there is a conflict when
simultaneously representing in a single litigation multiple clients
"nominally on the same side." It appears to me that the issues we
have raised are really more like the issues raised in comment e
("Suing present client in unrelated matter.")
Because of the oversimplified "plaintiffvs. defendant"
model of"civil litigation", this comment does not address civil
cases which, like bankruptcy, where parties who are adverse as to
some issues are not materially adverse with respect to numerous
others.
Perhaps we should suggest a new comment e(i):
e(i). Proceedings Involving Multiple Parties in
Disparate Controversies. Certain types of civil
proceedings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve
multiple parties and multiple disputes. While
Section 209 (2) addresses the lawyer's role in asserting or
defending against a claim made by one client against
another in the context of such a proceeding, a lawyer is not
disqualified from representation of a client in such a
proceeding with respect to other matters where material
adversity does not exist. 128
128 Memorandum from Mr. Bernstein to Gerald K. Smith (May 2, 1996) (on file with author). Subsequently,
Mr. Bernstein articulated additional reasons why he believed the bankruptcy case as a whole should not be subject to
the bilateral litigation rule:
I do not see the bright line distinction between the pre and post-filing period .... In business
reorganization (chapter 11) cases, most of the disputes between clients will be the same ones that existed
prior to bankruptcy in the context of efforts to restructure out ofcourt: are the claims valid, are the liens
good, how should the company's debt be scaled back, how much equity should the old equity holders
retain. Although after the filing the court will be involved in detennining whether these disputes give rise
to a conflict (because the court must approve retention ofcounsel by the DIP), from the lawyer's
perspective, the potential disputes have not, in the main, changed.
This leads me to ask why, if the treatment of creditors is still the subject of negotiation rather than
litigation, the ground rules should change by virtue of the fact that the debtor comes under court
supervision by filing a petition. One might take the view, instead, that if the per se civil litigation rule did
not apply to pre-bankruptcy situation, the fact of the filing should not change this unless and until the issues
between the parties degenerate into litigated disputes in the case. Prior to that time-and in the pre-filing
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At the same time, Susan M. Freeman suggested to Professor Wolfram a specific
amendment to comment d(iii) to section 209 of the Restatement and the Reporter's Note to
Professor Wolfram:
d(iii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all possibly
differing interests of co-clients in complex and multi-party
litigation involve material interests creating conflict.
Determination whether a conflict of material interests exists
requires careful attention to the context and other circumstances of
the representation and in general should be based on whether
(1) issues common to the clients' interests predominate,
(2) circumstances such as the size of each client's interest make
separate representation impracticable, and (3) the extent ofactive
judicial supervision of the representation. Further, the fact that
one client merely holds a claim against the other client in a
judicial proceeding is not "assertion" ofa claim for conflict
purposes. A claim is "asserted" or "defended" when a dispute
concerning the claim is resolved For example, a lawyer might
represent several unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy proceedings.
In addition to general conflict of interest rules that may apply, a
lawyer representing such multiple clients must also comply with
statutory regulations if more stringent.
... [comment continues with discussion of class actions]
Reporter's Note Comment d(iii). Add a citation to In re
Amdura, 121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 19990) and 139 B.R. 963
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) after In re Aircraft Instrument & Dev., Inc.,
151 B.R. 939, 943-44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).129
context as well-the general rules stated in Sections 201 and 209(1) should apply. There may well be a
conflict, but it is not generated by the pendency of the bankruptcy case. It is generated, if at all, because the
parties are on opposite sides of the table trying to resolve disputes in a negotiated restructuring.
Maybe we haven't been clear on this point because it is so intuitive to those of us in bankruptcy
practice: most chapter JJ cases are in the eyes ofbankruptcy practitioners continuation ofan out ofcourt
restructuring transaction. The fact that a bankruptcy proceeding has been commenced does not mean, at
least to the bankruptcy lawyer, that all aspects of the relations between the parties have become the subject
of litigation.
Memorandum from Donald S. Bernstein to Professor Charles Wolfram 1-2 (Oct. 3, 1996) (on file with author).
129 Draft Accompanying Letter from Susan M. Freeman to Professor Charles W. Wolfram I (May 3, 1996) (on file
with author).
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Ms. Freeman's explanation for the proposed changes focused on what she
believed was the Reporter's position:
"[A]sserting" and "defending" a claim for conflict purposes means
litigating over the claim. Merely holding or filing a claim is not
deemed "asserting" it. This matters.
As the Restatement comment properly notes, resolution of
conflicts in bankruptcy depends on the interpretation of bankruptcy
statutes and rules in addition to lawyer code provisions and judicial
decisions. The Bankruptcy Code does not prevent all
representation ofdebtors in possession and trustees when the
lawyer's firm represents a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c). In some
circumstances~ the creditor may hold such a minimal interest that
representation of the debtor or trustee would not "be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to [the creditor] client in
the matter," in the words of Restatement § 209. However, if the
mere holding or filing of a claim or interest is considered
"asserting" it, under the Restatement prospective counsel for a
debtor or trustee still must obtain the informed consent of each
creditor client before he can take on the debtor or trustee
representation. The same would be true for representing a
defendant in a class action context, where firm clients are likely
class members. This may be extremely impractical in a large case,
especially since Restatement § 202 comment c states that the
requirement of consent generally requires an affirmative response
by each client, and that counsel cannot just assume consent from
client acquiescence.
The size of the claim by the creditor client is a factor in
determining whether there is a substantial risk of material adversity
in a bankruptcy case, wholly apart from whether separate
representation is impracticable. Thus, the phrase in the comment
about the size "mak[ing] separate representation impracticable"
should be deleted. Second, a citation to the Amdura case would be
useful, since it discusses at length the application ofRestatement
criteria to a single law firm's representation ofa debtor in
possession and a creditor, while the Aircraft Instrument &
Development case cited for that issue concerns an accounting firm
instead ofa law firm, and includes a discussion of lawyer
restrictions on conflicts being inapplicable to accountants.
Finally, the reporters' understanding about the meaning of
"asserting" a claim should be expressly set forth, since courts and
attorneys could reasonably understand that a creditor client's
invoices or letters demanding payment or filing ofa proofof claim
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would be "asserting" a claim. If "assertion" and "defense" of a
claim instead means litigation of the claim, the intent of the
Restatement provision would be met in the bankruptcy context. A
law firm could not litigate against a present client in a courtroom
dispute without its informed consent, no matter how small the
claim. Absent claim litigation, however, whether counsel could
represent a debtor in possession or trustee and, on unrelated
matters, creditors or other parties in interest, would depend on
whether there was a substantial risk that representation of one
would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties
to the other in the case. 130
Professor Wolfram immediately responded with a proposed text for the first
paragraph of Section 209, comment d(iii), based on Ms. Freeman's draft and earlier suggestions
of Professor Wolfram.
d(iii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all possibly
differing interests of co-clients in complex and multi-party
litigation involve material interests creating conflict.
Determination whether a conflict of material interests exists
requires careful attention to the context and other circumstances of
the representation and in general should be based on whether
(I) issues common to the clients' interests predominate,
(2) circumstances such as the size ofeach client's interest, and
(3) the extent of active judicial supervision of the representation.
For example, in a bankruptcy proceeding, the fact that one client
holds a claim against another client is not necessarily "assertion"
ofa claimfor conflict purposes. A claim is "asserted" or
"defended" when a dispute concerning the claim is involved. On
the other hand, when there is no substantial likelihood that the
proceeding will devolve from administration ofthe estate into
contestedproceedings between two or more clients, no adversity is
ordinarily involved as between the clients and hence no conflict of
interest is present. In addition to general conflict of interest rules
that may apply, a lawyer representing such multiple clients must
also comply with statutory regulations ifmore stringent. 131
130 Jd. at 1-2.
131 Letter from Professor Charles W. Wolfram to Susan M. Freeman (May 3, 1996) (on file with author). The
suggested language "when there is no substantial likelihood that the proceeding will devolve from administration of
the estate into contested proceedings between two or more clients, no adversity is ordinarily involved as between the
clients and hence no conflict of interest is present," came from Director Hazard. See Letter from Professor
Charles W. Wolfram to Gerald K. Smith (May 3, 1996) (on file with author).
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Several drafting matters were then considered, along with a substantive point
raised by Mr. Bernstein. 132 A final draft of agreed amendments to the Commentary to
section 209 was achieved on May 9, 1996:
Amendment No.1 - § 209, Comment c
(1 ) Change the heading of present Comment c
(Proposed Final Draft, page 659) to read as follows: c(i)
Clients aligned in opposition to each other-in general.
(2) Add a new Comment c(ii) at the end of the present
Comment c (Proposed Final Draft, page 660), to read as
follows:
c(ii). Opposing client in multi-party litigation.
Certain types ofcivil proceedings, such as bankruptcy
cases, may involve multiple parties and multiple disputes.
The fact that one client holds a monetary claim against
another client in a bankruptcy proceeding is not necessarily
"assertion" ofa claim for purposes of this Section. A claim
is "asserted" or "defended" when a dispute concerning the
claim is involved. When there is no substantial likelihood
that the proceeding will devolve from administration of the
estate into contested proceedings between two or more
clients, no conflict of interest under this Section is
ordinarily present as between the clients. Further, a
discrete conflict between two clients, such as a dispute over
the validity ofa claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, may not
disqualify a lawyer from representing one client with
respect to aspects of the case not involving the dispute
between the clients. In addition to general conflict rules
that may apply, a lawyer must also comply with statutory
132 See Memorandum from Susan M. Freeman to Professor Charles W. Wolfram (May 6,1996) (on file with author).
I sent Don Bernstein your Friday letter to me for his review. He appropriately points out that in
bankruptcy cases, courts may allow counsel to represent a debtor in possession even when there is a known
conflict of interest with an existing creditor client. The court may simply have other special counsel
(authorized under § 327(e» or committee counsel handle that portion of the case. The Amdura case I
referred you to addresses a proposal to do precisely that. The court held in that case that the creditor
client's role in the case was so pervasive and critical that special counsel wouldn't work. In other cases, it
will work. E.g. In re Blinder, Robinson & Co., 131 B.R. 872, 880 (D. Colo. 1991); In re Lee Way Holding
Co., 102 B.R. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1988). The court will look to the materiality of the conflict from the
perspective of the case as a whole.
Id.
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regulations if more stringent, such as provisions of the
bankruptcy code.
Amendment No. 2--§ 209, Comment d(iii)
Amend the first paragraph of § 209, Comment d(iii) (Proposed
Final Draft, page 662) to read as follows:
d(iii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all
possibly differing interests of co-client in complex and
multi-party litigation involve material interests creating
conflict. Determination whether a conflict of material
interests exists requires careful attention to the context and
other circumstances of the representation and in general
should be based on whether (l) issues common to the
clients' interests predominate, (2) circumstances such as the
size of each client's interest, and (3) the extent of active
judicial supervision of the representation. Among other
considerations, assessment of the existence ofa conflict
should take into account the requirements of materiality
(see § 201 & Comment c(ii) thereof) and substantial risk
(see id & Comment c(iii) thereto) of conflict. In addition
to general conflict of interest rules that may apply, a lawyer
representing such multiple clients must also comply with
statutory regulations if more stringent. 133
Unanticipated opposition to the proposed amendments was voiced by Judge
Caroline D. King at the annual meeting of The American Law Institute. 134
Judge Carolyn Dineen King (Tex.): Yes. I think, if!
understand this correctly, that I do object. You will note that § 209
is broken down into Subsection (1) and Subsection (2),
Subsection (1) precluding the representation where you "represent
two or more clients ... if there is a substantial risk that the
lawyer's representation ofone of the clients would be materially
and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to another client" and
Subsection (2) dealing with representing "one client in asserting or
defending a claim against another client ... represented by the
lawyer."
133 Proposed Text of Amendments Accompanying Memorandum from Professor Charles Wolfram to Gerald K.
Smith, Susan M. Freeman, and Donald S. Bernstein (May 9, 1996) (on file with author).
134 A member of the American Law Institute's Council and Judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and next in
line to be the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit.
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Now, if you take a look at the language that is proposed in
this amendment, it starts out as if it were addressing
Subsection (2). It says "The fact that one client holds a monetary
claim against another client in a bankruptcy proceeding is not
necessarily 'assertion' of a claim ...." And then it says, "A claim
is 'asserted' or 'defended' when a dispute concerning the claim is
involved," and that looks as if it is addressing the second part of
this § 209. But then it goes on to say where "there is no substantial
likelihood that the proceeding will devolve from administration of
the estate into contested proceedings between two or more clients,
no conflict of interest under this Section is ordinarily presented,"
which ofcourse takes Subsection (1) out ofplay also. So I am not
altogether sure that was intended, but that is the effect of it. I
know that the bankruptcy lawyers have assiduously pursued the
proposition that they would like to be carved out of this
Restatement, and we have, I think quite properly, resisted that, and
I hope we will to our dying day. But I believe that, with the way
this has been drafted, they have been carved out.
And the next sentence doesn't give me any more comfort
because it says, "a discrete conflict between two clients, such as a
dispute over the validity of a claim ...., may not disqualify a
lawyer from representing one client with respect to aspects of the
case not involving the dispute between the clients."
I would like to make the point here that there is a
fundamental problem with what we are doing here, and that is
there are two ways in which a claim can be adversely affected in a
bankruptcy proceeding. One is at the end of the day, so to speak,
when we will adjudicate, most often at the end of the day, whether
it is valid, whether it is secured, whether it will be subordinated,
and so on, all right, and you can be killed if you are a claimant at
the end of the day. But you can be equally as dead by virtue of the
way that claim is treated under the plan. And you draw a
distinction in your language here between the administration of the
case, which sounds like sort of bookkeeping but is in fact where
the heavy hitting is done in a bankruptcy case. So my suggestion
is that it is naive, I think it looks naive, to buy into this
distinction.13S
135 Transcript of Debate over Amendments to Section 209 of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers at the
1996 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, in 73 A.L.I. Proc. 389 (1996).
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King:
136 Jd. at 391.
The following colloquy then took place between Professor Hazard and Judge
Director Hazard: Well, I mean if you say once
bankruptcy is filed, then you have to treat it as though all claimant
positions are hostile in a disqualifying sense to the debtor.
Judge King: Right.
Director Hazard: Is that the position you would take? So
that, if you represent anybody who is a claimant, you cannot
represent the debtor?
Judge King: I think that there is -
Director Hazard: That is the crunch that they are worried
about.
Judge King: I know. I know that is the crunch. Let me
say that is the crunch they are in today, all right.
Director Hazard: I understand.
Judge King: So we have now what I think the bankruptcy
lawyers view as an opportunity to get out of the crunch that they
are currently in, and I would say let's be very careful about that.
Director Hazard: Well, I agree with that, but I have to say
the word "administration" was my word, and I take responsibility
for it. I had in mind that there are lots of bankruptcies where it is
to a large extent a bookkeeping matter, ... but the question is, is
there a way you can describe a stage prior to, how shall we say, a
prelitigation or a precrunched stage where you would feel more
comfortable saying, "Well, you can go that far but you've got to
stop." I am questioning do we have any words that can describe
the boundary?
Judge King: I don't at this point. I think the thing needs
to be rethought. I mean, I really think it needs to be recommitted.
The problem is that in many prepacks all of this stuffgets worked
out ahead of time, but those present their own Eroblems, too. I
think that may be what you are talking about. I 6
K- 39
Professor Wolfram joined in.
Professor Wolfram: Judge, at least as I understand it-
but I will let the bankruptcy people, if there are any here, speak for
themselves, - it was a sub (2) problem, their problem. They
simply didn't want to be in the position of being tagged with the
sub (2) disqualification, even though they were clean under sub
(1), just because bankruptcy is thought to be an adjudication, and
that was the point of treating it as administration devolving into
dispute.
Professor Wolfram: But as I understand it, your problem
is that when you prepackage things, for example, the negotiation
that goes into that is where the hostility is.
Judge King: That's right.
Professor Wolfram: The fact that it is all sweetness and
light by the time it comes to court doesn't mean there was never a
conflict.
Judge King: That's right.
Professor Wolfram: I quite agree with that, but I wonder
whether that isn't a sub (1) problem and adequately covered by sub
(1).
Judge King: I am really not sure, because when you have
a claim in one of these proceedings, the question that you have is it
plays out in such ways that you can't see vis-a-vis the way in
which the debtor is administered, the way in which the plan is
confected ....
Professor Wolfram: Well, I see the problem, and I think I
take your point, that it might be well if we went back to possibly a
larger group in which you would be included - if I may suggest
that - to negotiate this further. But I think that, under sub (1), the
kind of problem that you are worrying about could be dealt with.
Possibly it can't be dealt with in a rule disqualifying. It is really a
rule that permits the unwinding of the representation later with
inspection into whether it in fact has been appropriate in terms of
adverse impact on the lawyer's representation, and it could be that
simply referring, for example, as the Comment does in the last
sentence here, to superadded requirements under the bankruptcy
K-40
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statute that might require a heightened duty, also has to be
observed as insufficient.
Judge King: May I respond to that? I mean in my court,
if someone asks you a question from up there, you get to respond; I
don't know if that is how it works here. (Laughter) Even when
the red light is on, you get to answer the question, and they
generally say, "But only one sentence."
You have in here this reference to complying with more
stringent statutory requirements, but you understand, of course,
that the statute operates in significant part, not exclusively but in
significant part, by incorporating the state conflict-of-interest rules.
So when you do this, when you do whatever you do here, you need
to understand that it will de facto amend the bankruptcy law.
Okay?
Ms. Susan M. Freeman (Ariz.):
The Bankruptcy Code in § 327(c) says that you are not
disqualified from representing the debtor because your firm
represents a creditor. That is not per se a disqualification, and the
Bankruptcy Code specifically authorizes special counsel to come
in and handle matters in a case that the attorney for the trustee or
the attorney for the debtor cannot handle. This provision is
intended to deal, you are correct, Professor Wolfram, with
Subsection (2), in saying that the mere fact that a client in your
office has a claim is not enough to disqualify you from
representing the debtor or the trustee. The question is, is there
going to be a dispute involving that claim, whether it is a dispute
over the validity of the claim or a dispute over treatment of the
claim under the plan, but those kinds ofdisputes you could not
handle on behalfof the debtor.
And then you get to the question of, well, can you still
represent the debtor if there are other claimants out there, if there is
a possibility of a dispute with an existing client of your office?
And then it comes down to the fact that you are depending on other
rules, the Subsection (1) rules, § 201, where the is not a likelihood
that there is going to be a significant contest, then -
Mr. Sheldon H. Elsen (N.Y.): I think the Director has put
his finger on it. This ought to go back for more work. I speak as a
nonbankruptcy lawyer who has been involved in these situations,
K-41
and I think that Geoff alluded to the fact that there are institutional
problems that this is intended to solve. In a large city like New
York, with giant bankruptcies involving big-board companies, a
situation where law firms represent creditors, such as the major
banks, would be barred from representing debtors-in-possession
would be bad public policy, because these firms accumulate a high
degree ofexpertise and skill in dealing with the problems of public
companies and complex accounting and other financial problems
and society, would simply be harmed if their skills could not be
made available to debtors because they represent the banks.
On the other hand, these firms have, in the better situations,
when the actual litigation ahs arisen, referred the case to special
counsel. I think what Judge King is pointing to in the Leslie Fay
case is a situation where that firm would have probably done better
to have done some referrals earlier in the game, but I know the
firm in question has solved that in other situations. It is immensely
complex, and I do think the Director is right. It ought to go back
for some further working, but I don't think you ought to throw the
baby out with the bath water. The institutional situation here is
socially desirable.
Mr. Brian Redding (III.): I have great sympathy with the
practical problems that Ms. Freeman articulated and also with
Judge King's comments. Having wrestled with this a bit, one of
the things I might suggest that the Reporters might think about if,
as seems likely, they are going to do more work on it, is the
consent problem. When I talk to bankruptcy lawyers one of the
enormous problems here is the practical problem of getting consent
from a huge number of clients of your law firm who are
representing creditors, and, in the short run, sometimes in some
courts the bankruptcy judge can be of assistance on that. I think
maybe, as you discourse with the bankruptcy folks, maybe you
ought to think about whether there isn't a way to help solve the
problem by relaxing consent in terms ofdoing consent through the
court rather than the kind of consent that we are all used to,
individualized consent with individualized contact back and forth
through a client list that may include 75 or 100 or 200 creditors in
a given bankruptcy.
Vice President Traynor: Do the Reports wish to respond
briefly?
Professor Wolfram: I think I am sympathetic to the
motion, which I understand to be a motion to recommit for further
consideration, but I don't wish to withdraw the matter from the
K-42
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floor. We are on the tipping point of a vote which I think is
inevitable in any event.
Vice President Traynor: Judge King, do you wish to take
a minute to respond?
Judge Carolyn Dineen King (Tex.): I think recommitting
this is the thing to do. I am very sympathetic to the problem, and I
want very badly to see this problem taken hold of by the horns and
fixed. I think Mr. Redding's comments go right to it, but I don't
want to see something like this. I would rather see us tackle the
whole thing head on instead of trying to do something like this, so
I think recommitting it is what I would espouse. 137 ,.
Judge King's opposition doomed the proposed amendments and resulted in the recommittal of
section 209.
As a result of discussions and correspondence among those concerned, including
Judge King, Council Draft No. 13 reflects changes to the commentary to section 209.
e(ii). Opposing clients in multi-party litigation. Certain
types of civil proceedings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve
multiple parties and disputes. There is substantial disagreement
whether various bankruptcy proceedings should be considered
under Subsection (2). Tribunals must resolve such questions in
light of a body of decisions developed in the specific context of
bankruptcy, and often the issues are controlled by statute. The
context involves transformation of a business relationship into one
that is at least in part controlled by different principles and rules,
some of them of a fiduciary nature. The Restatement takes no
position on the applicability of Subsection (2) in the many
situations that may arise in bankruptcy. However, "asserting or
defending a claim" within the meaning of the Subsection refers to
a dispute about the claim and not merely holding or filing a claim
as to which there is no reasonable likelihood ofdispute.
In all such situations the lawyer must comply with
Subsection (1) and Section 201 generally, both before and after the
filing of a formal proceedings. For example, two or more present
clients of a lawyer or law firm may be involved in contentious
negotiations about such issues as the validity, amount, or priority
ofclaims, the voidability of a pre-bankruptcy transfer, or the nature
of a claim as secured or unsecured. Whether a conflict exists in
137 Jd. at 391-95.
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such multiple representations must be analyzed under
Subsection (1) (see also § 211). In addition to general conflict
rules that may apply, a lawyer must also comply with statutory and
regulatory requirements if more stringent, such as applicable
provisions of the bankruptcy code.
A dispute between two clients-either before or after filing
ofa bankruptcy proceedings-may not disqualify a lawyer from
representing one client with respect to aspects of the matter not
involving that dispute. For example, as may be true in other
contexts as well, a separable disputed matter may be handled by
one or more special counsel not affiliated with the lawyer or law
firm in question (see § 203).138
Thus, Judge King believes that the entire bankruptcy case shou'd be treated as a
civil lawsuit, thus precluding representation of a trustee, debtor-in-possession, or creditors'
committee, absent consent of a party-in-interest represented by the attorney in an unrelated
matter. Judge Jones concurs, but is also of the view that this is so under the Bankruptcy Code
and cannot be cured by consent. Others have suggested that until there is a "face-to-face
dispute," there should be no disqualification.
Mr. William Zewadski of the Florida Bar requested that the ALI address conflicts
in The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the
Director of the ALI, responded to Mr. Zewadski as follows:
If the Restatement addressed the conflict problem in bankruptcy in
terms of the rules governing conflicts as set forth in the
Restatement - rules universally accepted in this country - the
statement would, in my opinion, provide that a firm handling a
bankruptcy for a debtor, whether Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, would
require consent ofany concurrent client represented by the same
firm who was a creditor whose claim stood in any substantial
degree of risk of being compromised in the course of the
proceeding, and ofany former client having a claim subject to that
risk which had arisen from a transaction in which the client has
been represented by the firm. In my opinion, this rule may well be
too onerous, and bankruptcy law should recognize the efficacy of
an "insulation wall" within a firm between lawyers for the debtor
and lawyers for creditors not likely to suffer substantial financial
harm if their claims are compromised. However, such a rule
cannot be fashioned out of the generalized recognized rules on
conflict of interest. We thought it prudent, and certainly to the
interest of the bankruptcy bar, not to prejudice or foreclose a
138 Restatement (Third) ofthe Law Governing Lawyers (Council Draft No. 13, 1996), pp. 36-38.
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development in "bankruptcy conflicts" by speaking specifically to
the issue in the Restatement. If strongly pressed, however, the
Reporters could reconsider and tender a formulation like that stated
above. 139
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The American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct has been renamed the Ethics 2000 Commission. Its membership includes
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and others who are expert in the rules of professional conduct.
Its Chief Reporter is Professor Nancy J. Moore and an additional Reporter is Professor Thomas
D. Morgan, the Assistant Reporter in charge of Chapter 8 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Chapter 8 concerned conflicts of interest.
The Ethics 2000 Commission has a three-year-plus mission to review the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Additional public hearings are scheduled in Dallas
February 10,2000 and in New Orleans, June 2, 2000. Its goal is to have a preliminary report
available for the ABA House of Delegate in October 2000.
The Commission released a draft set of rules in March of 1999 for a six-month
comment period that ended in mid-September. Included among those rules were amended rules
concerning confidentiality and conflicts of interest. The proposed amended rules are attached as
Appendix 3.
Additional rules have now been released for comment. These were posted on the
Commission's website in November. These include a new disciplinary rule for prospective
clients, an amended rule on fees and an amended rule on the respect for rights of third parties. A
copy of this release is attached as Appendix 4.
Considerable input was made to the Commission by Dean Nancy B. Rapoport.
Her recent article is instructive and concerns bankruptcy cases. 140
As Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference's Ethics Committee and as a
member of the Board of Directors of the American College of Bankruptcy Professionals, I wrote
the Commission in January 1999 and brought to its attention the two articles I had written which
concern conflicts in bankruptcy cases.
It is once again my impression that the Ethics 2000 Commission does not care to
concern itself with bankruptcy matters. Although I received a polite response from Professor
Moore, it merely invited specific recommendations or suggestions from me, the National
139 Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to William Knight Zewadski, Esq. (Nov. 25,1997) (on file with author).
140 Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 Am. Bankr.
Inst. L. Rev. 45 (1998).
K-45
~---------------------------
Bankruptcy Conference or the American College of Bankruptcy Professionals along with a
description of the problems that exist under the present Model Rules. Since Dean Rapoport had
adequately presented these issues to the Commission, I did not submit any additional concrete
proposals. My suggestions as well as those of The National Bankruptcy Conference were
adequately covered in my two law review articles.
Because of the structure of the Model Rules, it is doubtful that the Commission
will recommend specific bankruptcy rules. However, it may be willing to introduce some
commentary which would be useful. Unfortunately, the present drafts do not do so.
C. National Bankruptcy Review Commission.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission had a capable Working Group. It
consisted ofCommissioners Ginsberg and Butler, Senior Adviser Professor Lawrence P. King,
and Staff Attorney Elizabeth Holland. Participants invited to discuss relevant issues included
Professor Charles W. Wolfram, the Reporter for the Restatement, practicing lawyers Don
Bernstein, Michael Bloom, Susan Freeman, Barney Shapiro, and the author. Mr. John R. Byrnes
sat in as the representative of the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee. The Working Group and
participants had working sessions July 18-19, 1996, in Washington, D.C., September 18, 1996,
in Santa Fe, New Mexico; December 17, 1996, in Washington, D.C.; and January 22-23, 1997,
in Washington, D.C. The Working Group explored a number ofissues,141 but the Working
141 The Service to the Estate & Ethics Issues List consisted of the following:
Should the existence ofa material adverse impact be the only grounds for
disqualification to represent, or receive compensation from, the estate? Should a
definition of material adverse interest be included in the Bankruptcy Code?
Should the "disinterestedness" standard be relaxed? Should professionals with
existing relationships with their clients be able to serve as counsel to the debtor
in possession?
Who are the "professionals" who should be supervised by the court?
Management consultants? Media relations advisors? Lobbyists? Surveyors?
Appraisers? Real Estate Brokers?
Should parties be able to waive disinterestedness requirements?
Are potential, rather than actual, conflicts sufficient to disqualify counsel?
Should the standard be different for section 327(a) counsel versus section 327(e)
counsel?
Should rules enacted in the Bankruptcy Code supersede local regulation under
canons ofethics and disciplinary rules?
How should conflicts of interest be defined for application to the engagement
and compensation of professionals?
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Group's work was cut short at admission to practice, the disinterestedness standard, and a
definition of adverse interest. 142 The Working Group recommended to the Commission that the
disinterestedness standard be abandoned as to those employed by the debtor-in-possession, but
When should multiple professionals be required to represent multiple, related
parties and when can such parties be represented by one professional? Should
certain inter-company relationships affect this result?
Does the disqualification ofan individual in a law firm disqualify the entire
firm? Do "Chinese walls" work in bankruptcy?
What criteria should judges use to approve applications for professional
compensation? Should fees be judged by local or national standards? Should
routine hold-backs be approved? Are lodestars appropriate? Are other
compensation schemes more likely to produce an efficient system? Does the
appointment of a fee examiner help the process or does an examiner usurp the
judge's role and drive up the cost to the professional?
Do requirements for local counsel drive up costs? Should they be abolished?
Or do they reduce costs by demanding representation by counsel familiar with
local court practices?
142 The proposal as to the national admissions rule was that
Admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of being
admitted to practice in the relevant United States District Court, should entitle
an attorney, on presentation of a certificate of admission and good standing in
another bankruptcy court, to appear in the other bankruptcy court in the United
States without the need for any other admission procedure.
Service to the Estate and Ethics Proposal #3: Nationwide Admission to Practice (revised for 1/22/97 Meeting).
Even this recommendation was watered down in the form approved by the Commission so as to leave intact local
rules requiring local counsel:
Admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of being
admitted to practice in the relevant United States District Court, should entitle
an attorney, on presentation ofa certificate ofadmission and good standing in
another district court, to appear in the other bankruptcy court without the need
for any other admission procedure. The proposal will not affect requirements (if
any) to associate with local counsel. Similarly, the proposal will not change the
requirements under state law governing the practice of law and the maintenance
ofan office for the practice of law. The proposal will only amend the local
bankruptcy rule or practice requirements governing special admission of
attorneys to the bankruptcy court who are otherwise not admitted to the bar of
the district court in the district where the bankruptcy court is located.
National Bankruptcy Review Commission - Proposals Initially Adopted by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission p. 4 (revised April 29, 1997). The Admission Rule drafted by Professor Coquillette for the Circuit
Courts of Appeals does not require local counsel. Daniel Coquillette, Study of Federal Cases Involving Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 46, Standing Committee Report July 19-20, 1997, published in Working Papers of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure - Special Studies of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct,
Appendix III, p. 259 (A.O. Sept. 1997) ("Working Papers").
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be retained as to those employed by the trustee. 143 Concerning the definition of adverse interest,
the Working Group recommended that the Commission give serious consideration to the
adoption of the language worked out by the reporters and participants in the process of creating
the Restatement, which basically identified a conflict of interest or an adverse interest in the
Code terminology as a representational or personal interest which resulted in a substantial risk of
a material and adverse effect on the representation. It was believed that this would give the
courts guidance. Under this approach, a lawyer who is a prepetition creditor of the debtor might
very well be disqualified, not under a per se rule, but because ofa significant interest, whether as
a result of the amount or the nature of the claim. On October 19, 1996, the Commission adopted
the first proposal of the Working Group that:
Professionals retained by a debtor in possession in a chapter 11
case should not have to meet the disinterestedness requirement of
11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The deletion does not change the requirement
that such professionals (i) not have any interest materially adverse
to the estate or (ii) disclose all potential conflicts to the court. 144
However, the proposal was revoked at a Commission Meeting in June, 1997, and by a mail ballot
August 5, 1997, by a vote of six to two. The following alternative language for Proposal No. 1
was adopted:
Section 1107(b), which authorizes an exception to the
disinterestedness/conflict of interest standards for professionals in
Chapter 11 cases, should be modified as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding § 327(a) of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under § 327 of this title by a debtor in
possession solely because of such person's employment by or
representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case, or
solely because of such person's being the holder of an insubstantial
unsecured claim against-or equity interest in the debtor. 145
143 The Jones/Zywicki memorandum makes much of the fact that the Commission's initial recommendation, and the
proposal of the Working Group, eliminated the disinterestedness standard as to professionals employed by the
debtor-in-possession. Somehow it was concluded that the failure to extend the recommendation to the trustee
indicated a flaw in the approach. That is really grasping at straws. Problems had not been encountered in practice
with the disinterestedness standard of counsel for the trustee. It is rare that the trustee seeks to employ anyone
having any relationship to the debtor, except in a special role. Nonetheless, it would make sense to eliminate the
disinterestedness standard as to the trustee in all likelihood; it no longer serves a useful purpose and the
independence of counsel would be adequately assured by the no material adverse interest standard which would
apply across the board.
I44National Bankruptcy Review Commission - Proposals Initially Adopted by the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, at 4 (revised April 29, 1997).
14S Service to the Estate & Ethics Ballot.
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As a result, the Commission and its staff did not pursue other issues or the adverse
interest definition proposal of the Working Group:
The Bankruptcy Code should define conflict of interest for
purposes of retention of professionals under section 327. A
professional has a conflict of interest if there is a substantial risk
that such professional's representation will be materially and
adversely affected by the professional's own interests or by the
professional's duties to another person that currently employs or
formerly employed such professional, or a third person. The
proposal does not affect a professional's duty under Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 2014 to disclose "all connections with the debtor, creditors, any
other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of
the United States trustee.,,146
D. Proposed Amendments To 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
The number of claims being asserted against professionals involved in bankruptcy
cases is increasing. The most dramatic example is the most recent lawsuit against Ernst &
Young arising out of alleged fraud and negligence in the Merry-Go-Round case. The Wall Street
Journal devoted considerable space to the fact that Ernst & Young paid $185 million to settle the
case.
147 Needless to say, with the notoriety given the settlement, we can expect that the incidents
of lawsuits of that nature will dramatically increase in the years to come.
The Ernst & Young lawsuit was not the only lawsuit of its nature resolved in
1999. Milbank., Tweed, Hadley & McCloy was reported to have paid $1,860,000 to settle a
claim against it arising out of nondisclosures and conflicts in the Bucyrus International, Inc.
Chapter 11 case. 148 One of the interesting issues that arises in cases of this nature is the
appropriate forum to resolve the claims. Intuitively, one would assume that it is the bankruptcy
court. If there has been a nondisclosure, the court where it occurred should deal with the matter.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court must pass on requests for compensation in any event and one
would normally assume any claims for improper services should be raised in that context. The
cases are legion where not only compensation has been reduced or denied, but where additional
sanctions were imposed. The bankruptcy court deals with these issues all the time. On the other
hand, it is an entirely different situation in state court. There the claimant generally asks for a
146 Memorandum from Prof. Lawrence King to National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Prof. Elizabeth Warren
and Stephen H. Case, dated April 28, 1997 at 4.
147 Elizabeth McDonald and Scott J. Paltro, Merry-Go-Round: Ernst & Young Advice to Client, But Not About
Everything: It Didn't Reveal Business Ties Alleged Posed Conflict With Its Consulting Job: Settlement For 185
Million Dollars, The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, August 10, 1999.
148 31 B.C.D. 21 at A I, A9-A1 I.
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jury trial and it is an extraordinarily difficult process to recreate the events that transpired in a
complicated Chapter 11 case before a jury.
In the Merry-Go-Round case, the plaintiff did just that. The plaintiff was the
trustee in bankruptcy and the liquidation case following the unsuccessful Chapter 11
reorganization attempt ofMerry-Go-Round. Ernst & Young removed the case to the bankruptcy
court, but the plaintiff requested that it be remanded to the state court and it was. The decision of
the bankruptcy judge was affirmed by the district court. 149 In a very similar situation Coopers &
Lybrand was sued in connection with an inadequate disclosure in a Texas state court. After
learning of the inadequate disclosure, the debtor asked the bankruptcy judge to require Coopers
& Lybrand to disgorge all of its fees. The bankruptcy judge did require that Coopers & Lybrand
return nearly 15% of the fees. Thereafter, the state court lawsuit was filed and removed to the
bankruptcy court which had presided over the Southmark bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy
judge then considered the claim and concluded that it was barred under principles of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. On the issue of which court
should hear the matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the claim was a core proceedin~ and that
the bankruptcy court had exercised its discretion appropriately in refusing to abstain. 15 The
Ninth Circuit has also recently considered whether the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is
exclusive as to a misconduct of a professional employed in a bankruptcy case. In Elias v.
Lisowski Law Firm, Chtd. (In re Elias),151 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
in a case initiated in a state court where the state court judge in essence referred the matter to the
bankruptcy court, in a dissenting opinion dissenting from a determination that there was no
jurisdiction because the case was closed, Judge Russell, a highly respected bankruptcy judge
from the Central District of California, concluded that the bankruptcy court not only had
jurisdiction, it had exclusive jurisdiction:
Indeed, the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination ofdebtor's attorney's fees: "The determination of
fees of an agent of the estate is a core proceeding within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court." In re Edgewater
sun spot, Inc., 183 B.R: 938, 943 (N.D. Fla. 1995), affd sub. nom
Edgewater Sun v. Pennington & Haben, 84 F.3d 438 (11 th Cir.
1996), cert denied sub. nom Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc. v.
Pennington & Haben, P.A., 136 L.Ed 2d 220, 117 S. Ct. 303
(1996). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the bankruptcy
court has exclusive jurisdiction over claims ofmisconduct on the
part ofdebtors' attorneys. In In re Ba/boa Improvements, Ltd., 99
B.R. 966 (9th Cir. BAP 1989), the BAP held that:
149 Ernst & Young. LLP v. Devan (In re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises. Inc.), 222 B.R. 254 (D. Md. 1998).
ISO Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), 163 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1999).
lSI 215 B.R. 600 (9th Cir. BAP 1997).
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Jurisdiction over a claim of misconduct by the debtor's
attorney in the administration of an estate may be
analogized to the exclusive jurisdiction over similar claims
against a court-appointed trustee or debtor-in-possession. It
is well settled that such fiduciary cannot be sued in state
court without leave of the bankruptcy court for acts done in
his official capacity and within his authority as an officer of
the court. I52
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit affinned, but Judge Fernandez
dissented:
Bankruptcy courts surely have the most expertise and interest in
controlling their own proceedings and in regulating the behavior of
professionals who seek to appear before them or work on cases
under their tutelage. It is those courts that help prevent distressed
debtors, and their creditors, from becoming cheerless carrion for
voracious vultures, who would pick the estate clean. In my
opinion, there is a need for exclusivity and I would require it, but I
need not even consider the farthest reaches of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over fees at this time. ISJ .
One of the amendments to S. 625 is a provision which seeks to assure that the
bankruptcy court will at least exercise exclusive jurisdiction over nondisclosures by bankruptcy
professionals.
Amendment No. 2478 as modified
(Purpose: To provide for exclusive jurisdiction in federal court for
matters involving bankruptcy professional persons)
On page 124, insert between lines 14 and 15 the following:
Sec. 322. Exclusive Jurisdiction in Matters Involving Bankruptcy
Professionals.
Section 1334 oftide 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b) by striking "Notwithstanding" and
inserting "Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and
notwithstanding"; and
(2) amending subsection (e) to read as follows:
IS2 [d. at 49-50.
IS3 Elias v. Lisowski Law Firm, Ltd (In re Elias), 188 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999).
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"(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced
or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction-
"(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as
of the commencement of such case, and of property of the
estate;
and
"(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of
section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to
disclosure requirements under section 327.,,154
Proposed Amendments To Bankruptcy Rule 2014.
-
As Chair of the Ethics Committee of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules, I drafted a proposed amendment to Rule 2014 which would eliminate the term
"connections." With the help of the members of that committee, including useful suggestions
from Len Rosen and Alan Resnick, I came up with a second draft which will be considered by
the Advisory Committee and its Ethics Committee. Ken Klee has taken over as chair of the
Ethics Committee and Jeff Morris is the new Reporter replacing Alan Resnick.
The proposed amendment is as follows:
Rule 2014. Employment of Professional Person
....
...
(2) state the name of the person to be employed and the
reasons for the selection;
(a) MOTION FOR AN ORDER APPROVING
EMPLOYMENT. A request for an order approving employment
under § 327, § 1103, or § 1114 of the Code may be made only by
written motion of the trustee or committee. The motion shall:
(1)
necessary;
(3)
state spe~ific facts showing why the employment is
state the professional services to be rendered;
-
-
-
-
(4) disclose any proposed arrangements for
compensation; and
154 Senator Strom Thurmond Amendment No. 2478 (Senate - November 16, 1999)
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(5) state that, to the best of the movant's knowledge,
the person to be employed is eligible under the Bankruptcy Code
for employment for the purposes set forth in the motion.
(b) STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL. The motion shall be
accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed.
The statement shall:
(1) state that the person is eligible under the
Bankruptcy Code for employment for the purposes set forth in the
motion;
(2) disclose any interest that the person holds or
represents that is adverse to the estate;
(3) disclose any interest or relationship relevant to a
determination that the person is disinterested;
(4) disclose the person's relationship to the United
States Trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United
States Trustee;
(5) if the professional is an attorney, state the
information required to be disclosed under § 329(a); and
(6) state whether the person shared or has agreed to
share any compensation with any person and, if so, the particulars
of any sharing or agreement to share other than the details of any
agreement for the sharing of compensation with a partner,
employee, or regular associate of the partnership, corporation, or
person to be employed.
(c) SERVICES RENDERED BY MEMBER OR ASSOCIATE
OF FIRM OF EMPLOYED PROFESSIONAL. If, under the Code
and this rule, a court authorizes the employment of an individual,
partnership, or corporation, any partner, member, or regular
associate of the individual, partnership or corporation may act as
the person so employed, without further order of the court. If a
partnership is employed, a further order authorizing employment is
not required solely because the partnership has dissolved due to the
addition or withdrawal of a partner.
(d) SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL.
Within 30 days after becoming aware of any matter that is required
to be disclosed under Rule 2014(b), but that has not yet been
disclosed, a person employed under this rule shall file a
supplemental verified statement concerning the additional matter
or matters to be disclosed, serve copies on the entities listed in
K-53
Rule 9014U, and, unless the case is a chapter 9 municipality
case, transmit a copy to the United States Trustee.
This will eliminate the requirement of identifying and disclosing "connections"
while retaining the requirement to disclose necessary information. I have long been concerned
with the uninformative nature ofBankruptcy Rule 2014. The absurd result in In re The Bennett
Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (B. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1998) makes it clear to me that the term
"connections" should be abandoned. Connections is too general a term. The problem is
compounded since the rule requires disclosure of connections with accountants and attorneys for
various parties-in-interest. The one required to disclose such information does not know who the
various parties-in-interest are let alone their accountants and attorneys.
I do not intend to belabor the point, but the rule as written is unsound and its
application by the U.S. Trustee and the courts is causing unnecessary misery to the courts as well
as professionals ensnared in its beguilingly simple language. This reflects badly on courts,
lawyers and the bankruptcy system. My recent law review article concerninf disinterestednesshas some of the background of the drafting of the rule and how it evolved. IS At the very least,
we should eliminate the requirement of disclosure of connections with attorneys and accountants,
replacing this with the requirement that there be disclosure of any adverse interest. This is the
proper focus and relevant inquiry. We can understand adverse interest (even better if defined),
but we cannot understand connection. We can conflict check adverse interests, but we cannot
conflict check connection.
F. Proposed Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct.
For several years, the Standing Committee has been exploring rules regulating
attorney conduct. The Standing Committee directed its Reporter, Professor Daniel R.
Coquillette, of Boston College Law School, to review local rules governing attorney conduct.
Professor Coquillette's Report to the Standing Committee describes the sensitive nature of the
project and the magnitude of the problem:
No area oflocal rulemaking has been more fragmented
than local rules governing attorney conduct. This difficult subject
was first raised at the outset of the Local Rules Project in 1988,
and was then discussed extensively by the Standing Committee at a
Special Conference on Local Rules, convened by the Committee at
Boston College on November 14, 1988. Many of the goals of the
Local Rules Project, including uniform numbering, were relatively
uncontroversial, but review of local rules governing attorney
conduct proved to be highly contentious. Rather than jeopardize
155 Gerald K. Smith, Standards for the Employment of Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases: A Response to Professor
Zywicki's "Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession's Professionals," 18
Miss. C. L. Rev. 327 (1998).
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the early progress of the Local Rules Project, it was decided to
defer this divisive issue to a later date.
Since that time, the "balkanization" of local rules governing
attorney conduct appears to have grown worse . . .. [T]here are
now seven fundamentally different approaches, and even within
these "groups" there are great variations. The most common
approach, local rules that incorporate the relevant standards of the
state in which the district is located, actually divides federal
districts because of the many differing state rules. . .. The
Department of Justice, other major federal agencies, and many
national legal organizations, including civil rights groups, national
corporations, financial networks, large law firms, and groups
facing multi-district litigation have been severely
inconvenienced. . .. Further, the rise of legal malpractice actions
has led to subsidiary dispute about choice of law-often of mind
numbing complexity. This situation has led some major
governmental agencies, including the Department of Justice, to
consider adopting their own professional standards. The
Department of Justice has now actually done so with regard to
communications with represented parties, promulgating new
Department regulations that differ significantly from most state
standards and the standards adopted by local rule in most Districts
and Circuits. . .. This adds further to the number and variation of
the rules. 156
After considering the Report, the Standing Committee voted to hold a special
study conference and the Chair of the Standing Committee, Honorable Alice-Marie Stotler,
directed Professor Coquillette to determine the frequency with which ethical issues arise in
reported federal cases. This led to an additional report to the Standing Committee. IS?
The Special Study Group considered the two Reports at two sessions - one in
January, 1996 in California and one in June, 1996 in Washington, D.C. At the conclusion of the
second session, a substantial majority of the Study Group favored the drafting of a model local
rule, but did not favor a uniform rule promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. A majority
concluded that additional empirical data should be gathered as to (l) the experience in districts
that had adopted the earlier model rule, (2) the experience in districts that handle attorney
discipline matters, (3) the experience with attorney discipline in the courts ofappeal, and (4) the
federal decisional law involving discipline of attorneys. 158
IS6 Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct 1-2 (July 5, 1995).
IS' Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct
(December I, 1995).
IS8 Judicial Conference of the United States, Standing Committee, June 1996 Minutes.
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Thereafter, the Standing Committee appointed an Attorney Conduct Rules
Subcommittee which included representatives of each of the Advisory Committees.
The Attorney Conduct Subcommittee recommended a rule of dynamic conformity
to the law governing professional conduct of the state within which the district is located. Each
Advisory Committee has been requested to consider the recommendation and report and respond
to the Standing Committee in March 2000.
The following are comments by Professor Coquillette concerning the conclusions
of the Subcommittee:
The Standing Committee Subcommittee on Federal Rules of
Attorney Conduct met on September 29, 1999. The draft Minutes
of the meeting are attached. This brief summary addresses the
request of the Subcommittee that each advisory committee
consider the attached draft of a possible FRAC 1 and offer advice
to the Standing Committee at its January 2000 meeting. The draft
is not submitted as a model that might be published for comment.
Instead it is used only to illustrate one possible approach to the role
of federal courts with respect to questions of attorney conduct in
connection with federal court proceedings.
The basic approach illustrated by the draft Rule 1 distinguishes
between matters of"professional responsibility" and matters of
"procedure." All questions of professional responsibility are
reserved to state authorities, whether or not the conduct involved is
connected to federal proceedings. Federal courts retain control of
federal "procedure" and control of the right to practice in a federal
court. The federal court of federal procedure is protected against
state encroachment by immunizing against state sanctions attorney
conduct that is authorized by federal court order or by federal
procedure. The question before the advisory committees is
whether it might be useful to attempt to develop this approach
through another round of work by the subcommittee, advisory
committees, and Standing Committees, with the hope of
developing a draft that could be published for comment in August
2000. The most probable alternative is to defer indefinitely any
further national-level work on federal regulation of attorney
conduct. Federal regulation then would continue to be imposed
through the welter of local district rules now in place, as they may
be revised by each district. IS9
159 Introduction to the Summary for Fall 1999 Advisory Committee Meeting (Sept. 1999).
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The draft rule prepared by Professor Cooper, the Reporter for the Committee on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is as follows: 160
Rule 1. Applicable Rules.
(a) Rules of Professional Responsibility
(l) District court. Except as provided in these rules, the
professional responsibility of an attorney for conduct in connection
with any action or proceeding in a United States District Court is
governed by the rules that apply to an attorney admitted to practice
in the state where the district court sits.
(A) With respect to any appeal from a district court, and any
other proceeding directed to a district court, by the rules that apply
to an attorney admitted to practice in the state where the district
court sits.
(2) Court ofAppeals. Except as provided in these rules, the
professional responsibility of an attorney for conduct in connection
with any appeal or proceeding in a United States Court ofAppeals
is governed:
r
r
r
r (B) With respect to any other action or proceeding:
r
(i) if the attorney is admitted to practice only in one
state, by the rules of that state, or
r
r
r
r
r
t
r
",..
I
r
160 Professor Cooper's preface identified the reason for the phrase "except as provided in these rules" as follows:
My charge was to draft a model Civil Rule 83(c) establishing dynamic
conformity with state rules of professional responsibility. I have chosen to
frame this draft as a revised Rule 1, FRAC. It will be easy to revise it as a Civil
Rule provision if that is the course to be taken in the end. On the other hand, if a
decision is made to go forward with additional national rules addressing the
concerns of bankruptcy practice or the concerns of the Department of Justice,
for example, there could be "FRAC 2" and "FRAC 3" and so forth.
It may make sense to have a single Federal Rule of Attorney conduct even if it is
decided not to have any additional rules; the "except as provided in these rules"
preface in Rule 1(a)(1) and (2) is easily deleted. One reason not to have any
additional rules may be that only clear procedural policies justify adoption of
specific federal rules. These procedural policies might better be reflected in
specific procedural rules - grand-jury problems, for example, could be
addressed in the Criminal Rules. Bankruptcy problems provide a general
example. On the other hand, there may be specific topics that cut across the
various bodies of procedural rules and that should become FRAC 2 et seq.
K - 57
(ii) if the attorney is admitted to practice in more than
one state, by the rules of the state in which the
attorney principally practices, but the rules of
another state in which the attorney is licensed to
practice govern conduct that has its predominant
effect in that state.
J
J
(b) Enforcing Professional Responsibility. The rules of
professional responsibility that govern under subdivision (a) are
enforced by the property state authority. A United States District
Court or Court of Appeals may initiate an investigation of an
alleged infraction of a rule of professional responsibility, and -
with or without an investigation - may refer any question of
professional responsibility to the proper state authority.
(c) Procedure. Federal law governs all matters of procedure in
the United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals[, whether
addressed by the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct, Appellate
Procedure, Bankruptcy Procedure, Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, or Evidence; by judicially developed rules; or by the
court in its inherent power]. The court may, after notice and
opportunity to be heard, enforce the procedural rules and its orders
by all appropriate sanctions, including forfeiture of fees,
reprimand, censure, or suspension or revocation of the privilege to
appear before the court.
(d) Practice in United States Court. A court of the United
States may establish and enforce rules governing the right to
appear as counsel in that court.
(e) State Sanctions Preempted. No state authority may impose
any sanction, civil liability, or other consequence on an attorney
for conduct in connection with an action or proceeding in a United
States District Court of Appeals if the conduct is authorized by
order of the United States court or by the federal rules ofprocedure
that apply under subdivision (c).
Earlier, I had drafted specific rules for bankruptcy cases using the Restatement of
the Law (Third) Governing Lawyers as a model. I did this in the hopes of stimulating
discussion. These are contained at pages 378 and 379 of my Mississippi Law Review article.
"Standards for the Employment ofProfessionals in Bankruptcy Cases: A Response to Professor
Zywicki's 'Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession's
Professionals,'" 18 Miss. C. L. Rev. 327 (1998). The first rule defined adverse interest.
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Rule [1]. Adverse Interest
For purposes of §§ 101(l4)(E), 327, 328 and 1103, a person holds
or represents an adverse interest if there is a substantial risk that
the representation or performance ofduties would be materially
and apversely affected by the person's own interests or by the
person's duties to another.
Another rule modified the "bilateral litigation" rule as to bankruptcy cases.
Rule [5]. Representing Person with Adverse Interest
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the
limitations and conditions provided in Rule U, a person may not:
(l) represent a person if the representation would significantly
impair another client's expectation of the person's loyalty;
(2) represent two or more clients in a matter not involving
litigation if there is a substantial risk that the persons'
representation of one or more of the clients would be materially
and adversely affected by the person's duties to one or more of the
other clients;
(3) represent two or more clients in a disputed matter in a
bankruptcy case if there is a substantial risk that the person's
representation of one of the clients would be materially and
adversely affected by the person's duties to another client in the
matter; or
(4) represent one client in a dispute in a bankruptcy case
against another client currently represented by the person, even if
the matters are not related.
The Advisory Committees on Appellate, Civil, Criminal and Evidence Rules have
been asked to report to the Standing Committee this fall. Since the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules does not meet until March 2000, it has been asked to report after that meeting.
The input of interested persons to the Advisory Committee and Professor Coquillette, the
Reporter primarily in charge of the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct, will be helpful.
Marie Leary of the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of bankruptcy
judges concerning the standards governing attorney conduct. Standards Governing Attorney
Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts - Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules, Federal Judicial Center March 1999 (unpublished report, available upon
request to author or the Federal Judicial Center's Information Services Office).
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The Federal Judicial Center had conducted an earlier survey concerning local
rules of attorney conduct in the federal district courts. However, as Marie Leary pointed out in
her introduction to the bankruptcy survey,
Bankruptcy courts are different from the district courts in the
attorney conduct area in that attorneys who practice in bank.r'qptcy
courts are subject to a complex statutory system, which includes
bankruptcy-specific conflict of interest criteria and other standards
directly governing attorney conduct. The Standing Committee has
already given attorney conduct in the bankruptcy context some
attention through a study report issues in June 1997. That study
[hereinafter Study of Bankruptcy Cases], which examined reported
bankruptcy opinions involving rules ofattorney conduct,
demonstrated that the proposals being considered by the Standing
Committee for the federal district courts raise many additional
issues for bankruptcy courts. 161
Marie Leary developed a questionnaire with the assistance of the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Two versions were circulated, one was sent to all chief
bankruptcy judges and all bankruptcy judges in districts with only bankruptcy judge. There were
90 judges in that category. The other questionnaire was sent to all other bankruptcy judges. It
varied from the first questionnaire only in that it did not inquire as to the formal and informal
sources of attorney conduct standards in the district.
There was a high rate of response. Out of the 90 chiefjudge questionnaires, 86
responded, and out of the 227 questionnaires to other judges, 174 or 77% responded.
Marie Leary discusses the survey results in-depth in her Report. In addition, she
attached as appendices summaries of comments she received. Attached as Appendices 5, 6, 7,8
and 9 are these appendices.
G. Cases.
In In re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc., 222 B.R. 254 (D. Md. 1998) the
district court affirmed the remand ofa lawsuit filed by the Chapter 7 trustee of Merry-Go-Round
Enterprises, Inc. in the Maryland state court. The case had been remov«:d to the bankruptcy court
under the provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1452. The bankruptcy judge, however, remanded the case to
state court and an appeal followed to the district court. The district cowrt affirmed even though
the district judge acknowledged that the case involved a core bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 259.
Since a decision to remand is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals wlder 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b),
161 Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, p. 4 (footnote omitted), referencing
Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases (1990-1996) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct 293
(1997), reprinted in Working Papers of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure: Special Studies of
Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct (Administrative Office of the United Statcls Courts 1997).
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that was the end of the line. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, Ernst & Young paid $185
million to settle the case.
Allowing the state court to resolve claims of the nature asserted in the Merry-Go-
Round litigation raises a number of issues. First, there is a considerable duplication ofjudicial
effort. The bankruptcy judge has lived through the case and it need not be recreated before the
state court trier of fact. Second, the bankruptcy judge generally supervises the employment and
services ofprofessionals. Any nondisclosure goes to the integrity of the bankruptcy system and
should be resolved by the bankruptcy court. Third, the bankruptcy court should interpret the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules so that there will be unifonnity in their
interpretation. Allowing state courts to do so will result in many different interpretations.
Fourth, there are issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel inherent in those cases where
interim and final awards of compensation or sanctions have been made. These matters are best
resolved by the court that considered requests for compensation or sanctions.
In In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (B. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1998),
the trustee had a consulting agreement with Deloitte & Touche (USA) LLP ("Deloitte").
According to the opinion it provided that the trustee would "provide consulting services to
Deloitte concerning regulatory and other matters affecting domestic and international capital
markets and the financial services industry generally .... [I]t included consulting services [for]
legislative, regulatory, administrative or business issues as to which Deloitte may seek ... advice
and counsel and that are reasonably acceptable to ... the trustee." Id. at 332.
Bennett Funding and related cases have been pending for several years. The
trustee filed a third supplemental affidavit on April 16, 1998 stating that he had entered into an
agreement with Deloitte in February of 1998 to provide consulting services. At the time of the
initial hearing on the trustee's sixth application for compensation, the U.S. Trustee expressed
concern as to the adequacy of the disclosure as to the contractual agreement.
According to the Court's opinion, the trustee's search ofpublic records (Deloitte
would not disclose its clients) established that Deloitte was the independent auditor of A.G.
Edwards, Inc. and American Gaming & Entertainment, Ltd. The opinion only focused on the
latter relationship since the trustee was only suing Edwards "for an individual investor." Id. at
333, n.3. I do not quite understand this, but it is not important as far as the concerns expressed in
this memorandum.
The trustee's disclosure stated that American Gaming is a publicly owned holding
company of Shamrock Holdings Group, Inc., a subsidiary ofone of the debtors included in the
Consolidated Estate. Id. at 333. Shamrock owned 40% of the common stock and all of the
preferred stock ofAmerican Gaming. American Gaming was also indebted to Shamrock in the
approximate amount of $65 million.
The U.S. Trustee insisted on disclosure by Deloitte of its private clients since "it
is not possible to detennine whether there is a potential for conflict for Breeden in representing
the Consolidated Estate and in acting as a consultant to Deloitte." Id. at 334. The court stated
that Rule 2014(a) "requires the Trustee to disclose any connections Deloitte might have with the
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Debtors, creditors and any other party in interest." Id. at 334. The court went on to observe that
it was "left without answers to whether, in addition to A.G. Edwards and ... [American
Gaming], any of Deloitte's private clients have ties to the case and to what extent." Id. at 335.
The trustee argued that the services he was rendering under the consulting
arrangement with Deloitte were services on behalfof Deloitte, not its clients. Deloitte was
neither a creditor nor a party-in-interest in the consolidated cases. Nonetheless, the court
observed that
[t]he question of"whether a professional [in this case, the trustee]
has 'either a meaningful incentive to act contrary to the best
interests of the estate and its sundry creditors -- an incentive
sufficient to place those parties at more than acceptable risk -- or
the reasonable perception of one, '" ... cannot be addressed in a
vacuum without the benefit of knowing whether Deloitte numbers
among its private clients any of the creditors of the estate or
defendants in any of the thousands of adversary proceedings
commenced by the Trustee in this case.
Id. at 335.
The court concluded that Breeden must either resign as trustee or terminate his
consulting arrangement with Deloitte effective as of the date of his consulting agreement.
Under Rule 2014(a), a professional seeking employment must disclose any
connection the professional has with a creditor or any party-in-interest. In addition, the
professional must disclose any connection the professional has with any lawyer or any
accountant for a creditor or party-in-interest in the case. Under section 11 09(b), party-in-interest
includes an equity security holder. Apparently the drafters of Rule 2014(a) assumed that the
person to be employed could determine connections with accountants or attorneys for a creditor,
equity security holder or other party-iI)-interest. How is this possible? Perhaps the Rules need to
be amended to require that the debtor (or in appropriate cases the trustee) identify the
accountants and lawyers of creditors and other parties-in-interest in the schedules.
Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) requires a disclosure ofconnections with the debtor,
creditors and any other party-in-interest and their respective attorneys and accountants. The
trustee had a connection with Deloitte, but the trustee could not determine whether Deloitte was
an accountant for a debtor, creditor or other party-in-interest. Without such knowledge, how
could the relationship of Deloitte to a creditor or equity security holder or other party-in-interest
create a problem?
In Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), a very
similar situation to that in Merry-Go-Round, Coopers & Lybrand was sued in connection with an
inadequate disclosure in a Texas state court. After learning of the inadequate disclosure, the
debtor asked the bankruptcy judge to require Coopers & Lybrand to disgorge all of its fees. The
bankruptcy judge did require that Coopers & Lybrand return nearly 15% of the fees. Thereafter,
the state court lawsuit was filed and removed to the bankruptcy court which had presided over
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the Southmark bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy judge then considered the claim and concluded
that it was barred under principles of collateral estoppel andres judicata. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed on appeal. On the issue of which court should hear the matter, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the claim was a core proceedin~ and that the bankruptcy court had exercised its
discretion appropriately in refusing to abstain. 62
In Elias v. u.s. Trustee (In re Elias), 188 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth
Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's refusal to rule on the propriety and amount of fees incurred
by the debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case after the case had been dismissed. The bankruptcy
judge's ruling was affirmed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in Elias v.
Lisowski (In re Elias), 215 B.R. 600 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). There was, however, a vigorous
dissent by Judge Barry Russell. The Ninth Circuit per curiam decision pointed out that the
bankruptcy court generally has discretion as to whether to reopen proceedings to reconsider its
prior orders and the bankruptcy court also had discretion as to whether to consider the matter of
fees since it was ancillary to its core function of adjudicating the estate. "Because we agree with
the bankruptcy court that the state court is fully capable of resolving the fee dispute in this case,
we hold that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to decide the fee
issue." Id at 1162.
There was an interesting dissent by Judge Fernandez. Judge Fernandez pointed
out that this was a matter of nondisclosure. The attorney for the debtor has failed to disclose "all
... connections with the debtor, creditors, [or] any other party in interest. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
20 I4(a).... Moreover, a statement of consideration paid or agreed to be paid for attorney
services was required. See 11 U.S.C. § 329. The bankruptcy court and the BAP agreed that a
failure to make the required disclosures is sanctionable." Id Judge Fernandez concluded that
the questions were whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it declined to reopen
and whether there was jurisdiction to decide the attorneys' fees issue, whether or not the case
was reopened. Judge Fernandez could find no abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, Judge
Fernandez found that there was jurisdiction. In support of that ruling, Judge Fernandez cited
numerous decisions. He also pointed out that one court even found that it had exclusive
jurisdiction to decide attorneys' fees issues as core issues.
At least one court has gone even further and asserted that
bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to decide attorney's
fee issues because they constitute core proceedings. See
Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc., v. Pennington & Haben, P.A. (In re
Edgewater Sun Spot, Inc.), 183 B.R. 938, 943 (N.D. Fla. 1995),
affd, 84 F.3d 438 (11 th Cir. 1996). In reaching that conclusion,
the court relied in part on a BAP opinion that affirmed the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to sanction parties, even after a case
had been dismissed. See Mangun v. Bartlett (In re Balboa
Improvements, Ltd), 99 B.R. 966, 970 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1989); see
162 169 F.3d 925 (51h Cir. 1999).
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also In re French Bourekas, Inc., 183 B.R. 695, 696 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 195 B.R. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 1165.
Judge Fernandez pointed out that the Ninth Circuit itself had previously
concluded that "regulation of the activities ofparties before the bankruptcy court should be in the
hands of that court alone. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 915 (9th
Cir. 1996)." Id. And Judge Fernandez finally observed that:
Bankruptcy courts surely have the most expertise and interest in
controlling their own proceedings and in regulating the behavior of
professionals who seek to appear before them or work on cases
under their tutelage. It is those courts that help prevent distressed
debtors, and their creditors, from becoming cheerless carrion for
voracious vultures, who would pick the estate clean. In my
opinion, there is a need for exclusivity and I would require it, but I
need not even consider the farthest reaches of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over fees at this time.
Id.
The difficult issues that arise when matters involving performance of
professionals are left to another forum are obvious in Pipkin v. Henry & Peters, P. C. (In re R &
C Petroleum, Inc.), E.D. Tex., Tyler Div. 1999. In Pipkin, the trustee of an unsecured creditors'
trust filed an adversary complaint against an accountant and the accounting firm employed by the
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession alleging briefof fiduciary duty, professional negligence, gross
negligence and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The accountant's motion
for summary judgment was not entirely successful. The bankruptcy court left for resolution at
the trial on the merits such matters as the doctrine of res judicata based on matters determined at
the confirmation hearing, the preclusive effect of an earlier ruling on the accountant's fee
application and when the alleged malpractice was discoverable. These are issues best left to the
bankruptcy court.
As in the Pipkin case, the bankruptcy judge handled the disputes concerning the
performance by an accounting professional in In re Southmark.
In In re MPM Enterprises, Inc., 231 B.R. 500 (E.n.N.Y. 1999), the bankruptcy
judge disbarred an attorney from practicing before the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District.
Although the district court reversed the disbarment order for lack of due process due to
insufficient notice, excessiveness of the sanction, and because no statute, rule, decision or other
authority was given by the bankruptcy judge for his decision, the district court opinion makes it
exceedingly clear that the bankruptcy judge does have authority to disbar one from practicing
before the bankruptcy court.
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In In re BBQ Resources, Inc., 237 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999), an order was
entered authorizing the employment of counsel for the debtor-in-possession. It later turned out
that counsel had an adverse interest and was disqualified. Counsel sought compensation for the
period of time prior to disqualification. The bankruptcy judge held that there was no discretion
to do so under § 327(a). The court cited a number of Sixth Circuit cases in support of that ruling,
including In re Middleton Arms Limited Partnership, 934 F.2d 723 (1991); In re Eagle-Picher
Industries, Inc., 999 F.2d 969 (1993); and In re Federal Department Stores, Inc., 44 F.3d 1310
(1995). The bankruptcy judge rejected the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ruling to
the contrary in In re CIC Investment Corp., 192 B.R. 549 (1996).
This brings to mind the resolution of the House ofDelegates of the American Bar
Association in 1991 which sought a rule establishing safe harbor in such situations. However,
the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules declined to propose such a rule since several of its
members believed it would have been a substantive change not permitted under the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 ("Rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.")
In an interesting Michigan state court case, the Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed the imposition of sanctions by the trial court for the filling of a bankruptcy petition in
bad faith "in an attempt to reach a nominal settlement in this case through misrepresentation" or
to otherwise delay the state court suit and burden the plaintiff and the court "under circumstances
where the defendants had no intention of following through with the bankruptcy." Prince v.
MacDonald, No. 204615,1999 Mich. App. Lexis 222, decided August 3,1999. The defendants
argued that state courts did not have authority to sanction parties for abuse of bankruptcy
proceedings relying on Koffman v. Osteoimplant Technology, Inc., 182 B.R. 115 (Bankr. Md.
1995). That case had held that state law claims for abuse ofprocess and malicious prosecution
were preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. In contrast with the situation as to unsuccessful
involuntary petitions, there is no express statutory provision like 11 U.S.C. § 303(i), and the
Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 was not a basis for
preemption. See generally Matter ofGraffy, 233 B.R. 894 (Bankr. M.D. Fla., Tampa Div., 1999)
(bad faith filing of petition sanctioned by bankruptcy court under Rule 9011).
In In re Napoleon, 233 B.R. 910 (B. Ct. D.NJ. 1999), a useful decision which
should result in financial savings system-wide, the bankruptcy court in New Jersey held that the
employment of experts by special counsel were not subject to the approval process. The court
distinguished those who assist in the administration of the case.
He or she must also play an integral role in the administration of
the bankruptcy case. The professional could assist the trustee with
important activities, such as obtaining post-petition financing,
negotiating creditor claims or formulating a plan of reorganization.
It is these types ofactivities that rise to the level necessary to be
considered a 'professional person' under § 327(a). In the instant
case, the experts employed by Special Counsel merely assisted her
with the prosecution of the State Court Action. These experts in
K- 65
no way assisted the trustee with the administration of the
bankruptcy case.
Id. at 913.
The recent decision of Bankruptcy Judge Hillman in In re Filene's Basement,
Inc. /63 granting a motion for reconsideration of his order approving the employment of Price
Waterhouse Coopers, LLP and vacating the prior order approving employment of Price
Waterhouse and denying the application to employ Price Waterhouse is another interesting
example of the uncertainty in this area. In its verified statement, Price Waterhouse simply stated
that it "has provided and/or may continue to provide, services for various entities shown on
Exhibit A who are involved in the Debtors' case, which services are not related to the Debtors'
case."I64 The verified statement also asserted that it had no other connection with the debtors,
creditors, other parties-in-interest or their attorneys or accountants, except that it did state that it
was possible that it was providing professional services in wholly unrelated matters "in which
attorneys or accountants of the Debtors, creditors or other parties in interest also serve as
professional services provider." I 65 It was also disclosed by Price Waterhouse that Coopers &
Lybrand, a predecessor firm, did serve as auditors from January, 1989 through January, 1996. In
addition, it was disclosed that Price Waterhouse had been retained as an expert witness in
litigation against the debtors, but when retained by the debtor, it withdrew from that engagement.
it also established "information barriers.,,166 Judge Hillman suppressed considerable surprise and
concern at the fact that the name of the plaintiff employing Price Waterhouse was not disclosed
and the plaintiff was not identified in Exhibit A.
Price Waterhouse took the position that "[u]nder applicable accounting standards
and federal decisions, the pre-petition engagement ... [by the plaintiff in the litigation against
the debtors] and the simultaneous engagement of [Price Waterhouse] thereafter by [the Debtors]
was entirely proper.,,167 Judge Hillman disposed of the argument by pointing out that it "misses
the point entirely; the issue in the first instance is not the ethical correctness ofPwC's multiple
representations by the standards of any profession."168 Since Judge Hillman found that there was
a failure to properly disclose, he denied retention on that basis and did not reach the issue
whether Price Waterhouse could have been retained. Judge Hillman did allow the filing of an
application for reimbursement ofactual and necessary expenses incurred, although he gave no
indication whether it would be granted. In another decision in In re Filene 's Basement, Inc.,
Judge Hillman granted a motion for reconsideration of the approval of the employment of Hale
163 239 B.R. 845 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
164 /d at 847.
J6S /d.
166/d
167/d. at 849.
168/d.
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& Dorr as counsel for the debtor-in-possession, vacated the prior order and denied the
application. 169
169 in re Filene's Basement. inc., 239 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
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APPENDIX 1
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING NATIONAL ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
AMENDING LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES OR PRACTICE REOUIREMENTS
GOVERNING SPECIAL ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS TO BANKRUPTCY COURTS
National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report
Chapter 3: Jurisdiction, Procedure and Administration
October 20, 1997
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3.3.4 NlIlional Admission to Practice
• I
Admission to prac:tke In one bankn1pky court, usuany by 'flrtue or
beJDa admitted to prac:tfce la the re!eyant UDlted States DIstrld Court,
should emwe an attonIey, on preseotatlon or a certJflcate or admission
and loud ItaDdlDc In another district court, to appear In the other
IlllDlauptq court wllhout the Deed ror any other admission procedure.
'lbe RecommmdatloD wW not affect requirements (If' any) to assoclate
wIIh local coumeI. Similarly, the Recommendation will not chage the
rygulrements under state law coyerDiDc the practice or law and the
malDleuauce or an ofIlce ror the pradlce or law. The Recommendation
will only amend the local bankn1ptc:y nile or practice requirements
COYerulDc speclaladmlsslon or attorneys to the bankn1ptcY court who
are otherwbe not admitted to the bar or the distrlct court In the dlstrict
where the bankruptcY court Is located to aepear In a particular
bankruptcy case.
BanJcruptcy courts exist in the various federal judicial districts to supervise
cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Code and adjudicate disputes arising in
such cases. Attorneys who practice in the bankruptcy courts are required, at a
minimum, to be admitted to practice in their home distticts. Often attorneys
appear in bankruptcy courts in other distticts because their clients are involved as
parties in bankruptcy cases in such out~f·town districts. In order to represent such
clients, these attorneys must be admitted specially in the bankruptcy court where
the case is pending, usually on motion of a local attorney. These special admission
requirements are particularly burdensome on creditors (both private and
government) and their counsel who usually receive notice of bankruptcy
proceedings with little time to prepare and are often called to distant fora to defend
claims and interests of their clients.
Admission ofnonresidenfl'O aItomeYs to practice before a particular district
court generally applies to the bankruptcy court in that district.2771 The local rules
of the bankruptcy court in each district (with a few exceptions) provide the
admission terms for attorneys to participate in a particular case when they are not
admitted to the disttict court bar of the disttict where the bankruptcy court is
located.2m For the most part, these local rules closely fonow the admission rules
for the district court where the bankruptcy court is located.2m While these rules
vary widely among the ninety-four districts, there are distinct similarities that are
worth noting. Virtually aU of the bankruptcy courts provide for either (1)
admission to practice in a particular case after meeting certain requirements
(usually a certificate of good standing from another federal court or the highest
court in a state and the payment of a fee), or (2) appearance by pro hoc vice
motion. Additionally, a considerable number of bankruptcy courts waive the
special admission requirements for attorneys representing the United States
government or any of its agencies when appearing in a particular bankruptcy
case.2774 Very few bankruptcy courts, however, waive the special admission
"'"Tbe term Mnonresident" is used throughout this Recommendation to mean an attorney
(i) who is DOt • resident of the state in which the bankruptey court sits, ud (ii) who bas not been
admitted to the district court bar in the relevant district.
11'1 :SCI. I,g.• Bania. Ct. S.D,N.Y. LBR 2090-I(a) rAn attorney who may practice in the
District Coun pursuant to GcneraI Rule 2(a) and (b) of the District Rules may practice in this
Court."); BanIa. Cl D. MD. 4(a) r,xCtpt as otherwise provided, ... only memben of the Bar of the
District Court may appear as counsel.H).
11'1 Tbe Ioc:aI ban1avplcy rules tbat do IIOt provide for the admission ofnonresident attorneys
eeocrally incorporate by Id'ereoce the local rule of the disuict court. Sel, I,g., BanIa. D. Conn,
Local RuJe 2 ("OaIypenons admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the District
orCoaneaicut or admitted as Yisitiq lawyers pursuant to the Local Rules ofCivil Proccdwe IhaII
pnctice in the BanJauptcy Court.j.
2mTbe Ioc:aI baD1cruptcy rules often refer as well as conform to the district rule governing
admission orattorneyS. :SCI. I.g., Bankr. Ct. N.D. FJa. Rule 106 A rExcept as provided berein,
Local RuJe 11.1 of the United States District Court for the Nonhcm District ofFlorida governs the
admission aDd appearance oClIOIIICSidenl a1toI'I1CYS before the BanJauptcy Court"); BanIa. Ct. N.D.
W. Va. Rule '.20'(a) (adopting the applicable district court's rule loveming admission of
nomcsident attorneys).
.... See notes 2217.79 and accompanying text, In[rD.
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provisions for nonresident state attorneys representing state agencies277s outside the
state in which the bankruptcy court sits.2776
Certain district courts and the bankruptcy courts within those districts admit
attorneys who are members of the bar in another U.S. court to appear in a
particular case.2m These districts generally require (1) the submission of a
certificate of good standing; (2) knowledge of, and consent to abide by, the
disciplinary JUles in the district; and (3) payment of a fee.227I Most districts that
admit attorneys based on admission in other districts require the attorney to
associate with local counsel.227I
The vast majority of bankruptcy courts have provisions for admission of a
nonresident attorney by pro hoi: viet motion.mo Despite its popularity, pro 1ulc
211> Su BaDkr. a. ND. m. Loc:aI Rule 600(c) (Miviq the trial bar ~ssion RqUirements
for "the attorney ICuera1 or other highest legal offioer ofany state").
ZIlI SoIIlc couns,~, waive admission requmments for attorneys appearing on behalf
of the state in which the bankruptcy court sits. &e. e.g.• Bankr. N.D. m. LocaJ Rule 6OO(C)
(Miviq the trial bar admission requmments for, among others, "the state's attomey ofany county
in the Slate ofDlinois."); Bankr. S.D. Fla. LocaJ Rule 910(F') (waiving admission requirement for
anomey appearing on behalfof the Slate ofFlorida).
zm Bankr. D. Ariz. (admiucd to ptaetice in any federal court); Bankr. E.D. AJt. (member
ofbar in stale ol'resideDce and admiltod in any other federal court); Bankr. D. Conn. (same); Bania.
D. Monl (same); Bankr. W.D. Pa. (admiucd in U.S. Supreme Court or any district court); Bania.
Eel SD.N.Y. (admiltod in dislrict court in NJ., Conn. or VL and state bar of relevant district court);
Banler. S.D. Tcx. (admiltod in any district court); Bankr. D. Yl (admiltod in any distric:t court
within the Fint or Second Cimlits).
n Su. e.g., Bankr. D. Ariz. (subtnit application atlesting to baving read local diJciplinary
rules, au.eh certificate ofgood swuIing, IIId pay $50 fee); Bankr. D. Conn. (member ofbar must
sponsor visiting attorney's admission; must be a member in good standing IIId attofney nor any
memberof'attomey's finn can have been denied admission to bar or disciplined IIIIder 10caI rule 3;
and include $25 fee).
2m In Connec:tleut, for example, the sponsoring attorney may be excused from further
attendance in court upon panting of the mollon to admit a non-resident attorney. Despite being
excused from attending hearing$, the sponsoring attorney is not excused from any other obligallon
ofan appearingattomey. D. Conn. Rule 2(d).
- In fact, • study done by the Federalludicial Center found that ninety out ofninety-four
(96%) of the federal districts permit pt'O h« lllce appearances. The four districts that do DOt have
these provisions (D. Ariz.. ED. Mich.. WD. Pa.. cl E.D. Wis.) have adopted alternative admissions
procedures that make pro hac "ice provisions 1IIlMCCSSUY. &e Marie Cordisco, Eligibility
Requirements for, and R.estricllons on, Pracllce Before the Federal District Courts. Federalludicial
\Iict admission has its limitations, which vary depending on the local requirements.
These limitations run the gamut. Some courts requiIe foreign attorneys to associate
with local counsel to make the motion, while other courts require counsel to file
a written motion. Still other courts require counsel to file the motion with the
clerk of the district court, in addition some require payment of a fee, and others
requiIe the motion to be filed three days prior to the hearing for which admission
is requested.
A fair percentage of local bankruptcy rules waive the admission
requirements for attorneys appearing on behalf of the federal government and its
agencies.2l81 Very few local rules waive the admission requirements for attorneys
representing state governments, even for attorneys representing the state in which
the bankruptcy court sits.
The Commission has heard (both in testimony and by correspondence) that
creditor participation in bankruptcy cases is very low. Disenfranchisement of
creditors due to a bankruptcy ftling in an inconvenient forum was the single most
cited reason in favor of a Proposal to amend the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1408(1).2211 The cost to creditors of defending their claims in bankruptcy is also
part of the low creditor participation equation. While the Recommendation does
not eliminate the costs of participation, it does reduce some of the expense of
defending a claim in a nonlocal forum.
Bankruptcy proceedings also differ considerably from ordinary civil
litigation. •Appearance" by counsel in a bankruptcy proceeding (as opposed to a
district court proceeding) is often less formal and may be only for discrete hearings
on issues that may affect the interests of that counsel's client. Accordingly,
admission procedures and rules should confonn to these differences. For example,
Center (Nov. 7. 1995).
"" &e. ~.g.• BanIa. ND. Ala.. Loc:aI Rule 83.1 (waiving admission requirement for federal
govemment 1ttort1eyS); Bankr. SD. Ala..l.oca1 Rule 3 (waiving pro h« "ice requmment for federal
governrnentlttort1eyS but requiring written certification that attorney read local rules); Bankr. D. Ak.
(no pro hac "ice requirements for federal government anorneys); Bankr. M.D. Fla. Loca1 Rule
1.07(b) (same); Bankr. D. Idaho LocaJ Rule 105(a) (same); Bankr. W.D. Mo. LocaJ Rule 9.010
(same).
na The Commission received DumeroUS letters supporllng an amendment to the venue
provisions of28 U.S.C. f 1408(1) to eliminate place of incorpollltion as a permissible venue. Many
ofthese 1elters cited c:rcditor disenfllInchise and the cost ofdefending a claim in a distant forum
as the reason for low creditor participation. National Bankruptcy Review CQmmission Database.
Jurisdicllon and Procedure. Venue (1997).
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the Middle and Southern Districts of Florida distinguish between an attorney's
appearance for IdminisIrative bankruptcy matters and an appearance for contested
or adversary proceedings.zm
For lIWly creditors, both private and government creditors, bankruptcy is
a national practice. They may retain legal representation from parts of the country
other than the judicial district where a case under the Bankruptcy Code is pending.
H an attorney bas been admitted in any bankruptcy court pursuant to the rules of
admission for that court, which generally involves being admitted to practice in the
federal district court for that district, the admission should enable the attorney to
appear in any other bankruptcy court. This would obviate the need for special
admission or admission by pro h« vice motion. Under the Recommendation,
however, it would not, however, elIminate the need for local counsel where
required by local rule. The R.cc:ommendation also contemplates a Bankruptcy Code
provision requiring attorneys who appear under this provision to read the applicable
local rules and to submit to the disciplinary authority of the court where the case
is pending. .
National admission will also greatly assist attorneys who appear in
banlauptey cases on behalf of government entities, particularly state governments.
Governmental entities are often brought into the bankruptcy court on short notice
(often in injunctive matters) and, accordingly, government attorneys have very
little time to coordinate admission with other attorneys in the district where the
banlauptey case is pending. Government entities should be able to appear with the
least obstructions possible. National admission will streamline the appearance
process for governmental entities.
The Recommendation does not alter local counsel requirements. To the
extent that the local rules in a particular jurisdiction require the association of local
counsel to participate in a case, those requirements are not altered by the
Recommendation. The Recommendation eliminates special admission procedures
in an effort to reduce the costs of participating in a bankruptcy case. Increasing
creditor participation by reducing creditors' costs to participate in the bankruptcy
process is consistent with a number of the Commission's Proposals. In particular,
the proposal to eliminate place of incorporation as a permissible bankruptcy venue
2m &e Bankr. M.D. Fla. Loc:aI Rule 1.07(b) (providing that an attorney residing outside
the state ofFlorida IJId IIOl admitted to the district coun may IPpear without specia1 admission in
the following ciraDnslances: 1. Filing I DOliee ofappemnoe and I request for notices; 2. Prepantion
IJId filing of I proof of claim; 3. Attending IJId panicipating in the § 341 meeting; and 4.
M[A)ltendance IJId representation of I creditor II I hearing thaI has been noticed to all crediton
generally exc:cpt the representation of I pany in I conlested maner or advenary proceeding.W).
will reduce creditor disenfranchisement due to a bankruptcy filing in a distant
forum.22M
Competing Considerations. The concept ofnationwide admission is new and
might seem to impair the local autonomy of courts. It may also be seen, however
inappropriately, as a limitation of the supervisory control over attorneys by the
courts before whom attorneys practice. As demonstrated above, courts already
admit nonresident attorneys under a variety of requirements and still maintain
disciplinary control ofbanIauptey proceedings. Some local courts presently charge
a fee (often about $75) for special admission which may be used for federal bar
purposes, the fee could be lost if there was nationwide admission. The
Recommendation, however, will reduce the participation costs for creditors and
other parties in interest. The beneficial result may be an increase in creditor
participation.
n•• &. Commission R.ecommendation 3.1.4 to Amend Venue Provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1408.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE CONCERNING DISCLOSURES BY
AND COMPENSATION OF PROFESSIONALS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
-- Includim,: Suggested Attorney Declaration Form --
Proposed by the Ethics Subcommittee, Business Bankruptcy Committee
American Bar Association Section of Business Law
ulldformully adopted by The American Bar Association Section of Business Law
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.uppl...n~l attoenl1 d.cl~atioo Ihall be fil.d ¥lthln
15 day. dtu the oocun'''OI of Ally nut, 0&" the
dilcove~ of aftY faot, vMoh 1a lub'ect to 4ilal0'u.
paz-.aut to .ub••cUo". (a) aM (0) of tllJ.. Nil. IIIClh
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partil. li.tICI in lub'lctlon (I' and ••eh OUIZ' p~tl'l
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anINi INteRMAlIS! 'iU'
~o •• Appended to aeportl with a.comm.adatlona
SubmittinG Entity: Sectlon of BUlin••a Law
5. St.tu. Of L.gi.l.tlon. (If applicable.)
Not yet 18tro4uced.
1. '''mary OC "CPIWDIDd1tlQnl".
SutllDltt~ IY: Chait of the BUline.1 Bankruptcy Committ••
of the Section of Bu.ln••• Law 6. COlt to tb. AIIQci.t10D. (Both dirtet and indirect coste.'
Pos.ible Indirect COlt of monltorlnQ aD4 reportlnq br the
ABA Governmental ~ff.ir. Office.
~
.....:J
00
Amend aankrupt=r Cod' to allow 4ebtor's traditionll coun.,l
to continue to aerve debtor Ifter commeccemant ot
bankruptcy proceedina' by ,timlDltiDa ·dilintere.ted
ptrlon· pro.llo currently in Bankruptcy Codel 104 to
raco~nd Blnkruptcy lule chan,.. proYldint for enhlnced
disclo.url.
2. Apprg,ll bY Sybmittinl Entity.
ApprOVl4 b7 the Slction of I~ine•• LI. It it. full Cauncil
meetinV on Satur4ay, 31nulry It, Ittl.
i tiQOt IIIOC; Ior 'tl'TlDthl Bou••lyMi"SOD. tgPruiQua3. 'gaiUgp.
tloal 1mowIs.
4. hid fAr tc;tJOQ It n t • ""tip,.
·DS.Snt.r••te4D•••• h.. blla bel4 ~ G.rtlin ~lnkruptC7judG.' to dl'CUlllfy • dlbtor'l bl.toric coun••l. or •• I
blli, for r.fulinG to p.y f ..1 aftlr ••tvlcI •• oouc••l to
d.Ctor 1. blDkru,tcy proc.c4La,.. It il Delll.e4 that tht
proPO••l will btlnq Bankruptey ~4. provl.lonl 10 i1a. wlth
AlA MOd.1 lUI" ot 'CO(.I.lo~.lCOD4uot.
7. Ql.clolur. Of Int.r.lt. (If appllcablt.)
virtuilly all llvr". in gealral practice fir... iacludlnq
blakruptcy lawyer, in thoae firma, .upport the
leqlalation. A fa. laWYlrl In ·blakrupter boutiqu•••
oppaat, •• do • faw bankruptcy judg... ~ pro,o••l wa.
oyervbelaintly .pprovld by the lu.inel. IIDkruptcr
Co~lttlt (witH I 4111ent not.d br ODI blakru;tcy 'udq.)
aad by tht COuncil of the 'S'CtioD of .u.l.t.1 Law.
8. Battrrall. (Lilt tbe entitle. to whicb the "part hll b••n
r.flrrt4. Ind ;ivI thl 4Ata of the r.ftrral.)
rorvlrdt4 aD June I, 1"1, to TI.k 'orcI oa .Iakruptcy.
Tort aDd In.urIDC. 'tlctice Bec'loDI .Iakruptcy ~ittee.
Genttll 'tlctice S.ction; Creditor.' _igbt. LitlaltioD
committe•• Lltlq.tloD aoctloDI IDd Itla41n9 ca~tte. on
Etbic. an4 rrof•••lonal a"PO••lbllity.
t. cqot.ce ,.r.QP. ('rlor to ..ttl.,.)
••thla B. relaltel., Chair, .u.l••••••Dkruptcy Committe.,
AlA lactioa of lu,iae•• Law. CIO 'l,.~ • Mlr~r.r. 1200
.1••teeatb It••••••• Walbia,Col, D.C. 200S', tele,bont
(202)"1-3"7, Faa (202)223-201••
10. COptaat '.ra,l. (Mbo will ,rl"Dt ~ e'fOrt '0 cbe
Kou••• )
Z11Sott GOldltti.. Senlor IlCtioD .e,re.eatltl.e to ~
Hou•• of Deleratl,. cia Povell. Gol41tela, fra'lc • Murphy,
1100 Cltl•••• Soutbern Sink luildi••• S' Izo.4 Itt..t,
Atla.t•• GA 30S3" telephonl (404)572-"05, rl.
(404)512-"".
l.,"",~ l._~ L _<,$ L- l- 1"""., t"c,_ 1. ".~-. l.""","" l ..", l~ l&~ L_~" L_. 1,_ t__,._ L~" 1-,. l~.",
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Centerfor Professional Responsibility
Proposed Rule 1.6 - Public Discussion Draft
Ethics 2000 Commission
March 23, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been swell lNeY811.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMAnON
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation ofa client Q!J!
former client unless the client BeRsBRts after BeRSYltatieR, elleept fer diselesYfes that lIFe
gives informed consent. the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, Md elleept B5 stated iR or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b) Q!
required by paragraph (cl.
(b) A lawyer may reveal &Yell information relating to the representation ofa client or a
former client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(I) to prevent the elieRl (relft eeRlmifting a erimiRaI aet that the lawyer
Ilelie'/es is liltely te resl:llt ift imlftiReRl reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm;
ill to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is likely
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer's services;
(3) to rectify or mitigate substantial injury to the financial interests or
property ofanother resulting from the client's commission ofa crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules; or
~ ill to establish a claim or defense on behalfofthe lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
!£) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation ofa client or a former
client to the extent required by law or court order or when necessary to comply with these
Rules.
Comment
e la'" ORe eftRed ,,~th ypReldiRg.tR f~~e la'.... iR tRe. .., ·steRl ellllFge .'d R~' "ielalle efa JydUlia s~ R t tRey a' el IIIIII The la.....,'er is p~: advise elieRts s ~arrJ 'Ii tieRS IS ..la".,'er s AlR~ f their AghtS.preper elEefelSe e
{;ij The ellseR'lIRee eftRe ethieal ellligatieR efa 'a~'er te lIeld iRvielate eeRlideRtial
iRfeFRlatieR ef the elieRt Ret eAly faeilitates the filII de"elepRleRt ef fasts esseRtiel te preper
represeRtatieR eftRe elieRt hyt BIBB eRSeYFIIges peep'e te seel. ellFly legalassistMse.
~ AIRIest witReyt elieeptieR, elieRts seRle te la".,'ers ift erder te deteFRlifte "'flet tReir
FigRts are IIRd "'flat is, ift tRe Rllli!e efla";s IIRd regYlatiefts, deeRled te he legalllRd eeHeet.
The se_eR law resegRi;les lIlat tile slieRt's confidences must be protected from disclosure.
Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and
the law IS upheld.
ill This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the
representation ofa client both during and after the lawyer's representation of the client. See
Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c) with respect to the use ofsuch information to the disadvantage of
clients and former clients.
f4} ill A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that. in the absence of the
client's informed consent, the lawyer RlaiRtaiR BeRfideRtielity efmust not reveal
information relating to the representation. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark
of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance
and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter, The lawyer needs this information to represent the client
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost
without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in
the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon
experience. lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given. and the law is
upheld.
~ ill The principle ofclient-lawyer confidentiality is given effect Ht-tw& !2.Y related bodies
of law, the attorney-client privilege. Ewhiefl iftelydes the work product doctrine) iR tRe law
efe"ideRee. and the rule ofconfidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be
called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule
ofclient-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is
sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law, The confidentiality rule. for example.
applies not fReI'eIy QIl)y to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all
information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules ofProfessional Conduct or
other law. See also Scope.
f'} The rellyireRleRt efRlaiRtaiRiRg eeRlideRtiality efiRfeFRlatisR ,elatiAg te represeRtBtisR
Bpplies te ge','eRlfJleftt la'o''Yers wlls Rlay disagree ....'itll tile pelisy geals tRat tlIeir
rep,eseRtatieR is desigRed te ad"'lIRee.
ill Paragraph fa) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the
representation ofa client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a layO'er that do
not in themselves reVeal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of
such information by a third person. A layO'er's use of hypotheticals to discuss issues relating
to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the
listener will be able to ascertain the identity ofthe client or the situation involved.
Authorized Disclosure
p} illA Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that
authority. a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when
appropriate in carrying out the representation, eKeept ts the elEteRt that tRe elieftt's
iRstFlietieRs er s,eeial eireYlMstilAees IiRlit tllat IIYtlleFi~'. In IHigatieR some situations, for
example, a lawyer may diselese iftfeFRlatieR hy admittiRg be impliedly authorized to admit
a fact that cannot properly be disputed or, iR Regstiatisft hy RlalliRg to make a disclosure
that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. f&} Lawyers in a firm may, in the course
of the fIrm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm,
unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specifIed lawyers.
Disc:1osure Adverse to Client
f9} I§] The Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring
lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of infonnation relating to the representation of their
clients. the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. IR heseRliRg pFiJ,." te
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iRfeFIRalieR allelila BlieR!;a la....yer RIllY feresee Ihat \he BlieRI iRleRds seriells hllRR Ie
&ReIher perseR. Jlewever; la the elKeRIa la'l,.er is relillired er peFIRilted Ie disBlese a
slieRI's pllFJleses, \hs slieR! ".~II11e iRo'tilliled ReRl re"ealiRg msls ....lHsh 'Yelild eRallle the
la""'er Ie sallRselagaiRsla 'l'FeRgflll sellFSe efllslieR. The plllliis isllelter pratesled if filII
&Rd epeR seRlRllIRisatieR lly Ihe slieRt is eReewaged thBR if il is iMillited. Paragraph (b)(1)
recognizes the overriding value Qflife and physical integrity and pennits disclQsure
reasQnably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily hann.
Substantial bodily hann includes life-threatening Qr debilitating iniuries and illnesses and
the cQnsequences ofchild sexual abuse. Such hann is reasQnably certain tQ occur if it will
be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer
such hann at a later date if the lawyer fails to take actiQn necessary to eliminate the threat.
Thus, a lawyer whQ knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a
town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and
substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a Iife-threaterung or
debilitating disease and the lawyer'S disclQsure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce
the number ofvictims.
~ Se'Jeral sitvatieRs RI_lle distiRl!lIished.
d I that is sriRliRal er
. ReI sellRsel er IISsillt a elieR! iR ,s:i:reilile :U(a)(4) .Rel te lisefJ-4 Firsl, Ihe lallJyerI~(d) SiRlilarly, a la'",",er ~IIS lI~s~"ef \he d~' preserilled IR R-vlefralldlll~RI. liee:l:d~' is' esseRliallr ~ SJltelalrr::leRI seRdliet.~~~:;~d::id IISsisliRg a slieR! iR 8FIR1IRa er
d st ll}' Ihe elieR!
' , iR'leh'ed iR plISI ~e.ieialed Rille I.;l(d),~lieseRd,lhellal':d:a~~~~: :=~h ~1::~~=~~:el:dZe~rr:::::5 lUtewiRg that the
. iRa 9F ." "MiRa eIhat "'85 erlRl I er IISSISt SR
I "seliRselleeallss!e f1hat sharaeler.seRdliBIIS e
~ Third, the la".,'er RI~' le8fft thaI a elieRI iR!e!,ds pr~speelive ~eRdliet ~al is eriRliR:1
BRd Iiliel}' Ie reslilt iR iRlRliReRt death er slillstBRllal1le~t1y h~.• '.5 staled IR par:'.grBJ! h
~)(I) the 1B't',,'er has prefessieRal diserelieR Ie re'"eaIIRfeFIRalteR IR erde~ ~e preyeR! slieeeR5e~lIeRees. The lawyer RIllY RlalEe a disele~lIre i,! e~er Ie pre\'eRt ~eRllel~e ~r s~Relis
1ledil~' iRjwy whieh the lao",'er rellSeR81lly llehe'"es IS IRleRded ~y a sheRI: It 15 ve':}
diA4slllt fer a lao;;yer te "liRew" wheR.sllsh a heiRelis pllFJlese wtllaetvally lie earRed elll,
fer the alieRt RI~' hao;e a ehaRge ef RlIRd.
~ The la"'yer's exercise ofdiscretion requires consideration ofsuch factors as the nature
Qfthe lawyer's relatiQnship with the client and with those who might be injured by the
client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the
cQnduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client tQ take
suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse tQ the client's interest should be nQ greater
than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose, A lawyer's decision not tQ
take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(I) does not violate this Rule,
Wlthd..""••
, . d 11 . \he elieRI iR materially fvr\heriRg a eellFSe ef~ If\he lao,,.er's seFYlaes '\'111 lie 1I~~~t A ,.,j\hdraw lIIIlItIIted iR Rille I.Hi(a)(I).IRMiRS. Sf ffaydYleRt eSRdlle., the lav,..r lB.. ,
, I ef\he slieRI's
' €raiR ReRl malEiRg IIlse esvre 8~) Rer
A Aer ":j\hdra"'8llhe la''''fer i~:~'~:;detRIR:e 1.6. )lei\her \his r:'t~~::':-II:l ~~!:,'I....-::......:"::,,:;:t.:o_~.. to..': :.1.-:...,....;... Ii•••Rille 1:1 6(~) fre:~!'tk'dFII'V er disaA4FIR ~. eplRleR, eellm Ila....,.er RI~ II se •
{++J ill Paragraph (bl(2l is a limited exception to the rule ofconfidentiality that enables the
lawyer to reveal infQrmation to the extent necessary tQ prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud that is likely to result in substantial injury tQ the financial or prQperty
interests ofanother and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services. Such a seriQus abuse of the client-lawyer relatiQnship by the client forfeits the
protection of this Rule. The client can, QfCQurse, prevent such disclosure by refraining from
the wrQngful conduct. AlthQugh paragraph (b)(2) does nQt require the lawyer to reveal the
client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counselor assist the client in cQnduct the lawyer
knows is criminal Qr fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect tQ the
lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representatiQn ofthe client in such
circumstances. Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in dQubt whcther
contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to
guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the
organization as indicated in Rule 1.l3(b).
W Paragraph <b)(3l addresseS the situatiQn in which the lawyer does not learn of the client
's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated and substantial IQSS has been suffered
by the victim. Although the client nQ IQnger has the option ofpreventing disclQsure by
refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations In which the IQSS suffered by
the affected person can be rectified Qr mitigated. In such situations. the lawyer may disclose
informatiQn relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected
persons to attempt tQ recoup their losses,
[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing
confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these
Rules. In most situations, disclosing informatiQn to secure such advice will be impliedly
authQrized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not
impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because Qfthe importance of
a lawyer's compliance with the Rules ofProfessional Conduct.
Displlte CSRe'FRill!: ....."",.ep 's CeRdlist
{-I-3J ll.Q} Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a
client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the
lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasQnably believes necessary to establish a
defense, The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of
a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, or professional disciplinary
proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly cQmmitted by the lawyer against the
client or on a wrong alleged by a third person: for example, a person claiming to have been
defrauded by tbe lawyer and client acting together, The lawyer's right to respond arises
when an assertion Qfsuch complicity has been made. Paragraph (b~ does not require
the lawyer to await the commencement ofan action or proceeding that charges such
complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party
who has made such an assertion, The right to defend, ofcourse, applies where a proceeding
has been commenced. v,!JIere praatisallie Mil ReI prejllilieialle the la".,'er's allili,,· te
eslalliish the defeRse, \he I......,.er &hellill advise the elieR! ef\he third p~'s IISsertieR BRd
::=~:~=r:::~=:::1~:::,:~~:~:=er
&hew" tJ. JR., ill a JR8RM1' "AUah liMits eee'S9 te ., iRfefMMiSR {9 she 1filniAsl ef ether
,eFSeRs batJiB! a Reed 18 IYlel'/ it, BRd 8p,FspFiate'fsteeti·'e SfElIF& SF ether 8:ff8AgeRleRts
sh8llid lie Relight lly thelao'.,.er t8 \he flllle!lt eNteR! praetieallie.
f.J.Q) lillif the lao","er is skerged ,.vi\h nJFeRgdeiRg iR whieh the slieRt's seRdlist is
impliealed, Ihe Nle ef eeRltdeRtiality &heliid ReI preveR! \he la'''''er Rem defeRlliRg agaiRsI
the eharge. Slieh II sharge SM arise iR II eivil; srimiMI er prefessieRal dissipliRBFY
preeeediRg, Md eaA lie lIlISed eR alJJFeRg allegedly eeRlRlitted lly the lao....,·er agaiRst the
elieR!; er eR a"'FeRg alleged lly a tlHrd perseR; fer el_ple, a persell slaimiRg te haoJe lleeR
defralideillly \he la",.er Md elieR!aetiRg tege\her. A lawyer entitled tQ a fee is permitted by
paragraph(b~ to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect Qf
the Rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary ofa fiduciary relationship may net
e'f&loit it t~ the detrime~t of the fiduci~. Z::~ :r::.:=:r.;::::a1Ee e"ery
e rt pFllallsallle Ie a'leld IIRReeessary illS _ f 4l I 18 I
represeRtalieR, Ie liRlit disalesllre te these hao.iRg \he Reed te liAey· iI, Md te elltaiR
preteeti'"e elders er malEe ether III'FMgemeRlS minimi;eiRg \he rislE ee dissleswe.
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I!.1l Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the
disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the Purposes specified. Where practicable. the
lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a
disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection
with a judicial proceeding. the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to
the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate
protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent
practicable.
lUl Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a
client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(I) - (5). In
exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the
nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by
the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction, and factors that may extenuate
the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b)
does not violate this Rule.
Disclosure Otherwise Required or Authorized
~ The Mteffte~' slieRt ,,,:Hlege is lIiJfereRII~' lIeHRell iR \'Briells jllrisllislieRs. Ifa la',",,'er
is sallell as a \\~tRess te give lesliFReR~' seRsefftiRg a slieRl, aeseRI ....aiver lly lfll! slieRt,
paragflll!lh (a) reljllireSlfle lal';yer Ie iR\'elte lfll! pri';i1ege wheR il is aJlJllisaele. The law~'er
FRlISt lIeFRpl~' with the HRalerllers IIfa seM er elher trilnlRalefseFRpeteRtjllrisllistieR
rl!ljlliriRg lfle la,.,",,'er Ie gi\'e iRfeFFRatieR allellt the slieRt.
p.ij ll£ The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a
lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules~ 2,3,3.3, and
4. I . In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other
provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law
supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules, but a
presumption should exist against such a supersession.
I.12l A lawyer must also comply with lawful orders ofa tribunal. an administrative or
executive agency. or a legislative body. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony
concerning a client or is otherwise ordered to reveal information relating to the client's
representation, the lawyer must, absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise,
assert on behalfof the client all non-frivolous claims that the information sought is
protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the
event ofan adverse ruling, the lawyer should consult with the client about the possibility of
appeal. See Rule 1.4. Unless an appeal is taken. the lawyer must comply with the order.
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality
00 A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation
ofa client against inadvertent or unauthQrized disclQsure by the lawyer or by Qther persQns
who are participating in the representation Qfthe client Qr whQ are subject tQ the lawyer's
supervision. See Rules 1.1,5.1, and 5.3.
[17] When transmitting a cOmmunication that includes infQrmation relating tQ the
representatiQn Qfa client. the lawyer must take reasonable precautiQns tQ prevent the
information frQm cQming into the hands Qfunintended recipients. This duty. hQwever. dQes
not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method ofcQmmunication
affords a reasQnable expectatiQn of privacy. Special cjrcumstances. however. may warrant
special precautions. FactQrs tQ be considered in detennining the reasonableness Qfthe
~'s expectation Qf confidentiality include the sensitivity Qf the informatiQn and the
extent tQ which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality
agreement. A client may require the lawyer tQ implement special security measures nQt
required by this Rule Qr may give infQrmed CQnsent to the use of a means Qf cQmmunicatiQn
that WQuid Qtherwise be prohibited by this Rule.
Former Clients
~~ The duty ofconfidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has
terminated. Thus. Rule 1.6(a) prohibits the disclosure of information relating to the
representation ofa former client. See Rule I.9(c) for the prohibition against using such
information to the disadvantage of the former client.
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Center for Professional Responsibility
!!:2P0sed Rule 1.7 - Public Discussion Draft
Etbics 2000 Commission
Marcb 23,1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been .:'vell Ikrevgh.
CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE
W '" lal'''Yer shall Aet reflF8SeAt a elieAt if the reflreseAtatieA ef that elieAt will he direetly
adverse ta lAether elieAt, vnIess!
~ the la"'3'er reaseAahly helie'Jes the reflreseAtatieA ·"Jill Aet ad"ersely alreet the
relatieAshifl 'lAth the ether elieRt; lAd
~ eaah elieAt eeASeAts after aaAsvltatieA.
~ '" lal';'Yer shall Aet reflreseRt a elieAt if the reflreseRtatieA efthat elieAt FRay he FRateriall)'
limited h)' the la"'Yer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(I) the la¥J)'er reaseAahl)' helie\'es the reflreseAtatieA '\ill Rat he adveFllely alreBted; and
{:!) the elieRt eeRseAts after eaRsvl!atieR. ~~eR reflreseRtati~A efFRvlt,le ~ie~ts iR a siRgle
FRatter is vRdeFlalieR, the BaRsvltaheR shalllRBlvde elifllBRatleR efthe IFRflhBaheRs eftRe
eeFAMaA rl!jlreseRtatieA lAd the advantages Md riSllS iR'Jelved.
W Except as provided in paragraph Cbl. a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists if
(J) the representation ofone client will be directly adverse to another client: or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation ofone or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's duties to another client or to a former client or
by the lawyer's own interests or duties to a third person.
au Notwithstanding the existence ofa conflict of interest under paragraph (al. a lawyer may
represent a client ifeach affected client gives informed consent in writing and
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client:
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law: and
ill the representation does not involve the assertion ofa claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation.
Comment
Loyalty te I Client and Independent Judgment
[I] Loyalty is-eA and independent judgment are essential eIeMeAt elements in the lawyer's
relationship to a client. Conc!!lrellt conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's own
interests or from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third
person. Resolution ofa conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to:
I) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3)
decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence ofa conflict, i.e.,
whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent in writing. For specific rules regarding
certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8, For former client conflicts of interest,
see Rule 1.9.
ill Aft iFRfleFFAissihle A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in
which event the representation &ItevI4 must be declined. unless the lawyer obtains the
informed written consent ofeach client under the conditions ofparagraph (bl. +He To
determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer &ItevI4 must adopt reasonable
procedures, appropriate for the size and type of ftrm and practice, to determine in both
litigation and non-litigation matters the JIlIfIies~ and issues involved and to determine
whether there are aBMI er flBteAtial conflicts of interest. As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or, having once been established. is continuing. see Comment to Rule 1.3
and Scope.
Pl ill If&VeIl a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer &ItevI4
must withdraw from the representation. unless the lawyer obtains the informed written
consent ofeach client under the conditions of paragraph Cbl. See Rule 1.16, Where more
than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws heeavse a eeMiiBt arises after
reflreseAtatieA, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is
determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and
by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients. given the
lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See alse Rvle :!.:!{e). As te whetRer a
elieAt h""J)'er relatieAshifl eKists er, RB"iAg eAee heeR estahlisRed, is eeRtiRviRg, see
CeFAFAeRt te Rvle 1.1 and (;eefle,
Identifying Conflicts oflnterest: Direct Adversity and Material Limitation
P}Ml As a geAeNI flrafl9sitieA, leyalt)' Loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent. ParagFBflR {a)
eliflresses that geAeNI rvle. Thus, absent consent. a lawyer erdiRarily may not act as an
advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if
it-is when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client being sued is likely to feel betrayed,
and the resulting damage to the lawyer-client relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's
ability to represent the client effectively, In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse
representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's
case less effectively out ofdeference to the other client, i,e.. that the representation may be
materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly. a lawyer
acts directly adversely to a client int wjll be necessary for the lawyer to cross-examine a
client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit against another client. On the other hand,
simultaneous representation in unrelated matters ofclients whose interests are only
~eReNlly economically adverse, such as representation ofcompeting economic enterprises
m unrelated litigation, does not constitute a conflict of interest and thus does not require
consent ofthe ~ctive clients. ParagNflh {a) lIflfllies eRly "4teR the reflreseAtatieR ef eRe
slieAt 'Nevld ee dlreetly adverse te the ether.
(4J ill beyalt)' te a elieAt is a1se iFRflaired ...;4teR Even where there is no direct adversity. a
conflict ofintcrest exists if there is a significant risk that a la....yer ellMet mer's ability to
consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client eeeause will
be materially limited as a result ofthe lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.
ParagFBJ!h (\l) addresses sueh eitvatieAs. A pessihle eeRAist The mere possibility of
subsequent hann does not itselfflreelvde the reflreseAtatieR require disclosure and consent.
The critical questions are the likelihood that a eeAAiet difference in interests will eventuate
and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses ofaction th:lt
reasonably should be pursued on behalfof the client. CeRsideratieR sRevld he gi"eR t9
"'Rether the elieRt 'lJisRes te aeee_edate the ether iRterest iR"elved.
CeAsvltatien lad Censen. Prohibited Representations
l_,_~ 1. _ L~",~ L- L_~_ L"._. 1_, L.,--., l __" t.,~ l.~_ L_~, L. l-... L-,. L~"d' L._ (~.-. l.",~,...
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~ ill~ Ordinarily. clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict.
However, as indicated in pllfllgFapll (a)(I) witll Fespest ta FepFeseRtatieR diFeatly ad\'eFSe ta
8 slieRt,8Rd paragraph (b)(I) v~tll Fespest ta mateRallimitatiaRs eR FepFeSeRtatieR efa
eIieRt; wileR a disiRteFested law,'eF wauld saRslllde tIIat tlla slieRt sllallld Ret agFea te tile
FepFeseRt8tiaR \tRdeF tile aiFslllBslBRses, some conflicts are non.consentable. meaning that
the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on
the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client is
ifweIw4, the question ofeeMIiel consentability must be resolved as to each client.
"(eFea,'eF, theFe may lle SiFSllFRst8Rses wlleFe it is impassillle la malie tIIa disslaslIfe
Resessary la elltaiR saRseRI. feF eliBIHple, wileR tile lev..,'eF F9pFeseRts diWeF9Rt elieRts iR
Felated matteFS Md eRe aftlle elieRls Fefuses la eaRseRt Ie tile diselasllF9 Reeessary la peFFRit
the etlleF slieRI la malle M infeFFRed desisiaR, tHe lav..,'eF e&FAlel pFapeFI)' lISl. tHe latteF la
eeRSeRt.
ill Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests ofthe clients
will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to
representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus. under paragraph Cb)O ).
representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude
that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule I, I
(competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence), The concern is that a client who is asked to consent
in such a matter. particularly one who is unsophisticated in retaining lawyers. may not be
adequately informed or may not adequately appreciate the risks ofthe conflict. In
determining whether a multiple client conflict is non.consentable, one factor to be
considered is whether the representation will be provided by a single lawyer or by different
lawyers in the same firm. Cf. Rule 1.10. .
ill Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are non-consentable because the representation
is prohibited by applicable law. for example. in some states substantive law provides that
the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case. even with the
consent of the clients. and under federal criminal statutes. certain representations by a
former government lawyer are prohibited. despite the informed consent of the former client.
In addition. decisional law in some states limits the ability ofa governmental client. such as
a municipality. to consent to a conflict of interest.
I2.l Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are non.consentable because of the institutional
interest in vigorous development ofeach client's position when the clients are aligned
directly against each other in the same litigation. Whether clients are aligned directly
against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context
of the litigation.
InCormed Consent
(10) Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware ofthe relevant
circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could
have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule lo4(c) (jnfonned consentl. The
information required depends on the nature ofthe conflict and the nature of the risks
involved. When representation ofmultiple clients in a single matter is undertaken. the
information must include the implications of the COmmon representation. including possible
effects on loyalty and confidentiality, and the advantages and risks involved. See Cornments
[291 and [301 (effect onoint representation on confidentiality), Under some circumstances it
may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. for example. when
the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one ofthe clients refuses to
consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision.
the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
llJJ Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client in
writing. If it is not feasible to obtain the writing at the time the client gives informed
consent. then the lawyer must obtain it within a reasonable time thereafter. The requirement
of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawver to talk with the client.
to explain the risks and advantages. if any. of representation burdened with a conflict of
interest. as well as reasonably available alternatives. and to afford the client an opportunity
to rajse questions and concerns. Rather. the writing is required in order to impress upon
clients the seriousness ofthe decision the client is being asked to make and to resolve
disputes or ambiguities that might later occur by virtue of there being no writing. The
writing need not take any particular form: it should. however. include disclosure of the
relevant circumstances and reasonably foreseeable risks of the conflict of interest. as well as
the client's agreement to the representation despite such risks.
(12) Like any other client. a client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the
consent and terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to
the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other
clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature ofthe conflict, whether the client
revoked consent because ofa material change in circumstances, and whether material
detriment to the other clients or lawyer would result.
(13) Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in
the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b), If the consent is general and open-ended
(i.e~, the client agrees to consent to any future conflict that might arise), then the consent
ordinarily will be ineffective because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have
understood the material risks involved. On the other hand. if the client is a sophisticated
user of the legal services involved and agrees to consent to a particular type ofconflict with
which the client is already familiar. then the consent should be effective with regard to that
type ofconflict. for example. a bank that hires a lawyer to defend it in litigation might be
willing to agree in advance to have the lawyer represent borrowers in loan transactions but
not in resisting collection proceedings brought by the bank. The propriety of the client's
consent must be determined not only at the time it is first given but also at the time when
the waiver is sought to be implemented to determine if the circumstances at the time of the
conflict are what were earlier expected.
Lawyer's Own Interests and Duties to Third Persons
ll£ In addition to conflicts with other current clients. a lawyer's duties ofloyalty and
independence may be materially limited by duties owed to former clients under Rule 1,9, by
the lawyer's own interests, or by the lawyer's duties to other persons, such as fiduciary
duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor, or corporate director.
f'} Ilil The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representation ofa client. for example, &-Iawyef's need for income should not lead the
lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See
Rules 1.1 and 1.5. Ififthe probity ofa lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. A
Similarly. a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for
example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed
financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific rules pertaining to a number of personal interest
conflicts. including business transactions with clients.
1W Although most personal interest conflicts are consentable. some are not. For example.
jfthe lawyer has a 50% ownership in a company the client wants to sue and the client's
recovery is likely to affect significantly the value of the lawyer's investment, then the
lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the representation will be competent and diligent;
therefore, under paragraph (b) the lawyer may not request the client to consent to the
conflict.
[17] Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with clients unless the
sexual relationship predates the formation of the lawyer.client relationship. See Rule 1.8(k).
Interest oC Person Paying Cor a Lawyer's Service
twl~ A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if
~
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.j::.
the client is infonned ofthat fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise
the lawyer's duty ofloyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). HI'
eli_pIe, wileR IlR iRswer ull ils iR_ell lIa"e eeRAiedRg iRleNsls iR a lRalter BriSiRg flelR
a lillllifily insllfllRee agreelReRI. Mil the iRslifer is "'IliiNIi Ie preville &peeial eellRsel fer tile
iRslifeEl, tile III'f8RgeIReRI sllelilEi 8!lSlIfe tile speeial eeMsel's professional independence. So
also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in
which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal
representation ofthe directors or employees, if the clients give their consent after
consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. If
acceptance ofthe payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in
accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's duties to a payer who
is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements ofparagraph (b), as
well as the requirements ofRule 1.8(f), before accepting the representation, including
detennining that the conflict is consentable and that the client has adequate infonnation
about the material risks ofthe representation.
Qrganlzational Clients
ll2l A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not. by virtue of that
representation. necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization. such as a
parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a), Thus. the lawyer for an organization is not barred
from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter. unless the
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a cliem ofthe lawyer. or
there is an understanding between the laWYer and the organizational client that the lawyer
will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates. or the lawyer's obligations to
either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's
representation ofthe other client.
UQl Unforeseeable developments. such as changes in corporate and other organizational
affiliations. may create direct adversity conflicts in the midst ora representation. as when a
company sued by the lawyer on behalfofone client is bought bv another client represented
by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. In these circumstances the laWYer may withdraw from
one ofthe representations in order to avoid the djrect adversity conflict. Ordinarily. the
lawyer should withdraw from the representation ofthe client who will be least hanned by
the lawyer's withdrawal. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take
steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect
the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule
1&
fI4J au A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board
ofdirectors should determine whether the responsibilities ofthe two roles may conflict. The
lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions ofthe
directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may
arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect ofthe lawyer's resignation from the
board, and the possibility ofthe corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in
such situations. If there IS material risk that the dual role will comprornise the lawyer's
independence ofprofessional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should
cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts ofinterest arise.
GeRAie. GhaFlell .". 8R O"e51RI '8"'"
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reMeR Ie ~F thalllle la·,,'e! 11M Regleelell tile res,eRsillili~. IR a eFilRiRal eMe, iR'IlIiry
ll~' lhe eeMls geReFBlly Felllll.eEl"'"eR a lawye. FepFeSeRls 1RIIIliple lIefeREluls. "liteM tile
eeRAiel is Slleh M elearly Ie eall iR 'IliestieRlhe faiF eF eAieieRlalllRiRiSlralieR efjllstieeepll~siRg eeIiRSellRa~: pFepe.I~' F~ise tile 'IlieSlieR: Sliell 811 elljeelieR shelilEille ,'ie...eEl,.:AtIl
e&IIlleR,lIe\"8\'er, feF II eM lie fRlSll!leEi M a leeh.:11'1l1e ef h_slReRI. See Seepe.
Conflicts In Litigation
PIU1l Paragraph W!1UQl prohibits representation ofopposing parties in the same
litigation. regardless of the clients' consent. SilRlIllUeelis On the other hand. simultaneous
representation ofparties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or
codefendants, is geveFReEilly IlllFagFBph flI) not uncommon. "':II ilRpefIRissillle Aconflict
may exist by reason ofsubstantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in
positions in relation to an opposing party, or the fact that there are substantially different
possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in
criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent
more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation ofpersons having
similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the Fisli efaEl','IFse eAeel is lRiRilRal MEl the
requirements of paragraph (b) are met. CelRllare R.IIle ~.~ iR"elviRIl: iRtefIReElialieR lIelweeR
eIieRts.
f8i QFEliRBFily. a IIl'»yer IRa)' Ret asl 8!1 aEl'leeale agaiRst a elieRl lAe la",'er repFeSeRlS iR
selRe etller lRaller, eveR if the etller lRaller is '''''''elly lIRFelaleEi. Wewever, tile" are
eirSlIlRSlllRees iR " "'ish a lawyer lRay ael8!l aEl'leeall agaiRsta elieRl: FeF e!l_ple, ala""e.
Fep.eseRliRg u eRleFpFise 'Nilh Eli'lerse epeFBlieRs IR~' aeeepl elRllle~'lReRI M u aEiveeale
agaiRsl tile eRllFpFise iR 8R lIftFelaleEllRaller if EleiRg se '.vill ReI allveF&el~' affilel the la....'Yer's
relationship with the emerprise or conduct of the suit and ifboth clients consent upon
consultation. By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent
government employees in proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing party.
The propriety ofconcurrent representation can depend on the nature ofthe litigation. For
example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a
declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
I lIeslisRlhal h8!l
.. esilieRs eR alega'.~sel~' aAeele~.h "iRg BIIlageRlsbe 'reRl "'elilEille ~EI,. EliAeFeRllFlal
....... . ,....... II19J A'...,." .."'; ::=~~,:;; .....=::,:;;......~::.:::: ',_BriseR .iR. 1I1~!'4':nly ReI ilR,.el18d~e se iR eMes peRIIIRgTIlliS, IllS ~F 1ft • "I ifRllFepeF Ie
sellFls, llllllllRa~
eeIIFl.
In] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at
different times on behalfofdifferent clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position
on behalfofone client might create precedent adverse to the interests ofa client represented
bv the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of
interest exists, however. if there is a significam risk that a lawyer's action in behalfof one
client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a
different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent
likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalfof the other client. Factors relevant
in determining whether the clients need to be advised ofthe risk include: where the cases
are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship
between the matters, the significance ofthe issue to the immediate and long-tenn interests
ofthe clients involved, and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If
there is significant risk ofmateriallirnitation, then absent infonned consent of the affected
clients, the lawyer must refuse one ofthe representations or withdraw from one or both
matters.
~When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class ofplaintiffs or defendants in a
class action lawsuit. unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be
clients ofthe lawyer for purposes ofapplYing paragraph (a)( I) of this Rule. Thus. the
lawyer does not typically need to get the consent ofsuch a person before representing a
client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly. a lawyer seeking to represent an
opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent ofan UMamed member of the
class who the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.
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fI.B Illl Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to
assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is sjgnificant potential for e4YeHe
~material limitation include the duration and intimacy ofthe lawyer's relationship with
the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood
that 88tll81 8eRAiet disagreements will arise, and the likely prejudice to the client from the
conflict if it dees eAse. The question is often one ofproximity and degree.
f)-;} U§l~ For example. conflict questions may aIse arise in estate planning and
estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family
members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of
interest may lIfise be present. as when one spouse owns significantly more property than the
other or has children by a prior marriage. In estate administration the identity of the client
may be unclear under the law ofa particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. +ile
In order to comply with conflict of interests rules. the lawyer should make clear the~'s
relationship to the parties involved.
~ I21l Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a
lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are
fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where
the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest
among them. Thus. a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients
on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis: for example. jn helping to organize a
business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs. working out the financial
reorganization ofan enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest. or arranging a
property distribution in settlement ofan estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve POtentially
adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might
have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost,
complication, or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may
prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.
Special Considerations in Joint Representation
[28] In considering whether to represent clients jointly in the same matter, a lawyer should
be mindful that if the joint representation fails because the potentially adverse interests
cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost. embarrassment. and recrimination.
Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the
joint representation fails. In some situations the risk of failure is so great that joint
representation is plainly impossible. For example. a lawyer cannot undertake common
representation ofclients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are
imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the laWYer js required to be impartial
between COmmonly represented clients. joint representation js improper when it is unlikely
that impartiality can be maintained. Generally. jfthe relatjonship between the parties has
already assumed antagonism. the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by
joint representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer
subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation
involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.
[29] A particularly important factor jn determining the appropriateness of joint
representation is the effect on lawyer-client confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege.
With regard to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. the prevailing rule is that. as
between commonly represented clients. the privilege does not attach. Hence it must be
assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients. the privilege will not protect any
such communications. and the clients should be so advised.
UQl As to the duty of confidentiality, joint representation will almost certainly be
inadequate ifone client attempts to keep something in confidence between the lawyer and
that client. which is not to be disclosed to the other client. This is so because the lawyer has
an equal duty of loyalty to each client. and each client has the right to be informed of
anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and to expect
that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer
should, at the outset ofthe joint representation and as part ofthe process ofobtaining each
client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the
lawyer will have to withdraw ifone client decides that some matter material to the
representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be
appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed,
after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential.
For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade
secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture
between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed
consent of both clients.
[31] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients. the lawyer should
make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other
circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for
decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of
the representation made necessary as a result ofthe joint representation should be fully
explained to the clients at the outset ofthe representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[32] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the joint representation has the right to
loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations
to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule
.l.JQ.
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March 23,1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been stRisk 1lu=11I~.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests
are materially adverse to the interests ofthe former client unless the former client eeR54!RY
aAw 8111SIIhati8R gives informed consent to the representation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously
represented a client
(I) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and I.9(c) that
is material to the matter;
unless the former client SIRseRts aAef elRsllhetilR gives informed consent to the
representation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former
firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter~ use information
relating to the representation to the disadvantage ofthe former client except as Rule 1.6 or
Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has
become generallykno~
~ f8\'eal illfeffRatilll felatiR(l ta the fellfeseRtetilR elleept as Rille I.' If Rille LJ "Jlllld
peffRit If fel1l1ife wjtll. respeet ta a elieRt.
Comment
[I] After termination ofa client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer may not represent another
client except in conformity with this Rule. except that in the case ofa government or former
government lawver. Rule 1.11. not this Rule. applies. +Ae pAReiple5 iR RIlle 1.7 deteffRiRe
whetll.ef &I1e iRtef85ts af&l1e Ilfe5eRtllRd reffR" elieRtllAl adveRle. +AilS Under this Rule, a
lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalfofa new client a contract drafted on
behalfofthe former client. SI al51 ala'll"" ••Yha has pfl5eelilad lIR aeell5ed peRlaR elilld
Rat pflllerl" fepfe5eRt tIl.e aeell6ed iR a 611"5el1l1eRt eivil aetilR agaiRst tIl.e glvefRflleRt
elRlleFRiRg tIl.e 68111e &1IR6MMiIR. Nor could a lawver wbo had represented clients jointly in
a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related
matter after a dispute arose among the clients.
[2] The scope ofa "matter" for purposes ofthis Rule may depend on the facts ofa particular
situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of
degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent
representation ofother clients with materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the
other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type ofproblem for a former client is not
precluded from later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type
even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client.
Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense
and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is
whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be
justly regarded as a changing ofsides in the matter in question.
ill Interests are "materially adverse" for purposes of this Rule ifactions to the advantage of
the present client will diminish the interests of the former client.
ill Matters are "substantially related" for purooses ofthis Rule if the subsequent
representation involves the same work the lawyer performed for the former client or if there
is a substantial risk that confidential information obtained in the prior matter would
materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example. a lawyer who
has represented a business person and learned extensive private financial information about
that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly. a
lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a
shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose
rezoning ofthe property but would not be precluded. on the grounds ofsubstantial
relationship. from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction
for non-payment of rent. A former client may not be required to reveal the confidential
information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has
confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession
ofsuch infonnation may be based on the general nature ofthe services the lawyer provided
the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer
providing such services. In the case ofan organizational client. general knowledge of the
former client's business policies. practices. or officials will not ordinarily be disqualifying
because it will not be sufficient to materially advance the client's position in the subsequent
representation.
Lawyers MO\'ing Between Firms
W ill When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the
question ofwhether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There
are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former
firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not
compromised. Second, the Rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons
from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the Rule should not unreasonably
hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a
previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers
practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or
another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers.
If the concept ofimputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical
curtailment ofthe opportunity oflawyers to move from one practice setting to another and
of the opportunity ofclients to change counsel.
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lke JlFeelem ef lIiSEillalifieatieR ellFoRet ee JlFeJleFly Fesel"ell eitlleF ey simJlle lIRal9gy t9 a
la".,.eF JlFaetieiRg al9Re 9F e~c the "e~' geReFllI e9ReeJlt efllJlJlellFllRee ef imJlFeJlRety,
CeRAdeRCialiC,'
f&i ffil Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has
actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and I.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while
with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the
firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer mdividually nor the
second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter
even though the interests ofthe two clients conflict. See Rule 1.1O(b) for the restrictions on
a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.
f'l IZl PFesePliRg eeRfilleRtialiCy is a EillestieR eflleeess te iRfermatieR. Aeeess te
iRfermati9R, iR tllFR, is esseRtially a EillestieR ef feet iR Application of paragraph (b) depends
on a situation's particular eiFe_stllRees facts, aided by inferences, deductions, or working
presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together.
A lawyer may have general access to files ofall clients ofa law firm and may regularly
participate in discussions oftheir affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is
privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast. another lawyer may have
access to the files ofonly a limited number ofclients and participate in discussions of the
affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred
that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not
those ofother clients. In such an inquiry. the burden of proof should rest upon the firm
whose disqualification is sought.
PI AJlJllieatieR efJlllFllgFltJIll fll) lIeJleRlls 9R a sitllatieR's JllIftielllllF feets. IR sllell M iREilli~.,
tile bllFlleR ef JlF99f sllellill Fest lIJleR the firm wll9se lIisEillalifieati9R is S9l1gAt.
f9f ill Independent of the question ofdisqualification ofa firm, a lawyer changing
professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information
about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9fc), With regard to Rules
applicable to lawyers serving in or formerly serving in government agencies. see Rule I. II.
l.d,'eFse PesiCieRs
fJ.Q} The seeeRlIasJleet efle~'al13' t9 a elieRt is the la",'eF's geligati9R te lIeeliRe SlIeSeEilleRt
FeJlFeseRtatieRs iR,'elviRg JlesitieRs all'/eF5e te a fermeF elieRt aRSiRg iR sll9stMtially Felatell
madeF5. This ellligatieR FeEilliFeS aesteRtieR fi:em all"eF5e FeJlFeseRtatieR e~. lke iRlIi...illllal
la",'eF iR"91"ell, ellt lIees Ret JlFeJleFly 'Rlail aesteRtieR efeth'F la"~"F5 tllfellgll imJllltell
disEillalifieatieR. HeRee, this lISJleet eftlle JlFeelem is geveFRell ey ~lIle 1.9(a). ThIlS, ifll
la",'eF left eRe firm feF lIIIetlleF, the Re"laftiliatieR wellill Ret JlFeellllle lk, firms iR'.'el...ell
fFem eeRtiRlIiRg te FeJlFes'Rt eUeRts "lith all'/eF5e iRteFests iR the same eF Felatell mlltteF5, 59
leR! lIS lke eeRllitieRs efplIFlIgFlIJllIs fll) Mil (e) l!eRl!eFRiRg lIeRfilleRtialiCy 1I1I"l! eeeR met.
F-B I2lIRfermatieR Paragraph fc) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the
course of representing a client may not subsequently be used eF Fe",a1ell by the lawyer to
the disadvantage ofthe client. Neither may the infonnation be revealed. see Rule 1.6.
However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from
using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.
~ ll.Ql QiSEillalifieati9R fFem sllbseEilleRt FeJlFeseRtatieR is The provisions of this Rule are
for the protection of former clients and can be waived ey tllem. A "Iai...eF is ,f+eetiye 9Rly if
tReFB is lIisel9sllFe eftlle eiFellmstllRees, iRellllliRg tile lawyeF's iRteRllell Fele iR eeRalf eflke
Re.... elieRt with informed consent.~With regard to an opposing party's raising a question
ofconflict of interest. see Comment to Rule 1.7, With regard to disqualification ofa firm
with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule I. IO.
Centerfor Professional Responsibility
Ethics 2000 Commission
Proposed Rule 1.10 - Public Discussion Draft
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been slFllel. thF9111!1I.
IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none ofthem shallltRe·yjRgly represent a client
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that anyone of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8W, Q! 1.9~. unless the prohibition
is based on a personal interest ofthe prohibited lawver and does not present a significant
risk ofmaterially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the
fum.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from
thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those ofa client
represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm,
unless:
(I) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated
lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and I.9(c) that
is material to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the
conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Comment
Definition of "Firm"
[I) For purposes of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, the term "firm" includes lawyers in a
JlR'late firm, l1li11 law partnership. professional corporation. sole proprietorship or other
association. or in a legal services organization: lawyers in the legal department ofa
corporation or other organizatioll;eF-itHt who render legal services to that organization or to
others to advance the interests or objectives ofthat organization: or lawyers who share
office facilities without adequate measures to protect confidential information so that it will
not be available to other lawyers in the shared facilities. Whether two or more lawyers
constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two
practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily
would not be regarded as constituting a firm unless they fail to take adequate measures to
protect confidential infonnation ofthe clients ofeach. However, if they present themselves
to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they
should be regarded as a fum for purposes of the Rules. The terms ofany formal agreement
between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, lIS is the
feet tllat tlley IIlIye mlltllalaeeess te iRfermatieR eeReeFRiRg the elieRts tRe~! seR'e.
Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule
that is involved, A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes ofthe rule that
the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so
regarded for purposes ofthe rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to
another.
[2) With respect to the law department ofan organization, there is ordinarily no question
that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning ofthe Rules of
Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For
~
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example, it may not be clear whether the law department ofa corporation represents a
subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of
the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an
unincorporated association and its local affiliates.
p] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed
In the same unit ofa legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those
employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers
should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is
involved, and on the specific facts ofthe situation.
[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government,~
&i4YaMeB imputation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b), not this Rule; similarly. where a
lawyer represents the government after having served pFi¥ate clients in private practice or
nongovernmental employment, the sitliatieR imputation is governed by Rule 1.I1(c)(I). The
individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7, and
J.9££}. .
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Principles of Imputed DisqualificatioD
f'llli The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the
principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such
situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one
lawyer for purposes ofthe rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that
each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with
whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently
associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is
governed by Rules J.9(b) and l.lO(b).
ffil The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of
client IQyaltv nor protectiQn ofconfidential infonnation are presented. Where one lawyer in
a finn could not effectively represent a given client because ofstrong political beliefs. for
example, but that lawyer will do no wQrk on the case, the firm should not be diSQualified.
Likewjse. if a firm that emplQvs one lawyer represents a client in a matter adverse to a partv
Rpresented by a firm employing the lawyer=s spouse, paragraph (a) ordinarily would not
prohibit representation of the clients bv the lawyers= firmS so long as neither spouse
participates in the representation. See Rule 1.8m. On the other hand. if an opposing partv in
a case were Qwned by a lawyer in the law firm and others in the firm would be materially
limited in pursuing the matter because Qf loyalty to that lawyer, the personal
disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the finn.
ill The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm
where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a non-lawyer. such as a
paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representatiQn if the lawyer is
prohibited from acting because of events before the peWn became a lawyer, for example.
work that the person did while a law student. Such persQns. however. ordinarily must be
screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in
the firm ofconfidential information that both the non-lawyers and the firm have a legal duty
to protect. See Rules 1.1 Ha) and 5.3.
Pi1!l Rule 1.1O(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent
a person with interests directly adverse to those ofa client represented by a lawyer who
formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person
with interests adverse to those ofa present client ofthe firm, which would violate Rule 1.7.
Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or
substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client
and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6
and J.9(c).
121 Rule l.1Q(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or
former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7
require the lawyer to detennine that the representatiQn is not prohibited by Rule I.7(b) and
that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation.
Such consent may be conditional. For example, consent might be conditioned on procedures
being adopted and followed to assure both that no information material to the representation
will be exchanged between the personally disqualified lawyer and others in the firm and that
the personally disqualified lawyer will be apportioned no part of the fee from the
representation. See Rule I. I I. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may
not be cured by client consent.
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Proposed Rule 1.5 - Public Discussion Draft
Etbics 2000 Commission
November 15, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule bas been underlined; deletions from the current Model Rule bave
been SlAIeli 1N9111!:h.
FEES
-(a) A la"'''Yer's fee~ sbalille rell5911sllie not make an agreement for. charge. or collect an unreasonable
~. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness ofa fee include the following:
(I) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, ifapparent to the client, that the acceptance ofthe particular employment will
preclude other'employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the degree ofrisk assumed by the lawyer when the fee is fixed or contingent on the
outcome ofa matter.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the scope of the representation. the basis or rate
of the fee and disbursements for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client T
,nferallly in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Any changes in
these tenus ofthe engagement shall also be communicated in writing.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome ofthe matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter
in whicb a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in
writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the
contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion ofa contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client
with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance
to the client and the method ofits determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(I) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the
securing ofa divorce or upon the amount ofalimony or support, or property settlement in lieu
thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
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(e) A division ofa fee between lawyers who are not in the same finn may be made only if:
(I) the division is in proportion to the services perfonned by each lawyer or, by written agreement
with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is ad'JisedefBllddees Ret eltjeet gives informed consent in writing to the participation
ofall the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Comment
Basis or Rate of Fee
[II Whea the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding
concerning the basis or rate of the fee. If so. then both laWYer and client may rely on that understanding until
they agree that it will be changed. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, lIB a written understanding as
to the fee &heYI4 must be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the
basis ofthe fee. but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to
state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors
that may be taken into account in fmally fixing the fee. The writing must also describe the work expected to
be perfonned by the lawyer for the fee, disbursements for which the client will be liable and the method of
calculating charges for such disbursements. When developments occur during the representation that render an
earlier description ofthe engagement or estimate~ substantially inaccurate, a revised description or
estimate &heYI4~ be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee tenns ofthe
engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. flll'fliskiR@ the .li.Rt ,,~th a simple memeFMdllRl er
• eepy efth.la....,'er·s ellstem~' fee sehedlile is slllJieieAt iftheltasie er rate enhe fee is eet fe~h.
~ illContingent fees,like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard ofparagraph Ca) of this
I Rule, including consideration of the degree of risk assumed by the lawyer at the outset of the representation.
\0 Reasonableness ofa contingent fee should ordinarily be determined based on the facts known at the time the
o fee agreement was reached. The amount ofa contingent fee may be unreasonable if there Was a high
likelihood ofsubstantial recoverY by trial or settlement so that the lawyer bore little risk of nonpayment. or if
the c1ient=s recovery was so large that the lawyer=s fee would clearly exceed a sum appropriate in light of the
services perfonned and risks assumed. Applicable law also may impose limitations on contingent fees. such as
a ceiling on the percentage allowable.
Terms ofrayment
PI ill A lawyer may require advance payment ofa fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See
Rule I. I 6(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services. such as an ownership interest in an
enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition ofa proprietary interest in the cause ofaction or subject
matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8G}. However, a fee paid in property instead ofmoney may be
subject to 6f!eeial seMi", lteelllls. it ilWal",s ttII.stiafts eafte.FRiR@!!athth. Valli' afth. e,p·ie.s Md the
la..,.er·s 6f!eeiallifleu'led@e efth. Yaili' efth. prepeFly the requirements of Rule 1.8Ca) because such fees
often have the essential aualities ofa business transaction with the client.
~ ill An agreement may not be made whose tenns might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for
the client or perfonn them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter
into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that
more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client.
Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst ofa proceeding or transaction.
However. it is proper to defme the extent ofservices in light of the client's ability to pay. A la"~'er sheliid Ret
elipleit a fee BFFaRgemeRt ltased pFimaRly eft hellrly ehargee lty IIsiR@ wasteflll preeedlires. '\~eR there is
dell!!t "'h.ther a eeRtiR@eRt fee ie eeRsisteRt dth the elieRl's ltest iAterest, the la"~'er sheliid elfer tAe elieRt
altemati"e ltases fer the fee BIld "lplaiR their implieatiefts. ft.pplieal!le la'" ma~' impese limillltieRe 9R
eeRtiR@eRt fees, slleh as a eeiliRg eR the pereeRllI@e.
Division ofF..
f4} ill A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in
the same finn. A division of fee facilitates association ofmore than one lawyer in a matter in which neither
alone could serve the client as well. and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is
between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) pennits the lawyers to divide a fee on either the
basis of the proportion ofserVices they render or by agreement between the participating lawyers if all assume
responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is ad'Jieed amldaes Ret elljeet gives informed
consent to the arrangement. It does not require disclosure to the client of the share that each lawyer is to
receive. .IeiRt Assuming joint responsibility for the representation eRlllils the eltli@iItiaR5 stilted iR Rille ~.I fer
I'lIfJlesee efthe matter iR"elued requires each lawyer to assume civilliabilitv for any malpractice of the others
ID the matter.
rn Paragraph Ce) does not prohibit or regulate division offees to be received in the future for work done when
lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.
Disputes over Fees
~ ill Ifa procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation
procedure established by the bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may
prescribe a procedure for detennining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation ofan executor or
administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure ofdamages. The lawyer
entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the
prescribed procedure.
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Ethics 2000 Commission
November 15, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current Model Rule have
been swel. \Nelillh.
RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS
CAl In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods ofobtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person.
MIn communicating with third persons. a lawyer shall not seek to obtain information that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know is subject to an evidentiary or other privilege ofanother,
~ A lawyer who receives a document and has reason to believe that the document was inadvertently sent
shall promptly notify the sender.
Comment
[I] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordin\lte the interests ofothers to those of the client, but
that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to
catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods ofobtaining evidence from third
persons.
ill Third persons sometimes have documents or other information that are protected by an evjdentiary or other
privilege ofanother person. For example, present or former organizational emplovees or agents may have
infounation protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege or the work product doctrine of the
organization itself. If the person contacted by the lawyer has no authority to waive the privilege. it would be
unfair to permit the lawyer to deliberately seek to obtain the jnfounation in this manner.
ill As a matter of professional courtesy. some lawyers may choose to return a document unread for example.
when the lawyer learns before receivjng the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. The
decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter ofprofessional judgment ordinarily reserved to the
lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.
Ethics 2000 Commission
November 15, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current Model Rule have
been WIIel. thfell2h.
RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations ofthe lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation ofthe Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(I) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory
authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided
or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Comment
[I] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, ineluding secretaries, investigators, law student
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the
lawyer in rendition ofthe lawyer's professional services. A lawyer sfielII6 must give such assistants
appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly
regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be
responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of
the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.
ill Paragraph <a) requires each law firm to establish internal systems giving reasonable assurance that
nonlawvers in the fiun will act in a way compatible wjth the Rules of Professional Conduct. Paragraphs fb)
and fc) impose personal responsibility on lawyers who have supervisory authority over the performance of
nonlawyers in the fiun.
~
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Ethics 2000 Commission
November IS, 1999
Material added to the cumnt Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the cumnt Model Rule have
been swelE wallgh.
SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
(a) A lawyer shall hold property ofclients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person.
Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of [five years] after
termination ofthe representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has"an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person,
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course ofrepresentation a lawyer is in possession of property in which &e4II two or more
persons (ope of whom may be the lawyer &R1I &Ralher perseR) claim interests, the property shall be kept
separate by the lawyer untillhere is &R aeeallRliRg aRll severBRee af tIIeir iRlerests. If a lIisJlllta arises
eaReeRliRg tileir reslleeti"e iRlerests. tile llartiaR iR Ilisllllta shallile liept sellarale Ily tile la",,'er lIRtii the l!!lY
dispute about the interests is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions ofthe property as to
whIch the interests are not in dispute.
Comment
[I] A lawyer should hold property ofothers with the care required ofa professional fiduciary. Securities
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form ofsafekeeping is warranted by special
circumstances. All property which is the property ofclients or third persons. including prospective clients.
sIIelIkI J!!!W be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, ifmonies, in one or more
trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in
similar fiduciary capacities.
[2] Lawyers often receive funds from ~rll ,arties f,aRl which the lawyer's fee will be paid. Iftlla,a is Rsli that
tIIa eliaRt ~. Ili"art tile fuRlis "~tllallt IlByIRg Ilia fee, tile~ lawyer is not required to remit the llartieR RaFR
wIlieR f!m!!tl2 the fee is lalla peill client that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a
lawyer may not hold funds 10 coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of
the funds sIIelIkI must be kept in l!..trust account and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of
the dispute. such as arbitration. The undisputed portion ofthe funds shall be promptly distributed.
[3] +IIir4 Paragraph Cc) also recognizes that third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have jtIsllawful
claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law
to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and aeearlliRgl)' FR&)' in such
Cases must refuse to sumnder the property to the client until the claims are resolved. Ha"'a"er, a A lawyer
should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. but the lawyer may
file an action to have a court resolve the claims.
(4) The obligations ofa lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than
rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable
law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction.
[5] A "eliaRls' seellril)' lawyers'~ for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of
the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result ofdishonest conduct ofa lawyer.
Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.
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RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARlNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
(a) A partner in a law finn shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the finn has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the finn confonn to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the other lawyer confonns to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(I) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge ofthe specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law finn in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows ofthe conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
circumstances is a question offact. Partners ofa private finn have at least indirect responsibility for all work
being done by the finn, while a partner in charge ofa particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over
other finn lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner would depend on the
immediacy ofthe partner's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. The supervisor is required to
intervene to prevent avoidable consequences ofmisconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct
occurred. Thus, ifa supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate knowingly misrepresented a matter to an
opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting
misapprehension.
~ ffil Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the
part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation ofparagraph (c) because there was no
direction, ratification or knowledge ofthe violation.
f'J I11 Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct ofa
partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's
conduct is a question oflaw beyond the scope ofthese Rules.
I
\0 Comment
w
[I] Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the professional work ofa
finn or legal department ofs an enterprise or government agency. This includes members ofa partnership and
the shareholders in a law finn organized as a professional corporation; lawyers having supervisory authority in
the law department ofan enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intennediate managerial
responsibilities in a finn.
mParagraph (a) requires each law finn to establish internal systems giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the finn will confoW to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Systems required include those for
detennining conflicts ofinterest. jdentifying the dates by which required actions must be taken in each case.
8CCOW}ting for client funds and property. and assuring that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.
PIUl Paragraph (b) imposeS personal responsibilities on lawyers who have direct supervisory authority over
the professional work of one or mOre other lawyers. The measures required to fulfill the responsibility
prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the finn's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small
finn ofexperienced lawyers, infonnal su~rvision and 8eellSI8Rsi sdlll8Ri!i8R periodic review ofcompliance
with the required systems-ordinarily Illig he SYmeleR! will suffice. In a large finn, or in practice situations in
which~ difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate IlF8eedllfes measures may be
necessary. Some finns, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral
ofethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Finns, whether
large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical
atmosphere ofa finn can influence the conduct ofall its members and a lawyer having authority over the work
ofanother may not assume that the subordinate lawyer will inevitably confonn to the Rules.
Will Paragraph (c)(I) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts ofanother. See also
Rule 8.4(a).
f4} IiI Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty ofa lawyer having direct supervisory authority over performance of
speCific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular
~
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Proposed Rule 5.2 - Public Discussion Draft
Etblcs 2000 Commission
November 15, 1999
RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding
that the lawyer acted at the direction ofanother person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance
with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution ofan arguable question ofprofessional duty.
Comment
[I] Although a lawyer is not relieved ofresponsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the
direction ofa supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge
required to render conduct a violation ofthe Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at
the direction ofa supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty ofa professional violation unless the
subordinate knew ofthe document's frivolous character.
[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a malter involving professional judgment
as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent
course ofaction or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the
duty ofboth lawyers is dear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is
reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course ofaction. That authority ordinarily reposes in the
supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, ifa question arises whether the
interests oftwo clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution ofthe question should
protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.
Centerfor Professional Responsibility
~osed Rule 1.4 - Public Discussion Draft
Etblcs 2000 Commission
March 23, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been skYell trn:e1lf;1t.
COMMUNICATION AND INFORMED CONSENT
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status ofa matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed deciSIOns regarding the representation.
!£} As used in these Rules. "informed consent" denotes the agreement ofa person to a
proposed course ofconduct after the lawyer has communicated reasonably adequate
jnfonnation and explanation regarding the material risks ofand reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course ofconduct.
Comment
[I JThe client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions
concerning the objectives ofthe representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. For example, a lawyer
negotiating on behalfofa client should provide the dient with facts relevant to the matter,
inform the client ofcommunications from another party and take other reasonable steps that
permit the client to make a decision regarding a serious offer from another party. A lawyer
who receives from opposing counsel an offer ofsettlement in a civil controversy or a
proffered plea bargam in a criminal case should promptly inform the client of its substance
unless prior discussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will be
unacceptable. See Rule 1.2(a). Even when a client delegates authority to the lawyer, the
client should be kept advised of the status ofthe matter.
[2J Adequacy ofcommunication depends in part on the kind ofadvice or assistance
involved. For example, in negotiations where there is time to explain a proposal, the lawyer
should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In
litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects ofsuccess and
ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others. On the
other hand, a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy
in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and
the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation.
[3J Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a
comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this
staridard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from
mental disability. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often
impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs;
ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the
organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited
or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. Practical exigency may also require
a lawyer to act for a client without prior consultation.
Witbholding Information
[4] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of
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infonnation when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate
communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis ofa client when the
examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would hann the client. A lawyer may not
withhold infonnation to serve the lawyer'S own interest or convenience or the interests of
another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that infonnation
supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with
such rules or orders.
Informed Consent
ill Many of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the infonned
consent of a client or other person before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing
a course ofconduct. See, e.g.. Rules 1.6-1.12. The communication necessarv to obtain such
consent wjll varv according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the
need for disclosure. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to assure that the client
possesses infOrmation reasonably adequate to make an infonned decision. Ordinarily, this
will require communication that includes a disclosure ofthe facts and circumstances giving
rise to the situation. any explanation reasQnably necessary to infonn the client of the
material advantages and disadvantages ofthe proposed course ofconduct. and a discussion
of the client's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a
lawyer to advise a client to seek the advice ofother counsel. A lawyer need not infonn a
client offacts or implications already known to the client: nevertheless. a lawyer who does
not personally infonn the client assumes the risk that the client is inadequately infQnned
and the consent is invalid. In detennining whether the infonnation and explanation provided
are reasonably adequate. relevant factors include whether the client is sophisticated in legal
matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved and whether the client is
independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent.
ffi] Paragraph fc) wjll usually require an affiunative response by the client or other person.
In general. a lawyer may nQt assume CQnsent from a client's silence. Unless written consent
is required. however. consent may be inferred from the conduct ora client who has
reasonably adequate infonnation about the matter.
Centerfor Proftssiona/ Responsibility
Proposed Rule 1.8 - Public Discussion Draft
Ethics 2000 Commission
M8rch 23, 1999
Material added to the current Model Rule has been underlined; deletions from the current
Model Rule have been MnIsl, thFellP.
CONCURRENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
PRQWIRlreg ~1~,4,C+lQJol~SPECIFIC RULES
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(I) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing te tke elieRt in a manner wItiek that can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability ofseeking and is
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel ift Q!! the transaction; and
(3) the client eeH5Mts gives infonned consent in writing tMFete to the
essential tenns ofthe transaction and the lawyer's role in the
transactiQn.
(b) A lawyer shall not use infonnation relating to representation ofa client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client SeRGeRIs after seRsllltatieR gives infonned
consent, except as pennitted or required by Rule 1.6 [or Rule 3.3].
(c) A lawyer sball not solicit any substantial gift from a client or prepare on behalfofa
client an mstrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer 85 )lafeRt. skilli.
sieliRg, er SJl911Se any substantial gift Rem a slieRt, iRSlllEliRg a testaFReftl~' gift. ellSe)!1
vAlere tke sHeRt unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the 4eRee client.
(d) Prior to the conclusion ofrepresentation ofa client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate
an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in
substantial part on infonnation relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer sball not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation, except that:
(I) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses oflitigation, the
repayment ofwhich may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;
and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay CQurt costs and
expenses of litigation on behalfof the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation or direction for representing a client from Qne
other than the client unless:
(I) the client seRseRls after eeRSlIltatieR gives infonned consent in
writing under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7;
.
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
~
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professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation ofa client is protected as
required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement ofthe claims ofor against the clients, or in a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client e9RS9RIs after
e9Rsl,IItatieR, iRellldiRg gives informed consent in writing that includes disclosure of the
existence and nature ofall the claims or pleas involved and of the participation ofeach
person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not~
ill make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a
client for malpractice lIftIess "eMitted "¥ IlI'v Md the elieRI is
iRde"eRdeRtl¥ ,epreseRled iR FRIIliing tile agreeFReM,~ or
ill settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client withellt first ad\'isiRg unless that
person is advised in writing tIIat ofthe desirability ofseeking and is
given a reasonable onportunity to seek the advice of independent
,e"r9seRtatieR is a""r9"riate lwl counsel in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse 2LhI..!
cohabitating relationship closely approximating marriage shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer knows is represented in the
same or in a substantially related matter by the other lawyer ellee"t 1I"9R unless each
affected client gives informed consent "¥ the elieRl afte, eeRsllltatieR ,egardiRg the
,elati9Rshi" in writing under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause ofaction or subject matter
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(I) acquire a lien gr&Rte4 authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or
expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
00 A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual
relationship existed between them when the lawyer-client relationship commenced,
Comment
Business Transactions between Client and Lawyer
[IJ As a geReNI "riRei"le, all tr8ft5aetieRs lIM1''4leR elieRt and 11I'....,'e, &hellid lie fair and
reaseRa"le te the elieRI. IR slleh lraRSaetieRs a flvie'v lI¥ iRde"eRdeRt e9usel 9R lIeftalf ef
Ihe slieRI is efteR ad'/isaele. flll'theMere, a III'...,.er FRa¥ Ret en"leit iRfeMatieR relatiRg te
the re"reseRtati9R Ie the elieRt 's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that
the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent, seek to
acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for
investment. Paragraph (a)~ 's legal skill and training, together with the relationship
of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility ofoverreaching
when the lawyer participates in a business, property, or financial transaction with a client,
for example, loan and sales transactions and lawyers making investments for clients, The
requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related
to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client
leams that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the
client. The Rule does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions bctween the
lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for
example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or
distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no
advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary
and impracticable. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services
ancj1lary to the practice onawa for example. the sale oftitle insurance or investment
services to existing clients ofthe lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to
lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee
arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its
requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business as
payment ofall or part ofa fee.
ill Paragraph (a)(I) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its
essential terms be COmmunicated to the client. in writing. in a manner that can be
reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing,
ofthe desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that
the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragra,ph (a)(3) requires
that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in writing, both to the essential terms
of the transaction and the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the
material risks of the proposed transaction, including risk presented by the lawyer's
involvement, and the existence ofreasonably available alternatives, and should explain why
the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable, See Rule 1.4 (definition of informed
consent).
ill The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client
in the transaction itselfor when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant
risk that the lawyer's representation ofthe client will be materially limited by the lawyer's
financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must
comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of
Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's
dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the
lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's
interests at the expense ofthe client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed
consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1,7 will preclude the
lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.
Use of Information Related to Representation
ill Use ofinformation relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client
violates the lawyer's duty ofloyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to
benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate ofthe
lawyer. For example, ifa lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several
parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in
competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The
Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who
learns a government agency's interpretation oftrade legislation during the representation of
one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients.
Gifts to Lawyen
PI ill A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards
of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of
appreciation is permitted. Ira client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift. paragraph (c)
does not nrohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the
client under the doctrine ofundue influence. which treats client gifts as presumptively
fraudulent. In any event. due to concerns about overreaching and imoosition on clients, a
lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for theI~ 's
benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client. For purposes of this Rule, persons
related to the lawyer include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent. or other
relative or person with whom the lawyer maintains a close, familial relationship.
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1§l Ifeffectuation ofa substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or
conveyance, heweYeFr the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can
provide. PBfagFallR (8) Feeegflii!es 8fI The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a
relative ofthe donee SF tile gift is Ret 6111lstaRtial. as described in [S1 above.
rn This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or
associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially
lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless. such appointments will be subject to the general
conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's
interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice ofan executor or other
fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed written consent to the conflict. the lawyer
should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in
the appointment. as well as the availability ofaltemative candidates for the position.
Literary Rights
~ ill An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the
conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests ofthe client and the
personal interests ofthe lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may
detract from the publication value ofan account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does
not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist ofa share in ownership in the property, if the
arrangement conforms to Rule I.S and ll-gF8IlR paragraphs (a) and 0).
Financial Assistance
I2l Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalfof
their clients. including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses.
because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be
brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the
litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court
costs and litigation expenses. including the expenses ofmedical examination and the costs
ofobtaining and presenting evidence. because these advances are virtua!!y indistinguishable
from contingent fees and help insure access to the courts. Similarly. an exception allowing
lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of
whether these funds will be repaid is Warranted.
PePS8B '1,'IBg r.. I LI~'Ye.'. Servlee. Thlrd·Party Payment or Direction
J4J Pllf8gF8IlR (I) FelllliFes diselesllFe eftlle faet tIIat tile la"'Y8F's services are being paid forbya third party. Such an arrangement must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6
concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 Concerning conflict ofinterest. Where the client is a
class, consent may be obtained on behalfofthe class by court-supervised procedure.
llQl Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third
person will compensate the lawyer. in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative
or friend. an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company>. or a co-client (such as a
corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers
frequently have interests in conflict with the client. including interests in minimizing the
amount soent on the representation and in leaming how the representation is progressing.
lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless there is
informed consent from the client and the lawyer reasonably determines that the
representation wjll be comoetent and diligent and that the lawyer's loyalty to the client will
not be compromised. See Rule 1.7.
Ull Sometimes. it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent
regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the
fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply
with Rule. \.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule \.6 concerning
confidentiality. Under Rule I.7(a}, a conflict of interest exists if the lawyer's representation
of the client may be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement
or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third
party-payer is a co-client). Under Rule I.7(b}, the lawyer may accept or continue the
representation with the informed consent ofeach affected client, unless the conflict is
non-consentable under that paragraph. Under Rule I.7(c}, the informed consent must be
confirmed in a writing signed by the client.
Ull Just as when the client is paying his or her own legal fees. the client can always
designate an agent to make decisions on the client's behalf, and that agent could be the
person compensating the lawyer. For example, a client planning to be out ofthe country
could designate a close relative to make decisions on the client's behalf, regardless of
whether the relative is a third-party payer. In these situations both the lawyer and the agent
are obligated to act solely in the client's interests; thus, the lawyer may not accept direction
from the agent that would disadvantage the client or interfere with the lawyer's exercise of
independent professional judgment on the client's behalf.
IUl In some cases. the third party may have assumed obligations to the client. such as the
obligation to indemnify the client against any judgment rendered. that give the third party
an interest in the outcome ofa matter. In such cases. the lawyer may accept direction from
the third party that is reasonable in scope and character and consistent with the client's
interests.
1Hl It is not always easy for the lawyer to determine when following the direction ofa third
party protecting its own interests will interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment on behalfof the client. For example. an insurance company that pays the lawyer
to defend an insured in an action under a liability policy may direct the lawyer not to take
an additional deposition. If the lawyer reasonably believes that failure to take the deposition
will not harm the client's interests. then the lawyer may comply with the direction without
further consultation with the client. If. however. the lawyer has reason to believe that the
client may be harmed. as when the deposition is critical and there is significant risk ofa
judgment in excess of the policy limits. then the lawyer must refuse to comply with the
direction unless the client gives infonned consent under the conditions stated in Rule I.7(b).
I.!jJ Similar problems arise when an employer agrees to pay for the legal expenses ofan
employee. particularly when the employer is also a client. Before agreeing to representation
under these circumstances. the lawyer must consider whether the fee arrangement is likely
to undermine the lawyer's ability to provide competent and diligent representation. as when
the lawyer believes there is a significant likelihood that the employer will want to avoid
criminal liability by providing information incriminating to the employee. Even when the
potential liability is civil and the employer has agreed to indemnify the employee. the
lawyer should consider whether the employee's interests in reputation or continued
employment may conflict with the employer's desire to settle the case or tenninate the
employment relationship. Once the lawyer determines that the representation is consentable
under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. the lawyer should obtain the informed consent of
both employer and employee. If. as the representation proceeds. circumstances pose
additional significant risks to the employee. then the lawyer must withdraw when required
or consult further with the client before continuing the representation under the direction of
the employer.
Aggregate Settlements
ll.§l Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks
onoint representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule \.7 this is one of
the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation. as part of th~
process ofobtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a} protects each
client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of
settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal
case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that
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before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalfofmultiple clients,
the lawyer must inform each ofthem about all the material terms of the settlement,
including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is
accepted. See also Rule 1.4 (keeping the client informed). Lawyers representing a class of
plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer
relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with
applicable rules regulating notification ofclass members and other procedural requirements
designed to ensure adequate protection ofthe entire class.
Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims
~ PwegFlljlh E!t) 19 Ret IRteAded te apply te slIstelRBFY IIl1l11lAsalieAs BAd lilRitatieAS IR
legal s,iRiell& BAd lRelRefflflda,
ll1l Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited
because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many
clients are unable to evaluate the desirability ofmaking such an agreement before a dispute
has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement.
This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with
the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable
and the client is fully informed ofthe scope and effect ofthe agreement. Nor does this
paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited liability entity,
where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client
for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditil?ns required by law, such
as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance ofadequate liability insurance.
Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the
representation, although a definition ofscope that makes the obligations ofrepresentation
illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.
I.!!l Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by
this Rule, Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage ofan
unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing
of the appropriateness ofjndependent representation in connection with such a settlement,
In addition, the lawyer must give the client or fonner client a reasonable oppo!1Unity to find
and consult independent counsel.
~'s Family Relationships hlRnla La'll"'"
£'l I.!.2l Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers
in the same firm are governed by Rule 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in
paragraph (i) is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are
associated unless there is a significant risk that the representation ofone or more of the
clients may be materially limited as a result ofthe conflict. See Rule 1.10,
ruu When lawyers on opposite sides ofa dispute are closely related by blood or marriage or
by a cohabitating relationship closely approximating marriage there is a significant risk that
client confidences may be revealed and that the lawyers' personal relationship may interfere
with both loyalty and independent professional judgment, As a result, each client is entitled
to know of the existence and implications ofthe relationship between the lawyers before the
lawyer agrees to accept the representation. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the
representation is prohibited even with the clients' consent, See Rule 1.7.
ID.l Similar concerns may arise in circumstances not covered by Rule 1,8m. For example,
related lawyers may be asked to represent clients wjth interests that differ, although they are
not directly adverse, as when the prospective clients are forming a business. Or. a lawyer
representing a client in litigation may be involved in a dating relationship wjth a lawyer
representing the opposing client. Even if Rule 1.8m does not apply, if there is a significant
risk that the representation of a client will be materially and adversely affected by the
~s own interests, then the representation is governed by Rule 1.7.
I.IIIII15iti'8 'fAcquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation
PI un Paragraph 0> states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. +his Like paragraph eel, the general rule;-wfiieh
has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance; and is designed to avoid giving
the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition. when the lawyer acquires
an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a
client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific
exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, slIsh as cite ellse,tie8
fer reaseRat!le seRtlftgeRt fees set fertl\ itt RIlle 1,5 and cite ellselltteft fer sertaift ad¥anses ef
the sests ef litigatleR set fertlt 1ft ,_gFlljlh (e). The exception for certain advances ofthe
costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph eel. In addition, paragraph CD sets forth
exceptions for liens authorized bv law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts
for reasonable contingent fees. There are two types ofllens that are authorized bv law. The
first are Hens granted by law, in which the lawyer need take no further action. The second
are those that a lawyer acquires by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by
contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts
in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction wjth a client and is
governed by the requirements ofparagraph Cal. Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases
are governed by Rule 1.5.
Client-LaWYer Sexual Relationships
Illi The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer
occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always
unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and cHent Can involve unfair
exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical
obligation not to use the trust ofthe cHent to the cHent's disadvantage. In addition, such a
relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional
involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the cHent without impairment to the
exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the
professional and personal relationship may make it difficult to predict to what extent client
confidences will be protected by the attorney-cHent evidentiary privilege, since cHent
confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the
cHent·lawyer relationship. Because ofthe significant danger ofharm to client interests and
because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could
give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations
with a cHent regardless ofwhether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the
absence ofprejudice to the client.
[24] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited.
Issues relating to the exploitation ofthe fiduciary relationship and client dependency are
diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the cOmmencement of the
cHentolaWYer relationship. However. before proceeding with the representation in these
circumstances. the laWYer should consider whether the laWYer's ability to represent the
cHent will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7.
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Proposed Rule 1.18 - Public Discussion Draft
Ethics 2000 Commission
November IS, 1999
New material is underlined. (This draft Rule is an addition to the current Model Rules.)
DUTIES TO A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT
£!} A person who consults with a lawyer concerning the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship
with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
au Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues. a lawyer who has consulted with a prospective client shall
not use or reveal information leamed in the consultation. except as Rules 1.6 and 1.9 would permit or require
with respect to infOrmation ofa client or fOrmer client.
!£} Neither a lawyer subject to paragraph au nor a lawyer to whom disqualification is imputed under Rule
J.IQ shall represent a client with interests materially adverse to those ofa prospective client in the same or a
substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be
significantly harmful to that person in the matter. except as provided in paragraph Cd).
un Representation is permissible ifeither:
ill both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent in writing to the
~presentation. or
ill the lawyer who received the confidential information took reasonable steps to avoid exposure to
more infOrmation than was necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client and
that lawyer is screened as provided in Rule 1.11.
Comment
ill Prospective clients. like clients. may disclose infOrmation to a lawyer. place documents or other property
in the lawyer's custody. or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's discussions with a prospective client usually
are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes
required) to proceed no further. Hence prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection
afforded clients.
ill It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal infOrmation during an initial consultation prior to the
decision about fOrmation ora client-laWYer ~Iationship. The lawyer often mustleam such infOrmation to
determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the
lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer froID using or revealing that information,
except as permitted or required by Rules 1.6 or 1.9. even if the clien! or lawyer decides not to proceed with the
representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.
ill In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client. a lawyer considering
whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as
~asonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or
other reason for non-representation exists. the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the
~presentation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer. and ifconsent is possible under Rule 1.7,
then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation.
Hl A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no
information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in
the matter. If the agreement expressly so provides. the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer=s
subsequent use of infOrmation received from the prospective client.
ill Even in the absence ofan agreement. under paragraph (c). the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a
client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter
unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if
used against the prospective client in the matter.
ill The prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.1 Q. but. under paragraph
(dX21. imputation may be avoided irall disqualified lawyers are screened as provided in Rule 1.11.
ill With the informed. written consent of both the prospective and affected clients. under paragraph (d)()), the
lawyer and members of the lawyer=s firm may represent the affected client without screening.
ill For the duty ofcompetence ofa lawyer who gives assistance on the merits ofa matter to a prospective
client. see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer=s duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the
lawyer=s care. see Rule 1.15.
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APPENDIX 5
SURVEY COMMENTS INDICATING THAT
STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR RESOLVING BANKRUPTCY-RELATED
ISSUES OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT ARE INADEQUATE
Received in Connection with the Federal Judicial Center Survey of Bankruptcy Judges
Concerning Standards Governing Attorney Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts
- March 1999 -
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Comments Indicating Statutory Standards
for Resolving Bankruptcy-Related Issues of
Attorney Conduct Were Not Adeguate
• The statutory attorney conduct standards for conflicts of interest are not adequate
because:
(1) The statutory standards are not articulated in a specific or detailed enough manner
to provide the necessary guidance to attorneys, usually causing more problems
than they solve (especially the disinterestedness standard under § 327(a». The
vagueness of § 327(a) requires the court to make difficult decisions concerning
whether conflicts are such as to disqualify a professional. (Summary ofcomments
from 7 bankruptcy judges.)
(2) The statutory standards are too strict (specifically the definition of disinterested
persons under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a» and do not provide enough flexibility or allow
for judicial discretion in their application. (Summary of comments from 6
bankruptcy judges.)
(3) The statutory standards should be clarified as to related corporate debtors.
Representation of multiple, related entities ordinarily should be allowed if all
were operated as an integrated group with one decision-maker. There needs to be
a better definition of the conflict rule pertaining to the debtor and the principal of
a debtor entity represented by the same attorney. (Summary of comments from 3
bankruptcy judges.)
(4) The multi-party nature of bankruptcy, and the fact that bankruptcy cases often
involve a multitude of separate legal transactions unlike a single civil action or
criminal case, often makes it difficult to tell when a conflict or potential conflict is
likely because the potential for conflict or overreaching is constantly shifting and
is often obscure or obscured. Also, it is unrealistic to require disclosure of all
conflicts to the parties-in-interest because there can be so many of them.
(Summary of comments from 2 bankruptcy judges.)
(5) The disinterestedness concept in the Code does not work in reality because it is
incomplete. For example, the remoteness of conflicts that may exist across a large
flnn are not addressed. nor are problems arising in closely held corporations.
Funher, it is not clear what duty an attorney for a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession
has when he or she is acting in her own interest other than the interest of the
bankruptcy estate.
(6) The statutory standards should be clearer on issues of multiple representation: that
is, an attorney representing two related debtors; an attorney representing a debtor
corporation or a debtor subsidiary corporation; or debtor partner and debtor
partnership.
(7) The statutory standards should be clearer on issues arising from representation of
a pre-bankruptcy debtor and a debtor-in-possession.
• The statutory standards do not cover a broad enough range of attorney conduct issues,
forcing judges to tum to other standards to supplement them such as the ABA Model
Rules and state supreme court rules. The statutory standards mostly address conflict
issues affecting only attorneys paid by the estate (trustees' and creditors' committees'
attorneys and chapters 7 and 13 debtors' attorneys), leaving many other issues such as
those listed in this questionnaire unaddressed. The statutory standards are not specific
enough in most situations because they do not address all aspects of attorney conduct
toward the court, clients, or other parties in interest. For example, the statutory
standards fail to set fonh adequate criteria for the limitation of the scope of
representation of chapters 7 and 13 debtors. (Summary of comments from 16
bankruptcy judges).
• The statutory standards govern the attorneys' conduct but provide little guidance for
dealing with that conduct-such as whether bankruptcy judges have authority to
suspend attorneys from practicing before a bankruptcy court. Sua sponte contempt
powers should be expanded because referral of attorney misconduct to the U.S.
trustee, U.S. Attorney, or state bar association often results in no action and no repon
back to the court. Also. there is a wide divergence ofenforcement among bankruptcy
districts, causing attorneys to expect lax enforcement in certain districts. The "honor
system" does not work. There needs to be a policing and enforcement mechanism
other than denial of fees once a conflict becomes known. Sanctions and contempt
should be clearly authorized. (Summary of comments from 7 bankruptcy judges.)
• The statutory disclosure standards are too lax and used perfunctorily by too many
major firms. They can be interpreted by the lawyer required to make the disclosure in
ways that lead to opposite conclusions about whether disqualiflcation is required.
(Summary of comments reponed by 2 bankruptcy judges.)
• The Code and Rules are not adequate because they do not cover compensating an
attorney who submits an employment application in good faith, immediately performs
services, and is then disqualified in a "close call." Should the attorney be able to
recover for services that benefit the estate during this "gap" period?
• The Code and Rules are not adequate because they fail to recognize the "realities"
connected with attorney representation of consumer debtors. These clients simply
cannot pay a lawyer a fee adequate to allow for competent representation.
• Section 1927 ofTitJe 28 should be amended to permit clear use by bankruptcy and
magistrate judges.
• The statutory standards should be applicable to all professionals in a case, including
those representing parties other than the trustee/debtor in possession.
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APPENDIX 6
SURVEY COMMENTS INDICATING THAT
NON-STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR RESOLVING BANKRUPTCY-RELATED
ISSUES OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT ARE INADEQUATE
Received in Connection with the Federal Judicial Center Survey of Bankruptcy Judges
Concerning Standards Governing Attorney Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts
- March 1999 -
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Comments Indicating Non-StatutOry
Standards for Resolving Bankruptcy-Related Issues of
Attorney Conduct Were Not Adequate
• The non-statutory standards that are employed (e.g., state ethics codes and model
rules) are not adequate because they are not geared to issues unique to bankruptcy
such as the fiduciary duties bankruptcy imposes, the disclosures bankruptcy mandates
and issues of dual representation. (Summary of responses from 3 bankruptcy judges).
• Unlike the state courts, banlauptcy courts do not conduct investigations and must rely
on the state bar grievance committee to take action on bankruptcy complaints and
their decisions are far too lax. (Summary of responses from 3 bankruptcy judges).
• The non-statutory standards are not readily available to or known by practitioners
(since they are located in the local district court rules.) Education as to the existence
and content of the non-statutory rules is needed. (Summary of responses from 2
bankruptcy judges).
• The non-statutory standards are not applied uniformly and they lack clarity.
• The bankruptcy court in each district should have authority to conduct formal
disciplinary proceedings for attorney misconduct that occurs in the bankruptcy court,
instead of the current situation where the district court does so which delays the
process. In addition, the district coun may have insufficient understanding of issues
of bankruptcy procedure to make correct judgements. Bankruptcy courts should be
pennitted to disbar or suspend attorneys that practice in bankruptcy court.
• The state's code of professional conduct is inadequate because it is applied in one-on-
one situations despite the fact that bankruptcy requires consideration of multiple
panies and relative interests that are not comprehensively addressed in the non-
statutory standards.
• The non-statutory standards dealing with conflicts are unclear when applied to prior
representation in an unrelated matter of creditors who are peripheral to the case. The
standards do not adequately derme a "potential" conflict that is non-disqualifying, or
bow and when disclosure should be given when the situation has "ripened" to an
aetual conflict. And non-statutory conflicts standards do not identify what remedy is
appropriate when a major chapter II is at the plan conrmnation stage and counsel for
the debtor-in-possession develops a conflict.
• The non-statutory standards are inadequate because they are too cumbersome to
prevent an anomey with multiple infractions from continuing to represent entities in
bankruptcy court. An individual judge should be able to issue an order preventing
ongoing violations and representation, subject to immediate review.
• The non-statutory standards are inadequate because: (I) an attorney working for the
bankruptcy estate has fiduciary duties to the estate that an attorney outside of
bankruptcy does not have; (2) the California Code of Professional Responsibility and
the ABA ethics rules on potential conflict and actual conflict have never worked well
either in or outside of the bankruptcy context.
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APPENDIX 7
SURVEY COMMENTS REPORTING
PROBLEMATIC INCONSISTENCIES EXISTING BETWEEN
STATUTORY AND NON-STATUTORY ATTORNEY CONDUCT STANDARDS
Received in Connection with the Federal Judicial Center Survey of Bankruptcy Judges
Concerning Standards Governing Attorney Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts
- March 1999-
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Comments Reporting Problematic Inconsistencies
between StatutOry and Non-Statutory
Attorney Conduct Standards
• The inconsistencies between the disinterestedness standard of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and
the provisions for multiple representations in the ABA Model Rule and Code are
frequently encountered and problematic because:
(l) § 327 broadly disqualifies without regard to the degree of disinterestedness (i.e.,
small unpaid fee) and does not pennit knowing. intelligent waivers of conflicts as
do state rules (such as DR 5-105) under which it is possible to represent two
parties that have a potential or actual conflict as long as an appropriate client
waiver is obtained.
(2) The disinterestedness requirement works a hardship on small business debtors and
is often impractical.
(3) A professional person owed pre-petition debt automatically fails the
. disinterestedness test under the statute but not under any application of anomey
conduct rules. ,
(4) Multiple-member law firms and accounting firms represent parties who are
adverse in some cases and justify this by describing the maners as not "related"
when in reality these fmns are friendly with both sides.
(5) An anomey should not be disqualified from representing a debtor simply because
the attorney is owed fees for pre-petition representation.
(Summary of comments from 10 bankruptcy judges.)
• The inconsistencies between statutory and non-statutory attorney conduct standards
are problematic because attorneys look to state law which is loosely enforced. The
conflict of interest standards under the ABA and state rules of conduct are sometimes
not very useful when anempting to apply them within the bankruptcy context because
the conflicts arising in bankruptcy cases can be more numerous and complex.
(Summary of comments from 3 bankruptcy judges).
• The inconsistencies are problematic because trustee employment of the trustee and
the trustee's law fum is statutorily pennissible but presents conduct problems.
(Summary of comments from 2 bankruptcy judges.)
• The inconsistencies are problematic because the ABA model ethics principles do not
contemplate that the client (debtor) is a fiduciary toward parties with adverse interests
(creditors). and the statutory rules are ambiguous or often too vague. (Summary of
comments from 2 bankruptcy judges.)
• The inconsistencies are problematic because of the difficulties created by the blur
between situations presenting an "actual" conflict versus a non-disqualifying
"potential" conflict Notwithstanding the Code. I find either an actual, or a perception
of. a conflict of interest when a trustee also practices in cases under the same chapter
for other clients.
• The inconsistencies regarding confidentiality can present difficulties because the
trustee can waive the attorney client privilege fer corporate debtors while it is less
clear whether the corporate debtor or an individt:al debtor can do so.
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APPENDIX 8
SURVEY COMMENTS REPORTING THAT
BANKRUPTCY-SPECIFIC ATTORNEY CONDUCT ISSUES
ARE NOT COVERED BY ETHICAL RULES
Received in Connection with the Federal Judicial Center Survey of Bankruptcy Judges
Concerning Standards Governing Attorney Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts
- March 1999 -
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Comments Reporting BanknJptcy.Spec:ific
Attorney Conduct Issues Not Covered by Rules
• An issue that arises only in banlauptcy courts and is not adequately covered by
existing attorney conduct standards is conflict of interest issues:
(1) The conflict of interest standards under the ABA and state rules of conduct are
sometimes not very useful when attempting to apply them within the bankruptcy
context because the conflicts arising in bankruptcy cases can be more numerous
and complex (for example, potential conflicts due to the vast number of creditors
affected.).
(2) It is unrealistic to require disclosure of all connections to the parties in interest
because there can be so many of them.
(3) The Bankruptcy Code and Rules do not provide enough flexibility or allow for
judicial discretion in their application. Strict enforcement and application of the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules is often impracticable.
(4) The disinterestedness requirement of 1I U.S.C. § 327(a) neeej,s to be defined more
precisely and not applied so strictly, especially in a smaller community.
(5) The conflict issue that results from an attorney representing a client pre-
bankruptcy and then seeking to represent the debtor or debtor-in-possession is not
adequately addressed.
(6) Conflict issues relating to fee disclosures are not adequately covered by existing
standards.
(Summary of responses from 16 banlauptcy judges.)
• An issue that is not covered by our attorney conduct standards is the absence of
guidance on whether the banlauptcy judge has the power to discipline attorneys by.
for example, barring them from practicing before the bankruptcy court. I often feel
frostrated by the lack of mechanisms available to me to protect the debtor from his or
her attorney's incompetence in bankruptcy court representation. I have had many
cases where clients were ill-advised to me or to reaffirm debts or where lawyers
ignored deadlines, or did not communicate with clients. Banlauptcy Rule 2090 should
specifically provide that banlauptcy judges have the authority to impose sanctions
against lawyers and parties. (Summary of responses from 5 bankruptcy judges.)
• A bankruptcy case triggers considerations of many competing and countervailing
interests unlike traditional two-party lawsuits. For example, creditors' committees
may employ professionals who are confronted with special provisions under 11
U.S.C. § 1103(b) when multidisciplinary issues are involved.
• Other areas/issues unique to bankruptcy courts and not adequately covered by
existing standards include:
(1) conduct violating or allegedly violating disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C. §
329(a) or Bankruptcy Rules 2014 or 2016.
(2) whether one counsel can represent affiliated corporations in chapter lIs.
(3) the tension between an attorney's need for advance payment in banlauptcy and
the prohibitions against an attorney receiving payment in advance for post-
petition work.
(4) an attorney's refusal to represent a debtor client where the client is sued by a
creditor to prevent dischargeability of particular debts.
(5) A Chapter 11 attorney for a debtor-in-possession has an inherent conflict between
representing the reorganization needs of the debtor and requiring the debtor-in-
possession to be a fiduciary.
(6) Trustees who employ their own firms as counsel have a problem in determining
what is "trustee work" and included in their statutory fees and what they can be
separately compensated for..
(7) Attorneys who own paralegal mill operations.
(8) Attorneys who seeks to "limit" responsibilities to a consumer debtor client, i.e.,
preparing the schedules and statement of affairs but not appearing as attorney of
record
(9) Conflict in representing a corporation and its principals, especially in closely-held
corporations. The distinction is problematic because the owner provides the
authority for the attorney who represents the debtor-in-possession.
(10) Bankruptcy attorneys who abuse the system by filing multiple banlauptcies for
debtors that are not warranted under the law or facts.
(II) Attorneys who do a poor job of advising debtors and seeing that schedules and
other documents are accurate.
• Many attorneys for debtors do not understand or recognize their fiduciary duties. The
Bankruptcy Rules should clarify that a trustee or debtor in possession is a fiduciary to
the estate but the lawyer for the estate is Dot the fiduciary. The lawyer is an officer of
the court and has ethical duties to the client, who is the fiduciary. Recognition of an
attorney's duty of candor to the tribunal often places an attorney between a rock and a
hard place. Another fiduciary relationship not understood is the fiduciary relationship
of the attorney in Chapter 11 to the creditors. (Summary of responses from 11
bankruptcy judges.)
• Individual Chapter 7 debtors may be represented by counsel when they file a petition.
However, that counsel "frequently" has not been retained to file motions to lift the
stay, to make objections to claims or exemptions or for adversary proceedings
involving dischargeability. Unless at least mail communication is made directly to the
debtor by the moving party, the debtor may not learn of these matters timely. Thus,
communication needs to be tailored so they go to both attorneys and the debtor until
represented status is clarified.
• Allowing Chapters 7 and 13 trustees to represent debtors in banlcruptcy court
encourages the "you-do-a-favor for me today and I'll do the same for you tomorrow"
syndrome. "Trustee shopping" is common. More trustees are needed. Further, trustees
should be prohibited from retaining themselves (or their law fIrmS) as counsel to
trustee. Double billing and duplicative services are encouraged by this risky practice.
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• Requests for withdrawal of counsel by counsel for debtors. panicularly when
representing individuals unable to retain new counsel due to financial constraints.
With insolvent debtors, by defmition and in fact, they do not have the resources to
pay for adversary proceedings in which they may have a meritorious defense.
(Summary of responses from 2 bankruptcy judges.)
• It is essential that multiple representations be pennined for cost reasons even where
there are potential conflicts.
• Some conflicts that cannot be waived in bankruptcy courts, but they may be waivable
in non-bankruptcy matters.
• Our district recognizes "limited appearances" for debtors' anorneys in Chapter 7's
and 13's. This creates a problem because other attorneys in these cases do not readily
know when they can communicate directly with panies.
~
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• There needs to be clarity on issues arising from representation of pre-bankruptcy
debtor and debtor-in-possession. Also, there needs to be clarity on issues arising from
representation by the same debtor's counsel of related debtors' (parent and
subsidiaries, etc.) and when that representation may become a conflict. (Summary of
responses from 5 bankruptcy judges.)
• Fee splitting is allowed in some states, but strictly prohibited in the bankruptcy
context. Practitioners must be educated and/or the standard be made uniform.
3
~~,---i --
K-110
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
APPENDIX 9
SURVEY COMMENTS ON
THE INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
OF BANKRUPTCY RULE 2014
Received in Connection with the Federal Judicial Center Survey of Bankruptcy Judges
Concerning Standards Governing Attorney Conduct in the Bankruptcy Courts
- March 1999-
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Comments on Inadequate Disclosure
Requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2014
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 requires more detail in consumer cases to disclose fees paid in
prior cases where debtors are multiple filers. This is especially necessary in chapter
13 cases. The multiple filings are frequently driven by attorney's fees. Also, Rule
2014 does not apply to Chapter 13 cases, but it should.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should include a much clearer requirement to show prior
experience in representing debtors in small chapter II cases, and to show the level of
success in confirming plans or negotiating structured dismissals within the prior 3 to
S years. .
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should require an affidavit by the person who made (or should
have made) the conflicts check as to exactly what effort was made and require
disclosure ofevery representation within a prior period (perhaps 2 years before the
bankruptcy filing date), and the nature, beginning and end dates of every entity that is
or becomes a creditor or equity holder in the debtor-in-possession. Tbe Rule should
require regular amendments as "new" conflicts arise. Model Rule 1.7(a)(I) should be
totally abrogated in bankruptcy in favor of full disclosure.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should provide more specific examples of entities falling into
the category of "parties in interest" so as to allow less wiggle room.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014's provision "all of the person's connections" is arguably
vague. I would suggest some specific examples that would not limit the scope of this
language but rather would demonstrate the expansive intent behind this limitation to
representation. It would help eliminate the many excuses we get in this area.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 could provide for more suict enforcement in chapter II's.
(Summary of responses of 2 bankruptcy judges.)
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should require that the fee agreement be attached to the
application.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should specifically require details ofclient representations by
all members of a fum, with a requirement of action of disqualification by the court if
not done or if details indicate a conflict of interest.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should include a provision that the attorney disclose the source
of funds for a retainer and future payment.
• We have supplemented the disclosure requirements of Rule 2014 with a local
bankruptcy court rule.
• Often the question of inadequate disclosure results from the applicant's failure to
fully consider all the possible ramifications or subtleties associated with the
requirements of being "disinterested" and/or holding no "materially adverse interest."
In this disuiet, we have uied to minimize this problem through a local rule which
supplements the disclosure requirements of Rule 2014.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 or local rules should require more than just i: conclusory
statement. There should be some requirement to describe the steps or procedures
undertaken to determine whether a conflict may exist.
• Bankruptcy Rule 2014 should require disclosure of all payments made by the debtor
to the attorney within one year prior to filing, as well as a description of any retainer
paid.
• We have addressed the inadequacies by specific disclosure required by my standards,
my court's local rules and U.S. trustee guidelines.
• Three bankruptcy judges indicated that the problems they've experienced with Rule
2014 stem from attorneys' failure to follow the provisions of the Rule.
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